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THE LIFE OF CRIMMIGRATION LAW
CtSAR CUAUHTEMOC GARCiA HERNANDEZ'

The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many
centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what
it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.
-

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law
INTRODUCTION

In 2006, Juliet Stumpf took an enormous intellectual leap. Two areas of law, she realized, had wrapped themselves together so tightly that it
was hard to know where one ended and the other began. Criminal law
and immigration law were fast becoming the new creature of legal imagination and policing reality that she termed crimmigration law.2
In the years since then, a growing group of scholars and advocates

have followed in Stumpf's intellectual footsteps. Ranging across disciplines and oceans, they have begun to give an identifiable form to crimmigration law. 3 The Denver University Law Review's 2015 symposium,

"CrImmigration: Crossing the Border Between Criminal Law and Immigration Law," gathered a preeminent subset of this pioneering group.
Collectively, the symposium speakers and panelists have devoted themselves to carving the contours of crimmigration law. During their day and
a half at the University of Denver, they brought to bear that expertise on
many of crimmigration law's most pressing questions: the effects of multijurisdictional law enforcement policies that blend criminal and civil law
norms; examples of the basest of our cultural practices, racism, infecting

legislating and constitutional interpretation; the complications of hugely
important technical analyses obscured by the mundane term "categorical
approach"; and distressing tales of children in detention. Not to focus
only on the many ways in which criminal law and immigration law are
increasingly interwoven, panelists also spoke about rare but important
moments of disentangling: the much criticized Secure Communities pro-

f
Visiting professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Publisher, crlmmigration.com. This introduction is largely derived from the epilogue to CRIMMIGRATION LAW (forthcoming 2015) and is reprinted here with permission of the publisher.
I. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW I (Dover Publications 1991).
2.
See generally Juliet Stumpf, The CrimmigrationCrisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sover-

eign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 367 (2006) (describing crimmigration law's origins and identifying
some defining features).
3.
For a sample of cross-disciplinary, multinational collections, see generally SOCIAL
CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR (Maria JoEo Guia et al. eds., 2013).
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gram repealed and the use of immigration detainers derailed by litigation
and political pressure.
The story of change that the panelists collectively told reminds me
of the passage that begins this Introduction. In it, the towering jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes reminds us that law is not static. It is a winding path
through history, a dizzying foray into the vagaries of human nature, an
adventure in the unpredictability of legislating, a maddening glimpse into
the complexities of policing, and a test of faith in the righteousness of
judicial interpretation. "The life of the law," he wrote a few sentences
before the quoted lines, "has not been logic: it has been experience."A
Crimmigration law encapsulates Holmes' vision. It is a product of
human experience, a testament to the United States' greatest moments
and its most visceral fears. The nation's well-earned self-image of welcoming migrants has been dotted by consistent efforts to demonize those
same migrants through the power of criminal law. 5 Despite attempts to
penalize migration-related activity, legal advocates trained in the promises of equality and justice have resisted the worst excesses of the state's
coercive powers.
"Crimmigration: Crossing the Border Between Criminal Law and
Immigration Law" captured the story of life that has birthed crimmigration law in the United States. It tracked the use of immigration law to
sanction for a second time migrants who have engaged in criminal activity. It detailed the criminal justice system's increasing concern about migration. And it explored the many enforcement tentacles that comprise
the crimmigration law regime.
For all its detail, the picture that this symposium painted is necessarily incomplete. Crimmigration law, as Holmes suggests, is alive. And
as with all living creatures, it is constantly changing. It will evolve with
every day, propelled by perceptions of security or danger, comfort or
unfamiliarity. It will move in the direction of further entangling the
worlds of criminal law and immigration law if the community from
which it has arisen so desires. It will move in the opposite direction-a
direction more reflective of law's past-only if the fears of migrant criminality subside. The last three decades suggest that the former is much
more likely than the latter.
If crimmigration law's creation and expansion shows anything,
however, it is that law is perpetually malleable. Legislators, lawyers, and
judges can and will continue to shape crimmigration law's reach. Only
time will tell where this infant area of law leads. The only thing certain,
as the panelists at the symposium illustrated, is that there will be much
4.
5.

HOLMES, supra note 1.
See Csar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernndez, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REv.

1457, 1513-15 (2013).
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room for contestation as some legislators, lawyers, and courts expand
crimmigration law, while others push back.

CRIMMIGRATION: KEYNOTE ADDRESS
RACIAL PROFILING IN THE WAR ON DRUGS MEETS THE
IMMIGRATION REMOVAL PROCESS: THE CASE OF
MONCRIEFFE v. HOLDER
KEVIN R. JOHNSONt
INTRODUCTION

Today, I want to discuss the Supreme Court's decision in
Moncrieffe v. Holder.' In analyzing that case, I will try to show how the
criminal justice system of the United States, and its disparate treatment
of racial minorities, contributes to the current racially disparate impacts
in the immigration removal process.
The Supreme Court's decision in Moncrieffe started me thinking in
earnest about the relationship between the criminal justice system and
immigration removal. In that case, Adrian Moncrieffe, a lawful permanent resident, was facing removal from the United States based on a
criminal conviction for possession of the equivalent of two to three marijuana cigarettes.2 Addressing a straightforward question of immigration
law, the Court found that the U.S. government could not remove
Moncrieffe from the country.3 The Court specifically held that, because
the crime in question did not constitute an "aggravated felony,"4 mandatory removal was not justified.
Given that it was reviewing an administrative removal order, the
Supreme Court understandably focused on Moncrieffe's removal proceeding. Moncrieffe's arrest and drug conviction was not challenged in
that proceeding. The Court did not have the full record of the arrest and
conviction before it. In thinking about the case, I had some intuitions
about what Moncrieffe might look like, what his experiences with the
police might be, and the kind of person the police in Georgia would target for scrutiny. From the information that I collected about the stop,

t Kevin R. Johnson is the Dean and Mabie-Apallas Professor of Public Interest Law and
Chicana/o Studies at the University of California Davis School of Law. This address was based on
Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration Removal Process:
The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 967 (2015). This is an edited transcript
of my keynote address at the Denver University Law Review Crimmigration conference in February
2015. Thanks to law student Sadie Weller for proofreading this transcript.
133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
1.
2.
See id.at 1683.
3.
See id. at 1683-84.
4. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43) (2015).
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arrest, and conviction in that case, we can learn about the influence of
race on the criminal justice system and how such impacts are magnified
when that system feeds into the immigration removal process.
At the time of the Court's decision, Moncrieffe was a twenty-fiveyear-old lawful permanent resident from Jamaica. The Court's opinion
does not mention that he is Black, but I guessed (correctly, as it turned
out) that he was. Through a public information act request, I obtained the
police report on Moncrieffe's arrest.5 To answer some questions about
the report, my research assistant contacted the arresting officer, whose
profile was available on the social media website LinkedIn. He responded with a memorandum6 explaining various aspects of the police report.
So I ultimately had a police report, with some detail, and a memo from
the arresting officer with even greater detail, as well as the Supreme
Court's decision in the case, all providing facts about the criminal case.
I. MONCRIEFFE V. HOLDER AND RACIAL PROFILING

In light of the fact that racial minorities are overrepresented in the
criminal justice system, President Obama's focus on the removal of immigrants who have committed crimes has not-so-subtle racial consequences. Because of racial justice concerns, I looked carefully at
Moncrieffe and thought about the relationship between the criminal justice system and how it compounds racial disparities in removals. The
criminal justice system today disproportionately arrests and convicts
Latina/os and African Americans. Not surprisingly, because the removal
system relies heavily on a criminal justice system with racially disparate
impacts, one can logically expect removals with racially disparate impacts. As it turns out, more than ninety-five percent of the noncitizens
removed from the country annually are Latina/o. Moncrieffe highlights
the racial justice implications of basing immigration removals on criminal convictions.
A. The Stop
According to the police report, City of Perry, Georgia, police officer
Ron Brainard on June 13, 2006, was monitoring traffic on Interstate 75, a
main artery from Georgia to Florida. A resident of Palm Beach,
Moncrieffe later told the officer that he had made the trip to visit his
daughter for a long weekend in Atlanta. Over the years, police reportedly
have targeted African Americans for traffic stops on the interstate.

5.
See Johnson, supra note , at 985 n.97 (citing PERRY (GEORGIA) POLICE DEP'T, POLICE
SUPPLEMENTAL NARRATIVE (June 14, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter POLICE REPORT]).

6. See Johnson, supra note , at 985 n.98 (citing Memorandum from Ronald R. Brainard, to
Laraya M. Parnell (Oct. 14, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brainard Memo]).
7.

See Johnson, supra note t, at 985 n.99.
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At about 11:15 p.m., Officer Brainard pulled over a black Chevrolet
Tahoe heading south on 1-75. The police report does not suggest that the
driver, Adrian Moncrieffe, was traveling in excess of the speed limit or
otherwise violating the traffic laws. When Officer Brainard's vehicle
passed Moncrieffe's sport utility vehicle (SUV), the officer claimed to
make an observation that is somewhat hard to believe. He said that in the
dark of night, he could see that the tinting on the windows of
Moncrieffe's vehicle appeared to be darker than permitted by Georgia
law. Officer Brainard later explained that he looks for "any driving behaviors that people use to avoid law enforcement contact" and "any violation of the law that establishes probable cause to make a traffic stop." 9
Officer Brainard further explained why window tint violations are his
preferred justification for a stop:
[T]he vehicle that passed me had an obvious tint violation.. . . I particularly like the tint violation as a reason for stopping folks because
it negates the argument that I stopped a particular sex or race. If you
can't see what is in the vehicle, they certainly can't say you stopped
them because they were a particular sex or race. In today's world, it
0
seems to be the number one argument presented as a defense.'

"

After the stop, Officer Brainard approached the vehicle. The police
report states that he "saw the window roll down and made contact with
two B/Ms inside the vehicle. The driver was later identified as Adrian
Moncrieffe . . . and the passenger as Keyoanta Robinson."" Officer
Brainard later confirmed that "B/Ms" was shorthand for "Black males."l 2
He asked Moncrieffe to exit the vehicle and interviewed him. Officer
Brainard said that he interviewed the two men separately so he could
compare their stories to try to determine whether they were telling the
truth.
B. The Officer's Suspicions
In the police report, Officer Brainard identifies a number of factors
that he suggests made him suspicious that criminal activity was afoot.14
The report notes that he smelled a strong odor of air freshener in the
Chevrolet Tahoe, and he saw air fresheners on the rearview mirror and in
the backseat.
Officer Brainard stated in the police report that he thought that
Moncrieffe had more luggage than was necessary for a long weekend in
Atlanta. I do not know about any of you, but some people I know - in8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See id. at 985.
Id at 985 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 985-86 (quoting POLICE REPORT, supra note 5).
Id. at 986 (quoting POLICE REPORT, supra note 5) (emphasis added)).
Id. at 986 n.102 (quoting Brainard Memo, supra note 6)).
See id. at 989 (citing POLICE REPORT, supranote 5).
See id. at 986-88.
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cluding members of my family - travel with what I think is excessive
luggage.
Officer Brainard also wrote in the report that he thought that it was
odd that Moncrieffe was "taking a friend to hang with him while allegedly visiting his daughter in Atlanta." 5 Moncrieffe, however, understandably might have wanted company on the drive from Florida to Georgia.
To this point, the concerns that Officer Brainard listed in the police
report probably did not amount to the probable cause necessary to justify
a search of the vehicle. One is left with the impression that the officer
seemed to be trying to conjure something up to justify a search.
Officer Brainard next talked to the passenger of the vehicle, Keyoanta Robinson. Officer Brainard stated that, at the time, he first smelled
marijuana in the SUV. He later explained that "the air freshener had
worn off, and he could smell the marijuana."
Robinson told Officer Brainard the same story that Moncrieffe told
him about the trip from Miami to Atlanta. The officer found that suspicious, suggesting that they both relayed the same story because they had
practiced in advance what to say. The consistency of the two statements
might just as well have resulted from the fact that both men were telling
the truth.
Officer Brainard next asked Robinson if he had been smoking marijuana. The police report states that he then observed signs of an "adrenaline dump in that [Robinson's] breathing became quick and shallow,"
and he could see Robinson "visibly shaking." 7 Now, if a police officer
were to ask me if I had been smoking marijuana, my response probably
would be just as Officer Brainard described.
Another officer, Kessler (whose first name is not provided in the
police report), arrived on the scene. Kessler was Officer Brainard's partner. When one of the officers pulled somebody over, the other officer
would come to assist.1 Brainard decided that he would search the vehicle. He asked Moncrieffe if he had been smoking marijuana. Moncrieffe
admitted to smoking a "blunt" - a marijuana cigarette - earlier in the
day. Officer Brainard then handcuffed Moncrieffe and Robinson, telling
them that they were being taken into custody. Immediately before the
search of the vehicle, Moncrieffe told the officer that there was some
marijuana in the vehicle.

15.
16.

Id. at 988.
See id at 989.

17.
18.

Id. at 989 (quoting POLICE REPORT supra note 5).
See id at 989-90.
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C. The Search
There are indications that the traffic stop was for the purpose of
drug interdiction. Officer Brainard regularly patrolled the interstate with
a drug-sniffing dog, K9 Rex. The officer had the dog sniff the exterior of
the Chevrolet Tahoe. According to the police report, K9 Rex smelled
something in the vehicle.' 9
Officer Brainard found two baggies containing a small amount of
marijuana. He also located a wallet that included "bundles of cash," totaling to a little over a thousand dollars. He explained that, in his experience, the separation of cash into bundles was a practice followed by drug
dealers to keep track of where they had collected the money. I am not
sure whether the fact that someone had a thousand dollars on a trip is a
reasonable hint of criminal wrongdoing. Moncrieffe, while traveling out
of state, understandably might have carried some extra cash in the event
that he had car trouble or had other unplanned expenses.
Officer Brainard decided that there was not enough evidence to
charge Robinson with a crime. He, however, charged Moncrieffe with
possession of marijuana under a Georgia statute that penalized the possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use as well as possession of large amounts of marijuana for sale. 20
D. A JustifiableStop, Search, and Arrest?
If one looks at the entire police interaction, there are numerous suggestions that race played a role in the stop, search, and arrest of Adrian
Moncrieffe. One is left with the impression that Officer Brainard and his
partner Kessler were monitoring traffic on Interstate 75 as part of a drug
interdiction effort. It was not a coincidence that they had a drug-sniffing
canine in the patrol car. Officer Brainard's conduct in the stop and subsequent events certainly appears to have been influenced by the fact that
both Moncrieffe and Robinson were "B/Ms."
The window tint violation might have served as a pretext for race
for the traffic stop. The stop, even if based on pretext, still might not
violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
21
and seizures under Whren v. United States, which held that an officer's
subjective intent in conducting a traffic stop does not matter so long as
there is probable cause to believe that there was a violation of the traffic
laws has occurred. The smell of marijuana in the vehicle, if the officer's
statement is accepted as true, probably would justify a search. A small
amount of marijuana, if found through a valid search, could serve as the
basis for a criminal prosecution.
19.
20.
21.

See id. at 990.
See id. at 992-93.
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

It does not appear from the opinion that the Supreme Court in
Moncrieffe considered race at all in analyzing the question of immigration law before it. Moncrieffe's race is not even mentioned in the Court's
opinion. For all intents and purposes, the Court treated the case as a runof-the-mill immigration case.
Moncrieffe was the second time in the last five Terms that the Court
rejected the U.S. government's argument that a relatively minor drug
crime constituted an "aggravated felony" under the U.S. immigration
laws. In Carachuri-Rosendov. Holder,22 the Court in 2010 held that a
conviction of a lawful permanent resident from Mexico for the possession of one tablet of Xanax alone was not an aggravated felony under the
immigration laws. That case, as well as Moncrieffe, demonstrates that
long-term lawful permanent residents are subject to the threat of mandatory removal from the United States. The Obama administration aggressively defended both cases all the way to the Supreme Court.
Currently, the administration is pressing a case in the Court involving a lawful permanent resident who was convicted for possession of
23
drug paraphernalia. What was the paraphernalia? A sock. Mellouli had
placed four tablets of Adderall in his sock and pled guilty to the possession of drug paraphernalia.
The Obama administration, through a variety of programs, has
greatly increased the number of immigrants removed from the United
States. And, as in Moncrieffe, it has aggressively defended removal cases
based on relatively minor criminal convictions. One of most significant
things about the President's various immigration announcements in November 2014 is the dismantling of Secure Communities, a program that
focused removal efforts on immigrants arrested for virtually all crimes
that allowed the administration to ramp up removals to approximately
400,000 a year, an increase from about 20,000 to 30,000 in the early
1990s. Ninety-six percent of those removed are Latina/os, while a much
smaller percentage of the undocumented and legal immigrant population
is Latina/o.
CONCLUSION

Racial profiling in traffic stops has been at the heart of the "war on
drugs" and unquestionably has disparate impacts on people of color.
When triggered into action by a racially suspect criminal justice system,
the federal immigration removal system can logically be expected to
exacerbate those racially disparate impacts. To make matters worse, the
22. 560 U.S. 563 (2010).
23.
See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983-84 (2015). After I delivered this keynote
address, the Court rejected the removal order. See id at 1980.
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relationship and the magnitude of these racially disparate impacts are
obscured by the fact that the two systems appear to operate in a colorblind, race-neutral, fair, and nonarbitrary way.
Moncrieffe is the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Focusing removal efforts on noncitizens with criminal convictions, as the Executive Branch
currently does, compounds the racial impacts of the criminal justice system. Given the reliance of the immigration removal system on the criminal justice system, one can expect removals to fall overwhelmingly on
Latina/os, as is precisely the case.
Over the last ten years, there has been considerable discussion of
immigration reform. In my estimation, one of the matters that deserves
attention in reform efforts is the racially disparate impacts of the modem
immigration removal process. Unfortunately, I do not think that the role
of race in the contemporary removal process is on the radar screen of
Congress or the President.

PRODUCING LIMINAL LEGALITY
JENNIFER M. CHACONt
ABSTRACT

Inside and outside of the sphere of immigration law, liminal legal
statuses are proliferating. These legal categories function simultaneously
as a means to effectuate administrative resource conservation through
community-oriented risk management strategies and as a form of
"preservation through transformation" that enable governmental actors to
reassert and maintain control over populations identified as risky in ways
that do not trigger the rights-protective schemes that evolved both internationally and domestically in the mid-Twentieth Century. This Article
uses the existing literature on liminal legal subjects as a starting point for
understanding and critiquing the legal mechanisms that produce liminal
legality.
Part I discusses the taxonomical features of liminal legality identified in studies focusing on the life experiences of marginalized noncitizens. These features include uncertainty about the scope of reprieve
from banishment, a reliance on administrative grace to effectuate freedom from banishment, an obligation to pay one's way to prevent that
banishment, experiences of heightened monitoring by governmental actors, and a related vulnerability to control, exclusion, and abuse by private actors.
Part II tests the possibility of expanding notions of liminal legality
outside of the iconic cases of noncitizens granted temporary reprieves
from removal. This section expands the analysis first to other, more legally privileged noncitizens, then to citizens in immigrant communities,
and finally to broader classes of citizens with relatively high rates of contact with law enforcement agents. This analysis highlights the commonalities of the legal structures that regulate and punish these diverse categories of individuals and communities that experience liminal legality.
Part III explores the potential benefits that transubstantive legal
analysis focusing on liminal legality offers over more subject-specific
frames like "crimmigration." Framing legal analysis in terms of liminal
f
Professor Jennifer R. Chac6n, Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine School of Law. Thanks to
Susan Akram, Sameer Ashar, Jason Cade, I. Glenn Cohen, Kristin Collins, Frank Rudy Cooper,
Susan Coutin, Jonathan D. Glater, Stephen Lee, Kenneth Mack, Daniel Medwed, Rachel Rosenbloom, Benjamin Sachs, Kristen Stilt, Yolanda Vdizquez and the many other people at workshops at
the law schools of Boston University, Denver University, Harvard Law School, Northeastern University and Suffolk University whose thoughtful comments and hard questions helped to clarify my
thinking. For research support, I am grateful to Dean Erwin Chemerinsky of the U.C. Irvine School
of Law and Dean Martha Minow of Harvard Law School.
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legality could both check unjustifiable presumptions of immigration law
exceptionality and foster the identification of the common regulatory
practices that have generated a broader social normalization of liminal
legality. Additionally, a focus on the legal production of liminal legality
may, in fact, open up a path to return crimmigration scholarship to its
deeper theoretical grounding in membership theory, thereby reinvigorating the discussion of the role that race, class, and place play in structuring governance strategies both at the border of criminal and immigration
law and beyond it.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
.........................................
......
I. LIMINAL LEGALITY..........................................

710
713

A. Scholarly Origins ................................
B. Identifying Key Features: The Iconic Case.........

715
......... 718
II. LIMINAL LEGALITY AT THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL BORDER .....
...... 730
A. Immigration Law and the ProductionofLiminality.................... 731
B. Immigration Enforcement and the Production ofLiminality ...... 734
C. Legal Liminality at the Blurred Civil-CriminalBorder.............. 742
D. Concluding Thoughts on the Production ofLiminality .............. 753
III. LEARNING FROM LIMINAL LEGALITY
......................... 753
A. LiminalLegal Subjects and "The State"
................ 754
B. Liminal Legal Subjects Outside of "Exceptional"Immigration Law
. ......... 757
..............
764
C. Liminal Legality and Lawyeringfor Change...
CONCLUSION

..........................................

....... 766

INTRODUCTION

Recent sociological accounts focusing on immigrant communities
have used the concept of liminal legality to describe the status of legally
marginalized noncitizens. The term has its deeper scholarly roots in anthropological studies of the early Twentieth Century that focused on social ritual, including periods of liminality experienced by community
members. The more recent sociological accounts focus on liminality as a
temporally and socially uncertain transitional state of partial belonging
that arises out of marginal legal status. In the existing scholarly accounts,
the notion of liminal legality is used to describe individuals moving in
and out of, and living on the edges of, legal immigration status. The term
is understood in reference to the lived realities of these noncitizens, but
much of the existing literature does not seek to identify with specificity
the legal mechanisms that produce this liminal legality.
The legally imposed uncertainty captured by the concept of liminal
legality has the potential to serve as a more generalizable rubric under
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which to evaluate certain contemporary social and legal problems in regulation, policing, and punishment-one that can help illuminate comparisons across areas of substantive laws and among and between denizens
with varying formal legal citizenship and immigration statuses. Centering experiences of liminal legality can help to illuminate some of the
commonalities of individuals who live on the edge of banishment effectuated through combined civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms.
The age-old punitive method of banishment is an increasingly common
form of contemporary social control, and it is not limited to the sphere of
immigration enforcement. The susceptibility of certain noncitizens to
banishment in the form of deportation is mirrored by the exposure of
other liminal populations to banishment in the form of spatial exclusion
and susceptibility to incarceration. In both instances, the criminal justice
system operates in tandem with civil systems of law to effectuate the
expulsion of individuals deemed undesirable. Federal, state and local
agents empowered to enforce the criminal law use fluid and mutually
reinforcing civil and criminal law mechanisms to manage the movement
of particular groups of citizens and noncitizens. Private actors also increase the reach of the state and further the punitive consequences of
official decision-making. Focusing on regulated populations that experience liminal legality can therefore provide a fruitful analytical starting
point for evaluating the causes and consequences of a broad array of contemporary governance strategies.
This Article uses the existing literature on liminal legal subjects as a
starting point for developing an understanding of the legal mechanisms
that produce liminal legality. This analysis highlights commonalities in
governances strategies that affect liminal legal subjects across a range of
formal immigration and citizenship statuses. Part I explores the taxonomical features of liminal legality, as evinced in studies focusing on the life
experiences of marginalized noncitizens. Cecilia Menjivar's study of
Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrant communities in the United States
provides a starting point for this analysis. The analysis then proceeds to a
discussion of the term as applied to noncitizens eligible for deferredaction status under the broad executive relief programs announced by
President Obama in 2012 and 2014. These cases-core cases of liminal
legality-suggest some taxonomical features of liminal legality, including uncertainty about the scope of reprieve from banishment, a reliance
on administrative grace to effectuate freedom from banishment, an obligation to pay one's way to prevent that banishment, experiences of
heightened monitoring by governmental actors, and a related vulnerability to regulation, exclusion, and abuse by private actors.
Part II will explore the possibility of expanding notions of liminal
legality to apply outside of the iconic cases. Section A looks to broader
trends in immigration law to suggest that immigration policy as a
whole-and not just immigration policy as experienced by immigrants
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periodically eligible for temporary authorization-has reoriented itself to
favor the creation of liminal legal states rather than offering expanded
access to more fully incorporative legal statuses. Consequently, even
individuals with lawful immigration status experience liminal legality.
Neither lawful permanent resident status nor various forms of temporary
legal status or legal presence offer protection from this experience of
liminality. As Section B explains, however, the problem is even broader,
insofar as citizens also experience these instabilities. As the criminal and
civil immigration law systems provide mutually reinforcing backstops
that allow for the continual sorting and expulsion of undesirable noncitizens, entire communities experience liminal legality, regardless of the
citizenship status of individual members. Section C takes the analysis a
step further, transporting the notion of liminal legality outside of the immigration sphere entirely. Section C explores the ways that criminal law
interacts with other civil law systems to form complex, interlocking systems of legal regulations and practices that leave many marginalized
denizens vulnerable to banishment. Liminal legality is thus not uniquely
the domain of particular noncitizens, or even of immigrant communities.
Core features of the experience are common across some groups of citizens and noncitizens. These commonalities illustrate the degree to which
legal rights and benefits often hinge less on formal citizenship than existing analytical frameworks might suggest. This discussion further suggests that problems that the "crimmigration" framework might tempt us
to view as limited to noncitizens are, in fact, pervasive in marginalized
communities, regardless of formal immigration or citizenship status.
Moreover, the purported turn away from severity in both the criminal and
immigration law spheres promises to expand rather than contract the
categories of individuals whose status might be characterized as legally
liminal.
Part III identifies some of the potential discursive and practical benefits of using the concept of liminal legality to reframe discussions concerning certain contemporary trends in governance, particularly around
questions of regulation and policing. First, this framing might allow for
the development of richer and more nuanced accounts about the govemance strategies involved in the creation and management of liminal legal
subjects. Second, a more concretely conceptualized notion of liminal
legality might serve as a focal point that can bring inward-looking discussions concerning immigration regulation, criminal justice, and other
fields into more meaningful conversation with one another, incorporating
the experiences of noncitizens into the fabric of criminal justice reform
discussions and pushing the academic and social discourse surrounding
noncitizens beyond the constrictive and potentially stigmatizing borders
of "crimmigration." Finally, and more tentatively, I suggest that a focus
on the concept of liminal legality might also offer the basis for a theoretically coherent account of the rise of reform advocacy efforts that deemphasize formal legal citizenship as the focal point of rights discourse.
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I. LIMINAL LEGALITY

The notion of liminality in society emerged in anthropological analysis of communal social rituals offered by Victor Turner in the midcentury. The related concept of liminal legality was introduced by sociologists much more recently in work focused on certain immigrant com2
munities in the United States. Although this concept of liminal legality
has gained a foothold in sociological studies of immigrant communities,
scholars in the legal academy have not made much use of it, while scholars outside of the legal academy have used it in ways that suggest differing understandings of how the concept lines up against formal immigration and citizenship status.
The term, particularly in its present incarnation, offers a useful
framework in which to situate and analyze legal developments affecting
the millions of longtime denizens of the United States. This is true in the
case of unauthorized migrants, certainly, but also in the cases of many
others, including millions of formal legal citizens who face legal barriers
1.
See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
2.
Cecilia Menjivar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants' Lives in the
United States, Ill AM. J. Soc. 999, 999-1003 (2006); see also infra notes 6-9 and accompanying
text. Anthropologist Leo R. Chavez has also used Turner's notion of liminality to describe undocumented immigrants in their crossing of the border. Leo R. Chavez, Outside the Imagined Community: Undocumented Settlers and Experiences of Incorporation, 18 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 257, 257-60
(1991). Menjivar's conceptualization is self-consciously more extensive. See Menjivar, supra, at
1007 n.8. Susan Bibler Coutin's related notion of "legal nonexistence" served as a precursor and
central building block for Menjivar's "liminal legality." See Menjivar, supra, at 1007-08. Coutin
describes "spaces of nonexistence" in this way:
[E]xistence itself has multiple dimensions. Individuals who are physically present and socially active in the United States can nonetheless lack legal status in this country. Conversely, individuals who are legally present in El Salvador and who have Salvadoran citizenship can be persecuted in ways that negate both their citizenship and their humanity. I
refer to the domains occupied by such legal nonsubjects as spaces of nonexistence. Individuals enter such spaces not only when they cross international borders without authorization but also when they are involved in clandestine activities, when they are abducted
and secretly assassinated by death squads, and when they hide to avoid being captured
and tortured. Nonexistence, like existence, therefore takes multiple forms . . . . Nonexistence, however, is often incomplete . . .. In fact, there are multiple nonexistences and gradations of existence.
SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, LEGALIZING MOVES:

SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS' STRUGGLE FOR U.S.

RESIDENCY 27 (2000). Coutin's notion of nonexistence as a state that exists in degrees, and her
sense that it can obtain even when an individual is in her native land, are important insights that
foreshadow the discussion of liminal legality herein.
3.
For recent work using the term, see, for example, Leisy Abrego & Sarah M. Lakhani,
Incomplete Inclusion: Legal Violence and Immigrants in Liminal Legal Statuses, 37 L. & POL'Y 265,
266 (2015); Leisy J. Abrego & Cecilia Menjivar, Immigrant Latina Mothers as Targets of Legal
Violence, 37 INT'L J. Soc. FAM. 9, 12-14 (2011); Leisy Abrego, Legitimacy, Social Identity, and the
Mobilization of Law: The Effects of Assembly Bill 540 on Undocumented Students in California, 33
L. & Soc. INQUIRY 709, 714-15 (2008); Susan Bibler Coutin et al., Routine Exceptionality: The
Plenary Power Doctrine, Immigrants, and the Indigenous Under U.S. Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
97, 100, 115-16 (2014); Miranda Cady Hallett, Temporary Protection, Enduring Contradiction:The
Contested and Contradictory Meanings of Temporary Immigration Status, 39 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
621, 621-26, 629, 635 (2014); Cecilia Menjivar & Susan Bibler Coutin, Challenges of Recognition,
Participation,and Representationfor the Legally Liminal: A Comment, in MIGRATION, GENDER
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN INSECURITY 325, 325-29 (Thanh-Dam Truong et
al. eds., 2014); Menjivar, supra note 2, at 999-1002.
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to gaining or regaining full citizenship4 and who have only limited legal
protections from intrusive and harsh forms of governmental and private
monitoring, policing, detention, and punishment, including banishment.5

4.
Citizenship has many meanings, of course. Although much of the literature on liminal
legal status focuses on those who lack permanent formal legal status, this work acknowledges the
complexity of citizenship and effectively maps the ways in which liminal legal subjects can perform
as citizens. See, e.g., Abrego, supra note 3, at 714-15.

In his influential 1950 essay on the topic of citizenship, T.H. Marshall identified three
different forms of citizenship, which he treated as linear and progressive: citizenship with regard to
civil rights, citizenship with regard to political rights, and citizenship with regard to social rights. T.
H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS 10-14 (1950). More recently,
Linda Bosniak articulated a four-part typology: citizenship as formal legal status, citizenship as the
enjoyment of a particular bundle of rights and benefits, citizenship as political participation, and
citizenship as social and identity membership. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN:
DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 18-20 (2006). Bosniak uses her typology to demonstrate the existence and social importance of the seemingly paradoxical "alien citizen" in the United
States. Id. at 81-82. It is fairly easy to identify many formal legal citizens who lack some of the

rights of full "citizenship" offered in either account. Id. at 37-40, 90-91. Like Bosniak, Luis
Plascencia identifies different forms of citizenship. He theorizes that the terms "[c]itizen" and "citizenship" can be understood as terms divided into "three discursive fields: juridical uses, sociopolitical uses, and everyday uses." Luls F.B. PLASCENCIA, DISENCHANTING CITIZENSHIP: MEXICAN
MIGRANTS AND THE BOUNDARIES OF BELONGING 5 (2012). But he issues the important cautionary
reminder that these discursive fields are permeable. See id. They impact one another and are mutually constitutive. The fluidity within and among these discursive fields gives citizenship a certain
openness that is less evident in Marshall and Bosniak's accounts. Plascencia "suggest[s] that part of
the power of the concept of citizenship can be attributed to its lack of cloture. Its very openness
allows the state, interest groups, and individual actors to ground their actions on behalf of citizen-

ship-a citizenship that is differentially defined and generates its historical variability." Id. In this
way, citizenship is salient and elusive. It matters, but its meaning is always up for grabs. I
acknowledge the salience of formal legal distinctions created by citizenship laws, but here, I also
suggest that the discursive openness identified in Plascencia's work is vividly apparent in the legal
liminality experienced by many citizens.
5.
Banishment has no formal statutory definition and is not used as a term of art in immigration law. I use it here because I think it effectively captures what is happening when denizens are
removed from their social and political communities. As a formal legal matter, "removal," which
encompasses both deportation and exclusion, is not punishment. As such, it has been distinguished

from banishment. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) ("The order of
deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment . . . . It is but a method of enforcing
the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority, and through
the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend."). At times,
various members of the Court have described deportation as a banishment, however, and have

acknowledged its punitive nature. See, e.g., Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 132 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("Deportation is the equivalent to banishment or exile. Though technically not criminal,
it practically may be. The penalty is so severe that we have extended to the resident alien the protection of due process." (citations omitted)). Quite recently, the Court acknowledged for the first time
the punitive nature of deportation in a doctrinally significant way (albeit while continuing to classify
deportation as a corrective civil remedy). Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 357 (2010). For many
reasons, the archaic classification of deportation as a corrective civil measure no longer squares with
legal reality, if it ever did. See, e.g., DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 92, 121-22, 125-26, 158 (2007) (noting that in the early twentieth century, the
statute of limitations on deportation was eliminated and deportation increasingly came to be used as
a form of punitive "post-entry social control" rather than a mere adjunct to the administrative entry
screening process). Thus, "banishment," although not a legal term of art, more adequately captures
the punitive nature of return experienced by liminally legal populations and is unconstrained by
technical distinctions between "admitted" noncitizens and "inadmissible" (but physically present)
noncitizens. The term also appropriately signals the punitive design and purpose of the act of banishment. As I argue below, it also correctly signals the parallel functions served by immigration law,
which operates in tandem with the criminal law to banish noncitizens from the legal borders of the
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These individuals may, over time, gain full legal and political citizenship
and concomitant social protections, but they do not have it now, and law
reform efforts do not portend a near-term shift in that direction. The
shared liminal legality of so many at this particular historic juncture is
worthy of exploration. To begin such an exploration, this Part first provides an overview of prior uses of the term in the academic literature and
then suggests some defining features of liminal legality.
A. Scholarly Origins
Contemporary notions of liminal legality first appeared in the scholarship of Cecilia Menjivar, in her work focusing on Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants in the United States.6 Building on Susan Coutin's
notion of the "spaces of nonexistence" inhabited by legally marginalized
members of these immigrant communities, Menjivar catalogued the myriad ways that the legal regime governing the status of immigrants in these communities functioned to limit, structure, and transform not only
their social interactions but also their perceptions of themselves and their
modes of artistic expression.
The particular communities that she studied presented ample opportunities for exploring these questions. In the United States, many citizens
of El Salvador and Guatemala have moved in and out of lawful status
over time.8 Sometimes they have a status that offers them significant
protections from removal, sometimes not. Menjivar noted that many
people in these communities have lived in the United States for years, or
even decades, without access to the same rights of individuals lawfully
present on nonimmigrant or immigrant visas. 9 She labeled the legally
uncertain space occupied by these noncitizens liminal legality.'o
Notably, Menjivar posits the liminal legality of these individuals,
not because they have a temporarily lawful status (although many of
them do at various points in time), but because they and the members of
their families and communities move in and out of status, between tenta-

country, and the civil regulatory regimes that operate in tandem with the criminal justice system to
banish "undesirables" from the boundaries of the community. See infra at Part II.C.
Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1000.
6.

7.

Id. at 999-1001.

8.
Id. at 1000-01; see also Susan Bibler Coutin, Place and Presence within Salvadoran
Deportees' Narratives of Removal, 20 CHILDHOOD 323, 323-25, 327 (2013); Susan Bibler Coutin,
Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American Asylum Seekers, 36 L. & Soc.

INQUIRY 569, 570 (2011).
Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1012-16.
9.
10.
Id. at 1000 ("Examinations of the effects of legal status on different spheres of life have
concentrated on the differences between documented and undocumented status. I focus on the gray
area between these legal categories, how this 'in-between' status or liminal legality shapes different
spheres of life-the immigrant's immediate sphere of social networks and family, the communitylevel place of religious institutions in the immigrants' lives, and the broader domain of artistic expression."). For another recent discussion of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients in a legally liminal state see Hallett, supra note 3, at 622.
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tive lawfulness and more complete marginalization.i" In other words,
liminal legality captures the entire in-between existence of moving in and
out of protective states of administrative grace.
Menjivar's conception of liminality draws on the work of anthropologist Victor Turner, who, in his classic work on ritual, identified the
liminal individual as one who is "structurally . . . 'invisible"' because she
is "at once no longer classified and not yet classified."' 2 In his chapter on
"Liminality and Communitas," Turner defines liminal individuals as
"neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremon[y]."
Turner, for his part, had drawn on the work of Arnold van Gennep, who
had conceptualized the liminal state as the second in a three-part stage in
social rituals.14
In these classic formulations, liminality is an ambiguous, but not
always an undesirable, metaphysical space. It is also a predictable one.
To be liminal is to be outside of, but preparing to reenter, society. For
van Gennep, Turner, and, to a certain extent, the sociologists who later
adapted their work, liminality is not a space of permanent exclusion or a
full marginalization, but rather, a temporary and potentially productive
phase.' 5 The present discussion accepts the premise that liminality is not
inherently problematic, but emerging forms of liminal legality raise problems that are not inherent in classic notions of liminality.
Contemporary liminal legality is characterized first and foremost by
its inherent legal uncertainty. Individuals' legal assurances against full
marginalization lack definitive temporal scope and are generally extended as privileges, not rights.' 6 The inherent fragility and the indefinite
nature of the period(s) of administrative grace create instability in many
aspects of the lives of liminal legal subjects. As Menjivar observes in the
lives of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants that are the subject
of her study, the need to constantly reapply for, and meet the requirements of, the protected statuses that they may be eligible to access:
[C]reates enormous anxiety, as each deadline accentuates these immigrants' precarious situation, which for many has gone on for over
two decades....

11.
12.
13.

See Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1016.
VICTOR TURNER, THE FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL 95-96 (1967).
VICTOR W. TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE AND ANTI-STRUCTURE 95

(1969).
14.
ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE 10-11 (1960). Van Gennep argued that
social rituals involve passage through a period of separation, a liminal period, and a period of reassimilation. Id.
15. See, e.g., id at I1. Perhaps there is an (undue?) optimism in using the label of liminality
rather than marginalization to describe some the legal subjects discussed in this Article.
16.
See Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1000-01.
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. . . This uncertain status . . . permeates many aspects of the immigrants' lives and delimits their range of action in different spheres,
from job market opportunities and housing, to family and kinship,
from the place of the church in their lives and their various transnational activities, to artistic expressions.17
But the temporal and legal instability of their freedom from banishment at the hands of the state is not the only feature of liminal legality. Although Menjivar does not attempt to identify all of the features of
liminal legality or to offer a comprehensive theory of what that transitional state might entail, certain key features emerge in her account and
in the work of others who have studied the lives of people in communities with high concentrations of liminal legal subjects. 18 Reviewing her
work, the work of other scholars contributing to and building on this
concept, and the lived experience of the individuals categorized in previous scholarship as legally liminal, one can identify several notable features of liminal legality.

First, these populations are often obliged to pay their way to access
statuses that formally stave off banishment. The temporary protected

statuses to which the individuals in Menjivar's study might have access
come at a price. 19 Second, these individuals are subject to heightened
monitoring by governmental actors. 20 The eligibility requirements include the ability to document presence and residence, and the absence of
disqualifying criminal or associational conduct. 2 1 Each time the applicant
re-applies, this documentation is required, and a failure to reapply in a
timely fashion is itself a disqualifying factor.22

The heightened governmental monitoring of this population also
renders individuals with liminal legal status particularly vulnerable to the

discretionary decision-making of public and private actors. The eligibility criteria for certain qualifying temporary statuses impose stringent
requirements that do not apply to those with more stable forms of imni-

17.

Id. at 1000-01.

18.
See sources cited supra note 3.
19.
The application fee for Temporary Protected Status, the form of immigration relief that
many of the individuals studied by Menjivar are able to access, is currently $85, plus an additional
$380 for employment authorization. See Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status-deferred-enforceddeparture/temporary-protected-status (last updated Sept. 3, 2015). Of course, not all noncitizens pay
for status. Some experience a favorable exercise of discretion in the form of a closed case or a decision by USCIS not to initiate removal proceedings. In such cases, there is no formal price tag affixed to freedom from banishment. But even for many of these noncitizens, the lack of secure legal
status generate costs in the form of depressed wages and lost eaming opportunities. See infra note 73
(discussing the fiscal impact of undocumented immigration status) and note 223 (discussing wage
effects of criminal convictions).

20.
21.
22.

See id.
Id.
Id.
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gration status, 23 which means that individuals' right to remain is tied
more closely to discretionary law enforcement decisions about where to
allocate policing resources and how to process low-level crimes and infractions. At the same time, the same individuals are also more exposed
to exploitation, abuse, and manipulation by other private actors. Those
out of status are particularly vulnerable to workplace exploitation, negative wage effects, and private discrimination, 2 4 but neither provisional
legal statuses nor citizenship consistently offer a shield from such exploitation.25
B. Identifying Key Features:The Iconic Case
In Menjivar's work, noncitizens in Salvadoran and Guatemalan
communities in the United States, existing on the edge of banishment but
situated in communities that sometimes (and variably) have access to
various forms of formal legal status, constitute the relevant group of liminal legal subjects.26 As a legal matter, the subjects of her study are directly analogous to a new and more expansive group of liminal legal
subjects: communities of noncitizens potentially eligible for relief under
the broad executive relief programs announced by the Obama Administration in June 2012 and November 2014. Some scholars have already
described these communities as legally liminal.27 This population, which
is still squarely in the territory of iconic liminal legality, provides a useful focal point for amplifying the discussion of the features of liminal
legal status preliminarily mapped out in Section A. Liminal legal status is
not limited to this group of noncitizens or even to communities that include noncitizens more generally. But identifying key elements of liminal legality in this context is a useful step toward understanding how
liminality is produced by law.
Several recent executive actions offer certain noncitizens temporary
deportation relief without legal status. On June 15, 2012, Janet NapoliCompare id. (outlining the bars to TPS), with Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §
23.
237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2015) (providing the less extensive exclusion and deportation provisions of

the INA).
Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1009; see also JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS:
24.
THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 10-66 (2005) (discussing and providing examples of challenges
faced by immigrant workers in the workplace); Josiah McC. Heyman, State Effects on Labor Exploitation: The INS and Undocumented Immigrants at the Mexico-United States Border, 18 CRITIQUE
ANTHROPOLOGY 157, 157 (1998); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace,

61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1107 (2009); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibitingthe Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 195 (2007).
25.
See, e.g., Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 3, at 274-75 (discussing the social and legal
vulnerabilities of various groups of noncitizens lawfully present); David Bacon, Be Our Guests,
NATION (Sept. 9, 2004), http://www.thenation.com/article/be-our-guests (discussing the vulnerabilities of noncitizens present on H2-A visas).
See Menjivar, supra note 2, at 999-1000.
26.
27.
See, e.g., Ryan Anderson, Legality, Race, and Inequality: An Interview with Ruth Gom-

berg-Mulioz (Part II), SAVAGE MINDS (Feb. 5, 2015), http://savageminds.org/2015/02/05/legalityrace-and-inequality-an-interview-with-ruth-gomberg-munoz-part-ii/ (referring to DACA recipients
as being held in a state of "liminal legality" with express reference to Menjivar's work).
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tano announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) program.28 Noncitizens who were under thirty-one on the date of the announcement, who had entered the United States before June 15, 2007, as
children under the age of sixteen, who had completed high school, and
who did not have disqualifying criminal records were eligible for deferred action.29 A significant population moved out of the shadows3 0 and
into a new space of liminal legality. About 600,000 individuals moved
from being undocumented to being "DACAmented" 3 over the next two
32
years. DACA recipients obtained their access to this new legal space
largely through their own political exertions. In so doing, they demonstrated levels of belonging, political participation, and social influence
that are often thought to be limited to formal legal citizens.33 They were
able to capitalize on the protected space that Plyler v. Doe,34 and later,
legislation like California's in-state tuition bill, A.B. 540," had created
for them. In this way, it is important to note that DACA recipients were
really already liminal legal subjects before DACA was created. They had
a quasi-protected status in schools and were low priorities for removal
even before DACA created a new and somewhat more stable, but still
liminal, legal status that they were able to access.
Continued advocacy by DACA recipients and their allies eventually
succeeded in pressuring the administration to generate a plan to expand
executive relief. On November 20, 2014, Department of Homeland Secu28.
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Servs. & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft 1 (June 15, 2012)
[hereinafter Napolitano Memorandum], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/slexercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.

29.

Id.

30.
As Geoffrey Heeren notes, "'[C]oming out of the shadows' is how immigrant advocates
and Dreamers often characterize obtaining nonstatus. It is a way to claim some measure of dignity in
a society that stigmatizes those without status as 'illegals."' Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonsta-

tus,64AM.U.L.REV. 1115, 1132(2015).
31.
The term DACA-mented is increasingly commonly used to distinguish deferred action
recipients from populations with more formal legal immigration status. See, e.g., TOM K. WONG ET
AL., UNDOCUMENTED NO MORE: A NATIONWIDE ANALYSIS OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD
ARRIVALS, OR DACA,
at 2 (2013), available at https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/09/DACAReportCC-2- I.pdf.
32.
Press Release, Migration Policy Inst., MPI: As Many as 3.7 Million Unauthorized Immigrants Could Get Relief from Deportation Under Anticipated New Deferred Action Program (Nov.
19, 2014),
available at http://migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-many-37-million-unauthorizedimmigrants-could-get-relief-deportation-under-anticipated-new (noting that, as of the date of the
report, 580,000 individuals had received relief under the program); see also WONG ET AL., supra
note 31, at I (providing survey information regarding the impact of the program on recipients).
33.
Linda Bosniak's notion of alien citizenship seems apt here. See BOSNIAK, supra note 4, at

81-82.
34.
457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a Texas statute requiring unauthorized immigration
children to pay for or be denied public education from kindergarten through twelfth grade).

35.

Act of Oct. 13, 2001, ch. 814, 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv.

§2

(West) (codified at CAL. EDUC.

CODE § 68130.5 (West 2015)). A.B. 540 is the law that extended in-state tuition benefits to unauthorized immigrants attending California's public institutions of higher learning. Id. For a discussion
of the role the bill played in the political mobilization of undocumented youth, see Abrego, supra
note 3, at 727-29.
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rity Secretary Jeh Johnson issued a memorandum that could change significantly the lives of millions of people living within the borders of the
United States, 36 including many individuals who were more marginalized
than the original DACA recipients. Like Secretary Napolitano before
him, Secretary Johnson addressed this memorandum, "intended to reflect
new policies for the use of deferred action," to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Commissioner of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection. 3 The memo offers guidance to these agencies as
to appropriate uses of deferred action. The memo defines deferred action
in this way:
Deferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion by which the
Secretary deprioritizes an individual's case for humanitarian reasons,
administrative convenience, or in the interest of the Department's
overall enforcement mission. As an act of prosecutorial discretion,
deferred action is legally available so long as it is granted on a caseby-case basis, and it may be terminated at any time at the agency's
discretion. Deferred action does not confer anyform of legal status in
this country, much less citizenship; it simply means that, for a specified period of time, an individual is permitted to be lawfully present
in the United States. Nor can deferred action itself lead to a green
card. Although deferred action is not expressly conferred by statute,
the practice is referenced and therefore endorsed by implication in
several federal statutes.38
Several large classes of noncitizens would be eligible for deferred
action pursuant to the terms of the November memorandum. 39 These
include individuals previously eligible for DACA. 40 The memo extends
their initial grant of deferred action.41 But it also includes individuals
eligible for an expanded DACA (DACA+), as well as those who fall into
a category that was first called Deferred Action for Parental Accountability, and now bears the title of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). 42
In defining the category of noncitizens eligible for DACA+, the
Johnson memo removed the age cap for "otherwise eligible immigrants
who entered the United States by the requisite adjusted entry date [now
January 1, 2010, rather than June 15, 2007] before the age of sixteen
36.

Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. to Le6n

Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. I
(Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Memorandum], available at http://www.aila.org/infonet/dhsexercising-prosecutorial-discretion.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
See id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id.
See id.
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(16), regardless of how old they were in June 2012 or are today."43
DAPA applies to individuals with children who are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, provided those individuals "have continuously
resided in the United States since before January 1, 2010," are physically
present on the memo date, and when applying, "have no lawful status,"
"are not an enforcement priority" as identified in a separate memo issued
the same day, and "present no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, makes the grant of deferred action inappropriate."" Notably, DAPA
does not extend to the parents of DACA recipients who lack qualifying
relationships to citizens or Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs).45
By some estimates, the number of DACA+ or DAPA-eligible
noncitizens is approximately five million. 4 6 Qualifying noncitizens
would be eligible not only for deferred removal but also for work authorization 4 7 and drivers licenses. 4 8 The fee for this relief would be $465, and
"[tlhere will be no fee waivers and, like DACA, very limited fee exemptions." 49 Interestingly, there are a significant number of minor variations
in the DACA and DAPA eligibility criteria, particularly with regard to

43.
44.

Id. at 3-4.
Id at 4.

45.
The Office of Legal Counsel memorandum providing the legal rationale for the DACA
and DAPA programs posits that such relief would exceed the scope of executive power. See The
Dep't of Homeland Sec.'s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the

U.S. & to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 2 (2014) [hereinafter OLC Memorandum],
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-1I19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf. For a critique of this reasoning as internally inconsistent with the
OLC's own rationale in support of the other relief provisions, see, for example, Immigration LawOffice of Legal Counsel Issues Opinion Endorsing President Obama s Executive Order on Deferred
Action for ParentalAccountability-The Department of Homeland Security's Authority to Prioritize
Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others,

38 OP. O.L.C. (Nov. 19, 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 2320, 2325 (2015).
46.
See, e.g., Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Immigration Accountability Executive
Action,
WHITE
HOUSE
(Nov.
20,
2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11/20/fact-sheet-immigration-accountability-executive-action; see also Press Release,
Migration Policy Inst., supra note 32 ("MPI estimates the anticipated new deferred action program
and expanded DACA initiative could benefit as many as 5.2 million people-nearly half of the 11.4
million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States . . . .").

§ 274A(h)(3),

§ 1324a(h)(3)

47.

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)

48.

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and

Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13,

§ 202(c)(2)(B)(viii),

8 U.S.C.

(2015).

119 Stat. 231, 313 (2005). Several states

have challenged the driver's license provision in court, but to date, those challenges have been
unsuccessful in preventing the issuance of drivers licenses to DACA recipients. THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DECIDING WHO DRIVES: STATE CHOICES SURROUNDING UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS
AND
DRIVER'S
LICENSES
8-9
(2015),
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/Assets/2015/08/Deciding-Who-Drives.pdf.
49.
Johnson Memorandum, supra note 36, at 5. In the DACA context, private organizations
have engaged in fundraising efforts to assist in covering the application expenses for otherwisequalified DACA applicants. See Jana Kasperkevic, The High Cost ofBeing a Legal Immigrant in the

US:

$465,

GUARDIAN

(Jan.

8,

2014,

8:01

PM),

http://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/jan/08/undocumented-dreamers-immigration-daca-costfee.
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the kinds of criminal conduct and criminal records that will bar relief in
each of these categories., and the DAPA criteria is stricter.50
The proposed DACA and DAPA programs are not the first efforts
by the Executive Branch to provide relief to noncitizens who might otherwise be removed from the United States. Indeed, the Office of Legal
Counsel memorandum outlining the legal basis for the DACA+ and
DAPA programs5 ' notes the long history of executive relief in the immigration context, including some statutorily designated forms of discretionary, temporary relief such as parole-in-place (PIP), 5 2 Temporary Protected Status (TPS), 53 and some non-statutorily based recurring forms of
executive relief such as Deferred Enforced Departure (DED). 5 4 Temporary Protected Status was, of course, of central importance to the communities studied in Menjivar's account of liminal legality.55 The new
DACA recipients as well as the intended DAPA and DACA+ recipients
thus fit neatly under the same legal rubric that framed prior accounts of
liminal legality.
One important commonality between PIP, DED, TPS, DACA, and
DAPA is that they are all temporary forms of relief that offer no formal
legal immigration status, much less a path to citizenship. Like the TPS
recipients studied by Menjivar, DACA (and eventually, perhaps, DAPA
and DACA+) recipients receive a grant of protection that is timelimited. 6 As with TPS recipients, DACA recipients have to wait until
50.
See, e.g., Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr. & Nat'l Immigration Project of the Nat'1 Lawyers
Guild, Key Differences Between the DACA and DAPA Criminal and Enforcement-Related Bars,
MYGIDEON,
http://www.mygideon.org/@api/deki/files/68243/CriminalBarstoDAPA_Handout.pdf
(last

updated Jan. 27, 2015).
51.
See OLC Memorandum, supra note 45, at 5, 12.
52.
8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(5)(A) (temporary lawful presence available to noncitizens "for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.").
53.
8 U.S.C. § 1254(a). TPS is a statutory grant that appears to replace a prior form of nonstatutory executive relief known as extended voluntary departure. TPS is a form of temporary relief
available to noncitizens whose home countries are suffering from "ongoing armed conflict," the fallout of environmental disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes, and other such conditions. Id.

§

1254(b)(1). The application forms for DACA relief bear a good deal of resemblance to the TPS

forms, although they also departed from these forms in ways that made it possible for DACA applicants to reveal less personal information than would have been required for a grant of TPSpresumably because DACA recipients were understandably concerned about providing information
that might reveal the whereabouts of family members ineligible for the program. Compare USCIS

Form 1-821 (TPS application form) with USCIS 1-821D (DACA application form).
54.

OLC Memorandum, supra note 45, at 12 n.5. Deferred enforced departure (DED) "has no

statutory basis," but is described in the USCIS, Adjudicator's Field Manual. Id. (quoting U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL § 38.2(a) (2014)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). DED may be granted to nationals of appropriate foreign states and is
justified as an exercise of "the President's constitutional powers to conduct foreign relations." Id.
(quoting U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL § 38.2(a)
(2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). By way of example, it was granted to some Guatemalans
and Salvadorans at the time that their 1990 grant of TPS status expired. Menjivar, supra note 2, at

1016. Their DED status expired in 1995. Id.
55.
56.

See Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1016.
See Johnson Memorandum, supra note 36, at 3.
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very near the expiration date of their temporary protections to determine
whether the Executive Branch plans to extend that date. 57 Only then do
they have the opportunity to reapply.5 8 Nor does the uncertainty end with
renewal applications. In the Spring of 2015, over 11,000 DACA recipients who filed timely renewals actually experienced a temporary lapse in
status, and the related problems of temporary unemployment and even
job loss, because of processing delays. 59
The temporal uncertainty of core legal protections stands at the center of the experience of liminal legality. 60 It is not the formal legal reprieve-be it TPS, DED, or DACA-that defined liminal legality. It is
the existence on the edges of such relief, which sometimes comes into
existence and sometimes does not. The temporal limits on available relief
actually present potential recipients with valid questions about whether it
is worth it to apply; many people eligible for relief like DACA indeed
have not applied. 6 ' These non-applicants also exist in spaces of liminal
legality, however. They are potentially eligible for temporary forms of
deportation relief, but they do not have it. At the same time, their presumptive eligibility may offer them certain protections even in the absence of a grant of DACA because they are low enforcement priorities
with long-term ties to the United States. 62 The fact that one need not ac57.
USCIS made the first renewal forms for DACA available in June 2014, which was only a
few months before initial grants of DACA began to expire. See Patrick Taurel, The DACA Renewal
Process: Everything You Need to Know, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL: IMMIGRATION IMPACT
http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/06/05/the-daca-renewal-process-everything(June 5, 2014),
you-need-to-know/ ("Today, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced the
renewal process for hundreds of thousands of young noncitizens who received a grant of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). . . . The renewal announcement comes not a moment too
soon. Because DACA recipients are encouraged to request renewal between four to five months
ahead of their expiration date to avoid a lapse, the earliest major wave of DACA recipients-who
received their DACA grants in September and October of 2012-will need to act right away.").
58.
Cf Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1016; Hallett, supranote 3, at 630.
59.
David Noriega, Thousands of Dreamers are Losing Their Work Permits, BUZZFEED
2015),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/davidnoriega/thousands-shielded-from(Apr.
22,
NEWS
deportation-losing-work-permits#.rdrVpVKAO.
60.
Ruben Andersson has argued that temporality is a tool wielded by states in their efforts to
control unauthorized migration. Ruben Andersson, Time and the Migrant Other: European Border
Controls and the Temporal Economics of Illegality, 116 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 795, 796 (2014).
Making people wait is "an integral part of the exercise of power." Id. at 802 (quoting HANS LUCHT,
DARKNESS BEFORE DAYBREAK: AFRICAN MIGRANTS LIVING ON THE MARGINS IN SOUTHERN ITALY

TODAY 73 (2012) (drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu)). See also Susan Bibler Coutin, Being
En Route, 107 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 195, 196 (2005) (discussing illegality as "eras[ing] presence
and suspend[ing] time").
61.
Press Release, Migration Policy Inst., supra note 32 ("Fifty-five percent of those who met
the DACA criteria had applied for relief. Application costs, fear of self-identifying as unauthorized
or potentially exposing other unauthorized relatives to government scrutiny and lack of information
about the program and its temporary nature were among the barriers.").
62.
The announcement of DACA+ and DAPA was also made in the context of new enforcement priorities. Similar priorities theoretically have been in place for some time. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement to All Field Office

Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge & All Chief Counsel 1-5 (June 17, 2011), available at
(identifying
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf
enforcement priorities); see also Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor to

All

OPLA

Chief

Counsel

3-4

(Oct.

24,

2005),

available

at
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cess formal relief, or even intend to do so, illustrates the important points
that legal liminality is variegated and maps imperfectly onto the categories of formal legal status.
The uncertainty of liminal legality as experienced by potential beneficiaries of deferred action was highlighted recently when Federal District Court Judge Hanen issued an emergency stay to prevent the rollout
of DACA+ from being implemented on the planned February 18, 2015,
start date. 63 Judge Hanen concluded that the state of Texas (which
brought the suit along with twenty-five other states) had standing to challenge these executive actions, that the court had jurisdiction to hear the
challenge, and that the DACA+ and DAPA programs should be temporarily enjoined on the grounds that the Obama Administration violated
the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedures
Act in rolling out the programs. 4 Judge Hanen's legal reasoning on each
of these questions is debatable. 65 However, one judge's ability to grind to
http://shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretionimmigration1005.pdf;
Memorandum from Doris
Meissner, Comm'r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. to Reg'i Dirs. et al. 5-8 (Nov. 17, 2000),
available
at
http://niwaplibrary.wel.american.edu/reference/additionalmaterials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justice/govemmentdocuments/22092970-INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner- 11-700.pdf/view; Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
to
All
ICE
Emps.
1-2
(June
30,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2010/civil-enforcement-priorities.pdf;
Memorandum from
Julie L. Myers, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement for All Field Office Dirs.

&

All

Special

Agents

in

Charge

1

(Nov.

7,

2007),

available

at

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092973/ICE-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Julie-Myers11-7-07; SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, THE MORTON MEMO AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 3-6
(2011),
available
at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/ShobaProsecutorial Discretion_07201 1_0.pdf.
Individuals who are not priorities for deportation are certainly not immune from deportation. See,
e.g., Bill Ong Hing, The FailureofProsecutorialDiscretionand the DeportationofOscar Martinez,
15 SCHOLAR 437, 439-41 (2013) (discussing the deportation of purportedly low-priority noncitizens
with attention to one particular case).

63.
64.

Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677-78 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015).
Id. at 114-16, 193-95.

65.
Texas's standing is based on the costs of issuing driver's licenses to DACA and DAPA
recipients-a practice that is sanctioned for deferred action recipients by the REAL ID Act of 2005.

Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. 2,

§

202, 119 Stat. 231, 312-13 (2005). The DACA and DAPA

program do not create this obligation requirement on the states although each grant of deferred
action triggers it. Even if Texas has standing and a court decides that the question is justiciable, the
APA notice and comment requirements may be inapposite here. The requirement does not apply to

"general statements of policy." 5 U.S.C.

§ 553(b)(3)(A)

(2015). The Administration argues that the

announced expansion of deferred action is merely a statement of enforcement priorities that cede to
USCIS agents the ability to make individual case determinations in implementation. As such, it
appears to fall comfortably within the exception to notice and comment rulemaking, although such
questions are legally vexing in any administrative context, and certainly no less so in immigration.
See Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV.

565, 570-71, 588 (2012); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 893
(2004). Discretion is a key element that distinguishes a legislative rule from a policy statement.

Family, supra, at. 577-78.
While opponents of the program point to the low number of individuals actually denied
DACA status to support the argument that such discretion does not exist, more than 10% of applicants have been denied DACA. As of February 2015, the government reported that "six percent of
adjudicated DACA requests have been denied, in addition to the six percent that were initially rejected when filed." Attachments to Appellants' Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 32,
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a halt a process meant to lift the constant threat of expulsion faced by
millions of people in one fell swoop illustrates the extreme contingency
of liminal status. 6 6
As this Article goes to press, the Fifth Circuit had recently affirmed
Judge Hanen's order, 6 7 and did so in a way that once again illustrates
how widespread liminal legality is among noncitizens in the United
States. The Fifth Circuit agreed that the Obama Administration has the
discretionary authority to decline to deport a subset of unauthorized migrants.68 But the Court found that the Administration exceeded its authority in providing what the Fifth Circuit characterized as the status of "lawful presence" to some noncitizens. In the court's view, this status could
not be granted absent notice-and-comment rulemaking. 69 To bolster its
characterization of deferred action as a status, the court focused on the
DHS Secretary's planned grant of work authorization to DACA+ and
70
DAPA recipients. Yet the authority for providing work authorization
for deferred action recipients stretches back decades, and flows directly
from statutory provisions and notice-and-comment rules.71 The Fifth
Circuit's broad reasoning thus would potentially invalidate the work authorization of thousands of noncitizens-including current DACA recipients and other beneficiaries of humanitarian deferred action statuswho have received work authorization pursuant to the provision that the
Fifth Circuit found unlawful. In this way, the Fifth Circuit's decision
again highlights the legal precariousness experienced by many categories
of noncitizens.

Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238). Moreover, some potentially
qualified noncitizens are not applying for relief at all because immigration service providers have
identified elements of their records that could warrant unfavorable exercises of discretion, such as
imputed gang affiliation. See, e.g., Catholic Charities, DACA Pre-Screening Pre-Registration Form,
http://www.catholiccharitiesoregon.org/Pre-Screening%20Intake%2OForm.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
2015). One widely-used DACA screening form asks potential applicants to reveal whether or not
they "have any tattoos." Id. The fact that organizations bent on optimizing DACA and DAPA enrollment are screening out potentially eligible applicants because of concerns about discretionary
denials suggests that there is a real element of enforcement discretion in the administrative screening
of deferred action applicants.
66.
Juliet Stumpf and Stephen Manning theorize that the creation of DACA and DAPA, and
other innovations in immigration regulation indeed represent a kind of "liminal law." Stephen Manning & Juliet Stumpf, Rethinking the "Law " in Immigration Law (unpublished preliminary draft) (on
file with the author). Here, I do not argue, as they do, that there are categories of administrative
guidance documents or other administrative and legislative practices that constitute a distinctly
liminal category of law. But my arguments also are not incompatible with their claim.

67.

Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2015).

The Obama Administration has announced its plan to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, so
the litigation continues. Michael D. Shear, Obama to Appeal Immigration Ruling to Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/Il/l/us/politics/supreme-courtimmigration-obama.html?_r-0.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Texas, 2015 WL 6873190, at *16-18.
Id. at *18-19.
Id. at *24.
Id. at *48-50 (King, J., dissenting).
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Should DACA+ and DAPA ultimately move forward, hundreds of
thousands-perhaps even millions-of DACA and DAPA recipients will
join the ranks of the temporarily sanctioned sojourner. They will move
further from the more marginal spaces occupied by unauthorized migrants who are "enforcement priorities" and further still from the longtime residents of this country who have already been banished.72 They
will be marked, like existing DACA recipients and TPS recipients past
and present, as a part of the larger world of liminal legal subjects that
scholars like Menjivar have begun to map, and notwithstanding their
access to a non-status protection, they will continue to experience all of
the accompanying instabilities of liminal legality.
They will also experience significant benefits, of course. The temporary legal reprieve that DACA and DAPA offer will bring with it lifealtering improvements for those who have lived in the United States for
years without formal legal authorization. The negative effects of undocumented status are extensively documented. Unsurprisingly, the available data suggests that even at this early stage of the program, receiving
DACA has greatly improved the lives of DACA recipients.7 4 DACAmented individuals experience a wage bump and better educational outcomes.75 At the anecdotal level, they also report improvements in their
subjective feelings of security and well-being.76 Thus, it is a space of
some sort of inclusion, with some opportunity for positive transformations for the individual in their relations with other denizens and the
state.

See infra Part Ill.A (discussing recent enforcement trends).
72.
See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN
73.
IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 118-26 (2002) (documenting the negative
effect of undocumented status on wages); Heyman, supra note 24, at 157-58 (documenting the
negative effect of undocumented status on wages).
ROBERTO G. GONZALES & VERONICA TERRIQUEZ, How DACA Is IMPACTING THE LIVES
74.
OF THOSE WHO ARE NOw DACAMENTED: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
UNDACAMENTED RESEARCH PROJECT (2013), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/justfacts/how-daca-impacting-lives-those-who-are-now-dacamented; WONG ET AL., supra note 31, at
10; see also Caitlin Patler & Jorge Cabrera, From Undocumented to DACAmented: Benefits and
Limitations of the DeferredAction for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Program, Three Years Following
its Announcement, RES. & POL'Y BRIEFUCLA Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp't, May 2015, at
5, available at http://www.irle.ucla.edu/publications/documents/ResearchBrief27Patler_000.pdf.
GONAZALES & TERRIQUEZ, supra note 74; see also WONG ET AL., supra note 31, at 27;
75.
Patler & Cabrera, supra note 74.
76.
The Televisa foundation enlisted several DACA recipients to create autobiographical
videos promoting the DACA program to the estimated 500,000 noncitizens who are eligible for
DACA but have not yet applied. Think About It, THINKABOUTIT.US, http://thinkaboutit.us/ (last

visited Apr. 5, 2015).
This is consonant with Menjivar's findings, and with the prior uses of the notion of limi77.
nality as a social state, that the period of liminality can be a productive state. See supra notes 9-12
and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, there are social and legal costs to living in a state of
liminal legality.78 Identifying those costs helps to further illustrate some
of the key features of liminal legal status. First, there are the literal costs.
Individuals existing in states of liminal legality have access to a slightly
greater degree of legal protection from expulsion, but they have to pay
for it. Like TPS, the DACA, DACA+, and DAPA programs require (or
would require) recipients to pay recurring fees associated with moving
from an unprotected (but often untargeted) group79 to a group with a
more formal protection from banishment that still falls well short of a
privileged legal status. As previously noted, the fee for DACA is a nonwaivable $495, and it is payable with each application for temporary
relief. For some, this presents a very real obstacle to greater legal stability.80 The requirement that individuals threatened with banishment pay a
monetary price for the very basic right to be free from this banishment is
a recurring feature of liminal legality. 8
Second, liminal legal status exposes individuals to both govemmental caprice and private exploitation. Because of the stringent82 and somewhat ambiguous 83 eligibility limitations of the DACA and DAPA program, even those who gain this (non)status are more vulnerable than other long-time lawful residents subject to narrower deportation grounds.
This group of noncitizens is particularly vulnerable to discretionary decisions by law enforcement agents at all levels of government. Decisions
by state and local law enforcement to prioritize immigration-related en-

78.
Geoffrey Heeren skillfully illustrates the complex realities of the DACA program. Heeren,
supra note 30, at 1174-77. Heeren argues that the grant of nonstatus paradoxically bestows dignity
and legitimacy on its recipients, even as it orchestrates their heightened surveillance. See id
79.
1 should stress again, of course, that many people who fit the DACA and DAPA profile
have been deported over the years. To suggest that they are low-priority is not to suggest that they
are immune from deportation. See, e.g., Hing, supra note 62, at 501. Indeed, the very randomness of
their potential selection adds to the stress of liminal existence.
80.
Kasperkevic, supra note 49 ("Cost has been one of the top reasons why people eligible for
DACA delay their application, says Sarah Hooker, policy analyst at Migration Policy Institute. The
$465 application fee, while minuscule to most middle-class Americans, has played a large role in
preventing young undocumented immigrants from applying for work permits.").
81.
See sources cited supra note 73; cf Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1025-27 (noting the financial concerns generated by liminal legality).
82.
To succeed, the DACA applicant must establish that she has not been "convicted of a
felony, significant misdemeanor, three or more other misdemeanors, and do[es] not otherwise pose a
threat to national security or public safety." Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S.
DEPARTMENT HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals (last
published date July 17, 2015). Immigration service providers advise potential applicants that the
criminal bar of three non-significant misdemeanors exclude minor traffic violations, but also caution
that any purported gang activity or participation in criminal activity can serve as a bar to DACA on
public safety grounds, even in the absence of a criminal record. See, e.g., Understandingthe Criminal Bars to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER,
http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ilrc-2012-dacachart I.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
83.
Service providers note that the individual's total history is relevant to the determination.
Matters like juvenile and expunged convictions can affect DACA determinations, as can even loose
indicia of gang affiliation. See, e.g., Understanding the Criminal Bars to the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, supra note 82.
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forcement efforts carried out under a different name, 84 decisions by state
legislatures to criminalize noncitizens through expansive criminal provisions,85 and even the decision to concentrate greater policing resources
for "crime suppression sweeps" in immigrant-dense neighborhoods86 are
particularly problematic for individuals with deferred action status. Because the eligibility criteria for DACA is more exacting than the deportation grounds that cover long-time lawful residents, 87 DACA recipients
remain quite vulnerable to banishment.
This leaves them more vulnerable to private actors as well. Employers are one obvious example-they can exploit status vulnerabilities to
suppress wages, discourage organizing, and skirt workplace regulations
for their noncitizen workers.88 But there are other examples. Notably,
noncitizens are heavily reliant on private legal service providers when it
comes to getting their information about potential legal relief. Consequently, private organizations indirectly define eligibility for relief
through the dissemination of eligibility criteria and through their own
screening exercises.89 Moreover, private organizations play a significant

See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution:A Study of Arizona Before SB

84.

1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 1760-66 (2011) (analyzing Arizona's enforcement of its "selfsmuggling" prohibitions in the period preceding the enactment of S.B. 1070); Hiroshi Motomura,
The Discretion That Matters: FederalImmigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the

Civil-CriminalLine, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1847-49 (2011); see also Jennifer M. Chac6n, Tensions and Trade-offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1609, 1643-45 (2010) (noting that some states enacted anti-trafficking laws in contexts
that suggested their likely primary use as immigration enforcement tools).
85.
Federal District Court Judge Susan Bolton recently struck down on preemption grounds
the anti-smuggling provision that was the focus of Ingrid Eagly's study. See United States v. Arizo-

na,

No.

CV-10-01413-PHX-SRB

(D.

Ariz.

Nov.

7,

2014),

available

at

http://d35brb9zkkbdsd.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/2014-11-10ArizSmugglingRuling.pdf (order on partial judgment on the pleadings). But there are many ways
states can play the immigration enforcement game. To take another example, for several years Maricopa County officials used an Arizona provision that criminalizes "identity theft"-even where the
identity is fictitious-for the purpose of prosecuting noncitizens unauthorized to work in the state.
That practice was also recently preliminarily enjoined. Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, 76 F. Supp. 3d

833, 860-61 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2015) (prohibiting Maricopa County Attorney Bill Montgomery and
Sheriff Joe Arpaio from enforcing two identity theft statutes to the extent the laws address actions
committed with the intent to obtain employment). Imposing criminal penalties for driving without a
license and/or insurance is one of the easiest ways to criminalize noncitizens in states that prohibit
the grant of such licenses to noncitizens. Kevin R. Johnson, Driver's Licenses and Undocumented

Immigrants: The Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 215-16 (2004).
86. See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Plaintiffs'
arguments) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87.
The DACA bars are considerably broader than the criminal deportation and exclusion
grounds of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Compare Napolitano Memorandum, supranote 28,

at 1, with Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(2), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(2)

(2015). The INA provisions

contain no deportation provision for three non-significant misdemeanors unless one or more of those
offenses is also an aggravated felony or crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2)(A).
88.
See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 24, at 46-49; Lee, supra note 24, at 1141; Wishnie, supra
note 24, at 195.
89.
See, e.g., Catholic Charities, supra note 65. This issue is also at the heart of ongoing
studies that I have pursued with a research team funded by the Russell Sage Foundation. For a discussion of that research, see Navigating Liminal Legalities along Pathways to Citizenship: Immigrant Vulnerability and the Role of Mediating Institutions, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND.,
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role in reshaping eligibility criteria at the administrative level. "Stakeholders" including immigrants' rights organizations, chambers of commerce, and restrictionist organizations play a role in how criteria are defined, and although private lobbying is an element in any lawmaking
process, private power is more immediately felt in the shaping of the
eligibility criteria because it is so fluid relative to the process for reform
of comparable legislative or formal administrative rules.90
Ultimately, individuals with liminal legal status are often in the position of asking for inclusion in the form of an administrative act of
grace, 9 rather than asking an adjudicator to enforce a right. 9 2 There is no
appeal outside of an administrative agency for a denial of DACA. The
shifting criteria is entirely defined and applied within the agency. Administrative agents make determinations about status "via a calculation
that remains almost entirely hidden but for the traces it leaves in statements about the value of particular kinds of proof for establishing those
statuses."93 Courts exempt themselves from weighing in on these determinations, either as a matter of formal legal practice, 94 or through the

exercise of an all-encompassing deference that in fact shields administrative policies and decision making from any real review.
In sum, liminal legal status is unstable. Legal protections emerge
and recede, and basic protection from banishment is often bought and
sold. Basic liberties-freedom of movement, family unification, freedom
from detention 96-are bestowed as an act of grace, not of right. Individuals are particularly vulnerable to governmental error and whim, and their
basic freedoms are often contingent on the actions and decisions of a host
of private actors. Liminal legal status obviously affects the lived experience of its bearers. In the case of Salvadorans and Guatemalans who
http://www.russellsage.org/awarded-project/navigating-liminal-legalities-along-pathways-tocitizenship-immigrant-vulnerability- (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
See Family, supra note 65, at 570-71 (discussing the benefits of formal process); see also
90.
Manning & Stumpf, supra note 66 (discussing this downside of"liminal law").

91.
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 596-98 (1889); Coutin et al., supra
note 3, at 99-100; Allison Brownell Tirres, Mercy in Immigration Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1563,
1580-81.
92.
The positioning of noncitizens as supplicants seeking immigration status as an act of
administrative grace rather than a claim of right is widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak,
Amnesty in Immigration: Forgetting, Forgiving, Freedom, 16 CRITICAL REV. INT'L SOC. & POL.
PHIL. 344, 355 (2013); Coutin et al., supra note 3, at 99-100; Tirres, supra note 91, at 1580; cf

Jennifer Chac6n, Feminists at the Border, 91 DENv. U. L. REV. 85, 107 (2013) (discussing how the
structure of the immigration law disproportionately positions women in this supplicant position).
Coutin et al., supra note 3, at 100.
93.

94.

Id.

Coutin, Richland, and Fortin focus on the plenary powers doctrine, and thus center the
95.
experience of noncitizens and indigenous populations in their account, but the highly deferential
review that courts apply to administrative decision-making in contexts such as policing, sentencing
and prison administration effectively places many more citizens and denizens in the same legally
tenuous position as that experienced by noncitizens and indigenous populations in the context of the
plenary powers doctrine. See infra Part IV.A-B.
All of these rights are tied to the right to remain granted by programs like DACA and
96.

DAPA.
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have moved in and out of various protected statuses over the last decade,
the personal and social consequences of liminal legality are explored in
detail in the scholarly literature.9 7 New studies are now giving similar
attention to documenting the social experiences of individuals in the liminal legal statuses created by the DACA program, 98 and comparable work
will undoubtedly be done for DAPA recipients should the DAPA program move forward.
The foregoing discussion of iconic cases of liminal legality focused-as does the existing literature-on the experiences of noncitizens
who lack stable legal status in the United States. But the frame of liminal
legality is also useful to understanding how legal residents and citizens
are rendered vulnerable by law. The next section explores how civil and
criminal laws operate in tandem to produce liminal legality among citizens as well as noncitizens.
II.

LIMINAL LEGALITY AT THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL BORDER

Previous accounts of liminal legality have focused on noncitizens
on the edges of formal legal immigration status. But even in the realm of
immigration law, noncitizens are not the only people whose lives are
shaped by liminal legality. Many denizens of the United States, including
citizens, experience the effects of liminal legality, often as a direct result
of governance strategies designed to regulate, monitor, and (where possible) banish its liminal legal subjects. The growing role of criminal justice actors in the enforcement of civil immigration laws has played an
important role in generating the rise in liminal legality among residents
of immigrant communities. Some immigrant communities are now more
heavily policed and more likely to come into contact with the criminal
justice system as a result of changing enforcement priorities. Their vulnerabilities are often viewed as unique insofar as they exist at the intersection of criminal and immigration law. But in fact, the interplay of
criminal and civil regulatory regimes that they experience is not at all
uncommon; the liminal legality they experience has much in common
with-and indeed shapes and is shaped by-the experiences of other
heavily policed and socially marginalized communities. This Section
therefore begins with an analysis of the production of liminality in immigration communities regardless of the formal legal status of community

See Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1000; see also Susan Bibler Coutin, In the Breach: Citizen97.
ship and Its Approximations, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 109, 111-13 (2013); Susan B. Coutin,
Denationalization, Inclusion, and Exclusion: Negotiating the Boundaries of Belonging, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 585, 585-91 (2000).
98.
See, e.g., GONZALES & TERRIQUEZ, supra note 74 ("We find that the DACA recipients
we surveyed experienced a pronounced increase in economic opportunities, such as getting a new
job, opening their first bank account, and obtaining their first credit card. . .. Overall, our research
indicates that although DACA opens up some economic opportunities for young aspiring Americans,
it does not address the constant threat of deportation still facing those closest to them, including
mothers, fathers, and siblings.").
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members and then extends the analysis to communities rendered liminal
through their interactions with the criminal justice system. Significantly,
many individuals experience overlapping forms of liminality because of
their race, their geographic location and their immigration status. Their
intersectional vulnerabilities compound the destabilizing effects of each
form of liminality.99
A. ImmigrationLaw and the ProductionofLiminality
As a result of relatively recent changes to immigration law and law
enforcement patterns, many individuals with lawful status, including
LPRs, have been forced into increasingly liminal spaces.'" Specific legal
changes have operated to decrease the stability of the legal status of
LPRs. Once treated as citizens in waiting, over the past two decades,
lawful permanent residents have become increasingly vulnerable to deportation due to Congress's creation of expansive (and retroactive) removal provisions. 0 Registration requirements and the monitoring of
lawful residents have also been on the rise. Thus, even as some unauthorized migrants access more stable (albeit still liminal) status, noncitizens
with lawful status increasingly experience that status as legally liminal.
In her study of unauthorized Brazilian youth in the Northeastern
United States, Kara Cebulko found "that Brazilian young adults [in her
study] recognize[d] a hierarchy with four distinct categories of legal
membership in which the documents and rights conferred from one status
to another-undocumented to liminal legality to LPR to citizenincrease while the threat of deportability decreases." 02 These young
adults' comments on the immigration laws illustrate an awareness of the
broad range of existing legal statuses and the absence of a true legal/illegal binary, but they also tellingly oversimplify the incredibly
complex and sometimes unpredictable ways that formal legal status maps
onto an individual's actual ability to avoid banishment. As a general matter, lawful permanent resident status is not sufficiently stable or perma-

99.
Indeed, individuals who experience the most debilitating intersectional disadvantages are
at the center of Yolanda Vazquez's analysis of an emergent "crimmigration system" in the United
States. See generally Yolanda Vhzquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a
"Post-Racial" World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2015).
100.
See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006).

101.
Id. at 98.
102.
Kara Cebulko, Documented, Undocumented and Liminally Legal: Legal Status During the
Transition to Adulthood for 1.5-Generation Brazilian Immigrants, 55 Soc. Q. 143, 145 (2014).
Cebulko notes that for these young adults, it was "not just liminal legality that challenges the illegallegal binary. LPRs, often considered as authorized migrants, experience insecurity because of their
deport- ability, highlighting the precariousness of their legality." Id. LPR status certainly unsettles
the legal/illegal binary, but I would argue further that LPR status is itself liminal, particularly in the
post-1996 legal framework. See discussion infra Parts IlIl.A, Ill.B.
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nent to provide freedom from deportation; indeed, the Brazilian young
adults of Cebulko's study were aware of and noted that fact.103
Cebulko's typology therefore requires further refinement because
LPRs experience differing degrees of stability within that status. Some
LPRs-for example, those who live in heavily policed, restrictionist jurisdictions and who have old criminal convictions that might appear to
render them deportable-may experience greater liminality and a greater
likelihood of banishment than an unauthorized noncitizen who is a low
priority for removal and lives in a more immigrant-friendly jurisdiction.
This suggests that LPR status must be treated as categorically liminal.
The particular degree of vulnerability experienced by LPRs will vary
depending on their legal histories, their places of residence, their economic statuses, their religion and their phenotypes, among other factors,
but those are highly individualized inquiries that do not correspond neatly to formal legal status. Individuals with liminal legal status may be
more or less secure at various moments in time, and different liminal
legal subjects may be more or less secure relative to other members of
the population. Any attempt to situate liminality as a midway point between formal legality and formal illegality thus requires a distortion of
both the actual mechanics of law and the lived experience of many liminal legal subjects with varying formal legal statuses.
Notably, Congressional proposals to legalize the immigration status
of certain unauthorized migrants would rely upon and expand the liminal
legality of lawful residents. Some proposals would eliminate the possibility of citizenship completely, evincing a preference for permanent liminality. 10 But even the viable proposals with a path to citizenship require
extensive periods of legal residence before legalized noncitizens would
even become eligible for lawful permanent resident status. The Senate's
2013 reform bill, for example, would require most noncitizens present
without authorization to accumulate about ten years of blue card status
before gaining lawful permanent resident status.105 From there, it will
usually be another three to five years until naturalization.' 06 For a population that, by definition, already will have survived several years of postentry screening, o7 this would be an unprecedented period of liminal legality prior to citizenship in the United States.

103.

Cebulko, supra note 102.

104.
This strategy has been promoted by presidential hopeful Jeb Bush, among others. JEB
BusH & CLINT BOLICK, IMMIGRATION WARS: FORGING AN AMERICAN SOLUTION 42-44 (2013).
105.
Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,

113th Cong. § 2212 (2013).
106.
Immigration and Nationality Act
(2015).

§§

316(a)(1), 319(a), 8 U.S.C.

§§

1427(a)(1), 1430(a)

107.
Cf Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-OrderStructure ofImmigration Law, 59
STAN. L. REV. 809, 811-13 (2007) (observing the value of such post-entry screening and arguing
that immigration law as currently structured essentially relies on this, rather than on effective frontend exclusion).
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Thus, even as the creation of legally liminal spaces can generate
protective reprieves from legal marginalization, they also can be constructed in ways that forestall, complicate, or obviate more complete
integration measures. The trend in immigration law over the past three
decades has favored the expansion of liminal legal status at the expense
of more integrative and secure legal statuses for noncitizens on the path
to citizenship. 08 Indeed, in its more recent decisions, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that the bestowal of federal administrative grace is a
central feature of the operation of contemporary immigration law.1oo
These trends in law have been compounded by trends in law enforcement, because even as the path to citizenship has become more drawn
out and more perilous, enforcement efforts that target immigrant communities have been on the rise.
Liminal legality thus characterizes the lives of many noncitizens
with various forms of legal status or presence. The experience of liminality is, for example, quite notable among noncitizens who fall under the
growing umbrella of temporary humanitarian forms of legal authorization. In a recent survey of 108 noncitizens with lawful immigration status
ranging from immigrant visas administered pursuant to the Violence
Against Women Act to more temporary forms of relief like U visas, TPS,
and asylum-seeker status, sociologists Leisy Abrego and Sarah Lakhani
found that noncitizens with lawful status "remain vulnerable to blocked
mobility, persistent fear of deportation, and instability, confusion and
self-blame."10 Immigrants who are authorized to remain in these kinds
of legal statuses are often treated as if they are undocumented, both because most people-including governmental actors-are unaware of the
existence, let alone the nature, of these forms of relief, and because antiimmigrant hostility is unbounded by law."' The "nebulous character of
liminal, humanitarian legal categories in a broader inhospitable context
may create difficulties when immigrants seek to convert their status into
tangible resources by signaling their legality to social intermediaries who
dispense benefits and control opportunities.""l 2 Abrego and Lahkani conclude that "in the current political context, the harsh consequences of
108.

See MOTOMURA, supra note 100, at 5-6; Heeren, supra note 30, at 1133-45;.

109.

See, eg, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505-07 (2012) (finding section 6 of

Arizona's S.B. 1070 unconstitutional because it undercut the federal administrative discretion needed to implement federal immigration laws). Adam Cox argues that the Arizona decision "elevate[s]
prosecutorial decisions by executive branch officials to the status of law for purposes of preemption
analysis." Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future ofimmigration Law, 2012 SUP.

CT. REV. 31, 54. Padillav. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), also implicitly validates this exercise of
administrative grace with its acknowledgment of the propriety of bargaining over immigration
consequences in criminal cases. In this way, the Padilla court acknowledges the reality recently
described by Jason Cade: "Back-end adjudicators are reduced to a much-diminished role in immigration courts. Thus, equity enters the deportation system, if at all, primarily through enforcement

discretion." Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 683 (2015).
110.

Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 3, at 265.

111.
112.

See id. at 265-66.
Id.at269.
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dehumanizing immigrants affect not only undocumented immigrants but
also those whose presence is legally approved."I 13
In fact, the spillover effects can be even more pronounced-the current climate of immigration policing affects whole communities, regardless of immigration status. Unfortunately, even as legal uncertainty has
become a more pervasive feature of immigrant life, enforcement efforts
that target immigrant communities have been on the rise. This, in turn,
brings a broader ambit of both noncitizens and citizens into situations of
legal precarity.
B. Immigration Enforcement and the ProductionofLiminality
Throughout U.S. history, and no less so now, concerns about supposed threats to the national character posed by immigration of people
"different" from native residents along axes of race, culture, and religion
have helped to drive waves of exclusionary immigration laws and enforcement practices.1 14 Such policies wax and wane.
Beginning in the early 1990s, the United States experienced a revival of restrictionist political sentiment that helped to drive election outcomes and shape policies at the federal,' 15 state,"1 6 and local" 7 levels.
113.

Id. at 287.

114.

See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND

CIVIL RIGHTS 152-54 (2004) (charting this history of exclusions on various grounds); KANSTROOM,
supra note 5, at 91 (charting this history of exclusions on various grounds); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalizationof Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 641 (2005)
(analyzing the 1875 Page Act as an exclusionary law motivated by racial concerns); Gabriel J. Chin,
Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discriminationand the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46

UCLA L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1998); Bill Ong Hing, No Placefor Angels: In Reaction to Kevin Johnson,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 559, 590-91 (discussing anti-semitism in immigration policy during the World
War II era); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizen-

ship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 409-10 (2005).
115. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-32, §
432, 110 Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135; Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638.
116.
See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, PopularDemocracy, and
Californias Proposition 187: The PoliticalRelevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L.

REV. 629, 632-34 (1995) (discussing the political dynamics giving rise to California's restrictionist
Proposition 187); S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the

Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431, 1431 (2012) (discussing the political
factors that generate subfederal immigration laws).

117.

See,

e.g., Hazleton,

Pa.,

Ordinance

2006-13

(Aug.

15,

2006), available at

https://www.aclu.org/hazleton-pa-ordinance-no-2006-13; Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2952
(Jan. 22, 2008). Both laws have been struck down on preemption grounds. Villas at Parkside Part-

ners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 857 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (ruling that federal law
preempted Farmers Branch Ordinance 2952), affd, 675 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2012), affd on reh'g en
banc, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 555 (M.D. Pa.
2007) (holding that federal law preempted Hazleton's rental ordinance against undocumented immi-

grants), affd in part, rev'd in part, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Karla Mari McKanders,
Welcome to Hazleton! "Illegal" Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the

FederalGovernment Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 10-11 (2007); Huyen Pham, When
Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115, 1126-27 (2009); Rose Cuison Villazor, "Sanctuary Cities "and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 575-76 (2010).
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While the restrictionist impulse was not uniform,"8 exclusionary efforts
targeting immigrants outweighed inclusive, integrationist efforts. Attempts to legalize longtime residents lacking legal status failed repeatedly,' 9 but funding for immigration enforcement rose steadily and significantly. 120 Ironically, having campaigned on multilingual promises of
immigration reform, President Barack Obama has become the "Deporterin-Chief,"l21 presiding over the late-stage rise of "a formidable immigration enforcement machine[]"l 22 and the greatest number of deportations
in the nation's history. 123 Building upon and amplifying the policies of
the Clinton and second Bush administrations, the Obama administration
has pursued expansive and aggressive enforcement policies both at the
border and in the interior of the country.' 24

118.
See Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance ofthe Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567, 567 (2008) (discussing integrationist efforts). After 2012, the tide seemed to turn
away from enforcement-related measures in favor of more integrationist approaches as the subfederal level. See, e.g., ANN MORSE ET AL., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2013
IMMIGRATION REPORT, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2013-immigrationreport.aspx#4.
119.
See Rachel Weiner, How Immigration Reform Failed, Over and Over, WASH. POST (Jan.
30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/01/30/how-immigration-reformfailed-over-and-over/ (discussing the failures of immigration reform in recent years, including failed

comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) bills in 2005, 2006, and 2007, and mentioning the failureprone Dream Act); see also Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman, U.S. Immigration Reform Didn't
Happen in 2013; Will 2014 Be the Year?, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/us-immigration-reform-didnt-happen-2013-will-2014-be-

year (discussing failure of the 2013 CIR bill); Elise Foley, DREAM Act Vote Fails in Senate,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/18/dream-act-votesenate n 798631.html (discussing the failure of the DREAM Act in 2011 and previous failures).
120.
Jennifer M. Chac6n, OvercriminalizingImmigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

613, 647-48 (2012).
121.

Eyder Peralta, National Council ofLa Raza Dubs Obama 'Deporter-In-Chief,'NPR (Mar.

4, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/04/285907255/national-councilof-la-raza-dubs-obama-deporter-in-chief (quoting National Council of La Raza President Janet
Murguia) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122.
DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 12 (2013), available at
http://camegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Image Galleries/immigration enforcementinusMPIreport.

pdf.
123.
Id. at 7-8. There is some dispute over this honor, with critics who favor a more restrictionist immigration policy pointing out that the bulk of these formal removals occur at the border,
while enforcement in the interior is declining when compared to the policies of the late Bush II
presidency. See Caitlin Dickson, Is Obama Really the Deporter-in-Chief? Yes and No., DAILY
BEAST (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/30/is-obama-really-thedeporter-in-chief-yes-and-no.html.
124.
Border efforts, both genuine and optical, still substantially outweigh interior enforcement
efforts. See Dickson, supra note 123. Indeed, just about the only thing the U.S. Congress can seem to
agree on is that you can never have enough boots on the ground on the U.S.-Mexico border. In 1993,
there were around 4,000 border patrol agents in the US. See, e.g., U.S. Customs & Border Prot.,
Border
Patrol
Agent
Staffing
by
Fiscal
Year,
CBP.GOV,
(last
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Staffing%20FYI992-FY2014_0.pdf
updated Sept. 20, 2014). Now, there are more than 20,000, almost all of whom are assigned to the
Southwestern border region. Id. The failed comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the
Senate in 2013 would have further increased this number. Border Security, Economic Opportunity,

and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong.

§

1102 (2013).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

736

[Vol. 92:4

Congress has enabled these practices. Unlike almost every other
line in the budget, spending on immigration enforcement seems to know
few constraints. In a 2013 report on immigration enforcement in the
United States Migration Policy Institute (MPI) found that:
Spending for the federal government's two main immigration enforcement agencies-US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)-and its primary
enforcement technology initiative, the US Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, surpassed $17.9 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2012. This amount is nearly 15 times the
spending level of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) when IRCA was enacted [in 1986]. In the ensuing 26 years, the
nation has spent an estimated $186.8 billion ($219.1 billion if adjusted to 2012 dollars) on immigration enforcement by INS and its successor agencies CBP and ICE, and the US-VISITS program.125
The MPI report only takes into account federal spending here, and
then, only spending by DHS. 126 These figures do not account for the
costs of formal criminal prosecutions for immigration offenses, which
are at historic highs. 12 7 Nor do they account for the increasing role of
state and local law enforcement in immigration enforcement, some of
129
which is driven by states,1 28 and some by the federal government. The
flow of resources into enforcement shows little sign of abatement.
As an outgrowth of this spending, formal removals are at historically high levels. 130 About 80% of these removals are taking place at the
border. 31 The remainder-about 80,000 a year-come from the interior
and involve longtime residents, including longtime lawful permanent
residents who are being removed either because they lack legal authorization to remain or because they have violated the terms of their stay,
usually as a result of a minor criminal conviction.132

125.

126.
127.
128.
H.B. 87,

MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 122, at 3-4.

Id. at 4 n.4.
Id at 93; Chac6n, supra note 120, at 635-36.
See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); H.B. 56, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Ala.);
151st Gen. Assemb., 2011-12 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); S.B. 20, 1 19 h Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg.

Sess. (S.C. 2011). These laws were largely enjoined on preemption grounds in the period leading up
to and following the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States. See, e.g., Arizona v.

United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th
Cir. 2012).
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
129.
130.

MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 122, at 7.

131.

Id.

See id. at 134-35. Since 1996, the laws of the US have expanded to require the removal
132.
and permanent return of individuals who have committed a long list of crimes, including relatively
minor offenses, that the Congress has classified as "aggravated felonies," in addition to the usual
removals for CIMTs, and other violations or unauthorized presence. See id. at 7. Removals for
unauthorized presence also trigger ten year bars in the case of anyone whose unauthorized presence

extends longer than a year. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(9)(B) (2015). Although the composition of the deported population is ever-shifting, official
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Reliance on detention has risen, too. The United States government
now detains well over 400,000 noncitizens each year, some for extended
periods of time, in public and private facilities around the country.133
Throughout this period, various criminal justice actors have played an
increasing, and increasingly contested, role in immigration enforcement
efforts.1 34
If the goal of all of this enforcement activity is preventing unauthorized migration, 35 the effectiveness of all this activity is debatable. Interestingly, these changes are coming at a time when numbers of unauthorized entries into the United States are at historic lows. The number of
records demonstrate that the vast majority of noncitizens removed to date for criminal offenses are
removed for traffic violations and similarly minor offenses. See TANYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA,
DEPORTED: POLICING IMMIGRANTS, DISPOSABLE LABOR AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 143 (2015).
133.
C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hemndez, Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives in Immigration

Detention, 57 HOw. L.J. 869, 869-70 (2014); see also Philip L. Torrey, Immigration Detention's
Unfounded Mandate, 15-04 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 5-9 (2015) (discussing the practice and politics
of the "bed mandate" and charting the steep rise in the numbers of noncitizens in immigration detention).
134.
Many of the discussions about the role of state and local law enforcement in immigration
policing take place in the context of debates over "immigration federalism." Hiroshi Motomura is
credited with coining the term. Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, InternationalHuman Rights, and
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999) (advocating a federal prerogative in immigration policy in tandem with a rejection of immigration exceptionalism with regard to
individual rights). Some scholars and policymakers have advocated a greater role for state and local
police in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential
Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L.

REV. 179, 183 (2006); Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls
and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 460-61 (1999). Others have expressed concerns that, at least at present, subfederal officials lack the necessary institutional competency, legal authority, or necessary oversight mechanism to fairly and constitutionally enforce immigration law. Jennifer M. Chac6n, A Diversion ofAttention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudica-

tion of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1607 (2010) [hereinafter Chac6n, A
Diversion] (contesting the sufficiency of the legal incentive structure to check excesses in policing of
immigrant communities); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why
Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
965, 986-87 (2004); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws,

6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1115 (2004). Speaking to the question of subfederal immigration policing, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled out some forms of participation in the case of Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), but that case also leaves open a broad swath legal terrain for potential
state and local immigration enforcement activities on the ground. Jennifer M. Chac6n, Policing
Immigration After Arizona, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 231, 231-32 (2013); Jennifer M. Chac6n,
The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577, 58 1-82 (2012);

Eagly, supranote 84, at 1750-52.
135.
Of course, there are many goals to this kind of policy. Border buildups serve a political
messaging function. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 147, 158-61
(2012). The growth in the relevant federal agencies-much like the growth in corrections-is also a
source of middle class jobs. And just as African-American women have benefitted from the proliferation of correction spending, see James Forman, Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America 's
Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 791, 798 (2011), the growth in immigration enforcement agencies has
redounded to the benefit of Latinos seeking solid middle class positions with government benefits.
See, e.g., Paulette Chu Miniter, A Border Agent (and Immigrant) Defies Stereotypes, USA TODAY,
May 7, 2007, at 21A (noting that in 2007, CBP "agency spokesman Mario Martinez says at least
6,700 of the country's 12,800 Border Patrol agents identify themselves as Hispanic"). This is not to
suggest that the individuals who have benefitted from this federal spending might not have benefited
more from comparable federal spending in other sectors like infrastructure development or education. But it does serve as a reminder of the complexities involved in assessing the "benefits" of
federal programs like these.
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individuals crossing the southern border without authorization is down
significantly;136 they have not been this low since the 1970s.137 In the
meantime, the size of the unauthorized population in the United States
has remained stagnant for several years.' 38 Net unauthorized migration is
currently negative.' 3 9 According to the Pew Hispanic Center, the estimated number of unauthorized migrants in the United States peaked around
2006-2007 at about 12 million and has since fallen to about 11.2 million,
where it has been holding steady for some time. 14 0
If border enforcement is playing some kind of a role in reshaping
entry patterns, 141 though, enforcement has thus far not generated the "at136.
Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, Beyond DAPA and DACA: Revisiting Legislative
Reform in Light of Long-Term Trends in Unauthorized Immigration to the United States, 3 J. ON
MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 80, 92-93 (2015).
Id. at 87. The drop in Mexican migration is a key factor here. Much of this has been
137.
attributed to increasing economic opportunities in Mexico and declining economic opportunities in
the U.S. Id. at 100. But this trend has been accompanied by a numerically smaller but still significant
rise in apprehensions of women and children migrating from the Northern Triangle countries of
Central America-Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador-pointing to the important role that push
factors in home countries play in shaping migration. Id at 96.

138.

Id. at 83

&

139.
Id. These statistics raise important questions about what it would take to demonstrate a
secure border to those politicians who continue to demagogue around the need for such "security."
140.
Paul Taylor et al., Unauthorized Immigrants: Length of Residency, Patterns of
1,
2011),
CENTER
(Dec.
Parenthood,
PEW
RESEARCH
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/12/01/unauthorized-immigrants-length-of-residency-pattems-ofparenthood/; see also Warren & Kerwin, supra note 136, at 83; Growth in UnauthorizedImmigration
Has
Leveled
Off
PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER
(Sept.
3,
2014),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/09/03/as-growth-stalls-unauthorized-immigrant-populationbecomes-more-settled/ph-2014-09-03-immigration-OI/.
It is difficult to assess with any certainty the strength of the causal connection between
recent enforcement efforts and migration flow. Longitudinal surveys suggest that migration flows do
not fluctuate in direct relationship to enforcement policies and are more heavily influenced by economic conditions. MASSEY ET AL., supra note 73, at 7-9; Wayne A. Cornelius, Controlling "Unwanted" Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993-2004, 31 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION
STUD. 775, 790 (2005); Wayne A. Cornelius, Impacts of Border Enforcement on Unauthorized
Mexican Migration to the
United States, BORDER
BATTLES
(Sept.
26,
2006),
http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Cornelius/. On the other hand, the most recent leveling off and decline in
the unauthorized population can be traced to trends that predate the Great Recession. Warren
Kerwin, supra note 136, at 90. This suggests that the state of the domestic economy may be just one
factor in the change. Improving economic conditions in Mexico are another oft-cited reason for the
decline in the unauthorized migrant population from Mexico in particular. See id (noting that Mexicans constituted nearly 70% of unauthorized migrant arrivals throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but
now constitute only about 33% of those arrivals). Similarly, the recent rise in entrants from the
Northern Triangle countries of Central America are largely attributable to deteriorating conditions in
those countries rather than any events in the United States. See id at 96. Ultimately, it is quite difficult to disaggregate the precise effects of these internal and external developments on migration

flows.
141.
The federal government's border enforcement strategy has largely ended circular patterns
of migration to the United States, thereby changing not only the places of entry of border crossers
(hence the notable rise of border deaths), but also the nature of work (from seasonal to permanent,
with an ensuing quest for year-round work); place of settlement (from traditional receiving states
like Texas, California and New York to states throughout the Midwest and Southeast); the demographics of the migrant flow (with more crossings for family unification purposes); and a shift in
the unauthorized population from predominantly migrants who entered without inspection to predominantly visa overstayers, a significant portion of whom are from outside of Mexico and Central

America. Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
121, 125, 164 (2001); see also Warren & Kerwin, supra note 136, at 94.
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trition"l 42 of settled immigrant populations. Perhaps this is because so
many unauthorized residents have lived in the United States for so

long.

143

Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that they bear the brunt of increasingly draconian enforcement efforts, many unauthorized migrants feel
themselves to be citizens, even if they lack any formal legal status.M
This is what prompted undocumented youth in the United States to or-

ganize for political change with sit-ins, anti-deportation campaigns orchestrated through social media, the mobilization of the undocu-bus, and
the proud proclamation of sin papeles sin rniedo-without papers and
unafraid. Far from spurring attrition, the crackdown on long-settled resi-

dents without legal status consolidated political mobilizations by individuals with no citizenship and (some would argue) no claim of right to
participate in the political process. This mobilization, in turn, was largely
responsible for the creation of the significant new temporarily protective
immigration statuses previously discussed.1 45 In other words, the enforcement strategies that increased the legal vulnerabilities of certain
immigrant populations also gave rise to the political forces that ultimately generated their increased protection. Immigration enforcement programs and deferred action programs are opposite sides of the same coin:
both are governance strategies aimed at liminal legal subjects, but enforcement pushes toward marginalization while deferred action pushes

toward inclusion."

6

142. Kris Kobach initially applied the phrase "attrition through enforcement" to the context of
immigration policing. Kris W. Kobach, Attrition through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to
Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 155, 157 (2008). The preamble to Arizona's S.B.
1070 explicitly expressed the achievement of enforcement by attrition as a goal of the statute. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1509(A), 13-2928(C), 13-3883(A)(5), invalidated by Arizona v. United
States 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). Immigration attorney Hans Meyer characterizes the resulting enforcement policies as a "war of attrition," and notes the many costs of this war. Hans Meyer, Remarks at the Denver University Law Review Crimmigration Symposium (Feb. 2, 2015), available at
http://du-denverlaw.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=93a85392-078a-414e84bd-5607b4fb08d3. The notion of attrition through enforcement also spawned a related discourse
concerning the desirability of enacting polices that prompt noncitizens to "self-deport." Mitt Romney used the phrase in his 2012 presidential campaign, Michael Barbaro, On Air and Before Audiences, Romney Makes Push for Hispanic Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, at Al 5, and that term
made another recent appearance in Judge Hanen's opinion in Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d
591, 634-35 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
143. Taylor et al., supra note 140 ("Nearly two-thirds of the 10.2 million unauthorized adult
immigrants in the United States have lived in this country for at least 10 years and nearly half are
parents of minor children . . .").
144.

See Abrego, supra note 3, at 729-31; GONZALES & TERRIQUEZ, supra note 74; Stephen

Lee, Growing Up Outside the Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1407-08 (2015) (reviewing HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014)); Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented

Closet, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 51-53, 57 (2013).
145.
WALTER J. NICHOLLS, THE DREAMERS: HOW THE UNDOCUMENTED YOUTH MOVEMENT
TRANSFORMED THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEBATE 30 (2013).

146. At the same time, the inclusive dimensions of the deferred action program arguably undercut, at least for a time, political mobilization efforts aimed at more comprehensive legalization
policies, even as they fail to achieve full incorporation.
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But the massive and unprecedented enforcement activities-the militarized border,1 47 the high-profile raids of homes and workplaces, 14 8 the
anti-immigrant bravado of certain state and local actors, 149 and the resulting churn of migrants through criminal courts, prisons, detentions centers, and deportation proceedings-have increased the legal liminality of
many individuals living in immigrant communities, not just those without legal status. Increased border policing, interior workplace raids, and
warrantless home entries by federal immigration officials and state and
local police officers have not just affected unauthorized migrants, or
even just their families, but entire communities where noncitizens live
and work.150
In the realm of immigration enforcement, individuals can be, and
are,profiled based on ethnicity and national origin. It is a longestablished constitutional principle that race is a permissible factor in
federal immigration policing and that federal officials can rely primarily
on racial markers to make policing decisions in the immigration context. 5 ' Indeed, the most recent Department of Justice guidelines on racial
profiling expressly exclude immigration policing from their ambit.1 52
Thus, when it comes to immigrant communities, formal legal guarantees
of equal protection and general guidelines against racial profiling are thin
in their protective scope against state and local actors purportedly engaged in ordinary policing activities. These policing activities can be
combined with and converted into immigration enforcement activities,
and when they are, the traditional protections that might otherwise have
inhered in the criminal process are not triggered.153

147.
PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 94 (2d ed. 2009);
Gulasekaram, supra note 135, at 147; Hing, supra note 141, at 129, 161.
148.
See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 143-44 (2009).
149.
Governor Jan Brewer and Sheriff Joe Arpaio are two easy examples. See, e.g., Femanda
Santos, In Arizona, Confusion on Ruling on Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2012, at Al2; cf Fernanda Santos, An Added Mission for Arizona Sheriffs Immigration Posse: School Patrols, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2013, at Al4. The federal government has no shortage, either. Representative Steve
King's statement that most unauthorized migrants are drug smugglers, which explains their "calves
the size of cantaloupes" is a case in point. Todd Beamon & John Bachman, Rep. Steve King Slams
Norquist over Attacks
on Immigration, NEWSMAX
(Jul.
18,
2013,
5:59 PM),
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/king-norquist-attacks-

immigration/2013/07/18/id/515882/#ixzz2ZVT2GoP5 (quoting Representative Steve King).
150.
See, e.g., AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE AFTERMATH
OF
IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
41-65
(2010),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412020_FacingOurFuture final.pdf (documenting the negative
impact of immigration detention on the children of detainees).

151.

See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975). The case seems dated

and problematic to the modem reader, but the DOJ continues to rely upon it in litigating equal protection and fourth amendment claims, so its continued significance is clear.
152.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION,
OR
GENDER
IDENTITY
2
(2014),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/pages/attachments/2014/12/08/use-of-race-policy.pdf.

153.

Chac6n, A Diversion, supra note 134, at 1602-06, 1620-22.
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The Second Circuit's recent opinion in Maldonado v. Holder,154
concluding that national origin profiling by local police did not constitute
an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment, both highlighted and
amplified the problem.' 5 5 In that case, the Second Circuit reasoned that
national origin profiling is a central and accepted component of immigration enforcement.' 5 6 The court concluded that there is no legal remedy
for such profiling even if the actors who engaged in the initial profiling
were not legally sanctioned to enforce immigration law at all.'
The consequences of such profiling, of course, are felt not only in
"sweatshops, forced brothels, and other settings in which illegal aliens
are exploited and threatened-and much worse,"' 5 8 but also in neighborhoods across the country with large immigrant populations unpopular
with the political establishment. Official investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice in jurisdictions as disparate as East Haven, Connecticut,'5 9 Alamance County, North Carolina,1 6 0 and Maricopa County, Ari-

zona, 161 describe immigrant communities living in fear of the police and
rampant racial profiling of Latinos as a standard element of policing
practices as local police prioritized immigration enforcement goals.' 62 In
this way, efforts to target legally liminal immigrants ultimately moves
154.

763 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2014).

See id. at 162-63. The case involved noncitizens who were identified as day laborers and
155.
seized by state and local officials who then turned the noncitizens over to ICE. The plaintiffs alleged
an "egregious violation" of the Fourth Amendment-the standard that is required for suppression in

removal proceedings under INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). Id. at 158-59 (quoting Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006)). The court found that reliance
on national origin was an essential part of immigration policing, and swept under the rubric of national origin the markers of ethnicity at issue in the case. Id. at 162-63.

156.
157.
158.

See id. at 162-63, 166-67.
See id. at 163.
Id. at 162.

http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/171201291812462488198.pdf

(finding

that "ASCO

-

159.
Letter from Thomas A. Perez, Asst. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Div., to
Hon. Jospeh A. Maturo, Jr., Mayor of E. Haven, Conn. 1-2 (Dec. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Perez,
Conn. Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthavenfindletter_ 1219-1I.pdf (finding the East Haven Police Department (EHPD) "engages in discriminatory policing
against Latinos, including but not limited to targeting Latinos for discriminatory traffic enforcement,
treating Latino drivers more harshly than non-Latino drivers after a traffic stop, and intentionally and
woefully facility to design and implement internal systems of control that would identify, track, and
prevent such misconduct").
160.
Letter from Thomas A. Perez, Asst. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Div., to
Clyde B. Albright, Cnty. Att'y, Alamance Cnty., N.C. & Chuck Kitchen, Att'y, Turrentine Law Firm
Letter],
available at
2012)
[hereinafter
Perez,
Alamance
1-2
(Sept.
18,
through the actions of its deputies, supervisors, and command staff-unlawfully targets, stops,
detains, and arrests Latinos").
161.
Letter from Thomas A. Perez, Asst. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Div., to
Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Att'y, Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. 1-2 (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Perez, Ariz.
Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso-findletter_12-15-1l.pdf
(finding that the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office (MSCO), "through the actions of its deputies,
supervisory staff, and command staff, engages in racial profiling of Latinos; unlawfully stops, detains, and arrests Latinos; and unlawfully retaliates against individuals who complain about or criticize MCSO's policies or practices").
See Perez, Alamance Letter, supra note 160; Perez, Ariz. Letter, supra note 161; Perez,
162.
Conn. Letter, supranote 159.
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more members of targeted minority groups, including many citizens, into
the criminal justice system, thereby marginalizing or completely banishing them through means other than deportation. The criminal law enforcement system and the immigration law enforcement system, even
when not formally intertwined, generate mutually reinforcing enforcement efforts that focus on disfavored minority groups.163 But, as the next
subsection will relate, these developments are not limited to the sphere of
"crimmigration."
C. Legal Liminality at the Blurred Civil-CriminalBorder
For the past two decades, the criminal and immigration enforcement
systems have been on parallel tracks of rising severity.
The similar and
sometimes interrelated developments in these areas of law initially gave
rise to the growth of a fairly extensive literature-one of which is increasingly referred to as a "crimmigration" literature. 16 This literature
163.
See GOLASH-BOZA, supra note 132; see also Vhzquez, supra note 99, at 647-49. Federal
enforcement may suffer from the same blindspots. Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles have found
evidence to support the conclusion that the speed of the rollout of the federal Secure Communities
program to particular jurisdictions correlated more closely to the size of the Hispanic population than
to the size of the jurisdiction's noncitizen population or the degree to which a given jurisdiction was
characterized as a high crime area. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, PolicingImmigration, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 87, 88 (2013). Cox and Miles note that these findings accord with Bernard Harcourt's
notion that seemingly rational models of policing "can often obscure the ways in which seemingly
neutral rules can in practice concentrate the burdens of law enforcement on minority communities."

Id. at 133.
164.
The severity turn in the criminal justice system has a longer trajectory, dating back to the
1970s, which has been documented in numerous scholarly accounts. See, e.g., MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 54-58
(2010); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 14-15 (2001); LoIC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY, 195-98 (2009); Mary Louise Frampton et al.,
Introduction, in AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION I2 (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008); David Garland, Epilogue, in MASS IMPRISONMENT:
SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 179-81 (David Garland ed., 2001); Tracey L. Meares, Mass
Incarceration: Who Pays the Pricefor Criminal Offending?, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 295,

295 (2004).
Immigration severity manifests as early as the late 1980s with the expansion of the aggravated felony category of deportability to further the goals of the war on drugs. See Jeff Yates et al., A
War on Drugs or a War on Immigrants? Expanding the Definition of "Drug Trafficking" in Determining Aggravated Felon Status for Noncitizens, 64 MD. L. REV. 875, 884-86 (2005); Nancy

Morawetz, Rethinking Drug Inadmissibility, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 173 (2008). But 1996
marks the true turning point in immigration law. See infra Part III.A.
165.
Some of the foundational literature predates the crimmigration label, and emerged in the
period following Congress's legislative enactments, beginning in the late 1980s, but really taking off
after 1996, as Congress first gradually and then quite suddenly expanded the scope and consequences of criminal grounds of deportation and exclusion while simultaneously reducing procedural protections and avenues for discretionary relief. This literature maps the increasingly punitive nature of
immigration law, the criminalization of immigration violations, and the proliferating immigration
consequences of criminal convictions. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 5, at 13; Kevin R. Johnson, The AntiterrorismAct, the ImmigrationReform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: ImportantLessons for Citizens andNoncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833, 838-43 (1997);
Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizingthe Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th

"Paleof Law," 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639, 651-52 (2004); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113

HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1890-91 (2000); Stephen H. Legomsky, Reforming the Criteriafor the Exclu-
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sion and the Deportation of Alien Criminal Offenders, 12 DEF. ALIEN 64, 64-65 (1989); Maria
Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud,
5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 671-72 (1997); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between
Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 83-85 (2005);
Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 99 (1998); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some
of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 305-06

(2000); Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51
EMORY L.J. 1131, 1132 (2002); Wishnie, supra note 134, at 1084-85; Victor C. Romero, Note,
Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?: Undocumented Immigrants' Rights After INS v.

Lopez-Mendoza and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999, 1001-02 (1992).
A second wave of scholarship examined procedural connections and emerging parallel
logics in criminal and immigration law enforcement. See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR
SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 140-41 (2006); Raquel Aldana, Of Katz
and "Aliens": Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1083
(2008); Chac6n, A Diversion, supra note 134, at 1564-65; Jennifer M. Chac6n, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1827, 1831 (2007) [hereinafter Chac6n, Unsecured Borders]; Jennifer M. Chacon, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the "CriminalStreet Gang Member," 2007 U. CIII. LEGAL F.
317, 321-23; Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration

Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1147-48 (2008); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the
Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature ofImmigration Removal

Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 289 (2008); Morawetz, supra note 164, at 166-67;
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L.

REV. 367, 369-73 (2006). Stumpf's article is the source of the crimmigration label, which I discuss
further below. See Part IV.B.
More recent scholarship has continued to refine and elaborate on the systemic and particularized connections and the more general parallels between these two enforcement systems. See, e.g.,
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 57-61 (2014); Jason A. Cade, The Plea
Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOzO L. REV. 1751, 1754-55 (2013);
Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, 25
CRIM. JUST. 21, 25 (2010); Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality ofState Regu-

lation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 253-55 (2011); Cox & Miles,
supra note 163, at 87-88; Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Varia-

tion in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1129-31 (2013); Eagly, supra note 84, at 181617; Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281, 1349-51 (2010); C6sar
Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernndez, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2013);
C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernandez, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 114-15); Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Courts,
23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 675, 675-76 (2015); Kevin R. Johnson, Essay, How Racial Profiling
in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United

States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1007 (2010); Anil Kalhan,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,

74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1107-09 (2013) [hereinafter Kalhan, Immigration Policing]; Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of

the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1462-64 (2011); Christopher N. Lasch,
"Crimmigration" and the Right to Counsel at the Border Between Civil and Criminal Proceedings,

99 IOWA L. REV. 2131, 2132-34 (2014); Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer
Enforcement Under Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL'Y 281, 313-30 (2013)
[hereinafter Lasch, Detainer Enforcement]; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration
Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471-72
(2007); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and its Possible Undoing,

49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 107-49 (2012); Motomura, supra note 84, at 1821-22; Rick Su, Police
Discretion and Local Immigration Policymaking, 79 UMKC L. REV. 901, 901-03 (2011); Vizquez,

&

supra note 99, at 640-45.
A subset of this literature has also explored the linkages between national security law and
discourse and immigration law. See, e.g., Muneer 1. Ahmad, Guantanamo is Here: The Military
Commissions Act and Noncitizen Vulnerability, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 1-2; Susan M. Akram
Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September II, 2001: The Target-

ing of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 297-98 (2002); Chac6n, Unsecured
Borders, supra note 165, at 1830-3 1; Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards:
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posits that the criminal law and immigration law regime operate in tandem in ways that make noncitizens uniquely vulnerable to incarceration
(including in immigration detention) and exclusion. It explores both substantive connections between the criminal and immigration enforcement
systems and the convergence of logics in the criminal and immigration
law spheres. While it has been quite important in sussing out the interconnections of nominally unrelated enforcement systems and the discourse that fuels them, the "crimmigration" framework may at times also
obscure the important point that the legal vulnerabilities produced by the
interaction of civil and criminal legal mechanisms in heavily policed
communities are not unique to noncitizens. Outside of the bounds of any
"crimmigration" system, the criminal justice system evinces such trends.
The interaction of civil and criminal legal regimes in the production of
liminal legality is acutely evident far beyond the bounds of immigration
enforcement, and the marginalizing effects of this civil-criminal interplay
are ironically aggravated by the efforts of policymakers at the state and
federal level to bring down the incredibly high human and financial costs
of incarceration.
The United States, the world leader in imprisoning its residents, 166
appears to be rethinking its heavy reliance on incarceration as the solution to its social problems.' 67 Budgets are an important driver of these
reforms. Although the federal government can print money to enforce its
laws, states have to include criminal justice costs in their balanced budgets, and these groaning budgets have pushed state officials to do things
that would have been unheard of fifteen years ago. This includes reducing the severity of some offenses and decriminalizing others. 168 Marijuana has been a particularly popular focal point for the decriminalization
efforts, but states are also experimenting with the decriminalization of
other offenses, including crimes like driving with a suspended license,
disturbing the peace, petty theft, and other regulatory offenses that used

Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the "War" on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1059-60
(2002); Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling After September II: The Department ofJustice's 2003

Guidelines, 50 LOY. L. REV. 67, 69 (2004); Kevin R. Johnson, September II and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 850-52 (2003); Stephen H.
Legomsky, The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Noncitizens: National Security and International

Human Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 161-62 (2005).
166.
See sources cited supranote 164.
167.
1 should note that imprisonment is still a central and bloated component of criminal justice
throughout the United States. See, e.g., U.S. PrisonPopulationDeclinesfor Third Consecutive Year,
SENTENCING PROJECT (Dec. 19, 2013), http://sentencingproject.org/detaillnews.cfm?newsid=1720
(noting that the prison population has declined for 3 years in a row, but at "[a]t its 2012 rate of
decline, it would take until 2101, or 88 years, for the U.S. prison population to return to its 1980
level").
168.
See, e.g., State Spending for Corrections:Long-Term Trends and Recent CriminalJustice
Policy Reforms, NAT'L Ass'N OF ST. BUDGET OFFICERS 5
(Sept.
11, 2013),
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/pdf/State%20Spending%20for%2OCorrections.pdf
(noting
the fiscal pressures driving state-level criminal justice reform).
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to carry jail time.' 69 California, one of the nation's leaders in incarceration, is also potentially leading the way out of the penal expansion with
its realignment efforts.1 70

At the federal level, the arbitrary crack-cocaine sentencing disparity
that once punished crack possession at a rate of 100 times of that of cocaine possession has been reduced to the slightly less inexplicable rate of
18-to- 1.'1 Former Attorney General Holder issued explicit guidance to
U.S. Attorneys to exercise their discretion in favor of more lenient
charges in cases involving of low-level drug crimes.1 72 In the face of
these and other changes, prison populations have shrunk for four years in
a row, and some states are even closing prisons.173 As Alexandra Natapoff writes, "Scholars and commentators say hopeful things like 'there
seems good reason to hope the war on crime may soon wind down,'
'mass incarceration has come to an end,' 'the war on drugs is over,' and
the U.S. has become 'a more benevolent nation."'l74
It might be easy to lose sight of the less encouraging aspects of these developments, but it is important to catalogue them. First, an awful lot
of people are still in prisons and jails.1 75 These individuals are denied any
expectation of privacy vis-A-vis the state,176 experience unparalleled limits on human intimacy,1 77 and are subjected to high rates of documented

169.

Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV.

1055, 1058

(2015).
170.
Joan Petersilia & Jessica Greenlick Snyder, Looking Past the Hype: 10 Questions Everyone Should Ask About California'sPrison Realignment, 5 CAL. J. POL. & POL'Y 266, 267 (2013)
(noting that realignment has the potential to substantially reduce incarceration rates without a negative effect on crime rates, but also noting that implementation might not achieve either or both of
those lofty goals).

171.

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220,

§ 2,

125 Stat. 2372, 2372 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). It is not entirely clear why 18-to-I is "fair," but it is
less unfair than it used to be.
172.
Holder Calls for New Approach to Prosecuting Low-Level Drug Crimes, PBS

NEWSHOUR (Aug. 12, 2013, 6:02 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/videos/#51054. Interestingly, this non-prosecution policy did not excite the cries of unconstitutionality that accompanied the
parallel exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the immigration context.

173.

Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1105.

174.
Id. at 1106 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ian F. Haney L6pez, Post-RacialRacism: Racial
Stratificationand Mass Incarcerationin the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2010));
E.J. Dionne
Jr.,
A
More Benevolent Nation?, WASH.
PosT, Nov.
17,
2013,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-a-more-benevolent-

nation/2013/11/17/36fc99aa-4e46-l I e3-9890-a Ie0997fb0cO story.html; Nick Gillespie, The War on
Drugs is Over (If Obama Wants It), DAILY BEAST (Oct. 30, 2013, 5:45 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/10/30/the-drug-war-is-over-if-obama-wants-it.html;
Michael Santos, Mass Incarceration as a Public Policy, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 24, 2012, 11:36
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-santos/mass-incarceration-as-a- p b_1447564.html.
175.
In 2012 there were 1,570,397 in state and federal prison. U.S. Prison PopulationDeclines
for Third Consecutive Year, supranote 167.

176.

See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).

177.
Keramet Reiter, The Pelican Bay Hunger Strike: Resistance within the Structural Constraints ofa US Supermax Prison, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 579, 579-80 (2014); Russell K. Robinson,
Masculinity as Prison: Sexual Identity, Race, and Incarceration, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1317-19
(2011); Michael Montgomery, Does 22 '/z Hours Alone in an 8-by-10 Cell Every Day Amount to
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sexual, physical, and emotional abuse.178 Citizens in prison are also denied the right to vote in almost every state.17 ' These individuals subsist in
a legal zone that is devoid of many of the rights and protections available
to those who have not been convicted.1 80 Their status is not liminal; these
individuals have been banished, at least for a time.
Second, and of central importance to this analysis, many decarceration schemes generate the expansion of liminal legal statuses to individuals who might not be incarcerated but who are also not free of the reach
of the criminal justice system. Criminal justice may be entering an Eliasian moment, insofar as a growing number of people have begun to
express distaste for the nation's heavy reliance on incarceration. 1At the
same time, however, the resulting decarceration efforts rely on softer and
more pervasive touches by government actors and private agents. Around
the core group of individuals who have been relegated to the nation's
prisons, there is a growing group of people who are neither in prison nor
fully free of its punitive and rights-limiting grasp. Like the noncitizen
slipping between undocumented and membership statuses, these individuals have strangely indeterminate legal rights. They are regulated by civil
law regimes backed by the threat-but lacking the procedural protections-of criminal punishment. They must often pay to avoid banishment. They are nominally free but subject to unusually high levels of
state monitoring and control. They are frequently limited in the exercise
of their citizenship rights, and they are vulnerable to capricious exercises
of discretionary authority and private discrimination and retaliation. Although they are not identically situated to those with DACA and DAPA
status, they too experience a form of liminal legality.
As a result, the turn away from penal severity has not resulted in a
notable contraction of the criminal justice system. Although the number
of people in prisons is down,1 82
[T]he penal apparatus is quietly expanding. While state prison populations declined in 2012, jail populations went up. Supervisory programs like diversion, privatized probation, community supervision
Torture?, CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Feb. 25, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports/does22-12-hours-alone-8-1 0-cell-every-day-amount-torture-4225.
The U.S. Department of Justice National Former Prisoner Survey found that 10% of
178.
inmates experienced sexual abuse in prison. ALLEN J. BECK & CANDACE JOHNSON, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION REPORTED BY FORMER STATE PRISONERS, 2008, at 8 (2008),
at
available
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/zPersonal/Huus/svrfspO8%5BI`%5D.pdf.
PROJECT,
SENTENCING
Disenfranchisement,
179.
Felony
http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=133 (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
180.

See, e.g., Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535 (finding that a prisoner has no right to privacy in his

prison cell). Prisoners are constitutionally protected from cruel and unusual punishment in prison,
but the bar is high, and courts give broad deference to prison officials in the administration of prison

facilities. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-86 (1987).
181.
182.

JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL 155-60 (2014).
U.S. Prison PopulationDeclinesfor Third Consecutive Year, supra note 167.
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and GPS monitoring are growth industries . . . . Defendants are on the
hook for an increasing array of fines and fees that can require years
to pay.1

The modem criminal justice system also relies upon an "increasingly intrusive system of surveillance, social stratification, and behavioral
controls," including video cameras, crime records databases, immigration

violator databases, DNA databases, sex offender registries, and other
amalgamations of data.' 84 The effects of this pervasive and intrusive
monitoring extend well beyond individual defendants, reshaping lives at
the level of communities.'
At the same time, there are few formal checks on many of the growing intrusions into the lives of citizens in heavily policed communities.

Concerns about the inadequacies of the Fourth Amendment as a check on
governmental surveillance are common

86

and are beginning to stir re-

newed interest among some justices of the Supreme Court. 87 But governmental intrusions into spaces of informational privacy are far more
concerning when they operate in tandem with other exercises of governmental control.' 8 8 Ironically, the checks on governmental power are often
quite thin even when governmental intrusions are at their greatest. Government actors are increasingly relying on civil and administrative law

tools-backstopped by the criminal justice system-to maintain social
order. But just as criminal procedural protections are inapplicable in the
civil realm of immigration law, those same protections also do not extend
to other civil law regimes like parole, trespass laws, and civil gang injunctions. Unsurprisingly, these are the tools that federal, state, and local
governmental actors are increasingly using to regulate community members. This shift toward practices that supplement criminal punishments
with more flexible regulatory regimes generates a new set of liminal legal subjects.
Individuals on parole experience this problem firsthand and provide

perhaps the clearest example of liminal legality at the edges of the criminal justice system.1 89 Parole is often framed as "a defendant-friendly in183.

Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1106-07 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

184. Id. at 1056.
185. Tonja Jacobi et al., The Attrition ofRights Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 887, 889-90
(2014); Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1103.
186.

David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the

Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1087-88 (2014).
187.
See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484-85 (2014); United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
188.
Sklansky, supra note 186, at 1103, 1118 (exploring other forms of governmental intrusions).
189.
David Sklansky has already noted the parallels between the interplay of immigration and
criminal law and the use of parole. He writes:
For the large and growing population of parolees, parole supervision functions as a parallel enforcement track, with lower procedural hurdles but a set of available sanctions that
often (although far from always) will be less severe than the sanctions that would be trig-
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stitution"; it purportedly reduces prison time and aids offender reintegration in the community.190 Certainly, it is an improvement over incarceration in many respects; but it also generates liminal legality. Like their
counterparts in the immigration world, parolees must pay for the protections that the status can offer.191 Parolees also live on the razor's edge of
banishment, with little to no judicial process to stand between freedom
and prison. Parolees arrested on probable cause of parole violations can
be detained for up to three months pending a violations hearing and can
be reincarcerated for such offenses on a preponderance of the evidence
standard.
"[Elven if the parolee is only accused of a technical violation-for
instance, failing to attend meetings with a parole supervisor-he or
she can be subject to a longer term of incarceration than he was initially sentenced to serve. . . . [Including] beyond the maximum sentence allowed for the initial crime.1 92
The wide net supposedly designed to allow more individuals to escape incarceration ultimately results in more, not less, prison time for
some subset of those released.
The effects of these policies are not limited to individuals subject to
reincarceration. Because individuals on parole have little or no reasonable expectation of privacy,1 93 their homes can be searched in the absence
of a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion-a fact that under-

gered by a new criminal conviction. That is to say that parole serves the same function
with respect to parolees that immigration law serves for noncitizens: a separate enforcement track that low-level officials can elect to pursue, in lieu of normal criminal enforcement, when it appears convenient.
David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV.

157, 207 (2012).
Jacobi et al., supra note 185, at 889-90.
190.
Many criminal justice systems require parolees to pay "supervision fees" associated with
191.
the costs of their freedom. See Paul Peterson, Supervision Fees: State Policies and Practice,76 FED.
PROBATION 40, 40 (2012). For some examples of such fees, see, e.g., Cost of Supervision, IDAHO
DEP'T
CORRECTIONS,
http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/probationandparole/offenderresources/cost-of supervision
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015) ("Any person under Idaho Department of Correction probation or parole
supervision shall be required to contribute not more than seventy-five dollars ($75.00) per month as
determined by the Board of Correction. The IDOC currently assesses a monthly fee of sixty dollars ($60.00) per
month.");
Fees,
WASH.
COUNTY
COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONS,
http://www.co.washington.or.us/CommunityCorrections/fees/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (describing
Washington County, Oregon supervision fees set at $35 per month); Frequently Asked Questions
About Community Resources, WIS. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS, http://doc.wi.gov/communityresources/faq (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (discussing, inter alia, supervision fees for probationers in
Wisconsin); Monitored Misdemeanor Program Fee Payments, MULTNOMAH COUNTY,
https://multco.us/dcj-adult/mmp/monitored-misdemeanor-program-fee-payments (last visited Mar. 9,
2015) (detailing monitoring fees in Multnomah County, Oregon); Probation and Parole Fee Payment System, ARK. COMMUNITY CORRECTION, https://www.ark.org/dcc/pmt/index.php (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015) (describing Arkansas Community Corrections supervision fees allowed for up to
$2000). This list is far from exclusive.
Jacobi et al., supra note 185, at 891.
192.

193.

See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006).
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mines the privacy of any individual living with a parolee. 194 Indeed, parole affects entire neighborhoods. One study of New York City found
that "not only do police stop more individuals in high parole density
neighborhoods, but . .. they then conduct significantly more searches
and arrests in those neighborhoods. The rates of frisks, however, are
lower in parolee-dense neighborhoods ....
The authors read these
numbers to suggest that it is not just parolees who are being targeted for
full searches in the absence of justifying criminal suspicion, but nonparolees in the neighborhood as well.1 9 6 In other words, entire neighborhoods in parolee-dense areas are policed differently.1 97 Parole is transformed into a "mechanism for the infectious degradation of community
rights."' 98 In this regard, it is not only parolees who exist in a liminal
legal space; the rights of entire communities surrounding parolees experience the effects of liminal legality as well.
Because of racial disparities in the criminal justice system, African
Americans are overrepresented among parolees relative to their presence
in the general population, which means that the communities marked for
this type of policing are disproportionately African-American communities.1 99 The Supreme Court's decisions in cases like Atwater v. Lago
Vista,200 which allows for warrantless arrests for minor offenses that car201
202
ry no jail time, and Heien v. North Carolina, which upholds the validity of arrests based on the arresting officers' mistaken understanding
of the law, 203 increase the likelihood of arrests in these more heavily policed areas while simultaneously decreasing the availability of remedies
for errors in arrests.
As a result of doctrinal developments that emerged during the war
on drugs era, arrests, in turn, often seem to be a virtual black hole of procedural rights. In escalating situations, police are allowed to use deadly
force to effectuate an arrest, even if the underlying conduct does not warrant incarceration, much less death.204 Arrests allow officials to conduct
dehumanizing and demeaning searches, including strip searches, as part
of standard booking procedures, and there is no redress for the resulting
violations of bodily integrity and dignity, even if these arrests are made

194.

Jacobi et al., supra note 185, at 891.

195.
196.

Id. at 893.
Id. at 893-94.

197.

Id.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 894.
Id. at 892.
532 U.S. 318 (2001).
Id. at 354.
135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
Id. at 536.

204.
Indeed, this is precisely the sequence of events that led to the deaths of Eric Garner and
Michael Brown in the Fall of 2014. See Ian Ayres & Daniel Markovits, Enforce the Law - Without
Force, WASH. POsT, Dec. 25, 2014, at A25 (describing the encounters and suggesting changes to the
"rules of engagement" governing arrest).
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in error. 20 5 The more permissive stop, search, and arrest doctrines governing parolees can therefore create highly intrusive policing effects for
everyone in parole-dense communities, not just parolees. The communal
rights degradations generated by this interplay of criminal and civil/administrative regulatory regimes are very like those experienced in
immigrant communities subjected to heighted immigration policing.206
Nor are parolees the only liminal legal subjects existing on the edges of the criminal justice system. State and local actors throughout the
United States have demonstrated a creative ability to pair criminal justice
system mechanisms with novel civil law tools to regulate and limit the
movement of their residents in ways that actually mimic deportation.
"Increasing swaths of urban space are delimited as zones of exclusion
from which the undesirable are banned. The uniformed police are marshaled to enforce and often delineate these boundaries; they use their
powers to monitor and arrest in an attempt
to clear the streets of those
20 7
considered unsightly or 'disorderly."'
City officials rely on a hybrid combination of civil and criminal law
to achieve these banishments. In their study of policing practices in Seattle, Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert noted the proliferation of civil
law mechanisms that are used in conjunction with the criminal law to
keep individuals deemed undesirable out of certain physical spaces. One
such mechanism is a "Stay Out of Drug Areas (SODA) order[]," which
can be "imposed by judges as a condition of a sentence" but "may also
be issued by probation or community corrections officers as part of
community supervision." 20 8 These orders require individuals to stay out
of certain designated areas. Another combined civil-criminal law mechanism for enforcing spatial exclusion is the trespass admonishment. Municipalities encourage property owners to authorize law enforcement to
determine who can be on their property. So empowered, law enforcement
can admonish people to remain off of the affected property and can be
punished with criminal law sanctions for their failure to comply. 209 Trespass admonishment has become a pervasive and intrusive means of enforcing spatial exclusion in public housing areas across the country. 210
Still another mechanism is the "off limits" order, which is imposed as a

205.

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012). Individuals

identified as arrestable in databases, whether accurately or mistakenly, are indefinitely relegated to
liminal legal state. When their record triggers an arrest, there are no formal legal protections from
intrusive arrest procedures, even in hindsight. Id.
206.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
207.
KATHERINE BECKET & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTROL IN
URBAN AMERICA 8 (2010).

208.
209.
210.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
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condition of supervised release and which requires individuals to stay out
of certain, specified areas. 211 As Beckett and Herbert have explained,
Many U.S. cities now deploy other new social control tools that involve spatial exclusion and, like the innovations just described, fuse
civil and criminal law. These include gang injunctions, juvenile curfews, and "no contact orders." Civil gang injunctions, widely used by
such California cities as Los Angeles, mobilize the civil power of the
injunction to address what is typically thought of as a crime problem
.... As is the case with trespass exclusions, a violation of these civil
orders is a criminal offense. 212
Those who are subject to these exclusionary practices are separated
from family members and can lose access to important treatment and
employment opportunities. 213 Indeed, the life-altering consequences of
civil exclusions prompted Professors Beckett and Herbert to characterize
the experience as one of banishment.
Individuals in diversionary programs also experience liminal legality as a result of their legal regulation at the border of civil and criminal
legal regimes. For example, as jurisdictions decriminalize certain conduct, some people are able to escape imprisonment by paying fines. Because these fines can play a key role in funding the workings of municipal government, there are perverse incentives on police officers to seek
out opportunities to gather them, even when such efforts themselves are
not supported by law.214 Moreover, the payment of a fine does not exempt the payee from a host of punitive mechanisms that follow from
their putative criminality. These same individuals may experience private
denials of housing, credit, and jobs that flow from their marked records,
generating enduring forms of liminality. 215
The diversionary processes to which they submit can also render
some individuals quite vulnerable to a host of private actors. Private ac-

211.

Id.at9.

212.

Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted).

213.

See id. at 4-7.

214.
For outrageous-but surely not isolated-examples of this practice, see, for example, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 4
at
available
REPORT],
FERGUSON
[hereinafter
(2015)
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/201 5/03/04/fergusonpolice departmentreport.pdf ("[Ferguson municipal]
court practices exacerbate the harm of Ferguson's unconstitutional police practices. They impose a
particular hardship upon Ferguson's most vulnerable residents, especially upon those living in or
near poverty. Minor offenses can generate crippling debts, result in jail time because of an inability
to pay, and result in the loss of a driver's license, employment, or housing.") The report also provided detailed examples of police officers giving citations for conduct that was not, in fact, a violation
of any law. Id. at 22. Racial animus has been an important, driving force in this unconstitutional
conduct. Id. at 4.
215.
See Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1107 ("The collateral consequences of even a minor
conviction-from employment restrictions to housing, education and immigration-have become a
new and burdensome form of restraint and stigma.").

752

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:4

tors engage in the collection of unpaid fines.21 6 Private actors also often
assess success in diversionary programs like drug treatment programs.217
And the state backs these private actors by holding out the threat of the
ultimate sanction of prison, even as the path to prison is strewn with fewer procedural protections when compared to the traditional criminal process. 2 18 The resulting system visits its most severe consequences on economically disadvantaged members of racial minority groups. Law enforcement officers can willfully target African Americans and other racial minority groups with these practices-and they have done so. 2 19
Moreover, even where no overt racism is at work, the practices can have
disproportionately harsh effects on minorities because whites are more
likely to be able to pay, and program managers are more likely to deem
whites to have succeeded in diversionary programs than their non-white
counterparts.220 This means that racially disparate outcomes in new, alternative sentencing schemes may be baked into the mix. 22 1

-

As in the case of the iconic liminal legal subjects, the role of private
actors is again important not just in shaping and implementing these new
regulatory mechanisms but also in extending them. 222 Issa KohlerHausmann's analysis of misdemeanor courts in New York shows that
criminal defendants will often plead to low level misdemeanors rather
than deal with the harassment of the multiple appearances that are re223 quired to contest a criminal charge,
just as immigrants with tenuous
legal statuses will sometimes take unfavorable pleas to escape the gov224
ernmental monitoring associated with pretrial detention.
Those individuals attempt to escape a process that is a punishment by pleading to
offenses that do not carry jail time.225 But once a plea is entered, individuals continue to face a range of collateral consequences, quite often privately imposed, and they are also treated differently if they are brought
back into contact with the process again while still marked as a misde226
meanant in their temporary records2.
These liminal legal subjects are

216.
217.
218.

Id. at 1085.
Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1095-96.

219.

FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 214, at 4.

220.
221.

See Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1096-97.
See id.

222.
See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 611, 662 (2014); see also MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 171-72 (1992).
223.
Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 222, at 666.
224.
Cade, supra note 165, at 1776 ("Noncitizens placed under immigration detainers at booking, or who fear ICE contact in pretrial detention, have a tremendous incentive to plead guilty as
quickly as possible in misdemeanor court, even to charges that trigger the possibility of additional
immigration consequences, and even if they are innocent or have been subject to unlawful police
practices.")
225.
Cf FEELEY, supra note 222, at 30.
226.
Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 222, at 668-69; see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE,
CRIME AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 144-47 (2007) (finding that crimi-
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therefore particularly vulnerable to punishments, formal and informal, by
public and private actors. 227
In short, contemporary governance strategies to expand social control while simultaneously decreasing penal severity sometimes lead to
more diffuse, less visible, and less accountable forms of punishment.
These strategies generate new classes of individuals who now exist in a
fraught space of liminal legality.
D. Concluding Thoughts on the Production ofLiminality
The discussion above is not meant to exhaustively catalogue the
class of liminal legal subjects, but rather, to demonstrate that the concept
might be useful, not only for understanding the experiences of certain
unauthorized or temporarily authorized migrants, but lawful permanent
residents and citizens as well. The denizen on the edge of the criminal
justice system has many shared characteristics with noncitizens given
temporary reprieve from removal and with the citizens who are policed
more heavily because they bear the visible markers of race or ethnicity
that correlate to other forms of liminal legal status. Many individuals
experience overlapping vulnerabilities due to the combination of their
128
race, religion, class and immigration status.
But even if shared features of liminal legality can be identified, and
even if one accepts that citizens and noncitizens alike experience forms
of liminal legality, what, if anything, can we learn from focusing attention on the liminal legal subject?
III. LEARNING FROM LIMINAL LEGALITY

In this final Part, I discuss some of the potential discursive and practical benefits of using the concept of liminal legality to frame discussions
concerning governance choices in regulation and policing. While the
treatment is not comprehensive, this Part does sketch out some of the
ways that a focus on liminal legality can benefit and deepen legal academic discourse. First, such a focus might generate more nuanced accounts about the governance strategies involved in the creation and management of liminal legal subjects. Second, an analytical framework constructed around a shared concept of liminal legality might serve as means
of bringing inward-looking discussions concerning immigration regulation, criminal justice, and other fields into more meaningful conversation
with one another. Finally, and much more tentatively, I suggest that a
focus on the concept of liminal legality might also offer the basis for a

nal records have a significant effect on an individual's employment prospects, and that the effect is
significantly more pronounced for African American men).
227.
Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 222, at 670; Natapoff, supra note 169, at 1089-90.
228.
See generally GOLASH-BOZA, supra note 132, at 16-19; VAzquez, supra note 99, at 654-
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theoretically coherent account of contemporary reform advocacy efforts
that deemphasize the rights of formal legal citizenship as the focal point
of rights discourse.
A. LiminalLegal Subjects and "The State"
Scholars who have closely studied the lived experience of those
with liminal legality have provided a rich account of the impact of such
status on the lives of its bearers. Those accounts can be very helpful to
anyone seeking to understand the individual and community-level consequences of particular governance strategies. But these accounts could
also be used as the starting point for deeper exploration of how state
power operates in the production and regulation of liminal legality.
Sociological accounts theorize that the creation of liminal legal categories "brings to the fore the continued power of the nation-state." 229 In
this framing, the state's role in generating liminal legal status for noncitizens is just one part of a broader trend toward greater consolidation of
state power vis-a-vis would-be entrants-and would-be citizensthrough tightened access to entry and to citizenship. 230 At a time when
the cross-border movement is more possible, and more common, than
ever before, states find new ways to assert their power through tightened
barriers to entry and more tightly controlled access to both citizenship
and the benefits that citizenship bestows.23 1 Simply put, the existing
scholarship on liminal legality posits that through the creation of liminal
legal subjects, the state is strengthened vis-A-vis its subjects.
By concretizing how liminal legality relates to law and legal status,
scholars might begin to offer more detailed and nuanced accounts about
how liminal legality is produced by and shapes governance. Among other things, this will require a disaggregation of state actors. Different governmental actors are empowered and disempowered in the governance of
individuals with liminal legal statuses, and the transformative effect on
state actors is both more complex and more profound than a mere
strengthening of state power vis-A-vis noncitizens. Understanding these
dynamics is far more difficult than an analysis that presumes the existence of a monolithic state responsible for governing its diverse popula-

Menjivar, supra note 2, at 1004.
229.
See, e.g., Irene Bloemraad, Who Claims Dual Citizenship? The Limits ofPostnationalism,
230.
the Possibilities of Transnationalism, and the Persistence of Traditional Citizenship, 38 INT'L
MIGRATION REv. 389, 389-90 (2004); see also MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW,
supra note 165, at 98 (noting that the passage of immigration-related legislation in 1996 has increased the vulnerability of lawful permanent residents and hardened what had previously been a
softer citizen-resident line). But see Peter J. Spiro, The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of Citi-

zenship, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 899, 900 (2013) (arguing that "[flew important rights hinge
on citizenship status").

231.

See, e.g., Menjivar, supra note 2, at 999-1002.
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232

tions.
Using affected liminal populations as the starting point for analyses of governance strategies allows for more accurate accounts of how
various governing bodies share power among themselves in the regulation of particular populations.
One can look to the creation of the DACA and DAPA programs as
one example of how this focus aids in the analysis of regulations aimed
at liminal legal subjects. When evaluating the DACA and DAPA programs, many scholars and commentators have argued that the federal
Executive Branch is strengthened (or perhaps even aggrandized) not only, or even primarily, as against its liminal legal subjects, but also as
against the federal Legislature and state governments. 233 In this narrative,
executive agencies exercise power that exceeds that delegated by Congress's enforcement scheme and that is denied to both Immigration Judges housed within the Department of Justice and Article III courts. This
aggrandizement happens at the expense of the diminished federal legislature and judiciary, but also at the expense of states, since the states bear
some of the burdens of implementing the program.234 Such a story of
executive empowerment could be told about many of the rising liminal
classes, and the entire subject could be chalked up to insufficient checks
on executive power with the rise of the administrative state.
On the other hand, the experience of liminal legal subjects that were
the focus of the DACA and DAPA programs expose the inadequacy of
this account. These programs formalize (or would formalize, in the case
of DAPA) exercises of prosecutorial discretion expressly and impliedly
delegated by Congress to the Executive branch in an area where the Executive actually has quite expansive powers.235 In fact, the aggrandizement of USCIS at the expense of other political actors is not the best
account of the DACA and DAPA programs at all. This is quite evident
when one focuses not on the content of the OLC memo that provides the
legal justification for the programs, or on the statements of various officials in support of the program, but rather, on the liminal legal subjects
who dwell within the potential protective scope of DACA and DAPA.
Shifting the focus in that direction immediately begs the important question of why the programs were needed at all. After all, these liminal legal

232.
Accordingly, some sociologists are already beginning to explore the different roles of the
multiplicity of state actors engaged in the production and maintenance of liminal legality. See, e.g.,
Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 3, at 274-77.
233.
This is the essence of the lawsuits challenging the program that were filed by twenty-six
states and also by certain members of Congress. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591,

613-18 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
234.
Id at 22-23.
235.

On the power of the Executive under current immigration law, see Adam B. Cox & Cris-

tina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE LJ. 458 (2009).
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subjects were not priorities for removal.236 Why not just continue to leave
them alone?
Focusing on the experiences of liminal legal subjects in the lead-up
to the program rollout provides the answer. It was well known in immigrant communities and among immigrant-serving organizations that,
although elected officials repeatedly set enforcement priorities in the
immigration sphere, 23 7 those efforts were often undercut by low-level
federal officials and, at times, by state and local law enforcement.
Throughout the country, noncitizens who apparently fit into the low enforcement priority categories were being picked up by ICE or funneled to
ICE by state and local officials and then placed in removal proceedings.
Against this backdrop, DACA and DAPA can be properly understood not as tools designed to disempower Congress but as programs
designed to operate as a check on an "insurrection" 23 8 by lower-level ICE
agents who had repeatedly declined to fall in line with the commands of
elected officials. 239 These programs constitute an effort to reestablish
democratic control over a recalcitrant police force with tremendous power over the lives of liminal legal populations.
Furthermore, the programs reasserted federal enforcement priorities
in a way that supplanted some lower-level public and private immigration sorting by actors who might otherwise be able to exploit the particular legal vulnerabilities of removable noncitizens. The development of a
program that triggered statutory driver's license authorization 240 and employment authorization241 made no change to the existing legal framework. It did, however, empower liminal legal subjects vis-A-vis local
police officers who might use driving violations as a means of reordering
federal immigration enforcement priorities 242 and private employers who

236.
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Morton memo in particular
and the historical expansion of enforcement priorities more generally).
237.
See supra note 62 (cataloguing the various enforcement priority memos issued over the
last twenty years).
238.
Ahilan Arulanantham, The President's Relief Program as a Response to Insurrection,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/1 1/the-presidents-reliefprogram-as.html ("Although you will not find it discussed either in the administration's public
statements or in its OLC memo, the new administrative relief program arises out of a historical
context of defiance - some would say insurrection - by ICE enforcement agents and attorneys who
essentially refused to implement prior directives on prosecutorial priorities.").

239.

Id.; see also Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 248-49, 255 (5th Cir. 2015) (dismissing a

lawsuit by ICE agents and several state officials challenging the Obama administration's DACA
program).
240.
See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,

and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
241. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
3359.

§

274A, 100 Stat.

242.
There is evidence that some jurisdictions targeted immigrant neighborhoods for heightened surveillance and traffic stops and that unauthorized immigrants' lack of driver's licenses left
individuals vulnerable to criminal consequences and left communities vulnerable to enforcement
efforts explicitly premised on national origin discrimination.
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might otherwise exploit the vulnerabilities of unauthorized members of
the workforce.243
Examining the program through the lens of its effects on liminal legal communities also reveals the extent to which executive choices are
still heavily constrained by federalism in this context. Individual exercises of discretion by state and local law enforcement agents take on outsized significance in the shaping of immigration law on the ground,2 4
even as the program aims to quell such discretionary excesses on the part
of line ICE agents. Within this framework, private actors also gain new
forms of power in shaping the contours of eligibility for discretionary
relief, both by providing input that shapes the administrative rules that
govern discretionary relief and by performing a screening function in
determining which individual applicants seeking access to temporary
legal status are actually worthy of relief.24 5 Pervasive anti-immigrant
messages by both public and private actors can also affect state actors at
all levels of government in ways that effectively obliterate the protections purportedly provided by federal law. In this way, anti-immigrant
rhetoric sometimes has a greater effect on how noncitizens experience
the law than does the complex and convoluted federal regulatory system
that controls their formal legal status.246
The same sorts of complexities might be teased out when examining
the legal mechanisms that affect the governance of other liminal popula24
tions.247 The effects of liminal legality on the power of the state, and the
role of the state in creating and controlling liminal legal subjects, requires much more fleshing out. Identifying liminal legal populations and
using their experiences as the starting point for such analyses can illuminate features of governmental power distributions that get lost in accounts that ignore lived experience.
B. Liminal Legal Subjects Outside of "Exceptional"Immigration Law
Broadening the concept of liminal legality also provides a way to
avoid unproductive treatment of the field of immigration law as an exceptional domain with little relevance outside of its limited sphere. Immigration law is often treated as standing uniquely outside of the realm
of constitutional review248 and, therefore, incomparable with other sub243.

See Juarez v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 69 F. Supp. 3d 364, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (apply-

ing IRCA's antidiscrimination protections to noncitizens seeking work with DACA-related EADs);
see also discussion supra note 73 (discussing evidence of employer exploitation of unauthorized
workers).
Motomura, supra note 84, at 1821-22.
244.

245.

See id.

See Abrego & Lakhani, supra note 3, at 277.
246.
See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5-6 (2013)
247.
(critiquing the intragovernmental distribution of power in the criminal justice system).
For an early articulation of the notion of immigration exceptionalism, see generally Mo248.
tomura, supra note 134, at 1363.
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stantive areas of law. While claims of exceptionalism have a doctrinal
basis, the exceptionality is often less than meets the eye.249 Illuminating
the shared liminal legality of groups both within and outside of various
enforcement systems can lead to a better understanding of the common
experiences of certain noncitizens and citizens. It pushes against the reflective notion that the rights deprivations experienced by noncitizens are
a simple and direct result of their formal citizenship status. Citizens and
noncitizens experience declining legal protections in the wake of the
expansion of immigration enforcement, and citizens and noncitizens are
affected by similar transformations in the criminal justice system. Sometimes the rights deprivations operate in complimentary ways on populations situated at the intersection of the system, but sometimes the results
are more subtle. Less protective Fourth Amendment law in the area of
immigration policing has frequently migrated into the core of constitutional doctrine without regard to the citizenship status of the policed
populations, to take just one example. 2 50 Similarly, governmental reliance on the interplay of civil and criminal punitive mechanisms as a
means of effectuating social control is not limited to a crimmigration
system.
At academic institutions from the lowlands of Leiden in the NetherlandS 25 1 to the Mile High City in the Rocky Mountains252 and beyond ,253
249.
There is not really a consensus on the extent to which immigration law actually is constitutionally exceptional. Compare Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative
Apology and Predictionfor Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14

GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 257 (2000), with Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 290-92
(2000), and Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a Plenary

Powers Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307, 307 (2000).
250.
See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 129, 145 (2010); see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl 1. Harris, Undocument-

ed CriminalProcedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1547-50 (2011).
251.
252.

Leiden University hosted a Crimmigration conference in October 2014.
The University of Denver's Sturm College of Law hosted a CrImmigration symposium in

February 2015.

&

253.
Numerous law schools now offer courses that are explicitly styled as crimmigration
courses, including Harvard Law School. See, e.g., Crimmigration: The Intersection of Criminal Law
and
Immigration
Law,
HARV.
L.
SCH.,
http://hls.harvard.edulacademics/curriculum/catalog/index.html?o=67538 (last visited Mar. 7, 2015)
(course description); Crimmigration: The Intersection of Immigrationand Criminal Law and Procedure, U. CINCINNATI C.L., http://law.uc.edu/sites/default/files/CrimmigrationsyllabusF2014-rev-8-814-Vazquez.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (course description); Crimmigration, U. Hous. L.
CENTER, http://www.law.uh.edu/schedule/class-information.asp?cid=12623 (last visited Mar. 7,
2015) (course description); Crimmigration Legal Theory and Practice: Strategies and Solutions for
Non-citizens
Charged
With
Crimes,
U.
MD.
SCH.
L.,
https://www.law.umaryland.edulacademics/program/curriculum/catalog/course_details.html?coursen
um=549T (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (course description). This is not an exhaustive list. Indeed, the
Society of American Law Teachers recently offered a panel on the topic of teaching crimmigration
law. See Society of American Law Teachers, Legal Education in a Time of Change: Challenges
Opportunities, SALT
LAW
12-13
(2014),
available at https://www.saltlaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/2014-SALT-Teaching-Conference-and-SALT-LatCrit-FDW-ProgramOCT-9-1 1.pdf. Many other institutions have classes that focus on issues of the criminalization of
civil immigration proceedings or on the topic of non-citizens in the criminal justice system, although
they do not adopt the crimmigration label.
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the umbrella concept of crimmigration has been used to organize a wideranging academic discourse dedicated to exploring domestic and international developments at the intersection of criminal and immigration law.
This framing has advantages as well as disadvantages.
On the positive side, the crimmigration rubric has been useful for
thinking about the specific moments of procedural intersection between
the criminal and immigration enforcement systems. These moments occur frequently because the immigration system and the criminal justice
system actually intersect in a number of significant ways. A pipeline
connects the criminal justice system and the removal system. The criminal justice system has become an important entry point for removal, particularly with the rollout of the Secure Communities program, which
required state and local law enforcement to check arrestee data against a
federal immigration database.2 54 Although that particular program has
been rolled back in recent months, it has not been eliminated. 255 The
government will continue to use this screening function in a limited way
through the so-called Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) and many
criminal arrestees will continue to be funneled into the removal system in
this way. 256 The long-standing Criminal Alien Program (CAP) continues
*
*
*257
to ensure immigration screening in prisons and jails. Despite questions
about their legality, 258 the federal government also continues to issue, and

some jurisdictions continue to honor, immigration detainers to hold persons of interest to immigration officials beyond the time required to process their state criminal matters. 259 All of these programs generate far254.
Dep't of Homeland Sec., Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). For a discussion of critiques of
the program, see infra note 265.
255.
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Thomas
S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, et al., 2 (Nov. 20, 2014)
Il]
Memorandum
Johnson
[hereinafter
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120 memo prosecutorialdiscretion.pdf
(directing ICE to continue to screen state and local arrests, but to "only seek transfer of the alien"
from state and local custody when that noncitizen fits one of DHS's high priority categories for
removal).
The rollback of the Secure Communities may narrow the size of the arrest-to-deportation
pipeline, the continuation of arrest screening through ICE's Priority Enforcement Program (PEP)
ensures the continued flow of some noncitizen from arrest to deportation. Immigrants' rights organizations have taken to calling the new program PEP-Comm, to draw attention to its continuities with
the more expansive S-Comm program. See, e.g., Press Release, California Immigrant Policy Center,
Civil Rights Orgs Celebrate the End of S-Comm, Caution Against the Replacement "PEP-Comm"
Program (Nov. 21, 2014), available at http://www.caimmigrant.org/groups-celebrate-s-comm-end/.
256.
Johnson Memorandum II, supra note 255, at 1-3.
ENFORCEMENT,
&
CUSTOMS
IMMIGR.
U.S.
Program,
257.
Criminal Alien
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
Lasch, Detainer Enforcement, supra note 165, at 283-84; CHRISTOPHER LASCH, IMMIGR.
258.
POL'Y CENTER, THE FAULTY LEGAL ARGUMENTS BEHIND IMMIGRATION DETAINERS 2, 4-7 (2013),
available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/laschon-detainers.pdf; see

also Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *4-11
(D. Or. Apr. I1, 2014) (finding holds executed pursuant to an ICE request lacked basis in law and
constituted a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure).
See Tim Henderson, More Jurisdictions Defying Feds on Deporting Immigrants, PEW
259.
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and2014),
31,
(Oct.
TR.
CHARITABLE
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reaching practical and procedural connections between the criminal and
immigration systems.
The outputs of the criminal justice system are also taken into account in the substantive application of immigration law. The Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) imposes significant immigration consequences on a broad range of criminal convictions and activity, including for
conduct associated with extremely minor criminal offenses.2 60 The Supreme Court has recognized the reality of this interplay 26 1 and has concluded that to even be effective in the criminal justice system, advocates
for noncitizens in criminal courts must be aware of their client's immigration status and advise them of the clear immigration consequences of
their criminal offenses. 262
By looking at the particular spaces of intersection between criminal
and immigration law, scholars working at that intersection have paved
the way for important policy interventions that have sometimes mitigated
the most problematic manifestations of the systemic interplay of these
two bodies of law. For example, scholars working at the criminal and
immigration law intersection have developed successful challenges to the
widespread, and unlawful, reliance by states and localities on federally(notanalysis/blogs/stateline/2014/10/31/more-jurisdictions-defying-feds-on-deporting-immigrants
ing that, as of the date of the report, half of all noncitizens live in jurisdictions that declined to honor

ICE detainers).
260. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(a)(2), 236(c), 8 U.S.C. §§ I182(a)(2),
1226(c) (2015) (setting forth broad grounds for expulsion or exclusion on grounds of criminal violations and drug-related conduct); HING, supra note 165, at 4-7 (describing cases of sympathetic
noncitizens removed under expansive removal provisions); JOHNSON, supra note 114, at 7-8, 11112, 114-15 (describing the transformation of the immigration laws and their sweeping effects);
KANSTROOM, supranote 5, at 14-15, 243-46 (describing the expansive removal provisions and their
harsh effects); Hing, supra note 62, at 497-98 (discussing cases where noncitizens were removed
because of minor criminal infractions); Morawetz, supra note 164, at 166-67 (noting the harsh
effects of the nation's drug removal provisions).

261.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2010). In Padilla, Justice Stevens wrote for

the majority:
Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after the
1996 effective date of these amendments, his removal is practically inevitable but for the
possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses. Subject
to limited exceptions, this discretionary relief is not available for an offense related to
trafficking in a controlled substance.
These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important. These changes confirm our view that, as
a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important part-of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead

guilty to specified crimes.
Id. (citations omitted).

262.

Id. at 368-69, 374. For discussions concerning the specific meaning and content of Pa-

dilla's requirements, see, for example, C6sar Cuauhtimoc Garcia Hemndez, CriminalDefense after

Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 487-88 (2012); Christopher N. Lasch, Redress in
State Postconviction Proceedingsfor Ineffective Crimmigration Counsel, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 959,

971-75 (2014); Yolanda Vdzquez, Realizing Padilla'sPromise: EnsuringNoncitizen DefendantsAre
Advised of the Immigration Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 169,

172-73, 187-92 (2011).
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issued immigration detainers as the justification for holding noncitizens
past the period warranted under state law.263 The Supreme Court's decision to require counsel to advise noncitizens of the clear immigration
consequences of criminal convictions flows directly out of this work as
well. 264 And scholarship and advocacy interrogating the efficacy and
fairness of the Secure Communities program were essential to effectuating the November 2014 rollback of the program. 265 Ultimately, the sustained and particularized analyses of specific interactions between the
criminal and immigration law systems have been transformative on the
ground.
On the other hand, there are downsides to the crimmigration framework, too. First, it is often asked to support more weight than it should
bear. The assumption of the existence of an emerging crimmigration
system suggests both more novelty and more coherence in the interplay
of criminal and immigration law than actually exists. Some of the most
severe outcomes that arise at the intersection of the criminal and immigration system arise not because the systems work together but because
they operate in ignorance of one another. With much of the emerging
literature on the criminal-immigration law nexus focusing (understandably) on points of convergence, it is worth remembering that both theoretically and practically the immigration and criminal law systems also retain their distinctive logics and domains.
It is true, for example, that different federal, state, and local government actors can leverage one system when the other does not seem
likely to give the actor the result she seeks in a particular case and that
266
the interplay between these systems can be potent.
But it is also the
case that some of the most egregious harms wrought by criminal justice
actors in immigration courts are imposed inadvertently. They are caused
263.
For examples of scholarly challenges to the legality of detainers, see, for example, Lasch,
Detainer Enforcement, supra note 165, at 291, 293-94, 313. For a successful challenge see, for

example, Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *411 (D. Or. Apr. I1, 2014). The Miranda-Olivares case generated a cascade of jurisdictions unwilling
to enforce detainers. Andrea Castillo, Washington, Colorado Counties Join Oregon in No Longer
Complying
with
Immigration
Detainers,
OREGONIAN
(May
1,
2014),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwestnews/index.ssf/2014/05/washington coloradocountiesj.html ("At least four counties in Washington state and four in Colorado have joined a growing number of jurisdictions in Oregon that stopped
holding undocumented immigrants in jail for the sole purpose of deportation.").
264.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367 (citing numerous scholars in concluding that "[t]he weight of
prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the
risk of deportation").
265.
Influential criticisms included Cox & Miles, supra note 163, at 132-35; AARTI KOHLI ET
AL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES
BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1-4, 13 (2011), available
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure Communities by the Numbers.pdf; Thomas J. Miles
& Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure Communi-

ties, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937, 969-70 (2014).
266.

See, e.g., Chac6n, A Diversion, supra note 134, at 1567-69, 1615-20; Eagly, Prosecuting

Immigration, supra note 165, at 1285-86, 1339; Sklansky, supra note 189, at 163-64, 201-02.
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by judges and juries who sentenced LPR defendants for crimes that later
became deportable offenses under immigration law, but are not deportable offenses at the time of sentencing. Or lawyers who structured plea
agreements around existing law without the superhuman ability to forecast shifting interpretations of immigration law. Or lawyers who structured bad pleas because they simply didn't understand immigration law
at all. Or beat officers who conducted domestic violence arrests to secure
a temporary peace without recognizing (and even without wanting) the
deportation screening that the arrest could trigger. Or a school official
who calls the police to mediate a school fight without understanding the
immigration consequences such a call might have for an undocumented
student or his family-both now, and in terms of future eligibility for
relief-should intervening officials decide that there is a gang element to
267
the activities.
In daily practice, governmental actors at all levels may seek to
avoid immigration consequences or facilitate them, but they will often
undertake their specific actions in the realm of criminal justice with an
imperfect understanding of how they will affect immigration proceedings. Indeed, at the formal level, Congress and the courts have done a
great deal of work to keep the criminal justice system out of immigration
courts at critical junctures. While at one time the criminal sentencing
court had the potential to play an active role in deportation decisions
through the issuance of a Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation
(JRAD), that power was eliminated by Congress in 1990.268 The criminal
sentencing judge now has no role in preventing the deportation of noncitizens placed in removal proceedings for criminal convictions. Similarly,
much of the evidence available to criminal courts in the plea bargaining
process are deliberately (and largely for good reason) screened out of
immigration proceedings by the categorical and modified categorical
approaches that courts apply in determining the immigration consequences of certain kinds of criminal offenses. 269

267.
For this last point, see Jennifer M. Chac6n, Students and the Deportation Machine at 13
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

268.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363 (2010). The JRAD was always controversial and

never very systematically implemented, but it did have certain advantages, including allowing the
judge with the broadest understanding of the criminal conduct at issue and the equities at issue to
make a determination on the extent to which the individual's conduct warranted the application of
immigration consequences. Id.; see also Taylor & Wright, supra note 165, at 1143-44 (discussing
the sentencing judge's discretion to deport or not deport an offender).
269.
For applications of the doctrine in immigration cases, see Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.

1678, 1684-87 (2013); Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2012); Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 580-82 (2010); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 35-38, 41 (2009); Gonzales
v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 187 (2007); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50-52, 58, 60
(2006); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 4-7 (2004). For justifications, see Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting CategoricalAnalysis in Immigration Law, 86

N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1705-07, 1746-58 (2011) (arguing in support of the categorical approach on
historical and policy grounds); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the
CategoricalApproach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR.
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Suggestions of a coherent crimmigration system thus run the risk of
oversimplifying the nature of the relationship between the criminal and
immigration law systems. It may also lead to inadvertent overstatement
about the novelty of the systemic interplay at stake; in fact, when it
comes to reliance on criminal law actors to effectuate immigration enforcement goals, historical roots run deep.270 At the same time, in focusing attention on the evolution of a new system, the crimmigration
framework may skew attention away from the commonalities that the
criminal-immigration law interactions have with other criminal-civil law
interplay. Just as overstated notions of immigration exceptionalism can
skew attention away from systemic legal developments that affect citizens, crimmigration scholarship may at times perpetuate a notion that no
other populations are regulated in quite the same way as individuals
caught in the intersection of the criminal justice and immigration enforcement systems.
As the foregoing analysis suggests, liminal legal statuses are not
borne solely by noncitizens. Inside and outside the immigration sphere,
the proliferation of liminal legal statuses functions simultaneously as a
means of effectuating administrative resource conservation through
27
community-oriented risk-management strategies 1 and as a form of
2 72
"preservation through transformation,"
allowing governmental actors
to reassert and maintain shifting forms of control over racialized and
otherwise marginalized populations identified as high risk in ways that
do not trigger the rights-protective schemes that evolved in the post-war
era in both domestic and international law. "Crimmigration" serves as a
shorthand explanation of how this occurs in the area of immigration law,
but it is not always an accurate shorthand explanation. In conjuring up
the notion of a system designed to manage a discrete class of alien lawL.J. 257, 264-65, 299-300 (2012) (arguing in support of the categorical approach on historical and
policy grounds).
270.

Rachel E. Rosenblum, Policing Sex, Policing Immigrants: What Crimmigration's Past

Can Tell Us about It's Present and Future, 104 CAL. L. REV. 101, 102, 104 (forthcoming 2016); see
also FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL 120-21 (rev.
ed. 2006) (discussing the leading role played by local officials in the so-called "repatriation" of
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans to Mexico in the 1930s); JUAN RAMON GARCiA, OPERATION
WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, at 191
(1980) (discussing the important, and sometimes overly-aggressive, participation of California state
and local officials in implementing the infamous immigration enforcement sweep of the 1950s).
271.
For analyses that identify the risk-assessment theories undergirding the approaches, see,
for example, JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 4-6 (2009) (discussing
the shifting perspective of the American society from "governing crime" to "governing through
crime"); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 222, at 616-17 (analyzing the process of misdemeanor
adjudication in New York criminal courts as one that marks and monitors its subjects as potential
risks); Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 45, 48-50 (2015) (critiquing ICE's risk assessment tools for immigration detention and
noting accompanying danger of the expansive reliance on risk assessment logics to justify more
extensive and widespread monitoring of noncitizens).
272.
See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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breakers, it may also be a stigmatizing one. Framing the discourse
around liminal legality could operate to check unjustifiable presumptions
of immigration law exceptionality and encourage efforts to identify the
common regulatory methods that have generated a transubstantive normalization of liminality. 27 3 Shifting the focus to liminal legality may, in
fact, open up a path to return crimmigration scholarship to its deeper
theoretical grounding in membership theory, 274 thereby reinvigorating the
discussion of the role that race, religion, class, and place play in structuring governance strategies at the border of criminal and immigration
aw.275

C. Liminal Legality and Lawyering for Change
Finally, and relatedly, a more robust understanding of the features
of liminal legality might allow for the development of new accounts of
the social change strategies geared toward generating greater legal protection and increased stability in the lives of liminal legal subjects. Activists seeking to expand the rights of noncitizens in the United States have
long worked against the backdrop of skeletal, formal constitutional protections.276 In this context, rights protection has required leveraging doctrines designed to protect other populations or institutional interests, 2 77 as
well as engagement in political acts that assert previously unacknowl-

273.

For work in this vein, see, e.g., Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809,

844-46 (2015); Kalhan, Immigration Policing, supra note 165, at 1162-64; Sklansky, supra note
189, at 219-23.
274.
Stumpf, supra note 165, at 376. In her article, Stumpf uses the phrase "criminalization of
immigration law" and "crimmigration" interchangeably, and uses both to describe the "merger" or
"convergence" of criminal and immigration law. See id She offers an account of a "crimmigration"
merger that has evolved "on three fronts: (1) the substance of immigration law and criminal law
increasingly overlaps, (2) immigration enforcement has come to resemble criminal law enforcement,
and (3) the procedural aspects of prosecuting immigration violations have taken on many of the
earmarks of criminal procedure." Id. at 381. After charting these developments, Stumpf offers
membership theory as an explanatory basis for understanding why these systems increasingly appear
similar in their justifications and procedural mechanisms. See id. at 376.
275.
For a recent critique of crimmigration scholarship as insufficiently focused on questions
of race, see Kevin R. Johnson, Race-Based Low Enforcement: The Racially Disparate Impacts of
CrimmigrationLaw, (forthcoming) (on file with author). For a defense of use of the crimmigration
framework specifically because it facilitates a focus on governance strategies deliberately and differentially aimed at Latinos in the United States see Vazquez, supra note 99, at 609-11; Garcia Hernndez, Creating Crimmigration, supra note 165, at 1459. 1 agree with these authors about the
racialized effects of the interplay of immigration and criminal law strategies. But with my discussion
here, I hope to show why I think those developments are not simply an analogue to the phenomenon
of mass incarceration in African American communities. The governance strategies are, in important
ways, the same legal strategies.
276.
See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13-15, 52 (1996).

277.

See MOTOMURA, supra note 165, at 7-8, 114-15, 117-18, 132-35, 138-41 (explaining

the ways that preemption claims, equal protection claims of citizens, and procedural due process
claims have all operated as means of effectuating the legal rights of noncitizens, including the undocumented); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 560-65 (1990)
(discussing the role of "phantom norms" in generating rights protective developments in immigration caselaw, notwithstanding the plenary powers doctrine).
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278

edged rights into existence.28 Advocacy in the areas of national security
and immigration regulation have indeed transformed legal doctrine that
is generally viewed as rights-restrictive into vehicles for increased individual rights vis-i-vis federal legislative and executive administrative
agencies.279 Lessons from this area likely have broader application for
liminal legal populations.
When you start from the premise that the political branches have an
all but absolute right to expel noncitizens and that broad deference is due
to prison administrators, it should probably go without saying that there
is no right for a noncitizen to be free of immigration screening in a jail;
and yet community activism at one time ended the screening of Rikers
inmates by ICE officials previously housed on the premises.2 80 More
broadly, such activism resulted in the narrowing of the Secure Communities program.281 Similarly, under a constitutional doctrine that affords
virtually no substantive effect to time spent in the country when determining the right to remain, it is impossible to locate a right for unauthorized migrant youth to remain in the United States on the basis of their
time here and their good character. Yet, community activism changed the
legal structure to afford a version of this protection, and continued activism may well transform that more liminal status into something more
protective and permanent.
While a good deal of immigrants' rights activism focuses on the
vindication of formal legal rights,282 rights still often have to be willed
into existence through concerted legal activism that focuses on appeals to

278.

Peter L. Markowitz, Remarks at the Denver University Law Review Crimmigration Sym-

(Feb.

posium

2,

2015),

available

at

http://du-

denverlaw.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=93a85392-078a-414e-84bd-

5607b4fb08d3.
279.
See, e.g., Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered,
47 CONN. L. REV. 879, 882-84 (2015) (arguing that litigants and courts have used the Mathews v.
Eldridge test to generate judicial due process protections in immigration and national security cases,
which have traditionally been unyielding to individual interests); see also Peter H. Schuck,
Kleindeinst v. Mandel: Plenary Power v. the Professors, in IMMIGRATION STORIES (Peter H. Schuck
& David A. Martin eds., 2005) (discussing the role of litigants in turning the seemingly unprotective
Kleindeinst v. Mandel requirement for a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" to justify the
imposing certain exclusion bars to noncitizens into a meaningful, substantive check on ideological
exclusion).
280.
This Valentine 's Day, Celebrate the Best Breakup Ever: ICE out of Rikers, IMMIGRANT
DEF. PROJECT (Feb. 13, 2015), http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/valentines-day-celebrate-bestbreakup-ever-ice-rikers.
281.
See supra notes 263-65, 292 and accompanying text.

282.

See R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 170-73, 189-91 (D.D.C. 2015) (granting a

preliminary injunction against denying bond on national security grounds for Central American

migrants); Complaint at 2, 5, 21-24, 26, Chacon v. E. Haven Police Dep't, No. 3:10-CV-1692-JBA
(D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2010) (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2010) (alleging a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action for
damages, the parties eventually settled on July 17, 2014); Mora v. Arpaio, No. CV-09-1719-PHXDGC, 2009 WL 3488718, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 2009) (holding that plaintiffs could proceed
with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damage claim); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 165, at 46-47, 56-57
(chronicling these legal strategies).

766

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:4

fairness rather than on formal legality.283 To secure these rights, entire
communities actively work to reconstitute themselves in ways that insulate them from unwanted interventions. This is reflected not just in the
ongoing, and somewhat successful, efforts to narrow the scope of the
Secure Communities program and jail screening programs but also in
movements opposing gang injunction programs, "prostitution free
zones," and other initiatives that might otherwise increase policing in
liminal communities.284 The rights-protective strategies at issue here
identify particular policies and practices that exacerbate the vulnerabilities of liminal legal populations and work to change them by developing
new markers of community belonging285 and by privileging accounts of
community need that incorporate the voices of liminal legal subjects.
CONCLUSION
Although it is not possible to create a full map of the world of liminal legality in one short piece, this Article identifies salient and recurring
features of liminal legality, describes various sites where liminal legality
is produced, and suggests some possible benefits to using an expansive
283.
There are formal legal frameworks that anchor these claims, of course. Sometimes these
are rooted in the Constitution. See MOTOMURA, supra note 165, at 7, 64-65, 134-35, 141-42 (discussing federalism, procedural due process, and the constitutional rights of citizens). International
law norms serves as another important source of this rights-claiming, notwithstanding the lack of
coherent "architecture" around the rights of noncitizens. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms on Migration: Substance Without Architecture, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND KEY CHALLENGES 467, 471-75, 479 (Ryszard Cholewinski, et

al. eds., 2007).
284.
See, e.g., Dean Spade, The Only Way to End Racialized Gender Violence in Prison Is to
End Prisons: A Response to Russell Robinson 's "Masculinity as Prison", 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT
184, 193-95 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing to progressive decriminalization and
policing-containment strategies and organizations, and arguing that these "organizations and projects
understand the significant dangers queer, trans, and gender non-conforming people face at the hands
of law enforcement and seek to offer material relief by helping people survive these systems, dismantling the pathways to criminalization that entangle vulnerable people, and creating alternative
ways for people to get their needs met given that the criminal punishment system promises safety but
never delivers"). The Black Lives Matter movement is the most visible contemporary national
movement that explicitly seeks to address these structural issues, and it has done so by privileging
the experiences and centering the rights of the most marginalized and most legally liminal members
of the community. See BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com (last visited Dec. 3,

2015) ("Black Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, Blackundocumented folks, folks with records, women and all Black lives along the gender spectrum. It
centers those that have been marginalized within Black liberation movements. It is a tactic to
(re)build the Black liberation movement.")
285.
The adoption of municipal ID cards to facilitate the integration of noncitizens who lack
other legal forms of identification is one such strategy. Michael J. Wishnie, Remarks at the Denver
University Law Review Crimmigration Symposium (Feb. 2, 2015), available at http://dudenverlaw.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=93a85392-078a-414e-84bd-

5607b4fb08d3; see also Thomas MacMillan, Elm City ID Card Turns 5, NEW HAVEN INDEP., July
23,
2012,
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/idcardanniversary/
("Five years and 10,000 cards later, doomsday predictions have long fizzled out, leaving a stronger
community along with a new challenge-keeping the card useful and relevant, rather than largely
symbolic for most of its bearers."). On the challenges of keeping these programs vibrant, see Brian
Charles, Many Unaware ofNew Haven's Elm City ID Program, Critics Say, NEW HAVEN REGISTER,
Sept. 21, 2014, http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20140921/many-unaware-of-new-havenselm-city-id-program-critics-say.
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conception of liminal legality to assess the social and legal developments
that both exacerbate and mediate its destabilizing effects. Many community organizers are already ahead of scholars in recognizing the generative potential of organizing around analogous and complimentary experiences of legal liminality. To identify law reform projects that can help
advance social justice goals, legal scholars should also think creatively
and trans-substantively about the legal sites that produce liminal legality.

LEARNING FROM OUR MISTAKES: USING IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ERRORS TO GUIDE REFORM
AMANDA FROST'
ABSTRACT

Immigration scholars and advocates frequently criticize our immigration system for imposing severe penalties akin to (or worse than)
those in the criminal justice system-such as prolonged detention and
permanent exile from the United States-without providing sufficient
procedural protections to minimize enforcement errors. Yet there has
been relatively little scholarship examining the frequency of errors in
immigration enforcement and identifying recurring causes of those errors, in part because the data is hard to come by. This Article begins by
canvassing some of the publicly available data on enforcement errors,
which reveal that such mistakes occur too frequently to be dismissed as
flukes. Although the data is too limited to draw any definitive conclusions as to the causes of such errors, it appears that some errors occur
because low-level officials are asked to administer complex and ambiguous immigration laws quickly and with little training or oversight. This
Article concludes by calling for immigration reform advocates to gather
more information about wrongful deportations, following the lead of the
Innocence Project, which has used data from DNA exonerations to raise
public awareness of wrongful convictions and to advocate for additional
procedural protections in the criminal justice system.

t Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. I received valuable
comments from Jayesh Rathod, Jenny Roberts, Shana Tabak, and the participants in the Denver
University Law Review's CrImmigration Symposium.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. immigration law has morphed from a civil to a quasi-criminal
system, and yet it has failed to incorporate the procedural protections that
accompany enforcement of criminal law. As immigration scholars have
observed, criminal law and immigration law are now in a symbiotic relationship: many criminal convictions trigger serious immigration consequences, and many violations of immigration law are prosecuted as
crimes.' Furthermore, the consequences of immigration violations, such
as prolonged detention and removal from the United States, are as severe, if not more so, than those for violating criminal law.2 Yet many of
the procedural protections available in the criminal justice system to prevent wrongful convictions are absent from immigration enforcement. 3 As
1. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) ("To deport [an alien] .... may
result . . in loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living." (citation omitted)).
3. See, eg., Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints. The Explosion of Targeted Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 372 (2014) (noting that the procedural protections
available in the criminal justice system could reduce errors in immigration enforcement); Stephen H.
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice
Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 469, 469 (2007).
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Professor Stephen Legomsky put it, immigration law has "absorb[ed] the
theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities associated with criminal
enforcement," but has thus far "explicitly reject[ed] the procedural ingredients of criminal adjudication," leaving "noncitizens in deportation proceedings exposed to large risks of error when the personal stakes are

high."4
This Article argues that it is time to determine whether accuracy is
in fact a significant problem in immigration enforcement and, if so,
whether additional procedural protections could prevent some of these
errors from occurring. The Article is inspired in part by the work of Professor Brandon Garrett, who uncovered systemic errors in the criminal
justice system by closely studying the records of 250 innocent people
exonerated by DNA testing. Before the advent of DNA testing, many
assumed that wrongful convictions were the rare exception.5 As Garrett
explained in his book, Convicting the Innocent, "DNA exonerations have
changed the face of criminal justice in the United States by revealing that
wrongful convictions do occur and, in the process, altering how judges,
lawyers, legislators, the public, and scholars perceive the system's accuracy."6 Garrett studied the records of many of the 250 exonerees' judicial
proceedings to determine whether these cases were rare exceptions in an
otherwise healthy system or, alternatively, evidence of systemic failure.7
He concluded that they demonstrated the latter after identifying several
recurring problems-including "contaminated" confessions, eyewitness
misidentification, unreliable informants, and inadequate representationthat resulted in wrongful conviction in these cases.8 And he observed that
similar errors must have resulted in the wrongful conviction of many
who still languish in prison-or worse, who have been executedbecause they cannot be exonerated after the fact through a definitive
mechanism such as DNA testing.9 Professor Garrett concluded by sug-

4.
Legomsky, supra note 3. Procedural protections serve many values in addition to ensuring
accurate outcomes, such as protecting personal privacy and dignity, and ensuring government accountability. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-50
(1976). However, this Article will focus on benefits of added procedural protections to guard against
errors in decision making.
5.
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

Go WRONG 5 (2011).
6.
Id at 6; see also Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, Wrongful Conviction: Perceptions of
Criminal Justice Professionals Regarding the Frequency of Wrongful Conviction and the Extent of
System Errors, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 436, 439 (2007) ("Accumulating proof that wrongful convictions occur, and that they occur with a frequency that was not previously anticipated, has resulted in
more resources being devoted to discovering cases involving factually innocent defendants and in
increased academic interest in the extent and causes of wrongful convictions; in turn, system actors
have become increasingly aware of the problems and dangers of convicting innocent defendants.").
7.
GARRETT, supra note 5, at 6-7.

8.
9.

Id. at 8.
Id.
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gesting reforms that would prevent such errors from tainting future proceedings.10
It is time to conduct a similar study of the "wrongfully deported."
Indeed, the need is even greater in the immigration context, not only because the penalties imposed are so high, but also because the current
procedural protections are so low. As the Supreme Court explained in
Mathews v. Eldridge," courts must balance the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the individual's liberty against the burden on the government
of providing additional procedural protections to lessen that risk.1 2 Accordingly, if there are systemic problems in the accuracy of immigrationrelated detention and removal, it is time to determine why those mistakes
occur and whether they can be prevented.13
Unfortunately, however, data on immigration enforcement errors is
hard to come by. Although the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) both publish
statistics on immigration enforcement, they do not keep track of cases in
which the government is found to have erred in targeting individuals for
removal. For example, although immigration scholars and advocates
have shown that U.S. citizens are detained and even deported by immigration officials with surprising frequency, the U.S. government maintains no publicly available statistics tracking that problem.1 4 Nor does the
government appear to record how often it mistakenly bars entry into the
United States or erroneously seeks to remove noncitizens lawfully permitted to reside in the United States.' 5 Thus, this Article cannot comprehensively analyze immigration enforcement errors, but rather can only
review some of the limited data on enforcement errors and describe avenues for future research of this question.
Part I of this Article examines cases in which the government mistakenly concluded that an individual was not legally entitled to be in the
United States, leading to the exclusion, detention, or removal of that individual. This Article uses data from the Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse (TRAC), EOIR's annual statistics, advocacy reports, as
well as Westlaw and other publicly available databases, to determine the

10.
11.
12.

Id. at 12-13.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id at 321.

&

13.
Some criminal defense lawyers have critiqued the Innocence Project as unduly focused on
wrongful convictions, detracting attention from other needed reforms of the criminal justice system,
such as ensuring that the punishment fits the crime. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty
Project: A CriminalDefense Lawyer's Growing Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J.L.

Soc. CHANGE 315, 324 (2009-2010). That critique is well-taken, and in this Article I do not mean to
suggest that immigration reform efforts should myopically focus on avoiding mistakes in immigration enforcement at the cost of all potential areas for reform.
14.
Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting US. Citizens

as Aliens, 18 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 606, 618-20 (2011).
15.
See id. at 629-32.
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frequency of such errors, and provides several examples to illustrate the
problem.
Part II then asks what we can learn from the mistakes catalogued in
Part I. A number of themes emerge, many of which are similar to the
recurring errors that have led to wrongful convictions in the criminal
justice system. Coerced confessions, lack of legal representation, and
mental illness all appear to play an outsized role in leading immigration
officials to detain, exclude, and remove those legally entitled to be in the
United States. But some immigration enforcement errors are caused by a
problem unique to immigration law: the complexity of immigration law
itself. Byzantine immigration laws and regulations appear to confound
not only the targets of immigration enforcement but also the low-level
(and sometimes not-so-low-level) officials tasked with enforcing the
laws. The laws that control who is a U.S. citizen, who is legally permitted to enter and remain in the United States, and what types of post-entry
conduct justify removal take up hundreds of pages of the U.S. Code and
the Federal Reporter and are often ambiguous and confusing. Yet those
who administer such laws often must do so quickly, with little opportunity to consult and reflect, and with a bureaucratic rigidity that can lead to
terrible consequences for those legally entitled to be in the United States.
In short, it appears that the complexity of our immigration system defeats
even the supposed experts who administer it.
Part III lays out a framework for gathering and analyzing the data
on immigration enforcement errors going forward. Eliminating all errors
from any enforcement system is impossible; enforcing the law requires a
willingness to accept that occasionally an innocent party will be targeted
in error. Nonetheless, a reasonable enforcement system must ensure
that the costs of the errors do not outweigh the benefits of enforcement,
and this calculation can only be made with a clearer picture than we have
today about the frequency and causes of immigration enforcement errors.
I. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ERRORS
Part A describes the types of enforcement errors that are the focus
of this Article, and Part B canvasses the existing data regarding the frequency of such errors.
A. Enforcement Errors
This Article is focused on errors in which the government detains,
excludes, or removes individuals who it mistakenly concludes are not
16.
See, e.g., Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 87 (2008) (statement of Rep. Steven King, Member,
H. Subcomm. On Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law),

available

at

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 10hhrg40742/pdf/CHRG- I 10hhrg40742.pdf

(suggesting that immigration enforcement will always produce some errors).
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entitled to be in the United States. For example, the government errs
when it seeks to remove a U.S. citizen, or a noncitizen with lawful status
whom the government miscategorizes as lacking legal status, and when it
denies admission to those legally entitled to enter the United States.' 7
Below are five examples of the types of classification errors that are
the focus of this Article. They were chosen for the purely practical reason that they were publicly available-that is, descriptions of these errors
can be found in newspapers, law review articles, court documents, and
reports by advocacy groups. Although these individual cases cannot be
presumed to represent a larger sample, they do provide concrete examples of the types of mistakes that should be subject to further research
and analysis to determine the factors that lead to immigration enforcement errors.
1. Pedro Guzman
Pedro Guzman, a U.S. citizen who was born in California, was removed to Mexico after an employee in the Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Office mistakenly concluded that Guzman was a Mexican national.' 8
Guzman was arrested for trespassing after he entered a private airport
and tried to board an airplane.1 9 He pled guilty and was sentenced to 120
days in jail but was deported to Mexico before he completed his sentence.20 Although immigration officials subsequently conceded their mistake, they insisted Guzman told them he was born in Mexico and was not
authorized to be in the United States and that he signed documents in
which he agreed to be returned to Mexico. Guzman's attorneys responded that he never told officials he was born in Mexico and that documents, such as the incident report filed after the arrest, stated Guzman
was a U.S. citizen.22 They also noted that the Sheriffs Office knew
Guzman complained of hearing voices and was taking antipsychotic
medication, and thus even if Guzman reported he was a noncitizen they
should have known not to rely on those statements exclusively when
deciding whether to deport him from the United States.2 3

17.
These types of classification errors are not the only mistakes that the government can
make when enforcing immigration law. For example, the government can mistakenly conclude that a
noncitizen is ineligible for discretionary relief, denying the noncitizen a remedy that is legally available. However, the purpose of this Article is not to canvass every type of error that can occur in
immigration enforcement, but rather to set out a few types of clear-cut errors that can then be used to
determine whether there are systemic problems with accuracy in immigration enforcement.

18.

Paloma Esquivel, Suit Filed Over Man's DeportationOrdeal, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2008),

http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/28/local/me-guzman28.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.

LEARNING FROM OUR MISTAKES

2015]

775

2. Wilfredo Garza
Wilfredo Garza was born in Mexico to a U.S. citizen father and a
Mexican mother.2 4 Garza's father divorced his mother shortly after he
was born, and when Garza was eight years old he went to live with his
father in the United States. 25 Over the next twenty-five years, ICE officers repeatedly deported Garza to Mexico, and Garza repeatedly surreptitiously reentered the United States by swimming across the Rio Grande.
It was not until Garza was in his thirties that he learned he had acquired
U.S. citizenship from his father, who had lived in the United States a
sufficient number of years to automatically bestow citizenship on his
son.26 Garza petitioned the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) to acknowledge his citizenship, but while that petition
was pending he was picked up again and charged with illegal re-entry--a
27
felony that could have subjected him to two years in prison. Garza insisted he was a U.S. citizen and the charges were dropped. Nonetheless,
he was removed once again from the United States over his protests that
he was a U.S. citizen and without an opportunity to be heard by an immigration judge.28 Eventually USCIS recognized his claim to citizenship,
but only after he had spent months in jail and had been removed from the
United States on four separate occasions.29
3. Roberto Lopez-Gutierrez
Roberto Lopez-Gutierrez, a Mexican citizen, was kidnapped in
Mexico and held for ransom near the U.S.-Mexico border. 30 He escaped
and was arrested by the U.S. Customs and Board Protection (CBP)."' The
CBP officer asked if he was afraid of returning to Mexico, as the officer
was required to do by law.32 Lopez-Gutierrez explained he was afraid of
his kidnappers.33 Nonetheless, the CBP officer wrote down that LopezGutierrez was not afraid, and Lopez-Gutierrez was prosecuted for illegal
entry. 34 In subsequent court proceedings, the CBP officer explained she
recorded that he had no fear of returning because "he was afraid of kidnappers, not of government persecution." 3 5 The officer further testified
she was not trained in asylum law and that she believed if a person was
24.

12, 2006,
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Lauren Etter, Immigration Twist Gives a Laborer a Fresh Beginning, WALL ST. J. (May

12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBI 14739948011750992.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

30.
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS THE
at
ACLU
REPORT],
available
37
(2014)
[hereinafter
COURTROOM
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/fielddocument/1 20214-expeditedremoval_0.pdf.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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afraid of private individuals and not the government, that person had no
right to seek asylum in the United States.36 For that reason, she erroneously assumed Lopez-Gutierrez was not eligible for asylum, and so she
did not refer him to an interview with an asylum officer to determine if
he had a credible fear of returning to Mexico.37

4. Ian McEwan
Award-winning British author Ian McEwan was denied admission
to the United States as he tried to board an airplane from Vancouver,
British Columbia to Seattle, Washington on March 30, 2004.38 After
McEwan informed CBP officers in the Vancouver airport that he would
be paid thousands of dollars in honoraria for giving a few speeches in the
United States, the officers erroneously concluded he could not enter the
United States on a tourist visa, detained him for four hours for questioning, and then stamped his passport "Refused Admittance." 39 McEwan
spent the night in Vancouver, and he was only permitted to enter the
United States the next day after immigration lawyers, consular officers,
and members of Congress all got involved. 40 A few weeks later he received a rare letter of apology from the United States Customs and Border Patrol admitting the denial of entry had been an "error[]" and promising that it would not impact his future attempts to enter the United
States.4 1
5. Francisco N.G.
Francisco N.G. and his mother had both been granted U visas 4 2 after
they testified against his abusive father, and thus Francisco was legally
living and working in the United States.43 In 2014, Francisco was driving
himself and some of his coworkers to work when he was pulled over by
the police for having an expired registration sticker on his truck." The
police then called ICE, who arrested all the occupants of the truck.45
36.
37.

Id. at 37-38.
Id.

38.
John Marshall, British Author Detained 24 Hours at Border, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER (Mar. 31, 2004, 9:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/ae/books/article/British-author-

detained-24-hours-at-border- 1141079.php.
39.
Id.
40.
See id.
Lawrence Van Gelder, Arts Briefing, U.S. Apologizes to McEwan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22,
41.
(quoting statement by The
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/22/books/arts-briefing.htm
Associated Press).
42.
U visas are available to noncitizens, including undocumented immigrants, who have been
the victim of a crime and are willing to help in the investigation and prosecution of that crime. Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-crimes/victims-criminalactivity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status (last updated Jan. 9,

2014); see also Immigration and Nationality Act
43.

ACLU REPORT, supra note 30, at 52.

44.
45.

Id.
Id.

§

101, 8 U.S.C.

§

1101(a)(15)(U) (2012).
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Francisco was interrogated by several different ICE officers, one of
whom threw away his U visa ID and denied that he had lawful status to
46
remain in the United States.46 ICE officers then told Francisco that some
of the occupants of his car had been undocumented immigrants, and he
would be charged with smuggling.47 The next day Francisco was deported to Piedras Negras, Mexico.48 He was only able to return to the United
States after finding a lawyer who accompanied him to the border to explain the situation, and then spending several days in immigration detention while immigration authorities verified his status.49
B. The Frequency oflmmigrationEnforcement Errors
Are the examples of enforcement errors described in Part I the type
of mistakes that can occasionally occur in even the most carefully managed large-scale criminal or civil enforcement system, or are they evidence of systemic failures that require systemic reform? This Part examines data on immigration enforcement errors to try to determine the
scope of the problem. Although the available data is too limited to provide a comprehensive assessment of the error rate in immigration enforcement, it does suggest that errors occur too frequently to be dismissed as flukes.
1. Detention and Deportation of U.S. Citizens
As Professor Jacqueline Stevens has shown, a surprising number of
citizens are erroneously detained and sometimes even deported.50 Based
on her research, Professor Stevens estimates that approximately 1% to
1.5% of the persons detained by ICE at any given time are U.S. citizens
and that U.S. citizens constitute approximately .5% of the persons deported by ICE each year.51 The percentages are not large, but they add up
to approximately 4,000 U.S. citizens each year who are erroneously
caught up in the immigration enforcement system.52 In addition, ICE
issued 834 detainers against U.S. citizens between FY 2008 and FY
2012, which led to U.S. citizens being held in custody for longer than
they would have otherwise because ICE erroneously believed they had
53
violated immigration laws.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 53.
Id
Id
Id at 52-53.

Professor Stevens estimates that approximately 1% of all persons detained by U.S. Immi50.
gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are U.S. citizens at any given time. Stevens, supranote 14,
at 629. Part II.B discusses the frequency of immigration enforcement errors in more detail.

51.

Id at 629, 632.

See id. at 608 ("Recent data suggests that in 2010 well over 4,000 U.S. citizens were
52.
detained or deported as aliens, raising the total since 2003 to more than 20,000 . . . .").
53.
ICE Detainers Placed on U.S. Citizens and Legal Permanent Residents, TRAC REPORTS,
INC. (Feb. 20, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/3 11/.
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The detention and deportation of U.S. citizens is not the only type
of immigration enforcement error, however. As catalogued in Part I.A.,
immigration officials can also err by deporting noncitizens legally entitled to remain in the United States and by excluding noncitizens legally
entitled to enter. Assuming immigration officials err with similar frequency when they wrongfully detain and remove noncitizens, then the
actual error rate in immigration enforcement for these types of categorical errors is sure to be much higher. Furthermore, ICE may also erroneously deny noncitizens discretionary relief-for example, by mistakenly
asserting they are not eligible for cancellation of removal. Such errors are
even harder to detect and to study, but presumably they will further contribute to the overall ICE error rate. In short, if ICE is erroneously detaining and deporting 4,000 U.S. citizens each year, it seems reasonable to
assume that thousands of noncitizens are also mistakenly excluded, detained, and deported.
2. Termination of Removal Cases
Another important data point regarding ICE enforcement errors
comes from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC),
which uses Freedom of Information Act requests to gather data regarding
ICE's enforcement record before the immigration courts.5 4 In 2010,
TRAC noted that in a "significant and increasing" number of cases, immigration courts were rejecting ICE's attempts to have noncitizens removed from the United States. ICE's failure rate for the last three
months of fiscal year 2010 was 31%, which is significantly higher than
the 25% of cases in which it failed to obtain a removal order in Fiscal
56
Years 2004 through 2009. In approximately 15% of these cases, the
immigration judge granted affirmative relief from removal after a finding
of removability, and so it does not appear that ICE committed an error in
targeting the noncitizen for removal. 57 But approximately 12% of cases
in the last three months of fiscal year 2010 were terminated by immigra54.
55.

Id.
ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, TRAC REPORTS, INC. (Nov. 9, 2010),

http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/243/. Department of Justice statistics reveal that in FY 2013,
immigration judges terminated 15.4% of all the cases before them on the ground that ICE was unable to sustain the charges, permitting 24,453 people in removal proceedings to remain in the United
States in their original status. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK C2-C3 (2014) [hereinafter FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK],
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fyl3syb.pdf.
Immigration judges are permitted to terminate a proceeding to allow a noncitizen to pursue a naturalization application upon the showing of compelling humanitarian circumstances, or if

evidence shows the government has not proved removability. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1239.2(f)

(2004). The

immigration judge does not have the authority to terminate proceedings for any other reason. See
Wong 13 1. & N. Dec. 701, 703 (B.I.A. 1971). Terminations do not include administrative closures
or the granting of affirmative relief, which cannot be considered clear enforcement mistakes by ICE
even though these rulings also permit the targets of immigration enforcement to remain in the United
States. See ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, supra.
ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, supra note 55.
56.

57.

See id
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tion judges after finding no grounds for removal, an increase from the
approximately 5% to 7% of cases terminated for such reason from 1999
through 2005.
Significantly, the trend that TRAC identified in 2010 has continued,
as EOIR's own statistics show. EOIR's FY 2013 Statistics Yearbook
states that only 6.4% of cases were terminated in 2009, either because the
charges were not sustained or because the noncitizen established eligibility for naturalization.59 That number jumped up to 9.6% in 2010, 10.1%
in 2001, 11.5% in 2012, and was 13.3% in 2 013.6 In 2013 alone, 19,107
cases that came before an immigration judge for removal were terminated, allowing the target to remain in the United States in the status they
held before removal proceedings began. 61
However, it is not clear that in all of these cases ICE has committed
the type of enforcement errors described in Part I. A case may be terminated by an immigration judge for several reasons, not all of which are
due to targeting the wrong person for removal. For example, if the immigration court found that ICE obtained evidence of alienage through egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment, then that evidence will be
excluded and the case terminated even though the individual targeted for
removal was not in fact legally permitted to stay in the United States.62
Likewise, a case may be terminated because ICE chose to grant prosecutonal discretion for humanitarian reasons. Nonetheless, the data supports the conclusion that ICE cannot find evidence to support removal
for a significant percentage of those whom it brings before an immigration judge, which further suggests that ICE errs in selecting targets for
removal.
3. Errors in Summary Removals
EOIR's statistics, described above, relate only to the small percentage of removal cases brought before an immigration judge. Most removals in the United States occur through a streamlined removal procedure
in which there is no opportunity for review of the initial removal decision
58.
See id In the other cases in which ICE failed to obtain a removal order, the target of
removal obtained affirmative relief, or the case was dismissed for another, unspecified reason. See
id. at fig. I (showing removal order requests that were not granted by immigration courts).
59.
FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 55, at C2.

60.

Id

Id. Furthermore, immigration judges reject ICE's request for a removal order in close to
61.
50% of cases, which further suggests that ICE is targeting the wrong individuals for removal. See
ICE Targeting: Odds Noncitizens Ordered Deported by Immigration Judge Through June 2015,
TRAC
REPORTS,
INC.,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/courtbacklog/apprepoutcome leave.php (last visited Mar.
29, 2015); see also Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings,
89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 36 (2014) (observing that ICE's high rate of failure in obtaining removal orders
suggests that it is seeking to remove individuals with a legal right to remain in the United States).
See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51
62.

(1984).
63.

See Stevens, supranote 14, at 656.
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by an immigration judge. In 2013, 83% of removals were carried out by
immigration officials making unilateral decisions that were not subject to
judicial review.6 In such summary removals, the decision is made by
immigration officials, often in a matter of hours, and the individual usually has no opportunity for a hearing before an immigration judge. 65 if
immigration enforcement officials are consistently targeting for removal
those who are entitled to stay in the United States-as the data regarding
terminations of removal cases described in Part I.B.2 suggests may be
the case-then those types of errors are likely occurring at an even higher rate in the context of summary removals.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) recently published a
report entitled American Exile: Rapid Deportations that Bypass the
Courtroom, examining 136 cases of individuals removed from the United
States through summary removal procedures "such as expedited removal,
voluntary return, administrative removal, or a stipulated order of removal." 66 Although the ACLU Report was not exclusively focused on erroneous deportations, it nonetheless provided numerous examples of cases
in which immigration officials mistakenly deported U.S. citizens and
noncitizens with valid visas.67 In several of those cases-such as that of
Francisco N.G., described in Part I.A-the individuals involved explicitly informed immigration officials they were legally entitled to remain in
the United States and yet were deported without a hearing.
Data compiled by the American Immigration Lawyers Association's
(AILA) and the American Immigration Council's (AIC) Artesia Pro Bono Project provides further evidence of immigration enforcement errors
68
in these types of summary removal proceedings.
In the summer of
2014, unusually high numbers of women and young children crossed the
69
southwest border into the United States, many of whom sought asylum.
In June of 2014, the U.S. government began to house some of these
women and children at a family detention center in Artesia, New Mexico-a small town in the New Mexico desert that is hundreds of miles
from the nearest major metropolitan area.70 As required by law, those
women who sought asylum were granted interviews with asylum officers

64.
JOHN F. SIMANSKI, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 2-3, tbl.7 (2014), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/oisenforcement ar 2013.pdf.
65.
See, e.g., DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH:
DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW
AMERICAN DIASPORA 65-67 (2012) (describing summary removal procedures).
66.
ACLU REPORT, supra note 30, at 9.

67.

See id. at 44-66.

68.
Stephen
Manning,
Ending
Artesia,
INNOVATION
LAW
https://innovationlawlab.org/2014/12/20/the-artesia-report/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2015).

69.
70.
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to determine if they had a credible fear of persecution in their home
-71
countries.
Initially, almost none of the women were represented by lawyers
before or during these interviews and approximately 60% of the women
were found not to have credible fear and were deported shortly thereafter.7 2 For the first month, no one was released from the detention facility
aside from those who were deported. Starting in July 2014, AILA and
AIC organized pro bono representation for these families, putting volunteer attorneys on the ground at the detention facility each week to interview and prepare the women to seek asylum, as well as to obtain bonds
for those who passed their credible fear interviews and were scheduled
for asylum hearings.74 Shortly thereafter, the approval rate for credible
fear interviews shot up from only 38% for the unrepresented women to
near 100% for those who had access to counsel.75 Thus far, approximately 50% of the detainees represented by AILA have been released from
the facility on bond,76 and AILA attorneys have won fourteen of the fifteen asylum cases that have gone to trial.77
In light of these statistics, it seems likely at least some of the unrepresented detainees who were found not to have a credible fear of persecution and returned immediately to their home countries were actually entitled to asylum in the United States. That nearly 100% of the women and
young children who received legal assistance were able to show credible
fear meriting an asylum hearing strongly suggests some of the 60% who
were found not to have credible fear were in fact eligible to seek asylum.78 Moreover, similar problems have been reported in the past. In
2005, the bipartisan United States Commission on International Religious Freedom also found that immigration officials failed to properly
71.
72.
73.

Id
Id
Id.

74.
See id. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I spent a week at the detention
facility in Artesia, New Mexico supervising students in American University's Immigrant Justice
Clinic who represented the detainees.

75.

See id.

76.
E-mail from Vanessa Sischo, Coordinator, Artesia Pro Bono Project, to author (Nov. 16,
2014) (quoting Stephen Manning) (on file with author). At least one of the detainees released in
December was a U.S. citizen-a fact discovered by AILA volunteers after the detainee told them
that her mother was a citizen who had lived for the requisite amount of time in the United States, and
thus that she had automatically derived U.S. citizenship upon birth. After a meeting with ICE officials at which AILA volunteers provided them with evidence of this fact, the detainee was released
two hours later. See E-mail from Maria Andrade, to author (Dec. 2, 2014) (on file with author).
77.
Manning, supra note 68.
78.
A skeptic might argue that lawyers can manipulate the system on behalf of their clients
because the credible fear standard is both subjective and vague. But as anyone who attends a credible fear interview knows, the lawyer plays only a very minor role at the interview, usually speaking
only very briefly, after the client has been interviewed for several hours. Even well-prepared clients
will not be able to demonstrate a credible fear of persecution without being able to cite specific
events in their own lives that suggest they have reason to fear return to their home country. In short,
lawyers can help those with genuine fear make their case to an asylum officer, but cannot manufacture a factual basis for having such a fear for their clients.
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screen for asylum claims and removed those who had expressed a credible fear of persecution. 79 Thus, the evidence suggests that noncitizens
with meritorious asylum claims are deported with surprising frequency.
4. Conclusion
The U.S. government does not publicly report how often it discovers that it detained or deported a person in error. Nor does it record why
removal cases are terminated, or why some individuals are readmitted to
the United States after deportation, or why others are permitted to enter
after a previous finding of inadmissibility. In short, the government does
not keep records of its mistakes. Although the currently available data
cannot provide a comprehensive picture of the error rate in immigration
enforcement, it does suggest errors are too frequent to be dismissed as
rare outliers. If the United States is erroneously deporting thousands of
people a year, as would seem to be the case, it is time to address systemic
problems in the accuracy of immigration enforcement.
II. SOURCES OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ERRORS
The data described in Part I regarding wrongful detention and deportation is incomplete, and thus cannot provide any definitive answers
about the causes of such errors. Nonetheless, the data suggests there are
recurring problems in immigration enforcement worthy of closer study
and further research. Some of these errors mirror those observed in the
criminal system, while others appear to be unique to the problem of allowing immigration officials to interpret and enforce complex and ambiguous immigration statutes and regulations without outside review.
A.

"CrImmigration"Errors

Not surprisingly, immigration enforcement errors appear to be
caused by the same sorts of mistakes that lead to wrongful convictions in
the criminal justice system. For example, coerced confessions appear to
be a problem in both systems. Professor Garrett's analysis of 250 cases
in which convicted felons were exonerated through DNA evidence
demonstrates that false confessions-often made after hours of questioning, intimidation, and threats-are a significant source of error in the
criminal justice system.80 Likewise, those who were removed from the
United States despite having a legal right to remain in the country are
often subject to lengthy interrogations and end up signing documents
agreeing to their own removal.81 Professor Stevens's research reveals
79.
U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
EXPEDITED REMOVAL 4-5 (2005), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/specialreports/report-asylum-seekers-in-expedited-removal.
80.
GARRETT, supra note 5, at 5-8.

81.

See, e.g., Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2009) (excluding a nonciti-

zen's confession that he violated immigration laws because it had been made after many hours of
interrogation over the course of a single night, and thus was involuntary and unreliable).
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that a significant percentage of U.S. citizens who are wrongly detained
and deported falsely "confess" to being undocumented immigrants after
82
interrogation by immigration officials. Another immigration advocate
observed that "very difficult detention conditions create a strong incentive to agree to any option that will end the detention quickly, and provides a strong disincentive to exercising rights of appeal, which can
stretch a period of detention out for months longer."83
Intellectual disabilities and mental illness are also factors that increase the error rate in both the criminal justice and immigration enforcement systems. As many immigration advocacy groups have noted,
those with such disabilities are particularly likely to be the victims of
enforcement errors. 84 The deportation of Pedro Guzman provides an example of the problem. Guzman reported hearing voices and was on antipsychotic medication, which may have led him to sign papers conceding
to his deportability, and which certainly hurt his ability to convince immigration officials that he was in fact a U.S. citizen.85 Mentally impaired
individuals may not be able to gather evidence and make a compelling
argument about their legal right to remain in the United States, and thus
they are at the mercy of immigration officials' willingness to investigate
the matter for them.86 And yet immigration officials lack the capacity,
and possibly the incentive, to do so.
Inadequate representation also leads to errors in both the criminal
and immigration systems. In the criminal justice system, defendants have
a right to counsel provided by the government when charged with felonies. All too often, however, indigent defense lawyers are overworked,
or simply unprepared, to defend their clients against serious charges.88
Moreover, criminal defendants have no right to counsel in misdemeanor
cases, and thus wrongful convictions appear even more likely in that
context. 89 Likewise, there is no constitutional right to government-funded

82.
See Stevens, supra note 14, at 629-32.
83.
Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous Advocacy: Pushing Against the Borders in Immigration Litigation, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (footnote omitted) (quoting the manuscript at 28).
84.
See, e.g., ACLU REPORT, supra note 30, at 48 ("[I]ndividuals with mental disabilities may
be at particular risk of erroneous deportation given the complexity of immigration law, the continued
absence of appointed counsel in all immigration proceedings, and (in the absence of a lawyer) the
reliance on a person's own statements and admissions as the primary evidence.").
85.
Esquivel, supranote 18.
86.
See ACLU REPORT, supra note 30, at 48-49.

87.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).

88.
See GARRETT, supra note 5, at 165-67 (stating that "[p]oor lawyering appears to have
played a crucial role in these exonerees' cases," although also noting the degree to which inadequate
representation led to the wrongful convictions is hard to determine).
89.
See Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisisfor Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1808 (2013). Errors in the criminal justice system produce errors in the
immigration system, and vice versa. If a U.S. citizen is erroneously removed from the United States,
that citizen might subsequently be prosecuted for illegal re-entry when he tries to come back to the
United States-as happened to Wilfredo Garza. See Etter, supra note 24. Or if a noncitizen is mistakenly convicted of a misdemeanor shoplifting offense, he might be deported as a result. Thus, the
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counsel in removal proceedings, even when the target of removal is a
child or is mentally disabled. 90 Immigration enforcement errors almost
always occur in cases in which the individual lacks legal representation,
as the cases described in Part L.A show, and it is only with the assistance
of counsel that the wrongfully deported are able to find their way back
into the United States.91 The striking statistics from AILA's Artesia Pro
Bono Project illustrate the difference that counsel can make: although
approximately 60% of the women without legal representation were
found not to have a credible fear of persecution, almost 100% who benefitted from legal representation met that standard and were allowed to
remain in the United States while they pursued their asylum claims.92
B. ImmigrationLaw's Complexity as a Causal Factor
Although some of the causes of errors in immigration enforcement
are similar to those in the criminal justice system, others are due to factors unique to immigration law, such as the fact that low-level officials
are expected to interpret and apply a complex body of laws and regulations without review or oversight.
In most criminal cases, whether the defendant is guilty of a crime is
a straightforward question of fact, even if there is some ambiguity regarding the proper charge and sentence for that crime. 93 And in most
criminal cases, the decision whether to charge someone with a crime is
made by a lawyer, and a conviction or plea bargain is reviewed by a
judge.94 In contrast, many important questions in immigration law turn
on complex statutes and regulations that are not easily interpreted even
by experienced lawyers. For example, whether a legal permanent resident has committed a crime that renders him removable is a topic that
takes up thousands of pages in casebooks, treaties, and practitioners'
guides. 95 Admissibility also can sometimes be difficult to determine, as
evidenced by the experience of author Ian McEwan. 9 6 Even the basic
question of whether an individual is a U.S. citizen can get complicated
error rate of one system can come with twice the costs to the victim of that error. See Cade, supra, at

1808-09.
90.
See Complaint at 2, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 14-1026 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2014) (filing
class action lawsuit challenging government's failure to provide children in asylum proceedings with
counsel as a violation of due process).
91.
See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptional-

ism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 2022 (2013) ("The U.S. citizen deportation cases that have come to light
provide powerful examples of the difference that access to counsel makes, due to the growing number of cases in which those who have been misclassified as noncitizens within removal proceedings
later prevail on citizenship claims when prosecuted for illegal reentry.").
92.
See MANNING, supra note 68.
93.
See CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN
CALIFORNIA 55-61 (1993).

94.

See id. at 50-52.

95.
See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRiGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 548-88 (5th ed. 2009).
96.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-41 (describing error that led to CBP officials deny
Ian McEwan entry into the United States).
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quickly when the individual is born abroad and acquires citizenship from
a U.S. citizen parent. In all of these cases, it is not just the facts that may
be hard to ascertain, it is the law itself.
For example, at first glance McEwan's travails appear to be the result of negligence by the low-level CBP officials who prevented him
from entering the United States after learning he would receive honoraria
for his speaking engagements. But in fact honoraria are a gray area in
U.S. immigration law. Although the law clearly allows visiting foreign
artists and academics appearing before educational and non-profit groups
to accept honoraria without first obtaining a work visa, 98 there are no
regulations to guide field officers who are trying to distinguish permissible honoraria from impermissible payment for labor in the United States,
leading to inconsistent admission standards and general confusion. Representative Jim McDermott, who helped to resolve McEwan's predicament, explained that his office handles these types of border situations on
a daily basis, and he told the press that "this happens more often than
most people think." 99
Similarly, Wilfredo Garza only learned that he was a U.S. citizen
after his brother's lawyer determined their father had resided in the United States for a sufficient number of years to automatically transmit citizenship to his children.100 The laws regarding acquisition of citizenship
are complex and have changed frequently, requiring lawyers to consult
lengthy charts to determine the standards in place at the time their clients
0
were born.o'
Garza was removed from the United States four times, and
it apparently never occurred to immigration officials to inquire about his
parents' citizenship. But even if they had known of Garza's U.S. citizen
father, these officials would have had difficulty determining whether
Garza was therefore a citizen himself.
The complexity of immigration law is a particular problem when
admission or removal decisions are made through streamlined removal
procedures, which require only that two enforcement officers agree that

97.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-41 (describing error that led to CBP officials deny
Ian McEwan entry into the United States).

98.

Immigration and Nationality Act

§ 212,

8 U.S.C.

§

Il82(q) (2013) ("Any alien admitted

under section 101 l(a)(15)(B) of this title may accept an honorarium payment and associated incidental expenses for a usual academic activity or activities (lasting not longer than 9 days at any
single institution), as defined by the Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of Education, if such payment is offered by an institution or organization described in subsection (p)(1) of
this section and is made for services conducted for the benefit of that institution or entity and if the
alien has not accepted such payment or expenses from more than 5 institutions or organizations in
the previous 6-month period.").
99.
John Marshall, Author's Problems at U.S. Border May Signal Things to Come, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 1, 2004, 9:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/aelbooks/article/Author-s(quoting Jim McDermott, Washington State
problems-at-U-S-border-may-signal-l141231.php
Representative).
100.
Etter, supra note 24.
101.
LEGOMSKY & RODRiGUEZ, supra note 95, at 1293-95.

786

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:4

removal is justified, and are decisions that are typically made and then
executed quickly-often in a matter of hours, if not minutes.1 0 2 Some
advocates have criticized the expansion of summary removal proceedings and suggest more cases should be referred to the immigration
courts. 0 3 Assuming Congress is unlikely to make such a change, it is
essential that the immigration officials making these determinations receive proper training. For example, the CBP official who concluded
Robert Lopez-Gutierrez could not have a valid asylum claim based on
his fear of harm from non-governmental actors had not been trained in
asylum law.i' If she had even a basic understanding of the subject, she
would have known that a person who expresses credible fear of harm
from private actors rather than the government nonetheless may have a
valid asylum claim that is worthy of exploration in a credible fear interview. 105 For those seeking asylum in the United States, the rights granted
to them by statute matter far less than the legal knowledge of those CBP
officials charged with making these crucial threshold determinations.
In addition, training should be accompanied by a change in interpretive approach. When immigration officials make determinations about
who may enter and remain in the United States, they should err on the
side of interpreting the law expansively, at least in those cases that do not
raise national security concerns. Courts have adopted a "rule of lenity"
favoring the noncitizen when interpreting ambiguous immigration statutes;106 immigration officials should do the same, particularly when they
are the sole adjudicator of an individual's claimed right to enter or remain in the United States. 0 7 The immigration enforcement system cannot eliminate all error, but it should seek to minimize errors that lead to
wrongful exclusion and deportation of those entitled to remain in the
United States.
III. FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This Article began by noting that although many immigration
scholars and advocates criticize the lack of procedural protections in immigration enforcement, there is very little data on the frequency or causes of such errors. The data on immigration enforcement errors described
in Part I is far from complete, and thus no definitive conclusions can be
§ 235,

§ 1225(b)(1)(A)

102.

See Immigration and Nationality Act

103.

See, e.g., ACLU REPORT, supra note 30, at 7-8.

104.
105.

See id at 37-38.
See, e.g., Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2007).

8 U.S.C.

(2013).

Hiroshi Motomura, ImmigrationLaw After a Century of PlenaryPower: Phantom Consti106.
tutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 568 (1990) (describing the immigration rule of lenity as a means of "offset[ting] the disadvantaged position of aliens in constitutional
immigration law").
107.
Cf, Trevor W. Morrison, ConstitutionalAvoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1189, 1226 (2006) (asserting that the executive branch has an obligation to implement laws
to avoid encroachment of constitutional norms just as courts do and further noting that the obligation
is particularly strong when courts are not available to review executive action).
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drawn about how often immigration officials err and why they do so. Nor
would such a comprehensive data analysis be possible in the confines of
a symposium article. Accordingly, this Part sketches a framework for
future research and analysis and describes some challenges and issues
that such a project would entail.
A. Overcoming Secrecy
Immigration enforcement is disturbingly nontransparent, which can
both raise the risk of errors and make it difficult to identify and change
the practices that caused those mistakes.1os The lack of information about
detention and deportation of U.S. citizens provides a good example of
the problem. As Professor Stevens noted, DHS does not keep statistics
on the number of U.S. citizens that are detained and deported, and yet
DHS has claimed that such mistakes were rare. 0 9 After researching that
question, Stevens uncovered a significant number of errors, demonstrating that DHS is unaware of the scope of its most egregious errors.'10
Secrecy can be overcome in a number of ways. First, researchers
should seek out more information about immigration enforcement errors
through Freedom of Information Act requests, such as requests for documents from ICE and CBP in which those agencies admitted error in
targeting an individual for removal from the United States.'' In addition,
advocates can push the federal government to track and publicize its own
error rate. Congressional oversight is yet another method of forcing immigration officials to publicly disclose the frequency of their errors. Finally, immigration advocates should keep each other informed about
enforcement errors through listservs and other methods of data sharing,
which can be used by researchers to gain a more comprehensive picture
of these types of errors.
B. The Scope of the Project
Although it may be impossible to determine the full extent of immigration enforcement errors, even a partial picture would be helpful to
determining the causes of immigration enforcement errors. Scholars of

108.
See KANSTROOM, supra note 65, at 102 (criticizing immigration enforcement for its lack
of "accountability and transparency").
109.
See Stevens, supra note 14, at 618-19.

110.

See id at 620-21.

&

AILA has recently filed suit against the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR)
111.
seeking data on complaints filed against federal immigration judges, as well as information about
how EOIR responded to those complaints. AILA contends that EOIR is violating the Freedom of
Information Act by failing to proactively post online resolutions of complaints against federal immigration judges, and it explains that it has "sought public disclosure of the[se] records in light of
longstanding public concern that EOIR has failed to adequately investigate complaints against immigration judges and to take disciplinary action where appropriate." Memorandum of Points
Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment & in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Exec. Office for Immigra-

tion Review, No. 13-cv-00840, 2014 WL 2776308 (D.D.C. June 16, 2014).
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the criminal justice system give widely varying estimates of the number
of wrongful convictions, and there appears to be no consensus as to
whether that number is closer to 1% or 20%.1 12 Nonetheless, Professor
Garrett's examination of several hundred cases in which individuals were
exonerated through DNA evidence has value because it shows where the
system repeatedly went wrong in cases in which innocence is no longer
questionable. Likewise, a similar study of a small subset of cases in
which immigration enforcement officers admitted error could shed light
on how those mistakes were made, and thus how to prevent them from
recurring in the future.
C. DrawingConclusionsfrom Data
The question at the heart of this Article is whether the error rate in
immigration enforcement is too high. No system of law enforcement can
ensure 100% accuracy, and thus errors are a necessary, albeit regrettable,
by-product of enforcing immigration laws. Thus, uncovering errors by
immigration enforcement officers does not prove that the costs of those
errors outweigh the benefits of enforcing immigration laws.
Nonetheless, systemic and preventable errors can never be justified
by any enforcement system, no matter how good its overall track record.
For example, if ICE is regularly deporting mentally ill and intellectually
disabled individuals who mistakenly "confess" to being undocumented
immigrants, then it should change its policies regarding its willingness to
rely on such statements as the primary basis for removal. If CBP officers' lack of knowledge of asylum law leads to frequent failures to recognize valid asylum claims, then CBP should improve its training. Even if
these errors are rare-and, as described in Part I.B., the available evidence suggests they happen with some frequency-they are preventable
and thus must stop.
CONCLUSION
Every system of enforcement and adjudication will commit errors,
no matter how many procedural protections are put in place. On occasion, an innocent person will be convicted, or an individual entitled to
remain in the United States will be deported. But these mistakes should
be rare. The criminal justice system incorporates heightened procedural
protections to minimize such errors, not only to protect the innocent, but
also to promote the legitimacy of the government's exercise of its criminal enforcement authority. Now that immigration law comes with many
of the penalties that accompany the criminal system, it is important to
minimize the error rate in this field as well. To do so, immigration reform advocates should follow the lead of advocates for reform in the
112.
Ramsey & Frank, supra note 6, at 440 ("Various studies have provided estimates of the
frequency of wrongful conviction ranging from .5% to as high as 20%.").
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criminal justice system who have used the data gathered from wrongful
convictions to seek new procedural protections in the enforcement of
criminal law. Only after obtaining a clearer picture of the number of
wrongful deportations that occur each year, and the reasons why they
occur, can we begin to address the causes of those errors.

IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN
WEST: CAN EMERGING MODELS OF REFORM SOLVE OUR
REGIONAL PROBLEM?
LISA GRAYBILL & CHARANYA KRISHNASWAMII
ABSTRACT

Each year, tens of thousands of immigrants are held in civil immigration detention facilities as they await their immigration removal (deportation) hearings. Unlike defendants in criminal proceedings, individuals in immigration proceedings are generally not afforded the right to a
court-appointed attorney, and many immigrants cannot afford to hire a
private attorney. As a result, the vast majority of detained noncitizens
navigate, behind bars, what may be the most profound and irreversible
event in their lives without the aid of a lawyer. This four-part paper will
analyze the problem of representation and detention by focusing on immigrants detained at the immigration detention facility in Aurora, Colorado-the only such facility in the Rocky Mountain region-as a case
study.
In Part I, this Article provide an overview of the problem of access
to representation in detention. This part briefly describes the legal bases
for detaining immigrants; discusses the factors affecting immigrant detainees' ability to leave (bond out of) detention; examines the consequences of continued detention; and identifies the barriers immigrant
detainees encounter in seeking to obtain counsel. This part also examines
the scope of the problem both nationally and regionally.
Part II will serve as a case study on detention and representation in
the Rocky Mountain Region. This part, which relies on both quantitative
data (made available through FOIA, the Vera Institute for Justice, and
the Executive Office for Immigration Review) and qualitative interviews
with immigration attorneys and formerly detained immigrants, will be
divided into three sections. The first section will analyze demographic
data for the immigrant population detained at the Aurora Detention Center, including detained immigrants' criminal histories, representation
rates, and potential availability of relief from deportation. The second
section will discuss obstacles detained immigrants in the region face in
securing legal representation and how those obstacles affect their willf From 2012-2015, Lisa Graybill was an Associate Professor of the Practice of Law at the University of Denver School of Law. She now serves as the Deputy Legal Director for the Southern Poverty
Law Center's Mass Incarceration Project. Charanya Krishnaswami is a 2013 graduate of Yale Law
School and served as a legal fellow at the Rocky Mountain Immigrant Advocacy Network in Westminster, Colorado from 2013-2014.
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ingness and ability to fight their removal cases. The third section will
identify and catalog what representation-related resources are available
for detained immigrants (including access to free or low-cost legal services, legal resources, and assistance and orientation services).
While this is the first-ever region-specific study on the subject, it is
situated within a nascent and growing movement for access to legal representation for noncitizens-particularly those who are detained. In Part
III, the authors will discuss several recent models, both proactive and
reactive, for access to counsel. These include (1) the litigation-driven
model of providing access to counsel for immigrant detainees with competency issues and (2) the locality-driven model of providing access to
counsel for all detained immigrants. In this part, the authors will contextualize and evaluate each of these models.
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INTRODUCTION

Each year, tens of thousands of immigrants are held in civil immigration detention facilities as they await their immigration removal (deportation) hearings. Unlike defendants in criminal proceedings, individuals in immigration proceedings are generally not afforded the right to a
court-appointed attorney, and many immigrants cannot afford to hire a
private attorney. As a result, the vast majority of detained noncitizens
navigate, behind bars, what may be the most profound and irreversible
event in their lives without the aid of a lawyer.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the national problem
of access to representation for detained immigrants. This part describes
the legal bases for detaining immigrants and discusses the factors affecting immigrant detainees' ability to bond out of detention. The authors
explain why indigent immigrant detainees are not entitled to appointed
counsel and identify recent law and policy changes that have contributed
to a significant expansion of immigrant detention in the last decade. Finally, this part concludes with a discussion of the danger of continued
detention, especially for vulnerable individuals, who are unable to retain
counsel to represent them in immigration proceedings.
Part II examines how the problem of lack of representation for detained immigrants manifests in the Rocky Mountain region. This part
begins with a description of the region's detention facility, the Aurora
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Detention Center, which is just outside of Denver, and provides an overview of the immigrant population detained therein. It then describes the
results of the first-ever region-specific study on access to representation
for immigrants detained at the Aurora Detention Center, which relies on
quantitative and qualitative data collected with the support of the Rocky
Mountain Immigrant Advocacy Network (RMIAN), the region's only
immigration detention legal service provider. The authors examine how
case outcomes for immigrants detained in the Aurora Detention Center
are significantly affected by representation and review some of the factors that may influence these outcomes. This part concludes with a discussion of the resources available to assist immigrants detained in Aurora
and an explanation of why these limited resources are inadequate to
solve the problem of lack of representation for immigrants detained in
the Rocky Mountain region.
The final part of the Article examines two very recent efforts to expand access to counsel for indigent immigrants in detention and evaluates whether either of these approaches is currently viable in the Rocky
Mountain region. In 2010, advocates on the West Coast filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of mentally incompetent detainees, seeking to
force the government to appoint counsel for these particularly vulnerable
individuals based on alleged violations of the Due Process Clause and
the Rehabilitation Act.' That litigation, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder,2
resulted in the first-ever court order requiring the government to provide
legal assistance to certain detained immigrants in the specified jurisdictions.3 It also prompted the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to announce
nationwide reforms 4-which have largely yet to be implemented outside
the target jurisdictions.
Also in 2010, Second Circuit Judge Robert Katzmann convened a
group of experts on the East Coast to create the New York Immigrant
Representation Study Group (NYIRSG or Study Group). The Study
Group produced two reports examining the impact of lack of representation on detained immigrants, their families and communities, and the
local economy. 6 In response, in the summer of 2014, the New York City

1.
2.
3.

Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1037-38 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
767 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
See id. at 1061.

4.
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce Safeguards
for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions, U.S.
DEPARTMENT JUST. (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/department-justice-anddepartment-homeland-security-announce-safeguards-unrepresented.
5.
N.Y. IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY, ACCESSING JUSTICE: THE AVAILABILITY AND
ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 1-2 (2011) [hereinafter ACCESSING
JUSTICE], available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/NYIRSReport.pdf.

6.

See id. at 2.
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Council appropriated funding to support the nation's first-ever public
defender system for detained immigrants.
In light of these recent successful efforts, the authors evaluate the
viability of either large-scale class action litigation, or municipal funding
reform, as solutions to address the problem of lack of access to counsel
for immigrants detained in the Rocky Mountain region. In conclusion,
the authors explain why neither of these possible solutions are an appropriate fit for our community at present, but do offer hope for future reform.
I. IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND THE NEED FOR REPRESENTATION

The government has broad legal authority to detain noncitizens
pending their removal proceedings. Section 236 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) vests the government agency responsible for immigration enforcement, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
with the ability to take into custody any noncitizen who is removable.
A. Legal Basis for Detention
The Immigration and Nationality Act grants the government authority to detain a diverse range of immigrants while their immigration status
is being adjudicated.8 These categories include lawful permanent residents as well as individuals who may have claims to relief from deportation under the law. There are two kinds of detention: mandatory detention and discretionary detention.
1. Mandatory Detention
Congress significantly expanded the categories of immigrants subject to "mandatory detention" in 1996, pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Immigrant Responsibility Act.9 Individuals
now subject to mandatory detention include those charged with nearly
any kind of criminal offense (ranging from minor, nonviolent municipal
infractions or misdemeanors to violent crimes), "arriving aliens" (that is,
noncitizens apprehended at the border after "entering without inspection"), and noncitizens who are in "reinstatement of removal" proceedings, meaning that ICE is enforcing a prior deportation order against
them. o

7.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2015).
8. See id. (discretionary detention); id § 1225(b)(1) (arriving aliens subject to expedited
removal); id. § I225(b)(2)(a) (arriving aliens who are not subject to expedited removal but are otherwise inadmissible); id. § 1226(c) (mandatory detention for immigrants convicted of certain offenses); id. § 1231(a) (immigrants who have received a final order of removal).
9. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (arriving aliens subject to expedited removal); id.
§1225(b)(2)(a) (arriving aliens who are not subject to expedited removal but are otherwise inadmis-
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Noncitizens subject to mandatory detention may not bond out unless
and until their removal proceedings are favorably concluded." Even
noncitizens with viable claims for relief from deportation must remain in
detention until their removal proceedings are resolved.12
2. Discretionary Detention, Bond, and Parole
If an immigrant is not subject to mandatory detention, she is eligible
for release from detention on bond or on her own recognizance, although
there is no right to be released from immigration detention.' 3 Though
DHS has estimated that over 66% of noncitizens incarcerated in immigration detention facilities are subject to mandatory detention,1 4 a 2011
study by Judge Robert A. Katzmann and the Vera Institute of Justice
found that a full three out of every five, or 60%, of detained individuals,
are actually eligible for release from detention.1 5
When ICE first takes a noncitizen who is not subject to mandatory
detention into custody, it has the discretion to release that immigrant on
parole, set an initial bond amount, or refuse to set any bond.1 6 The "Notice of Custody Determination" issued by ICE lists the bond amount ICE
has determined and also states whether the detained immigrant can seek
review of the custody determination before an Immigration Judge.1 7
A bond-eligible immigrant may request a bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge (IJ). In determining whether to increase or lower the
immigrant's bond, the Immigration Judge considers whether the individual poses a flight risk or danger to society but has "broad discretion in
deciding the factors that he or she may consider in custody redeterminations." 8 The IJ can lower a bond, but he or she can also raise it or take it
away altogether.19 IS cannot set bonds below $1,500, although IJs can
release a respondent on her own recognizance. 20
ICE can "parole," or release from detention, any detained immigrant
on a case-by-case basis.21 For example, although detention of immigrants

sible); id § 1226(c) (mandatory detention for immigrants convicted of certain offenses); id.
1231(a) (immigrants who have received a final order ofremoval).
ACCESSING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 12.
11.

12.
13.

§

See id
Guerra, 24 1. & N. Dec. 37, 39 (B.I.A. 2006).

14.
DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION DETENTION
available
at
RECOMMENDATIONS
2
(2009),
OVERVIEW
AND
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf.
ACCESSING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 12.
15.

§ 236(a), (c),

8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a), (c)

(2015).

16.

Immigration and Nationality Act

17.

See DHS Immigration Regulations on Apprehension, Custody, and Detention, 8 C.F.R.

§

236.1(g) (2015).
18.
19.

Guerra, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 40.
FLORENCE IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RIGHTS PROJECT, ALL ABOUT BONDS 12 (2011),

available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/probono/Bonds%20-%20English%20(l l).pdf.
20. Id.
21. See Parole of Aliens into the United States, 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (2015).
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who are apprehended at the border and lacking legal status is mandatory,
many noncitizens falling into this category are fleeing potential or past
persecution in their home countries. Individuals afraid to return to their
home countries who have established that their fear of return is "credible" can be paroled into the United States under a recent ICE directive,
even though they are theoretically still subject to mandatory detention.22
However, to be released, this group of noncitizens must establish to the
satisfaction of ICE Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) their identities, a stable address, and that they are neither a flight risk nor a danger
to the community. 23
B. Recent Law and Policy Changes Have DramaticallyExpandedImmigrant Detention
In 1996, Congress enacted two legislative reforms that drastically
increased immigration detention. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) required the mandatory detention of a broad swath
of noncitizens, including those who committed multiple crimes involving
moral turpitude, drug offenses, and firearms offenses, while the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) significantly expanded the categories of immigrants subject to mandatory de24
tention. The nascent trend toward increased detention accelerated rapidly after 9/11, culminating in the Bush administration's announcement in
2006 that ICE would no longer "catch and release" immigrants but
25
would instead detain them. As a result, detention levels have reached
all-time highs in recent years; in fiscal year 2012, over 400,000 immigrants were detained in the United States. 26 Immigration imprisonment
has become "the single most common [category of] confinement that
occurs in the United States." 27
For the past several years, an additional factor has contributed to the
increase in immigration detainees: the so-called "detention bed mandate." Formally introduced in 2009 as part of the 2010 budget authorization for the Department of Homeland Security, the detention bed mandate refers to the requirement that the agency fill a minimum number of
22.
Parole ofArriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear ofPersecution or Torture, U.S.
8,
2009),
1
(Dec.
ENFORCEMENT
&
CUSTOMS
IMMIGRATION
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/11002.1-hd-parole ofarriving aliensfound-credible fear.pdf.

23. Id. at 3-4.
24. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 439, 110
Stat. 1214, 1276; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 303, 110 Stat. 3009-585.
25.
2006,

Lara Jakes Jordan, U.S. Ends 'Catch-and-Release'at Border, WASH. PoST (Aug. 23,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpPM),
9:57

dyn/content/article/2006/08/23/AR2006082301082.html.
26.
JOHN F. SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION
at
(2013),
available
2012
1
ACTIONS:
ENFORCEMENT
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement-ar_2012_1.pdf.
27.
C6sar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia HemAndez, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA

L. REV. 1346, 1382 (2014).
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28

immigration detention beds-an average of 34,000. ICE has interpreted
this language to mean it must maintain and fill all 34,000 beds every
night. 29 As Ted Robbins, writing for National Public Radio, put it, "Imagine your city council telling the police department how many people it
had to keep in jail each night. That's effectively what Congress has told
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement with a policy known as the
'detention bed mandate."' 30
Finally, private prison companies, which market bed space, have
lobbied aggressively for the changes in the law to further expand immigrant detention. 3 1 The cost of detention per detainee, per day, is estimated to be between $119 and $159.32 The GEO Group, which operates the
Aurora Detention Center, is the nation's second largest private prison
company, operating eight ICE facilities with the capacity to detain
10,288 immigrants every day. 33 In fiscal year 2013, the GEO Group reported revenues of over $1.5 billion, with profits of over $115 million.34
C. DetainedImmigrants Generally Have No Right to Court-Appointed
Counsel
Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court held that due process required the state to appoint counsel for an indigent criminal defendant
who faced a felony charge and attendant threat of incarceration. 5 A few
years later, the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to indigent
defendants facing misdemeanor charges that could result in potential
incarceration.36 The Court observed: "[I]n those [misdemeanors] that end
up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused will receive
28.
See, e.g., Nick Miroff, ControversialQuota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH.
13,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drivesPOST
(Oct.

immigration-detention-boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-lle3-adla-la919f2ed890_story.html;

Ted

Robbins, Little-Known Immigration Mandate Keeps Detention Beds Full, NPR (Nov. 19, 2013, 3:05
http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19/24596860 1/little-known-immigration-mandate-keepsAM),
detention-beds-full. Although not formally introduced into the DHS budget until 2009, the detention
bed mandate has its roots in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, when
DHS was directed to increase the immigration detention capacity by at least 8,000 beds each year
from 2006 to 2010. See Immigration Detention Bed Quota Timeline, NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUST.
CENTER, http://www.immigrantjustice.org/immigration-detention-bed-quota-timeline (last updated

Spring 2015).
29. Miroff, supra note 28.
30.
Robbins, supranote 28.
See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND
31.
at
available
(2011),
5
INCARCERATION
MASS
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf; see also Laura Sullivan, Prison

Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28, 2010, 11:01 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/130833741/prison-economics-help-drive-ariz-immigration-law.
32.
See NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION 2 (2013),
at
http://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Math-of-immigationavailable

Detention-August-2013-FINAL.pdf.
33. Aarti
Shahani,
What
is
GEO
Group?,
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/25/134852256/what-is-geo-group.
34. Id. at 40.
35.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963).
36. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
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the benefit of 'the guiding hand of counsel' so necessary when one's
liberty is in jeopardy." 37
Deprivation of physical liberty is the touchstone for the right to appointed counsel in the criminal context.38 Indeed, the Court has suggested that even in the civil context, there may be a "presumption that an
indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel" where "he may be de39
prived of his physical liberty" if his case is lost.
Yet because immigration detention has been considered administrative, rather than punitive, in nature, individuals who are detained for the
duration of their removal proceedings generally have no recognized right
to appointed counsel in proceedings,40 even though there are significant
liberty and due process interests at stake. 4 1
Just as immigration offenses are "civil offenses," immigration detention is ostensibly "civil detention." The INA, however, does not define "civil detention," and in practice, civil detention is functionally indistinguishable from punitive detention, such as jail or prison.42 In fact,
many immigrants in civil detention are held in regular county jails and
43
state prisons operating under contract with ICE.
For the most part, immigrants in detention are subject to the same
restrictions on liberty that characterize punitive detention: they are confined in cells, wear prison uniforms, are subject to multiple daily
"counts," are denied access to personal clothing and property, and have
restricted access to telephone and visitation and virtually no access to the
internet."4 These similarities have led scholars to observe that
45
"[i]mmigration imprisonment cannot be characterized as nonpunitive."
Although the government has issued standards governing civil detention,
46
they are not legally enforceable.

37.

Id.

38.

Matt Adams, Advancing the "Right" to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 9 SEATTLE J.

FOR SOC. JUST. 169, 172 (2010).
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981); see Adams, supra note 38, at
39.
172.
40.
See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ALIENS' RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: IN BRIEF 6 (2014) ("Aliens, as a category, have generally not been seen as
having either constitutional or statutory rights to counsel at the government's expense in administrative removal proceedings.").
See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 164 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
41.
See, e.g., Garcia Hemndez, supra note 27, at 1383-85.
42.

43.
44.
45.

Id at 1384.
Id
See e.g., id. at 1360.

46.
KAREN TUMLIN, LINTON JOAQUIN & RANJANA NATARAJAN, A BROKEN SYSTEM:
CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS REVEAL FAILURES IN U.S. IMMIGRANT DETENTION CENTERS I (2009),
available at http://nilc.org/document.html?id=9; see also 2011 Operations Manual ICE Performance-Based National Detention Standards, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/20 I1/ (last visited March 7, 2015) [hereinafter Detention
Standards].
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D. Consequences ofLack ofRepresentation
Observing the need for counsel in felony criminal proceedings, the
Supreme Court commented that "[t]he right to be heard" is of little consequence without the attendant right to counsel.4 7 This is because "[e]ven
the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law," and "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him." 48
The same concerns reverberate in the context of detained removal
proceedings. As the next Part discusses, detained individuals, including
individuals in the Rocky Mountain region, generally have limited education. The vast majority do not speak English, yet are forced to defend
themselves against charges of removability in a language they do not
understand. Not only must they navigate a proceeding likened to the tax
code in its complexity, without counsel, but they must do so while incarcerated, with very limited legal resources.
II.REGIONAL ANALYSIS: IMMIGRANTS DETAINED WITHOUT
REPRESENTATION IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN WEST

A. Characteristicsofl mmigrant Detaineesin the Rocky Mountain Region
In the Rocky Mountain region, immigration detainees are primarily
housed in the privately run Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado.4 9 The facility holds approximately 1,500 beds.so It also
houses an immigration court, which adjudicates detained cases.51 In
2013, over 2,000 noncitizens appeared before this court.52
The vast majority of individuals detained in Aurora are charged
solely with civil immigration violations. Only about 25% of the detainees
face crime-related grounds of deportability or inadmissibility and are
thus almost universally subject to mandatory detention.53 ICE has characterized individuals in immigration detention as a largely low-risk, low54
security population.

47.
48.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
Id. at 345.

INC.,
GROUP,
GEO
Facility,
Aurora
Detention
49.
http://www.geogroup.com/maps/locationdetails/39 (last visited Sept. 6, 2015).
50.
Kirk Mitchell, Lawsuit Accuses Aurora Private Prison of Paying Immigrants $1 a Day,
DENVER POST, Oct. 23, 2014, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_26784416/lawsuit-faultscompany-paying-detainees- I-day-at.

51.

Id.

52.
See U.S. Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/deport-filing charge.php (last updated Aug. 2015)
[hereinafter Deportation Proceedings].

53.

See id

54.

SCHRIRO, supra note 14, at 2.
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Table 1.1, Immigrants Detained in Aurora in 2013 by Charge55

charge

22%

,

Other Other
criminal 6%
EW
49%

Aggravate
Other d felony
mm
4%
charge
19%
Demographically, the vast majority of the detained population in
Aurora-mirroring the detained population nationwide-is male and
Spanish-speaking. Approximately 80% are primarily Spanish-speaking,
while 19% speak English, and the other 1% speak a wide mix of other
languages.56 Women comprise a small fraction of the detainee population
in Aurora. While the majority of noncitizens detained in Aurora are
Mexican nationals, many are also from El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras.
The U.S. government does not record the income level of detainees
who are in removal proceedings. However, according to the U.S. Census
Bureau, in 2011, nearly 20% of foreign-born individuals from Latin
America (other than Mexico) were living below the federal poverty level,
while 27% of foreign-born individuals from Mexico were living below
the federal poverty level.59 As one study of immigration detainees observed, "respondents tend to come from working class communities and
have limited financial resources. . . . There is every reason to believe that
the subset of foreign-born individuals who land in deportation proceedings are, as a group, even less economically secure than the general foreign-born population."a Of the experienced immigration attorneys surveyed for this report, most estimated the average annual income of clients in removal proceedings to be around $20,000.61 Universally, attor-

See Deportation Proceedings, supra note 52.
55.
56.
Denver Immigration Court, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/denverimmigration-court (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT: ROCKY MOUNTAIN IMMIGRANT
57.
ADVOCACY NETWORK 3 [hereinafter 2013 ANNUAL REPORT] (on file with author).

58.

Id.

59.
ELIZABETH M. GRIECO ET AL., THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
2010 16 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acs- 19.pdf.
Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deporta60.
tion: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 548 (2009).
See, e.g., Interview #108 with Anonymous Attorney (June 12, 2014) [hereinafter Inter61.
view #108] (on file with author);
Interview #118 with Anonymous Attorney (June 9, 2014) [hereinafter Interview #118] (on file with
author).
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neys surveyed stated that they believed the income levels for detained
respondents to be even lower. 62
Nor does the U.S. government record the average educational level
of detained noncitizens (or citizens in removal proceedings generally).
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2010, only about 53% of foreign-born individuals from Latin America who are in the United States
had completed a high school education. 63 Formerly detained individuals
interviewed reported education levels between seventh grade and the
completion of high school.6 One experienced attorney who was surveyed noted that on the whole, his clients in removal proceedings tended
to have, at most, a high school education.65
Finally, while the U.S. government does not record whether detainees have U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident family members affected by the detainee's detention, many detainees live in mixed-status families. Many formerly detained noncitizens interviewed reported a loved
one, such as a spouse or child, who was affected by their detention.66
B. The Impact of Representation on Outcomes for DetainedImmigrants
in the Rocky MountainRegion
Not surprisingly, given complexities of immigration law and barriers to self-representation, representation by an attorney strongly correlates to likelihood of success. Studies of other regions have shown that
representation makes a significant difference in case outcomes. For example, in New York, an individual who was detained and represented
was six times as likely to win his or her case as an unrepresented detainee. 6 In Northern California, a represented detainee was three times as
likely to win his or her case, yet two-thirds of individuals went unrepresented.6 8
The same holds true in the Rocky Mountain region. Consistent with
findings in other jurisdictions, there is a strong correlation between representation and a detained respondent's ability to stay in the country (ei62.
See, e.g., Interview #108, supra note 61; Interview #118, supra note 61.
63.
GRIECO ET AL., supra note 59, at 16.
64.
See, e.g., Interview #207 with Anonymous Previous Detainee [hereinafter Interview #207]
(on file with author); Interview #202 with Anonymous Previous Detainee [hereinafter Interview

#202] (on file with author); Interview #203 with Anonymous Previous Detainee (June 30, 2014)
[hereinafter Interview #203] (on file with author).
65.
Interview #115 with Anonymous Attorney (July 1, 2014) [hereinafter Interview #115] (on
file with author).
66.
See, e.g., Interview #203, supra note 64; Interview #208 with Anonymous Previous Detainee (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter Interview #208] (on file with author).
67.
ACCESSING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 3.
68.
JAYASHRI SRIKANTIAH ET AL., ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND
COMMUNITIES: STUDY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DETAINED IMMIGRANTS IN NORTHERN
CALIFORNIA
18
(Oct.
2014),
available
at
https://media.law.stanford.edu/organizations/clinics/immigrant-rights-clinic/lI -4-14-Access-to-

Justice-Report-FINAL.pdf.
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ther through relief from deportation or termination of proceedings). In
2013, 32% percent of represented detainees were allowed to stay in the
country, compared to just 3% of unrepresented detainees. 69 Similarly,
individuals were much less likely to be deported if they were represented: slightly over half of represented detainees were deported, compared
to nearly 90% of unrepresented detainees. 70
Legal representation has been steadily on the rise in Aurora, but
nearly two-thirds of immigration detainees in 2013 proceeded before the
Aurora Immigration Court without representation at any stage in their
removal proceedings. 7 ' By contrast, the Department of Homeland Security-which acts as prosecutor in these cases-is represented by an attorney in every single case. Furthermore, most DHS attorneys appear repeatedly before the Aurora Immigration Court, whereas the vast majority
of respondents appear, of course, only once. Thus, compounding the representation disparity is an imbalance in familiarity, expertise, and legitimacy.

72

C. FactorsAffecting Outcomes for UnrepresentedDetainees
Detention has a significant impact on detainees, their families, and
the community. While detained, detainees navigate a legal regime that
has been likened to the tax code in its complexity. 73 Without representation, immigrants are significantly less likely to be able to successfully
navigate the immigration process.74 Although there are some resources to
assist unrepresented individuals, these are necessarily limited in scope.
Detainees still face significant challenges in comprehending their immigration proceedings, obtaining access to evidence and supporting documentation, and contending with the psychological and emotional impacts
of detention as they go through the legal process.
1. Ability to Comprehend Immigration Proceedings
As noted previously, while there are no official data regarding the
educational levels of detainees, census data estimate about 53% of for69.

2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 57, at 9.

70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 8.

This phenomenon was famously documented in Marc Galanter's seminal work, Why the
72.
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95,
115-16 (1974). Galanter described a legal framework in which "repeat players" in the legal process,
including prosecutors, are advantaged (in terms of intelligence, expertise, and legitimacy) as compared to "one-shotters," such as criminal defendants. Id. at 97, 115-16.

73.

Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).

For example, a survey of detained immigrants by the City Bar Justice Center in New York
74.
found that nearly 40% of the detained immigrants who agreed to be interviewed for the survey were
eligible for some form of immigration relief, but few had had the opportunity to consult with a
lawyer or had any understanding of the specific statutory remedies that might apply to them. KIERA
LOBREGLIO ET AL., NYC KNOW YOUR RIGHTS PROJECT: AN INNOVATIVE PRO BONO RESPONSE TO
THE LACK OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT IMMIGRANT DETAINEES 2, 14 (2009), available at
http://www2.nycbar.org/citybarjusticecenter/pdf/NYCKnowYourRightsNovO9.pdf.
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eign-born individuals from Latin America who are in the United Statesa demographic that includes the vast majority of individuals detained in
Aurora-have completed a high school education. 7 5 Even for those who
have, understanding various immigration laws-from the allegations on
a Notice to Appear to the various eligibility requirements for forms of
relief-can be a near impossible task. Being forced to operate in a system in a language in which a detainee has little to no comprehension can
pose particular challenges.
As advocates have observed, "immigration law is notoriously complex and continually changing." There are several resources that provide clarity and help to detainees in immigration proceedings. However,
the vast majority of this population still proceeds without legal counsel
before the immigration court and against experienced attorneys representing the government.
2. Access to Evidence and Supporting Documentation
Many forms of immigration relief are predicated on supporting documentation and evidence, including affidavits, witnesses, letters of support, and records of presence in the United States. Asylum seekers need
to produce evidence of potential or past persecution through country reports, current news accounts, and expert testimony. For example, applicants for cancellation of removal, a form of relief that allows certain
longtime residents to remain in the country at the IJ's discretion, must
document several years of continuous physical presence in the country to
demonstrate eligibility. Yet immigrants in detention may have very limited access to such documentation and face significant obstacles in trying
to obtain it.
Several former detainees interviewed for this report noted the difficulty of collecting evidence to prepare their own cases while in detention. For example, one former detainee, who was applying for asylum,
explained: "I couldn't find witnesses or articles because I was in detention," and described how it was hard to go to court, though after gaining
a lawyer, the lawyer was able to find witnesses and articles.77 Another
former detainee who won her case after receiving pro bono representation observed, "It would have been impossible [for me to win my case if
I had not had a lawyer]. Not the same or different, [but] impossible be-

75.
See GRIECO ET AL., supra note 59, at 16.
76.
Lucas Guttentag & Abilan Arulanantham, Extending the Promise of Gideon: Immigration,
Deportation,
and
the
Right
to
Counsel,
A.B.A.
(2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights magazinehome/2013_vol_39/vol_30_no_4
gideon/extendingthepromiseofgideon.html.
77.
Interview #202, supra note 64.
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cause I didn't have the resources or the means to get an attorney [or] the
information [for my own case]."n
A social worker who works both with represented and pro se detainees interviewed for the study observed:
[W]ith pro se folks there is much more of an awareness that this is
going to be much more difficult. With that awareness there is an acceptance. . . . [P]ractically speaking how are they going to get documents or explain their situation. . . . Pro se people aren't really less

hopeful, but there is more of an acceptance that things might [not]
turn out well. 79
3. Experience of Intimidation and Fear During Court Proceedings;
Impact on Self-Presentation
Nearly every former detainee who appeared at any stage of his or
her proceedings without an attorney recalled the trepidation she or he felt
when proceeding alone in an adversarial courtroom setting before a judge
and against an ICE prosecutor. One former detainee, an asylum-seeker,
explained that:
[I]t was . . . hard [to proceed alone]. It was hard to express myself

and my head was full of things. The language barrier made it hard for
me.

. .

. [After I got a lawyer,] [a] lot changed. I was able to express

myself. Before, I couldn't.80
Another remembered that "[i]t was very scary" to proceed unrepresented, saying "I didn't know what to expect." 8 ' A third recalled that "it
was the worst in that moment before the judge. You feel abandoned and
you don't know what to do. It is something ugly that you feel." 82
4. Psychological and Emotional Consequences of Detention
Many former detainees also mentioned how the emotional difficulties of being in detention could have detrimental effects on their ability to
pursue applications for relief or represent themselves. One detained asylum-seeker noted that "[i]t's hard being detained. . . . I felt alone and
everyone spoke other languages." 83 Another noted that detention "was

78.

Interview #206 with Anonymous Previous Detainee [hereinafter Interview #206] (on file

with author).

79.
author).
80.

Interview #302 with Anonymous Social Worker [hereinafter Interview #302] (on file with
Interview #202, supra note 64.

Interview #208, supra note 66. However, one detainee noted that, despite his perception
81.
that the "government's attorney had the goal of deporting me . . . I had a lot of courage in front of
the judge" with the help of legal resources, including the Legal Orientation Program and the detention facility's law library. Interview #205 with Anonymous Previous Detainee [hereinafter Interview
#205] (on file with author).
82.
Interview #203, supra note 64.
Interview #202, supra note 64.
83.
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the worst thing that has happened to me in my life and I was so scared." 84
As a social worker observed, "depression and anxiety increase as people
worry about the future and possibly being deported. Being in a punitive
environment doesn't help."8 5
Several former detainees noted the detrimental effects that detention
had on their families. One longtime legal permanent resident noted:
"[Being detained] did a lot of damage [to my family]."8 6 Another observed:
Detention affected my family a lot. My son [was] only [a] year [old],
and he was very sad. It was really hard. We didn't know if I was going to stay or go. If I had been sent [back], I didn't know what I
would do. You don't know what to do. There was so much violence
there, it gave me so much fear that I would be sent there. I didn't
want my children to suffer the violence. It was so hard to think about
87
what could happen.
Other detainees concurred: "[My children] suffered a lot psychologically from the [detention] experience. . . . [T]hankfully, I have a strong
[partner] who was able to take on the role of father and mother [while I
was detained]."
Universally, former detainees reported feeling more emotionally
equipped to handle detention and their court proceedings when they had
lawyers. "[My lawyers gave] me the power and oxygen to fight," observed one detainee. "I had more strength and positivity [when I had an
attorney representing me]. My faith in the fight was stronger." 89
D. Existing Resources Are Inadequate to Meet the Legal Needs oflmmigrants Detained in the Rocky Mountain Region
1. Pro Se Resources Not a Substitute for Representation
Recognizing the problem of lack of representation, stakeholders
have created certain resources to assist detained, pro se individuals in
representing themselves. Immigration detention centers are legally required to maintain a library of legal resources for detainees to consult,
including relevant legal authorities, criminal and immigration resources,
books on federal procedure, and asylum-related resources. 90

84.
85.
author).
86.
87.
88.

Interview #203, supra note 64.
Interview #301 with Anonymous Social Worker [hereinafter Interview #301] (on file with
Interview #207, supra note 64.
Interview #208, supra note 65.
Interview #205, supra note 81.

89.

Id.

90.

Detention Standards,supra note 46.
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The Rocky Mountain region is a site for the Legal Orientation Program (LOP), created by the U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office
of Immigration Review (EOIR) "to improve judicial efficiency and assist
all parties in detained removal proceedings-detained aliens, the immigration court, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the
detention facility." 1 Through LOP, providers nationwide provide daily
know-your-rights presentations and individual orientations at the detention facility. 92 LOP is a valuable tool that educates and provides legal
resources to unrepresented detainees about the removal process. Studies
of the program have found that LOP participants are better equipped to
represent themselves; furthermore, the program promotes immigration
court efficiency as LOP participants are significantly better apprised of
their potential legal options. 93 However, LOP is not intended to be a substitute for legal representation; instead, its purpose is to provide legal
orientation to detained immigrants.94
2. Nonprofit and Pro Bono Resources Already Overextended
In addition to the LOP, the region boasts nonprofit and pro bono resource providers, including the Rocky Mountain Immigrant Advocacy
Network (RMIAN), the region's only legal services provider for detained
immigrants. In addition to providing services to detainees through LOP,
RMIAN has a limited capacity to pair certain indigent, detained individuals with pro bono attorneys, many of whom are practicing immigration
lawyers. 95

RMIAN also recently launched a pilot project that aims to provide
in-house legal representation for certain individuals. 96 RMIAN has two
full-time attorneys in its Detention Program who conduct know-yourrights presentations and are able to take on a limited number of individu97
al merits cases as a part of the pilot program.
Both of these free representation resources are limited in scope.
RMIAN relies on the generosity of the local bar for its pro bono referral
program, and the supply of attorneys is insufficient to keep up with de-
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http://www.justice.gov/eoir/probono/probono.htm (last updated Apr. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Legal
Access Programs].

92.

Id.

93.
NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM:
EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENT REPORT, PHASE II, at iii-v (2008),
availableat http://www.justice.gov/eoir/reports/LOPEvaluation-final.pdf.
94.
EOIR's Office of Legal Access Programs, which carries out the Legal Orientation Program, makes clear that it "does not offer legal representation to aliens in removal proceedings." See
Legal Access Programs,supra note 9 1.
95.
See Detention Program, ROCKY MOUNTAIN IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY NETWORK,
http://www.rmian.org/detention-program/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).

96.

See id.

97.
Interview with Megan E. Hall, Managing Attorney, Detention Program, Rocky Mountain
Immigrant Advocacy Network (June 9, 2014) [hereinafter Hall Interview].
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mand. In light of the spike in children's immigration cases following the
2014 child migrant crisis, resources for pro bono representation are
stretched especially thin.98 As for in-house representation, because both
detention program attorneys split their time between the LOP program
and merits representation, RMIAN is able to represent only a small fraction of unrepresented detainees seeking legal representation.
3. Disincentives to the Private Bar
Although the region is home to a generous bar willing to provide
pro bono legal services to detainees, the supply of free legal services for
indigent detainees is significantly outweighed by the demand for them.
While legal representation strongly correlates to whether an individual
detained in Aurora can achieve a favorable outcome, the vast majority of
detainees face significant barriers to securing legal representation, and
attorneys observe that there are significant disincentives, obstacles, and
costs to representing detainees.
a. Detainees Are Unable to Pay
For those who are able to pay some amount of money for legal services, the Colorado chapter of the American Immigration Lawyers' Association (AILA) provides an updated list of attorneys willing to provide
low- or slow-pay representation for both detained and non-detained individuals.99 Still, financial barriers prevent many detained noncitizens from
leaving detention and from being able to secure representation in their
cases. As mentioned above, while no official statistics exist regarding
income levels of detained individuals, a significant portion would likely
be considered indigent.
Immigration attorneys estimate that many clients in removal proceedings could be classified as low-income.' 00 On average, attorneys
estimated respondents' annual incomes to be in the neighborhood of
$20,000.10' Another attorney noted, that the "[average income is] very
low; [I've] never had a fee waiver [a request to the Immigration Court to
have the cost of an application for relief waived] denied."1 02 Another
attorney observed that respondents' financial resources were "low," and
"lower still" for individuals who are detained. 0 3 Multiple attorneys observed that the person being detained is often the breadwinner for the
entire family, meaning that at a time of even greater economic need for
Telephone conversation with Mekela Goehring, Executive Director, Rocky Mountain
98.
Immigrant Advocacy Network (Mar. 24, 2015).
See AILA Access to Services Committee List of Low-Pay and Slow-Pay Service Provid99.

ers (last updated May 31, 2014) (on file with author).
100.
See, e.g., Interview #108, supra note 61; Interview #118, supranote 61.
See, e.g., Interview #108, supra note 61; Interview #118, supra note 61.
101.
Interview #112 with Anonymous Attorney (July 7, 2014) [hereinafter Interview #112] (on
102.
file with author).
Interview #115, supranote 65.
103.
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the family, their income is reduced to $0.'4 Without a steady source of
income, paying for a private attorney is a near impossibility for many
detainees and their families.
With their especially limited financial resources, detained immigrants are often faced with a dilemma: paying the bond to get out of detention, or paying for a lawyer to represent them in their immigration
cases. In many cases, they are not able to do either. One former detainee,
the breadwinner for his family, observed that his situation was difficult
because he had a very high bond and could not pay it, and did not have
the resources to hire an attorney.o Another former detainee who fled
persecution in his home country explained, "I didn't have money. ... I
was a refugee.,,106

While there is no official data on the average bond amount set by
immigration judges, either nationwide or in the region, practitioners estimate an average bond for an immigrant detained at the Aurora Detention Center to be $7,500.107 The cost of removal defense varies, but practitioners have estimated that the price is in the range of many thousand
dollars depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. Financial
barriers likely impede a detainee's ability both to bond out of detention
and to secure representation in his or her removal proceedings.
b. Detained Cases Are Adjudicated on Compressed Timelines
Cases for individuals in detention are processed much more quickly
than in the non-detained context. In 2011, the Department of Justice announced that its goal was for 85% of detained cases to be completed
within sixty days. 08 In 2013, the average case processing time for a detained case at the Denver Contract Detention Facility was around seventy
days.1 09 By contrast, the average case processing time for a non-detained
case in Denver was 830 days.110 Nearly universally, attorneys identified
the relatively short times to prepare detained cases as a serious disincentive impeding their ability to take on such cases.
Many forms of relief for which immigration detainees are eligibleincluding cancellation of removal (both for permanent residents and non-

Interview #115, supra note 65; Interview #108, supra note 61; Interview #102 with
104.
Anonymous Attorney [hereinafter Interview #102] (on file with author).
105.
Interview #201 with Anonymous Previous Detainee (Apr. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Interview
#201] (on file with author).
106.
Interview #202, supranote 64.
107.
See, e.g., Interview #118, supra note 61; Interview #102, supra note 104.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT OF IMMIGRATION
108.
CASES AND APPEALS BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW 7 (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/e1301.pdf
109.
Immigration Court Processing Time
by
Outcome,
TRAC
IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/courtbacklog/court proctimeoutcome.php (last updated
August, 2015).
110.
Id.
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permanent residents), persecution-based applications for relief (such as
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture), and applications for U visas (for victims of crimes) and
T visas (for victims of human trafficking)-require the preparation of
extremely fact-intensive and time-consuming applications. In addition,
the burden of proving eligibility (and in many cases, worthiness) for these forms of relief rests with the applicant. Attorneys noted that, all [forms
of relief] for clients in removal proceedings are "very difficult," particularly because of the defensive posture of clients who are in removal proceedings."' Detained respondents often apply for multiple, alternative
forms of relief while contending with this compressed timeline.
Attorneys also noted that certain forms of relief for which many detained individuals are eligible are especially challenging to pursue. For
example, ten-year cancellation of removal, a form of relief available for
certain longtime U.S. residents without lawful status, requires applicants
to demonstrate that a spouse or child with lawful status would suffer "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" beyond the level of the normal social and economic disruption ordinarily faced by family members
when a loved one is deported.' 12 As one attorney noted, this form of relief has an "extraordinarily high hardship standard. Ripping apart a family is still two rungs down the ladder from where you need to be."" 3
Undoubtedly, lengthy detention times pose a hardship both to the
taxpayer and to the respondent, and prolonged and indefinite detention
without case resolution is a serious problem."l 4 At the same time, however, the short time frame allotted for cases on the detained docket can put
untenable pressure on attorneys' ability to thoroughly prepare cases. As
one attorney noted, "Any application where you have to collect evidence
is challenging for detained people because [of how quickly] the proceedings move . . . . Once you take on a detained case you know that is all
you will be doing."' 15 nother attorney observed that "I will oftentimes
get people who call me two days before their court date; it's hard in detention, as they have no money to make calls and it's always a time
6

crunch.""'

Attorneys who do take on detained cases have to be prepared for a
commitment that is all-consuming because of the quick pace of detained
cases. One pro bono attorney explained, "I [would] love [to do more pro
111.
Interview #104 with Anonymous Attorney (June 12, 2014) [hereinafter Interview #104]
(on file with author); see also Interview #107 with Anonymous Attorney (July 1, 2014) [hereinafter
Interview #107] (on file with author).

112.

Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 1. & N. Dec. 56, 57,71 (B.I.A. 2001).

113.
Interview #115, supra note 65.
114.
Improving Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the Immigration Court System: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (testimony of the American Immigration Lawyers Association).
115.
Interview #118, supra note 61.
116.
Interview #102, supra note 104.

2015]

IMMIGRA TION DETENTION IN THE ROCKIES

8 11

bono] work," but the "intensive" commitment required of a detained case
makes that impossible.'1 Another noted that "the time is so much more
compressed . . . . I might spend fewer actual hours [on a detained versus
a non-detained case] because things move so fast, but they are crunched
into a shorter time frame."" 8 Yet another observed: "When you have a
detained case you know it will be your life for a few months."" 9
c. Client Communication and Access Problems Are Pervasive
Attorneys identified logistical barriers to client access and client
communication as additional disincentives to representing detainees.
Detainees are unable to call their attorneys unless they have the financial
resources to do so. For in-person meetings, attorneys must travel to the
Aurora Detention Center in person to conduct legal visits.
The detention center's visitation policy for attorneys provides for
contact legal visits to be conducted in confidential legal visitation rooms
between the hours of 8 a.m. and 9 p.m. seven days a week, including
holidays, and no appointments need to be set up in advance.1 20
However, attorneys noted that, in practice, "time," "waiting," and
"access" can be serious challenges when preparing a detained case,1 21
and that "[y]ou take [more] . . . time with a detained client simply because of the lack of access."l22 One attorney noted that "[y]ou [can] end
up spending a lot of time waiting" to see a detained client, which can be
a particular challenge for attorneys who charge hourly rates.1 23 Another
attorney described her experience of "[g]oing out to GEO is often three
hours [of the day]." 24 A third practitioner observed that the fact of detention itself impedes access: "Setting up appointments is hard you don't
have control." 25 According to a fourth, "[M]eeting with [my detained
clients] is exhausting. You have the drive over there, then you wait to get
into [sic] see them and that can be anywhere between 30 minutes to 2
hours. It is literally your whole day, or your whole morning or afternoon.
It is hard." 2 6
As for telephonic communication, attorneys are permitted to place
legal calls to their clients. Clients can call their attorneys from the facili117.
Interview #106 with Anonymous Attorney (June 20, 2014) [hereinafter Interview #106]
(on file with author).
Interview #118,supra note 61.
118.
119.
Interview #115, supra note 65.
120.
Denver Contract Detention Facility, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/detention-facilities/facilities/denicdf.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2015).
121.
Interview # 112, supra note 102
Interview #101 with Anonymous Attorney (June 11, 2014) [hereinafter Interview #101]
122.
(on file with author).
123.
Interview #112, supranote 102.
124.
Interview #104, supranote 111.
125.
Interview #107, supranote 111.
126.
Interview #114 with Anonymous Attorney (June 23, 2014) [hereinafter Interview #114]
(on file with author).
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ty, but only if they have money in their accounts. Most attorneys noted
that, as a practical matter, their clients do not call them and instead wait
to be contacted by their attorneys. Because telephone calls are not secure
and entire dormitories rely on use of a single battery-powered cordless
phone, attorneys mentioned that they felt uncomfortable having lengthy
conversations with detainees via telephone.' 2 7 However, one nonimmigration pro bono attorney was "surprised at how easy it was" to get
in touch with her detained client via telephone.1 28
Finally, attorneys and social service providers mentioned even beyond physical barriers to communication and access, developing a relationship of trust and open communication can be difficult in the detention setting. "[E]stablishing rapport and a sense of safety [in the detention facility] is difficult and takes a while," noted one social service provider.1 29 "Establishing that this is a healing environment takes time in a
sterile environment." 3 0
d. Collecting Evidence Is More Difficult
As noted previously, many forms of relief from removal depend on
extensive fact gathering, documentation of years of physical presence, or
evidence of a respondent's past persecution in her country of origin.
While attorneys are better positioned than detained immigrants to gather
this information, it is still a time-intensive and burdensome undertaking.131 Unlike in a non-detained case, when the client himself or herself
can aid in this process, a detained client is severely limited in his or her
ability to help gather evidence.
Attorneys noted that difficulty in gathering documents was exacerbated if detainees' families were unwilling or unable to help their detained family member. "In taking on a detained case, I think it makes a
big difference whether there is family support," observed one attorney.' 32
"Access to documents in an immigration case is hard to obtain." 33 Attorneys often have to rely on detainees' family members to gather affidavits and documents essential to securing relief in a case. "You are reliant
on family members to supply evidence and they are sometimes unreliable
or the detained individual doesn't want their [sic] family involved with
[the] process." 34

127.

Id.

128.
Interview #110 with Anonymous Attorney (June 16, 2014) [hereinafter Interview #110]
(on file with author).
129.
Interview #301, supra note 85.

130.

Id.

131.

See, e.g., Interview #115, supra note 65.

132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Interview #101, supra note 122.
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One pro bono attorney was surprised by the sheer amount of work
and energy expended on tracking down records of his client's physical
presence for his relief application: "[The most challenging thing about
my case was] lack of access to records. [My] client is detained and has
no records [in his possession]."
e. Detention Itself Has a Deleterious Effect on the Legal Process
Multiple attorneys and former detainees pointed out the unique difficulties inherent in the context of detention.
First, attorneys noted that just the fact their clients are detained can
create a presumption of culpability. Detainees appear for their court hearings in prison uniforms, which are color coded to signify security "classification-blue for 'low security,' orange for 'medium security,' and red
for 'high security."'l 36 The fact that detainees appear in prison uniforms,
as well as the uniforms' color, affects their courtroom presentation.
Furthermore, as one attorney noted, "People who are in detention
tend to have much more complicated cases, for instance they may have
serious criminal charges. Unless they are recent border arrivals there is a
[reason they are in there]."'3 Another attorney concurred: "I think it is
intimidating taking on [a] detained case. Detained cases are very complex. [Detainees] are in there for what the [government] thinks is a reason and you need to be creative . ... "'3 Along the same lines, attorneys
noted that they perceive the detained setting to be more adversarial: "The
[ICE] trial counsel is a little more aggressive and uncompromising for
folks on the detained docket."139
At the same time, being detained affects a detainee's ability and
willingness to fight his or her case. As one attorney noted:
When they are detained you are dealing with the person[']s tolerance
for being detained. . . . [O]ther factors besides what is best for the
case interfere. They may not want to appeal or fight. Those on the
non-detained docket, even if there is a small chance of relief they will
likely try for it. . .. [But] [e]ven meritorious appeals are lost for people [in detention] that can't stomach the fight anymore.140

135.
Interview #106, supra note 117.
136.
RUTHIE EPSTEIN & ELEANOR ACER, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS:
TRANSFORMING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM-A TWO-YEAR REVIEW 8 (2011),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuitsreport.pdf.
137.
Interview #118, supra note 61.
138.
Interview #107, supra note 111.
139.
Interview #115, supra note 65.

140.

Id.
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Another attorney concurred: "The biggest challenge is that the clients on the detained docket are close to giving up. They are not certain of
their odds of prevailing and even if they are good they might choose to
just not fight."l 4 1 A third attorney observed how difficult motivating her
detained clients could be: "[It's] [h]ard to keep detained individuals motivated [to fight] . . . their case[s]."l42
Thus, while there are some available representation-related resources in the region, the barriers detainees encounter in securing legal
representation are significant. Meanwhile, immigrants in detention are
ill-equipped to represent themselves, not just because of linguistic and
educational barriers but also because of the physical and psychological
barriers brought upon by immigration detention.
III.

ACHIEVING REFORM

There is a tremendous need for representation for detained immigrants in the region, and representation is critically important for this
population. At the same time, regional resources are insufficient to meet
existing representation needs. In this Part, we address two potential advocacy approaches for moving towards a model of appointed counsel for
detained immigrants. The first originates in the rights-based framework
of statutory and constitutional law. In a precedent-setting class action suit
in California, litigators have sought to establish the right of particularly
vulnerable immigrants-the mentally ill-to counsel under the Due Process Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. The second approach is grounded in social and economic policy arguments. A coalition of advocates, academics, and policy
analysts recently persuaded the New York City Council to fund the nation's first-ever immigration public defender system, which seeks to provide representation to all detained immigrants in the New York City region. This Section provides an in-depth examination of the history, strategy, and context, which gave rise to these efforts, and then considers the
potential that either strategy could be employed to expand access to representation for detained immigrants in the Rocky Mountain region.
A. Litigation-DrivenReform: Franco-Gonzalezv. Holderand the Legal
Fightfor Appointed Counselfor Mentally Incompetent Detainees
1. Legal Framework
In recent years, there has been a groundswell of immigration scholarship and advocacy calling for universal representation in immigration

141.
142.
author).

Interview #101, supra note 122.
Interview #111 with Anonymous Attorney [hereinafter Interview #111] (on file with
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proceedings as a matter of constitutional right: an immigration Gideon.143
As established above, the stakes are extraordinarily high for the average
respondent in criminal proceedings, and the law is exceedingly complex;
yet the vast majority of detained respondents proceed unrepresented, in
Aurora and nationwide. As commentators have observed, "[D]espite
salient similarities between the immigration and criminal systems ....
[T]he right [to counsel] is essentially nonexistent in the immigration
courts."

M

The right to counsel recognized in Gideon is rooted in the Sixth
Amendment, which provides that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense." 45 The right to counsel was extended to criminal defendants
facing potential incarceration. By contrast, although civil proceedings,
including immigration proceedings, must comport with the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of due process, the adequacy of procedural
safeguards in such proceedings is governed by the balancing test first
articulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.146 Under
Mathews, courts consider the interest at stake; the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest absent the requested safeguard; and the cost to the
government to provide the procedural safeguard.1 47 Since Mathews,
courts have addressed right-to-counsel claims on a "case-by-case basis,"l 48 considering, for example, whether the civil proceeding will result
in a loss of personal freedom 49 or the relative simplicity and adversarial
nature of the proceedings. 50

143.
See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideonfor Lawful PermanentResidents, 122
YALE L.J. 2394, 2400 (2013); Guttentag & Arulanantham, supra note 76.
Guttentag & Arulanantham, supranote 76.
144.

145.
146.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ("First, the private interest that will be affected by the official

action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.").

147.

Id.

148.

Johnson, supranote 143, at 2402.

149.

Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981) ("That it is the defendant's

interest in personal freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to
counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to appointed counsel is demonstrated by the
Court's announcement in In re Gault that 'the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to
an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed,' the juvenile has a right to appointed
counsel even though proceedings may be styled 'civil' and not 'criminal."' (citation omitted) (quot-

ing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967))).
Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011) ( "[T]he Due Process Clause does not
150.
always require the provision of counsel in civil proceedings where incarceration is threatened. And
in determining whether the Clause requires a right to counsel here, we must take account of opposing interests, as well as consider the probable value of 'additional or substitute procedural safe-

guards."' (citation omitted) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976))). Turner
concluded that, although the petitioner faced potential incarceration as a result of his inability to
comply with child support payment obligations, because the state was unrepresented in these pro-
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Scholars have argued that, because of the tremendous interest that
respondents in immigration proceedings have in remaining in the country, and the fact that immigration proceedings are labyrinthine and complex to navigate for experienced practitioners, let alone pro se respondents, due process requires the appointment of counsel for all immigrants
in removal proceedings.' 5 ' Applying the Mathews balancing test, Kevin
Johnson has persuasively argued that due process requires the provision
of counsel for at least lawful permanent residents, who are granted legal
permission to remain indefinitely in the United States and thus have a
particularly strong legal interest at stake in the removal process.' 5 2
Other scholars and advocates have focused on the provision of
counsel for particularly vulnerable segments of the respondent population.1 5 3 The right to counsel in the criminal justice system "began where
it was most urgently needed," and advocacy for appointed counsel in the
immigration proceeding context has resembled that incremental approach.1 54 For example, advocacy groups have focused on the right to
counsel for mentally incompetent detainees, who are particularly ill
equipped to represent themselves in an adversarial process.155 Others
have argued that children, who are provided counsel in a variety of other
civil contexts, require legal representation because they are "categorically unable to represent themselves adequately in removal proceedings." 56
Yet others have called for the recognition of a due process-based right to
counsel for asylum-seekers who fear persecution, torture, or death if they
are forced to return to their countries of origin; because an erroneous
ceedings and they were fairly simple to navigate, Mathews did not mandate the provision of counsel.

See id. at 2518-20.
151.
See, e.g., Matt Adams, Advancing the "Right" to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 9
SEATELE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 169, 173 (2010) ("Lassiter's reiteration that a presumption to appointed
counsel exists in situations where persons are faced with deprivation of physical liberty reinforces
forceful arguments in support of a per se rule for most persons in removal proceedings."); LaJuana
Davis, Reconsidering Remedies for Ensuring Competent Representation in Removal Proceedings, 58
DRAKE L. REV. 123, 156-63 (2009) (arguing that the Mathews v. Eldridge test requires a due process
right to counsel for all noncitizens in removal proceedings).
152.
Johnson, supra note 143, at 2413 ("Limiting representation to lawful permanent residents
also provides guaranteed representation to indigent noncitizens with the greatest likelihood of having
the strongest legal interests to remain in, as well as the deepest community ties with, the United
States. Undocumented immigrants and temporary visitors generally possess fewer legal rights, and a
weaker legal entitlement to remain in the United States, than lawful permanent residents. Specifically, they lack the legal right to remain indefinitely in the United States and, generally speaking, lack
the deep and enduring community ties that lawful permanent residents have in the United States.").
153.
See, e.g., Development in the Law-Representation in Removal Proceedings, 126 HARV.

L. REV. 1658, 1659 (2013) (proposing "a right to appointed counsel for three classes of noncitizens-lawful permanent residents, the mentally ill, and juveniles").
154.
Guttentag & Arulanantham, supra note 76.
155.
See, e.g., Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case for a Right to Mental
Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 964-67 (2014) (describing advocacy
for counsel for mentally incompetent detainees and recent developments in DHS policy on this
front).

&

156. Benjamin Good, A Child's Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 10 STAN. J. C.R.
C.L. 109, 11 (2014); see also Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to be Heard: Voicing the Due Process
Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 41, 42-43 (2011)
(arguing that unaccompanied alien children have a constitutional right to counsel).
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denial of relief may result in such grievous harm, "a non-citizen's interest in life and liberty is implicated directly," and representation is a necessary procedural safeguard.157 It is from this rights-based framework
that the first class action to challenge the lack of appointed counsel for
mentally incompetent detainees originated.
2. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder
Jose Antonio Franco-Gonzalez, the named plaintiff in this classaction lawsuit challenging the government's failure to provide counsel to
immigration detainees with competency issues, is a 35-year-old citizen of
Mexico.' 5 8 His parents are lawful permanent residents of the United
States, as are two of his siblings,1 59 and three of his siblings are U.S. citizens. 160
Franco suffers from moderate mental retardation, which is characterized by an IQ level between 35 and 55.161 He was placed in removal
proceedings in April 2005, where he proceeded unrepresented. 162 The
Immigration Judge ordered a psychiatric evaluation, and, after Franco
was determined to be incompetent to stand trial, administratively closed
his case.163 Despite the absence of any open immigration charges against
him, Franco remained detained for another four and a half years, until the
government moved to re-calendar his case.'6 On March 26, 2010, he
filed a habeas petition, and three business days later, DHS released him
from custody.

On November 2, 2010, a group of nonprofit advocacy organizations
filed a federal class action lawsuit in Los Angeles on behalf of Franco
and other severely mentally disabled indigent immigrants who had languished in immigration detention in Arizona, California, and Washington
for, in some cases, years.'66 Other named plaintiffs included an El Salvadoran immigrant who suffers from schizophrenia,' 67 a Ukrainian immigrant who suffers from schizophrenia and psychosis,' 6 8 and an ethnically
Eritrean Ethiopian man diagnosed as bipolar with psychotic features.169
All of these individuals were detained and charged with removability
157.

John R. Mills et al., "Death is Different" and a Refugee's Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL

INT'L L.J. 361, 367 (2009).
Third Amended Complaint at para. 32, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 2011 WL 11705815
158.
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011) (No. CV 10-2211).
159.

Id.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

para. 33.
para. 34.
para. 35.
paras. 36-37.
para. 39.
paras. 2, 4.
para. 12.
para. 13.
para. 16.
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from the United States by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and, because they could not afford to hire counsel, proceeded without
*
*
cases. 170
immigration
representation in their
When confronted with detainees proceeding pro se but incompetent
to represent themselves, DHS and the immigration court responded in
various ways. Some detainees' cases were administratively closed, meaning the government did not actively prosecute their removal, but they
remained in detention and their cases were subject to reopening at any
time.171 Others were ordered removed despite their clear inability to represent themselves. 172 In no case did an immigration judge appoint or
DHS request counsel to represent incompetent detainees, despite, in
some cases, acknowledging the detainees' incompetence.1 73
The lawsuit alleged that DHS violated statutory provisions in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) which require the Attorney General to provide procedural "safeguards" to mentally incompetent immigrants in removal proceedingsl 74 and to appoint counsel for unrepresented individuals who are not mentally competent to represent themselves. 175 The plaintiffs also alleged that the government's failure to provide competency evaluations to a number of the named plaintiffs and
failure to appoint counsel for those found to be mentally incompetent
constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 176 Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that DHS violated Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations by failing to ap-

170.

Id. at paras. 12-13, 16.

171.
For example, the named plaintiff, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez, remained detained for four and a
half years after an immigration judge administratively closed his case based on his incompetence to

proceed pro se. See id. at para. I1. He was released within three business days of the filing of the
class action lawsuit. Id.
172.
For example, plaintiff Aleksandr Kurkhryanskiy, diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia
and psychosis, admitted his own removability and proceeded pro se until DHS assigned him a "custodian" who was also his deportation officer. See id at para. 13 (intemal quotation marks omitted).
When he obtained counsel in connection with the litigation, he was able to appeal his removability
but remained detained under a $30,000 bond. Id.

173.

See id. at paras. 11-18. In a case decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

after Mr. Franco-Gonzales's class action case was filed, the BIA considered the role of immigration
judges when adjudicating the removal proceedings of a potentially incompetent respondent. M.A.M.,

25 1. & N. Dec. 474, 474-75 (B.I.A. 2011). The BIA articulated a framework for cases presenting
competency issues in which it directed immigration judges to 1) consider indicia of incompetency,
including information provided by DHS; 2) take measures to assess competency, including but not
limited to requesting a competency evaluation; and 3) for immigrants lacking sufficient competency
to proceed, to prescribe "safeguards" to protect the rights and privileges of the immigrant. Id at
479-83. However, MA.M. did not address, much less require, the appointment of counsel.

174.
Third Amended Complaint at para. 127, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 2011 WL 11705815
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011) (No. CV 10-2211); see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 240, 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (requiring the Attorney General to provide procedural "safeguards" for immigrants in removal proceedings who are incompetent due to a serious mental disability).

175.
Third Amended Complaint at paras. 158-60, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 2011 WL
11705815 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011) (No. CV 10-2211).
176.
Id. at paras. 155-57, 164-66.
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point counsel as a reasonable accommodation for unrepresented individuals.'
On November 21, 2011, District Court Judge Dolly Gee granted the
plaintiffs' motion for class certification, broadly defining class as:
[a]ll individuals who are or will be in DHS custody for removal proceedings in California, Arizona, and Washington who have been
identified by or to medical personnel, DHS, or an Immigration Judge,
as having a serious mental disorder or defect that may render them
incompetent to represent themselves in detention or removal proceedings, and who presently lack counsel in their detention or removal
proceedings.1

78

Judge Gee created two subclasses, the first for individuals who have
a serious mental disorder or defect rendering them unable to represent
themselves in detention or removal proceedings, and the second for class
79
members detained for more than six months.'
In March 2013, Judge Gee announced she intended to enter a permanent injunction ordering both the Executive Office of Immigration
Review (EOIR)-the office within the Department of Justice which
manages the immigration courts-and ICE to significantly reform the
treatment of detained immigrants with serious mental disorders. 80
Exactly one month later, in April 2013, John Morton, then the Director of ICE, issued a directive entitled "Civil Immigration Detention:
Guidance for New Identification and Information-Sharing Procedures
Related to Unrepresented Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or
Conditions" (Morton Memo).' 8 ' The Morton Memo directed ICE personnel to do the following: (1) immediately develop procedures to identify and assess the mental health of newly arriving detainees within fourteen days of their admission and develop a process for screening existing
detainees at facilities staffed by ICE Health Service Corp.; (2) work with
personnel at facilities not staffed by ICE Health Service Corp. to identify
detainees with serious mental disorders or conditions, including via the
implementation of a national hotline; (3) for those detainees "identified
177.
178.
2011 WL
179.

Id. at para. 162.
Order re Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification at 3, Franco-Gonzalez v. Napolitano,
11705815 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011) (No. CV 10-02211).
Id.

I 80.

See Class Action Lawsuit Forces Policy Change to Protect Detained Immigrants with

Serious

Mental

Disorders,

ACLU

OF

S.

CAL.

(Apr.

22,

2013),

https://www.aclusocal.org/francoannouncements/.
See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to
181.
Thomas D. Homan, Acting Exec. Assoc. Dir., Enforcement & Removal Operations; Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor; and Kevin Landy, Assistant Dir., Office of Det. Policy & Planning,
Civil Immigration Detention: Guidance for New Identification and Information-Sharing Procedures
Related to Unrepresented Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions I (Apr. 22, 2013)
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detentionavailable at
Memorandum],
Morton
[hereinafter
reform/pdf/1 1063.1 _current-id-and-infosharingdetainessmentaldisorders.pdf.
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as having serious mental disorders or conditions,... request that . . . a
qualified mental health provider complete a mental health review report
or the facility provide the detainee's medical records .. . to ICE for further review"; and (4) develop procedures to ensure that mental reviews
and/or medical records were provided to the ICE Office of Chief Counsel
(OCC), which acts as prosecutor in immigration proceedings. 182 OCC
was directed to develop procedures to ensure that this information would
then be shared with the immigration court and immigration judges. 83
Contemporaneously, EOIR Chief Immigration Judge Brian O'Leary
issued a memorandum to all immigration judges entitled "Nationwide
Policy to Provide Enhanced Procedural Protections to Unrepresented
Detained Aliens with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions."l84 Under
the O'Leary Memo, immigration judges were directed to do the following: (1) provide competency hearings for unrepresented detainees
brought to the court's attention through medical records or other evidence as potentially having "a serious mental health disorder or condition
that [might] render [that detainee] unable to represent him- or herself in
removal proceedings"; (2) order mental competency examinations for
detainees whose competency could not be determined through the hearing; (3) appoint qualified legal representatives to detainees found to be
incompetent to represent themselves; and (4) provide bond hearings to
unrepresented detainees identified as having a serious mental disorder or
condition that might affect their ability to represent themselves and have
been detained for six months.' 85
The next day, in the first-ever legal decision to order the government to provide counsel to a group of detainees, Judge Gee found the
government's failure to appoint counsel for mentally incompetent detainees violates Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and that the INA requires the government to prove by sufficient evidence that continued
detention is necessary for mentally incompetent immigrants after 180
days in detention. 186 Both the Morton and O'Leary memos provided that
ICE and EOIR, respectively, would fully implement the procedures articulated in the memos by December 31, 2013.187 However, EOIR did not

182.
183.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2.

184.
See Memorandum from Brian M. O'Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, Executive Office for
Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to all Immigration Judges, Nationwide Policy to Provide
Enhanced Procedural Protections to Unrepresented Detained Aliens with Serious Mental Disorders
or Conditions
1 (Apr. 22, 2013) [hereinafter O'Leary Memorandum],
available at

http://nwirp.org/Documents/ImpactLitigation/EOIRDirectiveO4-22-2013.pdf.
185. Id. at 1-2.
186.
Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211, 2013 WL 8115423, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 23, 2013).
187.
at 2.

See Morton Memorandum, supra note 181, at 2; O'Leary Memorandum, supra note 184,
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even announce the procedures until December 31, 2013.188 One and a
half years after the original announcement on April 22, 2013, implementation in the jurisdictions named in the Franco litigation-Arizona, California and Washington-has just begun, and there is little clarity about
when and how the nationwide policy reforms announced by EOIR and
DHS will go into effect.1 8 9
3. Advantages and Limitations of Litigation-Driven Reform
A full treatment of the topic of litigation as a tool for reform is beyond the scope of this Article.' 90 With respect to the particular question
of the role of litigation in expanding access to counsel for mentally incompetent detainees, however, the model of reform illustrated by the
Franco-Gonzalezcase offers some advantages over other efforts.
First and most practically, court orders such as those entered by
Judge Gee in the Franco-Gonzalezlitigation are legally enforceable.19' In
fact, in October 2014, Judge Gee entered an order which incorporated
much of EOIR's Phase I Guidance and gave it the force of law.' 92 Should
the plaintiffs believe that DHS and/or EOIR are failing to implement the
terms of either of Judge Gee's orders, they may move the court to enforce the order or move for contempt. 93 The availability of these mechanisms ensure accountability for any failure to implement the reforms
Judge Gee ordered.
Second, litigation serves a compelling educational function in
American society, which may ultimately drive support for policy reform.1 94 Plaintiffs in impact litigation are usually selected to present the
most sympathetic manifestation of the problem or policy failure the litigation intends to rectify.'95 Lawsuits such as Franco-Gonzalez allow
advocacy groups like Public Counsel and the ACLU to develop a narrative intended not only to persuade a federal court, but also to persuade
the American public of the injustice wrought by failure to appoint coun-

188.
EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, PHASE I OF PLAN TO PROVIDE ENHANCED
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS TO UNREPRESENTED DETAINED RESPONDENTS WITH MENTAL

DISORDERS 1-2 (Dec. 31, 2013).
189.

See Order Further Implementing This Court's Permanent Injunction, Franco-Gonzalez v.

Holder, 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014).
190.

See Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyeringfor Social Change: What 'so Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH. J.

RACE& L. 201, 206-15 (1999).
191.
192.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 70 (enforcing a judgment).
See Order Further Implementing This Court's Permanent Injunction, Franco-Gonzalez v.

Holder, 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014).
193.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 70 (enforcing a judgment).
194.
JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGULATORY
PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY 221-35 (2015) (discussing impact litigation's role in the climate
change debate and public opinion on the subject).

195.

See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1555, 1687 (2003) (discuss-

ing strategy in litigating for jail inmates as opposed to those in prison as jail inmates may garner
more sympathy).
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sel to mentally incompetent detainees.' 96 By bringing these issues to the
attention of the public through carefully crafted litigation narratives, advocates can generate support for systemic reform while simultaneously
generating public pressure on the architects or defenders of the policies. 97
Finally, as illustrated by the Franco-Gonzalez case, litigation can
prompt a remedy broader than the specific harm the case seeks to address. While Judge Gee's orders are jurisdictionally limited to Arizona,
California, and Washington, the policy reforms initiated in response to
the litigation by DHS and EOIR are not.' 9 8 The Morton Memo applies to
ICE nationwide, and the O'Leary Memo and the guidance implementing
it apply to all immigration courts nationwide.
There are, however, limitations to the litigation-driven model of reform in this context. Litigation of the size and scope of the FrancoGonzalez case can be prohibitively expensive, so much so that only wellfunded plaintiffs or legal organizations can undertake it, and even then
funding can be a struggle.1 99 Plaintiff in the Franco-Gonzalez litigation
sought to recover $11,632,425.73 in attorneys' fees and $81,701.73 in
costs, ultimately settling the fees and costs claims for $9.5 million.200
Fees and expenses may be recoverable at the conclusion of litigation
under fee-shifting statutes such as the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d) and 5 U.S.C. § 504 et seq. (for actions brought against
the United States or one of its officials); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (for constitutional claims against state actors), and 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (for claims
under the Rehabilitation Act), but plaintiffs or their counsel must be able
to fund the case from its initiation through discovery and trial if need be,
201
and prevail, before seeking reimbursement.
Litigation also carries the risk of creating bad precedent. FrancoGonzalez was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California, which is under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit-a federal appellate jurisdiction widely recognized
196.
197.

Johnson, supra note 190, at 206-15.
See Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 487-89 (2004)

(discussing the importance of courts in shifting public opinion). But see GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?, at 401 (2nd ed. 2008) (arguing
that pro same-sex marriage litigation had little effect on public opinion of same-sex marriage).
See Order Further Implementing This Court's Permanent Injunction, Franco-Gonzalez v.
198.

Holder, No. CV 10-02211, 2014 WL 5475097, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014); Order re Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction on Behalf

of Seven Class Members, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211, 2013 WL 3674492, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
See ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A
199.
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 222-32 (2013).
Order Approving Parties' Settlement Agreement Resolving Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees
200.

and Costs, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015), available at
http://www.leagle.com/decision/ln%20FDCO%2020151013946/FRANCOGONZALEZ%20v.%2OHOLDER.
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2015); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2015).
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as among the most liberal and plaintiff-friendly.202 Even so, bringing a
case of first impression, the plaintiffs were not guaranteed success.20 3 A
decision against the plaintiffs on the merits of this case at the district
court level, even had they not appealed the loss, would have almost certainly discouraged other litigants from pursing similar claims and slowed
or halted altogether efforts at reform.204 A decision against plaintiffs in
the Ninth Circuit would have precluded mentally incompetent detainees
from seeking similar relief in federal courts in one of the most populous
205
and immigrant-dense regions of the country.
Finally, while litigation may prompt policy reform, it is an imperfect substitute for it. Using litigation to achieve structural reform has
been critiqued as an ineffective means of changing underlying inequalities in the system and a subversion of the constitutional separation of
powers in government. 206 Litigation is, of course, an adversarial process
that can polarize parties who otherwise might come to agreement, thus
resulting in a protracted (and expensive) dispute, the costs of which the
losing party may have to bear.207 Finally, while litigation may drive public support for a particular reform, scholars have argued that judicially
imposed reform may result in public backlash when broad social support
for the reform has not yet developed.208
4. Rights-Based Litigation in the Rocky Mountain Region
Given that mentally incompetent detainees in the Rocky Mountain
region lack appointed counsel despite the existence of a federal court
decision finding the failure to provide counsel to such detainees is a violation of Section 404 of the Rehabilitation Act, a regional lawsuit modeled on Franco-Gonzalezcould serve as a powerful incentive to force the
government to implement the nationwide policy reforms it promised but
202.
John Schwartz, 'Liberal' Reputation Precedes Ninth Circuit Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2010, at A33A. In fact, Americans for Tort Reform list California as its Number One Judicial Hellhole in a recent report. AM. TORT REFORM Ass'N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 3, 7-11 (2014), available at

http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/JudicialHellholes-2013.pdf.
203.
See Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
204.
But see Ben Depoorter, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 821 (2013)
(arguing that losses in court may nonetheless be catalysts for social change).
205.
See Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and
Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigrationunited-states (noting that with 10.3 million immigrants, California has the largest number of immigrants in the United States); see also Niraj Chokshi, The Undocumented Immigrant Population

Explained,

in

7

Maps,

WASH.

POST

(Nov.

21,

2014),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/11/21/the-undocumented-immigrantpopulation-explained-in-7-maps/.
206.
See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and

Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 946-48 (2007) (summarizing scholarship on multiple critiques of reliance on litigation as a vehicle for social reform in the Civil Rights Movement).
207.
See FED. R. Clv. P. 54 (judgment and costs); see also CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 199,

at 228.
208.

See Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from

Theory and Practice,36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 604-06 (2009).
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has thus far failed to deliver. Despite the potential rewards of bringing
such a lawsuit, there are, however, a number of region-specific obstacles
that may counsel against litigation patterned after Franco-Gonzalez in
the Rocky Mountain region.
First, as noted previously, litigation is expensive and class action litigation on this scale especially so. For this rights-based litigation strategy
to succeed in the region, nonprofit groups would likely need to team up
with local law firms, combining expertise and resources to launch a
complex, large-scale legal challenge on behalf of mentally incompetent
respondents detained in the GEO Detention Center in Aurora. 20 9 Denver,
which is a much smaller legal market than Los Angeles, lacks the quantity and depth of nonprofit and law firm resources of a larger jurisdic*210
tion.
Furthermore, although a significant number of noncitizens are detained in the region, this number constitutes just a fraction of the individuals who are detained in California, Arizona, and Washington. 211 Concomitantly, there are fewer individuals in the region with competency
issues, and thus fewer individuals who would be potentially affected by a
lawsuit in the region.212 This issue may, therefore, not be at the forefront
of the agenda for immigrants' rights advocates in Colorado. 213 Advocates
will have to weigh the need for advocacy on this issue against the many
other compelling legal issues affecting immigrants the region.214
Finally, considering that this claim would be litigated in the Tenth
Circuit-a notably more hostile legal environment for such a claim than
the Ninth-undertaking a rights-based litigation approach in the region

209.
See Greg Bass & Jocelyn Larkin, Cocounseling with Private Law Firms on Major Litigation, 42 CLEARINGHOUsE REV. 605, 606 (2009) (discussing the human, fiscal, and technical resources large private firms can bring to impact litigation); see also Cummings & Rhode, supra note

208, at 623.
210.
In 2014, California had over 160,000 active attorneys; by contrast, Colorado had just
21,545.
See
National
Lawyer
Population
By
State,
AM.
BAR
ASS'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market-research/national-lawyerpopulation-by-state-current.authcheckdam.pdf.
211.
As a rough proxy, in 2014, approximately 4,500 immigration cases were heard in Colorado and Wyoming, the two Tenth Circuit states with immigration courts. Deportation Proceedings,
supra note 52. By contrast, over 50,000 immigration cases were heard in Arizona, California, and
Washington. See id (analyzing immigration prosecutions by jurisdiction).

212.

See id

213.
See, e.g., Issues, ACLU OF COLO., http://aclu-co.org/our-issues/ (last visited Sept. 13,
2015) (listing eleven issues, including Immigrants' Rights, but without reference to access to counsel
in detention or anything specific to mentally incompetent detainees); CIRC Campaigns and Initiatives,
COLO.
IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS
COAL.,

http://www.coloradoimmigrant.org/article.php?list--type&type-4 (last visited Sept. 13, 2015) (listing
six current campaigns, none of which include access to counsel in detention or anything specific to
mentally incompetent detainees).
214.
For example, Denver has seen a significant increase in unaccompanied immigrant children
who need representation. See Immigration Cases for Unaccompanied Minors Strain Courts, CBS
DENVER (Sept. 8, 2014, 11:59 PM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2014/09/08/immigration-cases-forunaccompanied-minors-strain-courts/. Article II.
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may be contraindicated. The risk of not only failing, but creating potentially unfavorable precedent (and a circuit split potentially inviting a conservative Supreme Court to take up the case), is a problematic considera215
tion.

Alternatively, advocates may choose to put pressure short of litigation on local immigration courts and the GEO Aurora Detention Facility
via meetings with stakeholders, policy advocacy, or media outreach. If
the government does move toward implementation, regional immigrants'
rights advocates could push for a seat at the table where specific changes
are being discussed. Advocates would not be precluded from bringing
litigation if the government continues to fail to implement the QRP, or
implements its poorly. Adopting a "wait-and-see" approach would conserve resources, at least for the time being, but would not address the
immediate needs of unrepresented mentally incompetent immigrants
currently detained in the GEO Aurora Detention Center.
B. Policy-Driven Reform: The New York Immigrant Family Unity Project's Campaign to Fund UniversalRepresentationfor DetainedImmigrants
1. The Role of Policy Advocacy
In addition to attempting to establish a Gideon-like right to appointed counsel for at least some especially vulnerable detained immigrants
via litigation, advocates have also sought to expand access to counsel via
legislative advocacy and administrative reform. For example, at the federal level, the American Bar Association's Commission on Immigration
issued a resolution calling for "legislation to overturn the 'no cost to the
government' restriction on [access to] representation in removal proceedings."216 Advocates petitioned the Department of Homeland Security for
rulemaking to promulgate regulations governing the appointment of
counsel for immigrants in removal proceedings. 217 In anticipation of
comprehensive immigration reform in 2007 and again in 2012, advocates
pressed Congress to address access to counsel for immigrants and these
efforts bore some fruit: Senate Bill 744, the comprehensive immigration
reform bill proposed by the so-called "Gang of Eight" Senators in 2013,

215.

See, e.g., Kevin M. Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIz. L. REV.

341, 341 (2006).
216.

AM. BAR ASSOC. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

107A, at 1 (2013).
217.
See CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC. ET AL., PETITION FOR RULEMAKING
TO PROMULGATE REGULATIONS GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS
(2009),
available
at
https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/NIJC%20Petition%20for/20Rulemaking%201mmigrant's

%20Right%20to%2OAppointed%2OCounsel%206-29-09.pdf.
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would have required the appointment of counsel for unaccompanied minor children as well as immigrants with serious mental disabilities. 2 18
Efforts to secure access to counsel for civil litigants through policy
reform are neither new nor are they unique to the immigration arena. The
National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel (NCCRC), an organization dedicated "to encourag[ing], support[ing], and coordinat[ing] advocacy to expand recognition and implementation of a right to counsel for
low-income people in civil cases that involve basic human needs,"
counts over 280 organizations and individuals across the country as
members. 2 19 The Coalition was instrumental in securing passage of
American Bar Association's (ABA) Resolution 112A, which "urges federal, state, and territorial governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons in those categories
of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake." 220 The
ABA observed that powerful policy considerations support the provision
of counsel to indigent civil litigants, noting that the consequences to
courts and to individual litigants are severe. 221 Courts must attempt to
"preserv[e] judicial neutrality (where one side is represented and the other is not)," juggle already heavy dockets which are inevitably slowed by
the need to explain the law and procedure to unrepresented parties, and
attempt to "achiev[e] an outcome that is understood by pro se participants and does not lead to [repeated] proceedings."2 22 Individuals may
"lose their families, their housing, their livelihood, and [similarly] fundamental interests"-losses which might have been mitigated or never
sustained if they had been represented by counsel.223 Furthermore, the
ABA concluded that failure to provide access to justice undermines the
very justice system itself by eroding the public's faith in the system. 22 4
Civil access-to-justice advocates have made some progress. Although a federal Civil Access to Justice Act proposed in 2009 was forestalled, 22 5 state-level efforts have gotten more traction. Thirty-eight states

218.

See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,

113th Cong.

§ 3502(c) (2013).

219.
NCCRC Mission, NATIONAL COALITION FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL,
http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/about/staff (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
220.
AM. BAR Assoc. TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES I I2A, at 1 (2006) [hereinafter REPORT 1 I2A]; see also Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed
is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV.
59, 67-68 (2007) (noting that the impetus for the ABA resolution came from a NCCRC brainstorming session).
221.
REPORT I l2A, supra note 220, at 9-10.

222.
223.
224.
225.
Steinberg,

Id. at 10.
Id.
See id.
See Civil Access to Justice Act of 2009, S. 718, 111 th Cong. (2009); see also Jessica K.
DemandSide Reform in the PoorPeople's Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 771 (2015).
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have created Access to Justice Commissions,226 which are collaborations
between the courts and the private bar, legal services organizations, and
other stakeholders with the mission and purpose of ensuring that access
to competent legal representation is available to everyone despite income
level, disability, or other disadvantage. 227 "[T]he California Commission
on Access to Justice has created a model civil right to counsel statute .... [e]ntitled the State Equal Justice Act" and a narrower proposal
entitled State Basic Access Act.228 The San Francisco City Council
adopted an ordinance declaring San Francisco to be a "Right to Civil
Council City" and adopting a one-year Right to Civil Counsel Pilot Pro229
gram.
Some states have adopted legislation providing for appointed
counsel in certain civil cases.230
Laura Abel, writing about Gideon's lessons for advocates of a right
to counsel in civil proceedings, notes that successful efforts to reform
and expand access to counsel share three important characteristics. 231
First, they "creatively combin[e]" litigation, legislation, and public education to bring pressure for change. 232 Powerful government actors, such
as judges, can play a critical role in generating public support for reform.233 For example, New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Jonathan
Lippman, a vocal supporter of expanding access to justice, has been a
critical ally for advocates and has aggressively lobbied for increased ac234
cess to civil justice funding.
Second, such efforts identify and publi-

226.
ATJ
Commission
Movement,
AM.
BAR
ASSOC.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal aidindigentdefendants/initiatives/resource center for a
ccess tojustice/stateatjcommissions.htmi (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
227.
Center on Court Access to Justice for All, Access to Justice Commissions, NAT'L CENTER
FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/microsites/access-to-justice/home/Topics/Access-to-JusticeCommissions.aspx (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
228.
Gardner, supra note 220, at 76; see also Cal. Comm'n on Access to Justice, State Basic
Access Act (CA), BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, http://www.brennancenter.org/legislation/statebasic-access-act-ca (last visited Sept. 13, 2015). The State Basic Access Act is available online at
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/State%20Basic%2OAccess%2OAct%

20Feb%2008.pdf.
229.
See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE art. 58, §§ 58.1, 58.2 (2011); see also
JOHN & TERRY LEVIN CTR. FOR PUB. SERV. & PUB. INTEREST L., SAN FRANCISCO RIGHT TO CIVIL
COUNSEL
PILOT
PROGRAM
DOCUMENTATION
REPORT
4
(2014),
available at
https://law.stanford.edu/publications/san-francisco-right-to-civil-counsel-pilot-programdocumentation-report/.

230.

For example, in 2014, the Florida Legislature passed HB561, codified at Fla. Stat.

§

39.01305, which requires appointment of counsel for children in certain dependent and termination
of parental rights cases. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01305 (West 2015).
231.
Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons from Gideon v. Wainwright,

15 TEMP. POL. & Clv. RTS. L. REV. 527, 551-52 (2006).
232.
Id. at 551.
233.
Id.
234.

See Fern Fisher, Moving Toward a More Perfect World: Achieving Equal Access to Jus-

tice Through a New Definition ofJudicial Activism, 17 CUNY L. REV. 285, 290-91, 293 (2014).
Other examples Fisher cites include Judge Jon Levy of Maine, who co-chaired that state's Access to
Justice Commission and sought to improve the cultural competency of courts as they adjudicate
cases involving recent immigrants and new Americans, and Judge Dina Fein of Massachusetts, who
has expanded access to legal materials via translation into multiple languages and developed court-
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cize examples of harm to specific individuals resulting from the lack of
access to counsel. Abel argues that personal stories illustrating the implications of the lack of access to counsel are most persuasive to the public
and to legislators; they humanize the problem and are important to generate public support for change.235 Moreover, lobbying and public education efforts need to be sustained to ensure continuing public support for
adequate funding appropriations from the legislature.23 6 Finally, Abel
notes that cost-savings arguments provide compelling support for the
provision of counsel, both in terms of the reduction in detention costs to
the government resulting from the timely processing of cases and the
reduction in the burden on the public created when breadwinners are
237
removed from their families for long period of time.
Like CAJA, S.B. 744 was defeated, and the prospects for comprehensive immigration reform look dim for the immediate future. 238 However, immigration advocates have achieved remarkable success at the
local level. This Section will focus on how the New York Immigrant
Family Unity Project campaign succeeded in obtaining municipal funding for universal representation for immigrants detained in New York
City and its environs.
2. The New York Immigrant Family Unity Project
In 2010-the same year lawyers filed the Franco-Gonzalez litigation on the West Coast-a group of scholars, advocates, and community
organizations on the East Coast intensified efforts to persuade New York
City to fund a representation program for detained immigrants.239 The
New York Immigrant Representation Study Group (NYIRS Study
Group), convened by Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Robert A.
Katzmann and the Vera Institute of Justice, undertook a two-year study
of what it called "the immigrant representation crises in New York." 240
In 2011, the NYIRS Study Group published its first report, covering
its findings as to the availability and adequacy of counsel for immigrants
in removal proceedings in New York City. 2 4 1 In the report, Accessing
Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, the NYIRS Study Group analyzed data from EOIR, ICE, Immigration judges and nonprofit removal defense providers in New York
wide training materials for Limited Assistance Representation (LAR) lawyers who provided unbundled legal services to low income litigants. Id at 290-92.

235.
236.
237.

See Abel, supra note 231, at 552-53.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 553-54.

See, e.g., Greg Flakus, US Immigration Reform Appears Unlikely in 2015, VOICE OF
238.
AMERICA (Dec. 29, 2014, 11:57 AM), http://www.voanews.com/contentlus-immigration-reform-

appears-unlikely-/2577632.html.
239.
CARDOZO
240.
241.

Accessing Justice. The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33
L. REv. 357, 360 (2011) [hereinafterAccessing Justice I].
Id.
See id. at 361; see also Markowitz, supra note 60, at 541.
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City.242 Among the most striking findings was that that 60% of detained
immigrants in New York City were not represented by counsel by the
time their cases were completed, as opposed to only 27% of non-detained
243
Moreover, 74% of immigrants who were represented and
immigrants.
either released from detention or never detained had successful outcomes
in their cases, while only 3% of unrepresented and detained immigrants
244
experienced successful outcomes.
A year later, the NYIRS Study Group published Accessing Justice
II: A Model for Providing Counsel to New York Immigrants in Removal
Proceedings (Part11).245 In Part II, the group discussed the devastating
consequences of removal on New Yorkers, focusing on family separation, the loss of economic stability when a breadwinner is taken out of
the home, and the psychosocial impact on children of losing a family
246
member to detention or deportation.
Recognizing that detained immigrants face the most significant barriers to representation, the report laid
out a proposal for providing universal representation based on income
eligibility to detainees through contracts with small groups of institutional immigration providers. 247 Because existing resources for services to
detained immigrants are already stretched thin, NYIRS recommended its
proposal be funded through the appropriation of new resources.24 8
Just a few months after PartII was published, NYIRS's recommendations came to fruition when the New York City Council allocated
$500,000 to pilot a project offering representation to detained immigrants. 249 The program, called the New York Immigrant Family Unity
Project (NYIFUP), is administered by the Vera Institute of Justice and
aimed to provide representation to a few hundred immigrants its first
year.250 One year later, after the success of the pilot program, the New
York City Council made history when it allocated $4.9 million to fund
the nation's first-ever public defender program providing universal rep251
resentation to detained immigrants.
One of the stated goals of the
242.

Accessing Justice I, supra note 239, at 362.

243.

Id. at 363.

244.
Id. at 363-64. A "successful outcome" is defined as winning the long-term right to stay in
the United States. Id. at 363.
245.
N.Y. IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY, ACCESSING JUSTICE II: A MODEL FOR
PROVIDING COUNSEL TO NEW YORK IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 1 (2012) [hereinafter
ACCESSING JUSTICE II].

246.
247.
248.

Id. at 12-14.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 23-24.
&

249.
Press Release, The Council of the City of N.Y., Speaker Quinn, Council Members
Immigrant Rights Groups Announce Pilot Program Providing Legal Counsel for Immigrants Facing
Deportation (July 19, 2013), availableat http://council.nyc.gov/html/pr/071913nyifup.shtml.
250.
See New
York
Immigrant Family Unity Project, VERA
INST.
JUST.,
http://www.vera.org/project/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
251.
Press Release, Vera Institute of Justice, New York City Becomes First Jurisdiction in the
Nation to Provide Universal Representation to Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation (June 26,
2014), available at http://www.vera.org/news/new-york-city-provide-universal-representationdetained.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

830

[Vol. 92:4

NYIFUP is to develop a replicable model to implement in other jurisdictions.2 52

3. Advantages and Limitation of Funding-Driven Municipal Policy
Reform
Municipal legislation cannot, of course, create a federal statutory or
constitutional right to representation for detained immigrants, but it can
appropriate funds to create a solution to the problem of lack of representation. There are practical advantages and disadvantages to municipally
initiated reform in this area.
In terms of advantages, legislative reform through the allocation of
funding for service provision to detained immigrants may be a more rapid and efficient way to achieve change if the political will exists to support it. The Franco-Gonzalez litigation was filed in 2010; the first plaintiffs were appointed qualified representatives pursuant to a court order in
2011.253 The court did not issue its order requiring the appointment of
qualified representatives to class members until April 2013. Although
DHS and EOIR were supposed to implement new procedures by the end
of 2013, the court's October 2014 order suggests that DHS and EOIR are
only now in the initial stages of implementing procedures to identify
class members and provide them with qualified representatives.254
By contrast, NYIRS convened in 2010, issued its first report in December 2011 and its second report in December 2012.255 The New York
City Council allocated funding for a pilot representation project in the
summer of 2013, and the first detainees began receiving counsel shortly
thereafter.256 With full funding of the project, as many as 1,650 detainees
in New York will receive counsel this year. 2 57 We do not intend to suggest that legislative reform happens overnight, and indeed there were
many antecedents to the work of the NYIRS in laying the foundation for
258
reform.
Nevertheless, once the city council decided to act, it did so
decisively, and thousands of detained immigrants are already benefiting
from legal representation as a result.

252.
See New
York
Immigrant Family
Unity Project, BRONX
DEFENDERS,
http://www.bronxdefenders.org/programs/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project/
(last visited
Apr. 7, 2015). Bronx Defenders is one of the organizations funded through the NYIFUP to provide
legal services to detained immigrants. Id.

253.

Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 828 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1139, 1149-50 (C.D. Cal. 2011).

254.

See Order Further Implementing This Court's Permanent Injunction, Franco-Gonzalez v.

Holder, No. CV-10-02211, 2014 WL 5475097, at *1, *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014).
255.

See Accessing Justice I, supra note 241, at 360; ACCESSING JUSTICE II, supra note 245, at

256.

Kirk Semple, Seeking Boost in Aid to Help Those Facing Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, May

5.
29, 2014, at A33.
257.

Cristina Carr, New York City Offers Legal Defense for Detainees, CQ ROLL CALL, June

26, 2014.
258.

See, e.g., Markowitz, supra note 60, at 546.
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Legislative action generally has "the vast advantage of empirical
data and comprehensive study . . . [and] allow[s] experimentation and
use of solutions not open to the courts" 259 and may be better received as a
result. The NYIFUP was created in response to a comprehensive study of
the need for access to counsel for detained immigrants, which was buttressed by extensive research on the relative costs to New Yorkers of
260
One study estimated the costs of providing
failing to provide counsel.
representation at $0.78 per income taxpayer per year, balanced against
savings of up to $5.9 million for New York state and employers. 261
Finally, the legislative process is accessible to the public-including
grassroots advocates and community organizations-which may result in
greater public support, more legitimacy, and a stronger sense of community investment and ownership in resulting policy reforms.262 For example, the Northern Manhattan Coalition for Immigrant Rights (NMCIR) is
one of the lead organizations in the campaign to seek universal representation for all detained immigrants, and was deeply involved in the advo263
cacy that led to the creation of the NYIFUP.
Limitations to this approach include the danger that policy initiatives, unlike judicial orders, may be repealed if public opinion sways in a
different direction. Creating support for the NYIFUP required extensive
data collection and empirical analysis of government data, which may be
beyond the capacity of other jurisdictions. Furthermore, a project like the
NYIFUP may not be politically viable in smaller, less wealthy jurisdictions or jurisdictions with a lower proportion of immigrant residents.
Finally, appropriations do not create an enforceable right to representation.
4. Policy-Based Reform in the Rocky Mountain Region
Advocates' success in making NYIFUP a reality stemmed from
their ability to connect the detained immigrant population the program
sought to serve to members of the local community. The campaign's
focus on family unity was critical to securing political support for the
259.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 524 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
260.
See CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., THE NEW YORK IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY
PROJECT: GOOD FOR FAMILIES, GOOD FOR EMPLOYERS, AND GOOD FOR ALL NEW YORKERS 5
at
available
PROJECT],
FAMILY
UNITY
[hereinafter
(2013)
http://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/immgrant family unity projectprint layout.pdf; see
also JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, COST OF COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSAL PROVIDING PUBLIC COUNSEL TO INDIGENT PERSONS SUBJECT TO IMMIGRATION
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 24 (2014).
FAMILY UNITY PROJECT, supra note 260, at 9.
261.
262.
"'Rule-shifting' cannot possibly become 'culture-shifting' without public awareness both
that a change has taken place, and that that change will affect daily life. Ordinary citizens must know
that a shift has taken place for that shift to have cultural resonance." Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding

Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 980 (1997).
263.
See New York Immigrant Family Unity Project: Whole Familiesfor a Stronger New York,
NORTHERN MANHATTAN COALITION FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, http://nmcir.org/organizing/ (last
visited Sept. 13, 2015).
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program: the study found that, between 2005 and 2010, over "7,000 U.S.
citizen children in New York City lost a parent to deportation. In addition to the financial hardship caused by the loss of a primary breadwinner, these children [were] shown to suffer significant emotional and psychological effects.",264 By concretizing the deleterious effect of detention
and deportation on U.S. citizen families in the city in this manner, advocates were able to build support-and ultimately funding-for this ambitious program.
Our much smaller study revealed qualitative findings similar to
NYIFUP's. Interviews conducted with former detainees as well as their
lawyers demonstrated that the effects of detention reverberate far beyond
the detainees themselves. Several detainees reported U.S. citizens and
family members who were affected by their detention. One longtime
legal permanent resident recalled that "[being detained] did a lot of damage [to my family]."26 5 Others recalled that their children suffered tre266
mendously during their detention.
Detention also has detrimental economic effects for Coloradans. A
recent study tracked the economic impact of immigration enforcement in
Colorado, concluding that 85% of those detained based on a notification
from ICE, known as a "detainer," missed at least one day of work, and
that this missed work translated to approximately $9.5 million lost in
spending for the Colorado economy and a resulting $855,000 in lost tax
revenue. 267
Yet a policy-driven reform similar to NYIFUP seems unlikely here.
First, the population affected in this region, as opposed to the immigrantdense jurisdiction in which NYIFUP operates, is much smaller. Furthermore, as discussed above, the region's detained immigrant population is
shifting and now includes an increased number of asylum-seekers who
do not have ties to the region. An informal review of intakes with detainees in June 2014 revealed only about a third had lived in Colorado prior
to their detention; the remaining individuals were apprehended at the
border and transferred to the Aurora Detention Center. In New York, by
contrast, the majority of detained immigrants had ties to the local community, and as a result, the social and economic impact of detention and
deportation were both easier to measure and starkly illustrated the need
for representation. Such an effort would also require tremendous political
will; the political climate of a high-immigrant, liberal locality like New
York lends itself well to such a measure, whereas the political landscape
of Colorado may not.

264.
265.
266.
267.

(2013).

VERA INST. JUST., supra note 250.
Interview #207, supra note 64.
See e.g., Interview #205, supra note 81.
CHRIS STIFFLER, THE HIGH COST OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN COLORADO 5

2015]

IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE ROCKIES

833

This is not to say that such a reform is out of the question. Policy
advocacy around immigration enforcement issues has sparked swift and
dramatic reform in the past. For example, following a groundswell of
advocacy at the state and local levels, every county jail in Colorado in
2014 stopped honoring ICE's requests to continue holding suspected
immigrants in custody so that ICE could investigate their immigration
status. 2 68 This effort suggests there is a strong network of stakeholders in
the state who could lead the push for other reforms. At the same time,
however, the quick pace of the detainer reform effort was based in large
part on the potential civil liability local jurisdictions faced if they contin269
ued to honor detainers.
If reform efforts are to succeed here, advocates will need to conduct
research on key areas, including the economic consequences of immigration detention on Colorado taxpayers and the impact of immigration detention on U.S. citizen children and families residing in Colorado
(whether economic, social, or psychological). Advocates would also
need to consider how to message such a program to Coloradans; it is
unlikely that the messaging used in New York would translate or resonate in the Rocky Mountain West.
CONCLUSION

Detention without representation is a national problem with a regional manifestation. In Colorado, mirroring the nationwide trend, the
vast majority of detainees proceed unrepresented during high-stakes removal proceedings, even though having representation dramatically affects the likelihood they will be able to stay in the country. This suggests
that meritorious cases are lost simply because detained immigrants cannot afford lawyers.
To combat this problem, two very different-yet equally promising-reform efforts have taken hold. Out west, a group of advocates successfully litigated the first-ever class action calling for representation for
a particularly vulnerable subset of detainees who faced competency and
cognition issues in their proceedings. And in New York, a coalition of
stakeholders conducted an exhaustive, multiyear research study charting
the harmful effects of detention on detainees and their families, spurring
the creation of the first-ever immigrant public defender corps.
Both modes of reform have distinct advantages and are powerful
templates for advocates in other jurisdictions. Although neither impact

268.
Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, All Colorado Jails Now Reject Federal Immigration Detainers (Sept. 18, 2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/news/all-colorado-jails-nowreject-federal-immigration-detainers.
269.
Colorado Sheriff to Pay $30k to Woman Held on Immigration Detainer, ACLU OF
COLORADO (June 19, 2014), http://aclu-co.org/colorado-sheriff-pay-30k-woman-held-immigrationdetainer/.
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litigation nor municipal funding reform seems to be an immediately viable strategy in Colorado, advocates can take away important lessons
from both of these recent reform efforts.
In terms of expanding the right to representation for particularly
vulnerable members of the detained population, advocates may continue
to monitor the rollout of EOIR's Qualified Representative Program. If
the program does not come to fruition, advocates may consider filing a
Franco-style suit. In addition, advocates may build off Franco to argue
for legal representation for individual detainees with competency issues.
In terms of expanding access to universal representation for immigrants through municipal funding, advocates may consider taking a leaf
out of NYIFUP's book. The program was the result of years of exhaustive research covering detained case adjudications, representation rates,
and economic and social effects of detention. Advocates in Colorado can
engage in a similar study about the effects of immigration detention in
the region, with a particular focus on the economic impact of detention
for Colorado taxpayers and the social and psychological effects of detention and deportation on detainees and their U.S. citizen families. Alliances uniting nonprofits, the local immigration bar, and research institutions
could prove particularly powerful in measuring the need for-and impact-of universal representation in Colorado. Once research is underway, stakeholders could also consider pushing for a funding mandate in
particularly liberal or immigrant-friendly jurisdictions.
Even though litigation and legislative reforms may be far away,
given the recent successes in other jurisdictions, and increased scrutiny
and public awareness surrounding immigration detention, now is a critical moment to begin laying the foundation for future advocacy on access
to counsel for immigrant detainees in the Rocky Mountain region.

THE

PRESSURE IS ON-CRIMINAL DEFENSE COUNSEL
STRATEGIES AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY
BILL ONG HING'
ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court's message to criminal defense attorneys in Padilla v. Kentucky was clear: W when there is a risk of deportation, defense counsel has a constitutional duty to inform an immigrant defendant
of the potential for deportation or adverse immigration consequences
prior to pleading guilty. In my view, this constitutional duty places tremendous pressure on defense counsel to do more than advise, because
once advised, the client very naturally may want to know what options
are available other than going to trial. Rather than simply focusing on
how to minimize the time of incarceration for the client under a particular plea agreement, competent counsel has to figure out how to minimize
the immigration ramifications. As I discuss in this Article, the efforts
range from determining whether the client might actually be a citizen, to
seeking a sentence that would fall outside the realm of an aggravated
felony, to seeking a plea to an alternative charge that does not involve
moral turpitude or firearms, to making sure that the sentencing plea or
colloquy is silent about certain facts.
These efforts are demanding. They entail resourceful, intricate
knowledge of the relevant criminal codes. They also require resourceful,
intricate knowledge of the criminal grounds of removal and up-to-date
research on what classifications of convictions can or cannot lead to removal.
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INTRODUCTION

In Padilla v. Kentucky,' the Supreme Court made clear that criminal
defense attorneys have a constitutional duty to inform immigrant defendants of the potential for deportation prior to pleading guilty. When a particular plea "may carry a risk" of deportation, the defense attorney must
at the very least advise a "noncitizen client that pending criminal charges" might lead to "adverse immigration consequences." 2 "[W]hen the
deportation consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct ad*3
vice" is clear.
In Padilla, Jose Padilla was indicted by a Kentucky grand jury on
counts of trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor trailer without a weight and
distance-tax number.4 On advice from his lawyer, he entered a guilty plea
with respect to the three drug charges in exchange for dismissal on the
final charge.5 He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief arguing
that he was misadvised about the potential for deportation as a consequence of his guilty plea. 6 Mr. Padilla claimed that his counsel "not only
failed to advise him of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but
also told him that he 'did not have to worry about immigration status
since he had been in the country so long.' 7 Mr. Padilla had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years.
Relying on this erroneous advice, he pleaded guilty to the drug charges,
making his deportation "virtually mandatory." 9 But for this bad advice,

1.
2.
3.
4.
559 U.S.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

559 U.S. 356 (2010).
Id. at 369.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev'd, Padilla v. Kentucky,
356 (2010).
See Padilla,559 U.S. at 359.
Id.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008)).
Id.
Id.
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Mr. Padilla alleged that he would have gone to trial instead of pleading
guilty. o
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court recognized that after
amendments to the immigration laws in 1996, "removal is practically
inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable
discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses."" As such,
[t]hese changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the
stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been
more important. These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of
federal law, deportation is an integral part-indeed, sometimes the
most important part-of the penalty that may be imposed on nonciti2
zen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.'
The Padilla case thus underscores the absolute duty that criminal
defense attorneys have to advise their noncitizen clients of the potential
collateral immigration consequences. However, once that duty has been
discharged, then what? Mr. Padilla alleged that had he known about the
potential deportation consequences of his guilty plea, he would have
gone to trial. That option is clear, but was that his only option? A trial
could have resulted in a similar outcome, namely, a conviction of the
three drug charges. Or the outcome could have been worse. He could
have received a greater sentence on the drug charges than what he had
plea bargained for, or he could have been convicted of additional charges. Any of those outcomes also would have led to deportation.
What if Mr. Padilla's counsel had actually informed Mr. Padilla, "If
you plead guilty to these three charges, you will be subject to deportation," and Mr. Padilla responded, "What are my options to avoid deportation; or what can you do to help me avoid deportation?" Yes, a trial for
Mr. Padilla could have resulted in an acquittal thus avoiding the deportation consequence. However, the holding in the Padillacase is not simply
about giving the informed, noncitizen criminal defendant the opportunity
to go to trial. In my view, the pressure is on. The holding in Padilla invites competent counsel to engage in, or at least consider, a potential
panoply of strategies and options to avoid collateral immigration consequences for the noncitizen client. Thus, the goal is not simply about minimizing time in jail-the standard strategy that defense counsel might
otherwise be focused on.
In this Article, I discuss a list of options and approaches that competent criminal defense attorneys might consider in cases where their
I0.
I1.
12.

Id.
Id. at 363-64.
Id. at 364 (footnote omitted).
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noncitizen clients are charged with crimes that could render the clients
removable. This could mean working with an immigration law specialist
because "[i]mmigration law can be complex, and . . . a legal specialty of
its own"; 3 its provisions are notoriously complicated and continually
changing-comparable to the "labyrinth" of the Internal Revenue
Code.14 It could mean working on a plea deal that involves pleading to a
crime that is not a deportable offense. Or it could also mean looking for
flexible avenues within the criminal justice system, such as seeking diversion or a restorative justice approach that might result in charges being dismissed. In light of Padilla v Kentucky, defense counsel bears a
great responsibility to the noncitizen defendant.
The primary concern of this Article is on the representation of
noncitizen, lawful, permanent residents or refugees who would face removal if they were found guilty of pending charges. The focus is not on
undocumented immigrants or nonimmigrants-e.g., tourists or foreign
students-who could be removed or found inadmissible for future entry
if found guilty of the charges. Many of the strategies discussed here
might be helpful to the latter groups as well, however, undocumented
immigrants and nonimmigrants might face removal on other grounds,
such as overstaying their nonimmigrant visas, working without authorization, or crossing the border without inspection.
I. BACKGROUND ON CRIMINAL GROUNDS OF REMOVAL

The criminal grounds of removal have continued to grow through
the years as Congress increasingly relies on deportation to punish those
who acquire criminal records after admission. Most of these require a
conviction. The criminal deportability grounds apply to crimes involving
moral turpitude, multiple criminal convictions, aggravated felonies, highspeed flight, sex offender convictions, controlled substance and firearms
convictions, and domestic violence convictions.
A. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
A noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
(CIMT) that was committed within five years after the date of admission
is deportable if the crime is one for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.' 5 A similar provision makes a noncitizen inadmissible, although the deportability ground is more stringent; it focuses on the
possible sentence rather than the actual sentence in determining a noncit-

13.
Id. at 369.
14. Castro-O'Ryan v. U.S. Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th
Cir. 1987).
15. Immigration and Nationality Act § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2015). The statute
states that for those who obtained permanent residence through S visas, a CIMT conviction will
trigger deportation if committed ten years after admission. Id.
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izen's deportability.1 Even if a noncitizen is actually sentenced to less
than one year, the noncitizen is still deportable under this provision for a
crime involving moral turpitude if the offense carries a possible term of
one year or more.17
The CIMT provision states that the crime must have been committed within five years after the date of admission.' 8 The Ninth Circuit recognized admission under INA § 101(a)(13)(A) for the purposes of a
crime of moral turpitude as the prior "lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer."' 9 Admission, therefore, is a key factor in determining the relevant
time period for deportability.
The term "moral turpitude" has never been legislatively defined.
The Supreme Court held that the term was not unconstitutionally vague
in a case involving the deportation of a noncitizen for criminal convic20
tions involving fraud. In Jordan v. De George, the Court was asked to
decide whether the term moral turpitude was unconstitutionally vague in
a case involving the crime of conspiracy to defraud the United States of
taxes on distilled spirits. 2 1 That particular crime, the Court held, was
squarely within the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude,
"[w]hatever else the phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' may mean
in peripheral cases."2 2 Since then, courts have consistently defined moral
turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man." 23 Extensive case law has been developed around
what constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. Crimes that have been held
to involve moral turpitude include murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, rape, fraud, forgery, robbery, petty theft,
grand theft, burglary, perjury, counterfeiting, bribery, willful tax evasion,
and extortion.24 In one case, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
found that the noncitizen's involuntary manslaughter conviction for reck16.

See id.

§

1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) ("[An alien who] is convicted of a crime for which a sen-

tence of one year or longer may be imposed[] is deportable.").

Id.
17.
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(1).
18.
19.
Shivaraman v. Ascheroft, 360 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Immigration and
Nationality Act § 103(a)( 3)(A)).
20.
341 U.S. 223 (1951).
21. Id at 226.
22. Id at 232.
23.
E.g., Sosa-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 420 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11 th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Smith, 420 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1971) (quoting In re Henry, 99 P. 1054, 1055 (Idaho
1909)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063,

1068 (9th Cir. 2007).
24.

See, e.g., 6 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD

Y. wADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §71.05 (1988); NORTON TOOBY, J.J. ROLLIN & J.
FOSTER, CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE (2008).
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lessly causing the death of her child involved moral turpitude because the
criminal statute required conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the life or safety of others.25 Just as importantly, of course,
the list of offenses that have been held not to involve moral turpitude is
vital, such as simple assault, joy riding, possession of burglary tools, and
breaking and entering without intent to commit a moral turpitude offense. 2 6 Vandalism generally is not regarded as a crime involving moral
turpitude. 27

Under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), a noncitizen who, any time after admission, commits two or more crimes involving moral turpitude is deportable. 28 There is an exception for multiple offenses arising out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct. The BIA has interpreted the single-scheme provision to cover separate and distinct crimes performed in
furtherance of a single criminal episode, lesser included offenses, and
instances where two crimes flow from and are the natural consequence of
a single act of criminal misconduct. 29 The Ninth Circuit has rejected this
approach, noting that the statute refers to a single "scheme" rather than a
single act. 30 In the Ninth Circuit, a single scheme includes two or more
crimes that "were planned at the same time and executed in accordance
with that plan." 31
B. AggravatedFelonies
In 1988, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (Drug Kingpin Act) created a
new deportation category for a conviction of a single "aggravated felony" that included murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking. 32
Now, aliens-including longtime, lawful permanent residentsconvicted of a single aggravated felony at any time after admission are
deportable. 33 The new aggravated felony ground for deportation overlapped with other grounds of deportation. For example, drug convictions
that were now aggravated felonies remained independent grounds for
deportation under the provision pertaining to drug crimes.34 Similarly,
any person who was convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude

25.

Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1995).

26.

What Constitutes "Crime Involving Moral Turpitude" Within Meaning of§ 212(a)(9) and

241(a)(4) oflmmigration and Nationality Act (8 USC.A.

§

1182(a)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and Similar

PredecessorStatutes Providingfor Exclusion or Deportation ofAliens Convicted ofSuch Crime, 23

A.L.R. FED. 480,
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
(1988).
33.
34.

§§

2(a), 11(b) (1975).

See infra note 128 and accompanying text.

Immigration and Nationality Act § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2015).
Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506, 509 (B.I.A. 1992).
Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 614, 615-16 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 616.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7344(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4470-71
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); see id. § 1101(a)(3) (defining the term "alien").
INA §§ 101(a)(43); 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 237(a)(2)(B).
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was still deportable, irrespective of whether one or both crimes were
aggravated felonies.35
The major effect of the introduction of the aggravated felony
ground of deportation was that now a person with a single, non-drug
conviction was deportable, irrespective of time of entry-just as had
been true of single drug convictions prior to 1988.36 For example, a person convicted of murder committed more than five years after entering
the country was now deportable as an aggravated felon. That was not
possible prior to 1988. The problem is that the list of aggravated felonies
for deportation purposes includes much more than murder.
The list of aggravated felonies, expanded several times since
1988,37 is so broad that the current president of the National Association
of Immigration Judges considers the category a "misnomer that includes
many offenses that are neither aggravated nor felonies."38 Today, the
term includes murder, rape, and illicit trafficking of a controlled substance. 39 But theft offenses, when the term of imprisonment is at least
one year, also are included.4 0 So what one might regard as minor
crimes-for example, selling $10 worth of marijuana or "smuggling" a
baby sister across the border illegally-are aggravated felonies for de41
portation purposes.
A crime classified as a misdemeanor under state law might be regarded as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality
Act. For example, several offenses are classified as aggravated felonies
once a one-year sentence is imposed. These include theft, burglary, perjury, and obstruction of justice, even though the state criminal court may

§§ 101(a)(43); 237(a)(2)(A)(ii),
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).

(iii).

35.
36.

INA
INA

37.

See infra note 39.

38.

Dana Leigh Marks, Let Immigration Judges be Judges, THE HILL (May 9, 2013, 8:03

PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/298875-let-immigration-judges-be-judges.

39.

Immigration and Nationality Act

§ 101,

8 U.S.C.

§

I 101(a)(43) (2015). Aggravated felo-

nies include sexual abuse of a minor, any illicit trafficking in any controlled substance (including
possession for sale of marijuana, firearms, or destructive devices), money laundering, or any crime
of violence (except for purely political offenses) for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at
least one year. Id. The definition also includes treason; child pornography; operation of a prostitution
business; fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; tax evasion in
which the loss to the U.S. government exceeds $10,000; crimes relating to the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, if the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year;
alien smuggling, except in the case of a first offense involving the assisting, abetting, or aiding of the
alien's spouse, child, or parent and no other individual; document trafficking, if the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year; failure to appear to serve a sentence, if the underlying offense is
punishable by imprisonment for a term of five years; and bribery, counterfeiting, or forgery for
which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. Id. An attempt or conspiracy to commit any of
these crimes also is included. Id.

40.
41.

Id.
See id.
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classify the crime as a misdemeanor. 42 Misdemeanor statutory rape, consensual sex where one person is under the age of eighteen, also will be
treated as an aggravated felony.43 Similarly, a misdemeanor conviction
can be an aggravated felony for deportation under the "rape" or "sexual
abuse of a minor" categories.4
In spite of the creation of the aggravated felony ground of deportation in 1988 and the subsequent expansion of the term, until 1996, a
long-term, lawful permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony
remained eligible to apply for discretionary Section 212(c) relief.4 5 The
deportation respondent's ability to introduce evidence of remorse, rehabilitation, hardship to family, work ethic, and community engagement
before the immigration court remained constant.46
The introduction of the aggravated felony concept in 1988 signaled
a major shift in focusing on criminal immigrants. The Immigration Act
of 1990 foreclosed criminal sentencing judges from making a Judicial
Recommendation Against Deportation.47 The Violent Crime and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 and Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994 added to the list of aggravated felonies and created "administrative" deportation with no hearing before an immigration
judge, while the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) of 1996 required mandatory detention of certain criminal aliens and barred relief for aggravated felons, drug offenders, and double
moral turpitude defendants.4 8
While deporting criminals might be viewed simply as an effort to
rid the country of immigrants who pose public safety concerns; in fact,
an important purpose of the strengthened penalties was over allocation of
resources in the prison system. 49 One-fourth of federal detainees in 1995
were aliens who were taking up precious and costly prison space.50 But

42.

See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1999); American Immigra-

tion
Council,
Aggravated
Felonies.
An
Overview,
available
at:
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/aggravated-felonies-overview
43.
William J. Johnson, Note, When Misdemeanors Are Felonies: The Aggravated Felony of

Sexual Abuse ofa Minor, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 419, 434-38 (2008).
44. See, e.g., Small, 23 1. & N. Dec. 448, 449 (B.I.A. 2002).
45.
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
46. Id; C-V-T-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 7 (B.I.A. 1998).
47.
Lisa R. Fine, Preventing Miscarriages ofJustice: Reinstating the Use of "JudicialRecommendations Against Deportation," 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 491, 506-07 (1998); see also Carl
Shusterman, Padilla - Bring Back the JRAD?, NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (Apr. 18, 2010),
http://shusterman.typepad.com/nation-of-immigrants/2010/04/padilla-bring-back-the-jrad.html.
48.
Katherine Brady, Recent Developments in the Immigration Consequences of Crimes, in
OUR STATE OUR ISSUES: AN OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION LAW ISSUES 129 n.1 (Bill Ong Hing ed.,
1996); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive DeportationLaws and the Due Process Clause, 73

N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 114 (1998).
49.

Fine, supranote 45, at 492.

50.

Id. at 492-93.
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without a doubt, clamping down on criminal aliens was about removing
aliens who were perceived as undeserving of residence.
Within months of the passage of AEDPA, Congress considered further enforcement-focused immigration legislation. Proponents of the
Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
continued to voice concern over resource allocations.52 Fresh on the heels
of the 1996 welfare refonn act-the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act-that placed limitations on public assistance for immigrants, 53 IIRIRA contained further limits on such benefits. 54 "As a consequence of these laws, with limited exceptions, undocumented migrants became ineligible for all federal public
benefits, including loans, licenses, food and housing assistance, and postsecondary education." 55
However, the IIRIRA debates focused heavily on the idea of immigrant criminality by increasing categories of deportation and "streamlining the removal process." 56 Prominent Republican Senator Orrin Hatch
(R-UT) argued, "We can no longer afford to allow our borders to be just
overrun by illegal aliens. . . . Frankly, a lot of our criminality in this
country today happens to be coming from criminal, illegal aliens who are
ripping our country apart. A lot of the drugs are coming from these people."5 This conflation of "illegal alien" with pervasive crime was sufficient to affect the treatment of all criminal aliens-even those who were
in fact long-term, lawful permanent residents-leading to restrictions on
deportation relief for aggravated felons regardless of immigration status. 58

As a result, IIRIRA eliminated Section 212(c)'s second-chance relief as it had been applied for twenty years. In its place, a cancellation of
removal provision was added that precluded the possibility of relief for
many who had been able to seek discretionary relief from an immigration
judge under the prior provision.59 The new provision, INA § 240A(a),
permits the Attorney General to "cancel removal" only for certain aliens
who commit crimes if the alien (1) has been a lawful permanent resident
for at least five years, "(2) has resided in the United States continuously
51.
52.

Id. at 493.
Fine, supra note 45, at 492-93.

53.

See generally Bill Ong Hing, Don't Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor: Conflicted Immi-

grant Stories and Welfare Reform, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (1998).
54.

Jennifer M. Chac6n, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime

Control and National Security, 39 CoNN. L. REV. 1827, 1842 (2007).
55.

Id. (footnote omitted).

56.
57.

Id at 1843.
Id (alteration in original) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S 11,505 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996))

(internal quotation marks omitted) (statement of Sen. Hatch).

58.
See id at 1839.
59.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, 187,
repealed by Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
304(b), I10 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597 (1996); see also Brady, supra note 48, at 129-30.
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for seven years after having been admitted in any status," and, most significantly, "(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony." 6 0 The
aggravated felony bar, thus, eliminated relief for many lawful resident
aliens who would have been eligible for Section 212(c) relief.6 1 The aggravated felony category, that began as additional grounds for crimebased deportation, became a convenient marker for who should not be
eligible for discretionary relief.
The effect of eliminating Section 212(c) relief for a long-time, lawful permanent resident who has been convicted of an aggravated felony
is evident. The weighing and balancing of equities against the seriousness of the crime does not take place in the removal proceeding because
the immigration judge does not have discretion to grant relief. Hardship
to the respondent and to his or her family is rendered irrelevant, as is any
evidence of rehabilitation, remorse, or atonement on the part of the respondent. In essence, a single bad act that may have taken "fifteen
minutes" to commit can control the outcome, while the rest of the person's life that could be exemplary and crime free is ignored. 62
C. ControlledSubstances, Firearms, Domestic Violence, and Other
Crimes
In addition to the general CIMT and aggravated felony provisions,
63
the statute names specific crimes that make a noncitizen deportable.
These provisions are far-reaching in their scope and effect, and they reflect a congressional purpose to regulate the activities of noncitizens
even after admission.
§ 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)

(2015) (emphasis added).

60.

Immigration and Nationality Act

61.

The 1996 amendments also expanded the list of crimes included as aggravated felonies.

See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(a),
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 (1996); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277-78. For example, a crime of theft for which the
person

received

a

one-year

sentence

was

now

an

aggravated

felony.

8

U.S.C.

§

I l01(a)(43)(G). Previously, a theft crime was only classified as an "aggravated felony" if the individual received a sentence of five or more years. See Immigration and Nationality Technical Correc-

tions Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416,

§ 222(a),

108 Stat. 4305, 4321 (amended 1996). Although

such a crime would have been considered a "crime involving moral turpitude," it would not have
been grounds for instituting deportation unless it was committed within the first five years or was
accompanied by a second crime of moral turpitude. Brady, supranote 48, at 144-45. Once the immigrant is classified as an aggravated felon, other harsh immigration consequences follow. An aggravated felon is ineligible for release on bond and asylum (although the person might be eligible for
"restriction of removal" or the protections of the Convention Against Torture). BILL ONG HING,
DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 58 (2006). An aggravated
felon who is not a lawful permanent resident can be deported without a hearing before an immigration judge and is not eligible for a waiver for moral turpitude offenses upon admission. Aggravated
Felonies: An
Overview,
AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL
(Mar.
16,
2012),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/aggravated-felonies-overview. To make matters worse,
a deported aggravated felon who returns to the United States illegally can be sentenced up to twenty

years in federal prison. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(2).

CITY & CNTY OF S.F. IMMIGRANT RIGHTS COMM'N, A CITY AND NATION OF
62.
IMMIGRANTS: 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM 78 (2013)
(testimony of Anoop Prasad, staff attorney) (on file with author).

63.

8 U.S.C.

§

101(a)(43).
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A noncitizen who at any time after admission has been convicted of
any state, federal, or foreign country law related to controlled substances,
other than possession for personal use of thirty grams or less of marijuana, is deportable. 4 The statute covers convictions for conspiracy or attempt as well as direct convictions. 65 The statute also makes a noncitizen
who at any time after admission becomes a drug abuser or addict deportable. 66 This provision is triggered simply by behavior rather than a conviction.
Just as broad in its application is the provision that makes conviction of a firearms offense after admission a deportable offense. The statute states that "[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted
under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying . . . any weapon, part, or accessory
which is a firearm . .. in violation of any law is deportable."6 7 This provision also covers conspiracy and attempt offenses. 68
Probably the most far-reaching criminal deportability ground is the
domestic violence ground. A noncitizen convicted of any domestic violence offense at any time after admission is deportable. 69 Domestic violence offenses include domestic violence, stalking, and child abuseneglect or abandonment.70 Moreover, the statute makes anyone deportable who violates a protection order, whether civil or criminal, when involving threats of violence.
The statute enumerates several other offenses for which conviction
makes a noncitizen deportable, including failure to register as a sex offender; 72 high-speed flight from an immigration checkpoint;" crimes
related to espionage, treason, and sedition; 74 and certain violations of the
Trading with the Enemy Act or the Military Selective Service Act.75
Note that some grounds of removal that are criminal-related do not
require convictions. A drug abuser or addict is deportable even without a
conviction.76 A noncitizen who has aided, assisted, or encouraged noncitizens to cross the border illegally is deportable.77 A noncitizen is deportable who is found by a civil or criminal judge to have violated portions

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
Id.
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
Id.
Id § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
Id.
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v).
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv).
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(i).
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(iii).
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Id. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(i).
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of a domestic violence protective order relating to threat, violence, or
repeated harassment.78
II. CLIENTS WHO ARE UNAWARE OF THEIR U.S. CITIZENSHIP

Before proceeding to criminal justice system defense strategies, a
preliminary step needs to occur. At some point early in the representation
of a noncitizen in the criminal phase and certainly in the deportation
phase, counsel needs to verify that for sure the client is in fact a noncitizen. Removal laws only apply to aliens. Thus, U.S. citizenship can be
regarded as a "complete bar to removal" from the United States.7 ' As
unbelievable as it may seem, some individuals may be unaware of the
fact that they have derived U.S. citizenship from a parent. Consider this
example:
Douglas Centeno, 31, was released from an immigration jail in April
after a Chronicle story attracted fresh attention from immigration officials to his case. Now the government has abandoned its efforts to
deport Centeno, accepting the evidence that he is, in fact, a U.S. citizen.

Centeno's case is the latest example of an increasingly common
problem, legal experts say: People wind up in immigration detention
for months, or years, trying to assemble evidence to show that they
don't belong there in the first place.

Citizenship is one of the most complex areas of law .

. .

. Some peo-

ple born abroad inherit U.S. citizenship from a parent or grandparent;
others gain it as children if their parents naturalize. Sometimes that
citizenship is difficult to trace or document.
That was what happened for Centeno, according to his attorney, Sin
Yen Ling of San Francisco's Asian Law Caucus. Born in Nicaragua,
Centeno arrived in the United States legally as a 2-year-old. When he
was 16, his father became a naturalized U.S. citizen, and Centeno automatically derived citizenship as well, though he never obtained a
naturalization certificate to prove it.
Legal immigrants who have been convicted of certain crimes face
deportation; citizens do not. And in recent years, local law enforcement agencies have increased their cooperation with immigration officials, handing over potentially deportable aliens.

78.

Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).

79.
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., IMMIGRATION RELIEF TOOLKIT
DEFENDERS
8
(2014),
available
http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/natlrelief-toolkit jan_2014_finalO.pdf.
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Centeno landed in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents in December after serving time for assaulting an officer.
Centeno, who suffers from schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, was
walking down the street talking to himself when police stopped him
.... Centeno asked police to take him to a mental health center, and
when he was refused, he had a psychotic episode and struck [an officer].
"Unfortunately, it snowballed into him being put in deportation proceedings," said Ling. "It was a huge mishandling of someone with
mental health problems."
Centeno was locked up for four months....
... [Immigration] Judge Lawrence DiCostanzo ended the deportation
case, noting that the evidence appears to show that Centeno is a citizen.
"It's a great ending for Douglas," said Ling. "But the consequence of
0
this broken system is that it wrongfully deports U.S. citizens.,,8

One might think that federal immigration officials would screen for
whether someone they have taken into custody is actually a U.S. citizen.
However, that would be wrong. "If it's not clear whether you are an immigrant or a citizen, the system is set up to detain you. . . . The default is,
you are an alien, and then from a remote detention facility you have the
burden . . . .81 Even when the person in custody asserts citizenship and

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials could have confirmed citizenship with reasonable efforts, deportation might still occur.
Nearly three months after U.S. immigration officials dumped Luis
Alberto Delgado in Mexico despite his insistence that he is a U.S. citizen, the 19-year-old was permitted to re-enter the country last weekend with the U.S. government's blessing.
Delgado said U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents cleared him
to return to the United States on Friday, roughly 85 days after he was
detained by immigration officials and pressured to sign papers that
cleared the way for his removal to Mexico.
Steven Cribby, a spokesman for U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
declined to comment on Delgado's case.

80.
Tyche Hendricks, Modesto Man Won't Be Deported, Citizenship OKd, Hous. CHRONICLE
(May 21, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/article/Modesto-man-won-t-be-deported-

citizenship-OKd-3232299.php.
81.
Id. (quoting Holly Cooper, a professor at the UC Davis School of Law) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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On Monday in Houston, Delgado said he was pondering a lawsuit
against the U.S. government, calling his case "an injustice."
U.S. Border Patrol agents detained Delgado after a traffic stop in
South Texas on June 17 and held him for eight hours, questioning
him about his citizenship.
Delgado said he gave immigration agents a copy of his birth certificate showing he was born at Houston's Ben Taub Hospital, a state of
Texas identification card and a Social Security card.
But Delgado, who was raised in Mexico after his parents divorced,
said immigration agents were suspicious of him because he did not
speak English well, and insisted the paperwork he carried belonged
to someone else.
Delgado said he eventually signed paperwork that resulted in his removal to Mexico because he wanted to be released from immigration
custody, and thought he could fight his case from Houston.
"I believe (the agents) discriminated against me because I didn't
speak English," he said. "If you don't speak very well, I think they
just assume you're Mexican."
Isaias Torres, a Houston immigration attorney who took Delgado's
case pro bono, said he believes the U.S. government was "at best,
very negligent" in its handling of the case.
U.S. immigration officials have faced scrutiny in recent years over allegations that they have deported U.S. citizens, including a highprofile case of a mentally disabled Los Angeles man who was lost for
months in Mexico in 2007.
Estimates of the number of U.S. citizens deported from the U.S. vary
widely, and such statistics are not officially tracked by U.S. immigration officials, who recently adopted guidelines designed to prevent
such deportations.
Torres said the government should not tolerate discrimination against
U.S. citizens and legal immigrants who do not speak English fluently.
"I don't believe this is an isolated incident," Torres said.

He said such cases will become increasingly common because
the U.S. government is deporting parents with U.S.-bom children. . . . Between 1998 and 2007, the United States removed
108,434 illegal immigrants with U.S. citizen children, according to a
2009 Department of Homeland Security report.
Delgado said he does not speak English well because he and his
brother moved to Mexico with their mother after she divorced their
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father, who lived in Dallas. Delgado moved back to Houston about
three years ago.82

Given the phenomenon of real and potential wrongful deportation of
U.S. citizens, competent counsel must determine when the perceived
"noncitizen" criminal defendant actually is not a citizen. First, the client's place of birth needs to be determined. Birth in the United States,

with rare exception-e.g., child of foreign diplomat-confers U.S. citizenship on the person.83 Second, if the client was born outside the United
States, but a parent or grandparent was born in the United States, under

certain circumstances, the client may have acquired U.S. citizenship at
birth. For example, a child born abroad to two U.S. citizen parents acquires citizenship at birth as long as one of the parents had a residence in
84
the United States prior to the child's birth. A child born abroad to one
U.S. citizen parent and one alien parent acquires citizenship at birth provided the U.S. citizen parent was physically present in the United States
at the time of the child's birth."
A third way of becoming a U.S. citizen is through derivation, as in
the Douglas Centeno story. Different rules can apply depending on the
person's date of birth. However, a person born on or after February 28,

1983, automatically becomes a citizen prior to his or her eighteenth
birthday if the following events occur: (a) at least one parent who has

legal and physical custody of the child is a U.S. citizen by birth or naturalization, and (b) the child is a lawful permanent resident.86 Similarly,
an adopted child becomes a U.S. citizen through adoptive parents if the
child was born on or after February 28, 1983and (a) was legally adopted
by a U.S. citizen before age sixteen, and (b) became a lawful permanent
resident and resided in the legal custody of the citizen parent for two
years before age 18.
If the client is in fact a noncitizen, then Padilla v. Kentucky obligations apply. Going to trial is one option. However, a host of other strategies need to be considered as well.
III. ARGUING THAT

THE CRIME

Is NOT

A REMOVABLE OFFENSE

Occasionally, a conviction can be challenged on the ground that the
crime is not a moral turpitude crime, not an aggravated felony, and not a
82.
Susan Carroll, Man Born at Ben Taub Returns after He 's Wrongly Deported, Hous.
CHRONICLE (Sept. 14, 2010, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Manborn-at-Ben-Taub-retums-after-he-s-wrongly- 1694617.php.
83.
Birth in Puerto Rico, Guam, and U.S. Virgin Islands also confers U.S. citizenship at birth.

8 U.S.C.

§§

1401, 1402, 1406, 1407.See also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)

(child born to parents in the United States who were not eligible for citizenship is a citizen nonetheless under the Fourteenth Amendment).

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. § 1401(c).
Id. § 1401(g).
8 U.S.C. § 1431(a); Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752, 758-60 (9th Cir. 2001).
8 U.S.C. § 143 1(b).
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narcotics crime-in essence, that the crime is not a removable offense. A
noncitizen generally is not subject to removal based on a criminal conviction unless the conviction fits categorically within one of the criminal
removal grounds. This "categorical approach" requires adjudicators to
determine whether all of the conduct covered under the statute of conviction fits within the alleged criminal removal classification.88 If it does
not, the person does not fit within the removal classification. Importantly, the immigration judge may not delve into the particular conduct underlying the person's conviction.
The Supreme Court in unequivocal terms has reaffirmed the traditional categorical approach for determining whether a conviction falls
within a removal classification. In Moncrieffe v. Holder,90 the Court held
that a Georgia conviction for marijuana possession with intent to distribute may not be deemed a drug trafficking aggravated felony for removal
purposes. 9 1 The statute of conviction covered some conduct-social sharing of marijuana-falling outside the aggravated felony drug trafficking
definition.92 Under the categorical approach, the court does not assess the
person's actual conduct; instead the court focuses on the text of the statute under which the person was convicted. 93 If the statute would criminalize conduct that is not within the federal standard for an aggravated
felony, then the categorical approach is not satisfied and a conviction
under the statute does not render the person an aggravated felon. 94
In Descamps v. United States,95 the Supreme Court again emphasized the application of the categorical approach where the elements set
forth in the criminal statute must be compared to the immigration law
removal ground.96 The facts in the criminal case are irrelevant. All that
matters are the elements of the statute of conviction. The rationale for an
elements-centric approach, as the Court explained in Descamps, is multifold: it comports with the text and history of the statutes it was created to
apply, it avoids Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing courts making factual findings that belong to juries, and it averts
the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach.9 7
Descamps makes clear that deviation from the categorical approachi.e., application of a modified categorical approach-is permitted in only
one scenario: where the relevant criminal statute expressly defines more

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684-85 (2013).
Id. at 1684.
Id. at 1678.
Id. at 1693-94.
Id. at 1684-85.
Id.
See id. at 1686-87.
133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
Id at 2281.
Id at 2287.
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than one offense.98 In cases involving these statutes-called "divisible"

statutes because they set out one or more of the elements of the offense
in the alternative, e.g., burglary involving entry into a building or an automobile-courts may consult a limited universe of extra-statutory documents for the purpose of ascertaining which elements of the statute the
defendant was convicted of.99
The lesson for criminal defense counsel is that as long as a client
can plead guilty to a crime under a nondivisible statute that makes criminal some conduct that does not fit within the removal classification, that
option is a good one from an immigration perspective. In some circumstances, that likely requires very sophisticated knowledge of the applicable criminal statutes. However, defense counsel's effort to reach that
level of understanding is well worth the effort for noncitizen clients.
However, when a divisible statute is involved, knowledgeable defense counsel has an additional set of considerations to make. The Supreme Court has recognized a "narrow range of cases" in which sentencing courts or immigration judges-applying what has come to be known
as the modified categorical approach-may look beyond the statutory
elements to "charging paper and jury instructions" used in a case.m
When a statute with alternative elements, such as a burglary statute that
prohibits entry of an automobile as well as a building, the court permits a
limited review of facts specific to the case.'or
For example, if the burglary of a building constitutes a deportable
offense but burglary of an automobile does not, the court permits this
modified categorical approach. Because the statute is "divisible,"-i.e.,
comprises multiple, alternative versions of the crime-a court cannot
tell, without reviewing something more, if the person's conviction was
for the building or automobile form of burglary. So a sentencing or immigration court is authorized to scrutinize a restricted set of materials,
such as "the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between
judge and defendant," to determine if the person had pleaded guilty to
entering a building or a car.1 02 Thus, in the divisible statute situation,
defense counsel representing a noncitizen client have a particular burden
to steer the plea agreement or colloquy transcript in a direction away
from the deportable division of the criminal statute if possible.
Odd language in the federal generic statute can also provide a basis
for an immigration court to look at the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime. In Nijhawan v. Holder, o0 the government al98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 2292-93.
Id at 2281.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
Id.
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
557 U.S. 29 (2009).
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leged that Mr. Nijhawan's convictions for conspiring to commit mail
fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering constituted aggravated felonies.'0 In defining "aggravated felony," the Immigration and Nationality
Act includes "an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the
loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000."' Mr. Nijhawan argued
that since criminal statutes under which he was convicted did not require
a finding of any particular amount of victim loss, his convictions did not
constitute aggravated felonies.' 06 However, the Supreme Court ruled that
the italicized language does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit,
but rather to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed
a fraud or deceit crime on a particular occasion.1 0 7 As such, the immigration court could look to the facts and circumstances underlying the con08
viction.s
At his sentencing, Mr. Nijhawan stipulated that the victim loss
exceeded $100 million and, therefore, his convictions fell within the definition of aggravated felony.1 09 Again, the Nijhawan holding admonishes
defense counsel to be aware of the particular circumstances that fall into
the classification for removal offenses and use language in sentencingrelated records that avoids removable classifications. 0
IV.

AVOIDING A CONVICTION

Criminal grounds of removal require a "conviction." So avoiding a
conviction averts deportation on those grounds. Whether a legal disposition constitutes a conviction for immigration law purposes is determined
under federal standards."' However, some efforts that are commonly
known to defense attorneys can result in a non-conviction and should be
considered.
A conviction occurs for immigration purposes only if there is an
admission or finding of guilt and the judge imposes some form of punishment or restraint such as jail, probation, restitution, or fines.11 2 A disposition that contains these two elements is a conviction for immigration
purposes, even if the state does not consider the outcome to be a conviction. 1 Because most criminal courts impose requirements or restrictions
on a defendant, the second prong-imposition of punishment or re104. Id. at 32-33.
105.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2015) (emphasis
added).
106.
Nihawan, 557 U.S. at 35-36.
107.
Id. at 32.
108.
Id. at 41-43.
109.
Id. at 32-33.
110.
Id. at 42-43.
111.
See, e.g., Paredes-Urrestarazu v. INS, 22 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1994), withdrawn and superseded on denial ofreh'g, 36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1994); Ozkok, 19 1. & N. Dec. 546, 546, 548 (B.I.A.
1988), superseded by statute as recognized in Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 629

F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2011); Grullon, 20 1. & N. Dec. 12, 12 (B.I.A. 1989).
112.
See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § I l01(a)(48)(A); Cabrera, 24
1. & N. Dec. 459 (B.I.A. 2008).
113.
See, e.g., Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2001).
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straint-will only rarely be avoided. However, many dispositions avoid
the first prong of the conviction definition-admission or finding of
guilt. Some dispositions that avoid a conviction for immigration purposes
include acquittal, deferred prosecution, deferred verdict, deferred sentence, and dismissal before conviction under a pre-plea diversion
scheme.
A. DeferredProsecutionor Sentence
Criminal defense attorneys can bargain for an informal deferred
prosecution in which the plea hearing is postponed and the defendant
agrees to meet several conditions during postponement. This must be
done with the understanding that the prosecution may drop or reduce the
charges based on the defendant's good performance. This disposition is
not a conviction because no guilty plea is taken. In the alternative, there
is no conviction if a plea is taken but no sentence is ever imposed.
B. Pre-PleaDrug Court
Some states provide the option of a pre-trial drug court program,
which may not involve a guilty plea. For example, California Penal Code
§ 1000.5 provides for a "pre-guilty plea drug court program."l l4 Under
this program, criminal proceedings are suspended without a plea of
guilty." 5 Consequently, successful completion of the program should not
constitute a conviction for immigration purposes.
Unfortunately, some pre-trial drug court programs may require an
admission of drug abuse or addiction. A drug abuser or addict is deportable even without a conviction."6 In some cases, therefore, a first conviction of simple possession or less may be preferable to being labeled an
abuser or addict. For example, elimination of a conviction under a state
rehabilitative relief provision eliminates the crime for immigration purposes in the Ninth Circuit, as long as it was a first conviction for simple
possession of a controlled substance."17
C. Other Pre-PleaDiversion Programs
Many states have special pre-plea diversion programs or courts for
such things as misdemeanors, first-time offenders, and domestic violence. For example, California provides for pretrial diversion without a
guilty plea for some individuals who are charged with misdemeanor offenses or who have mental retardation." Because these dispositions do

114.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 1000.5

(West 2015).

115. Id. § 1000.5(a).
116.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii).
117.
Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other
grounds by Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011).
118. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001; People v. Weatherhill 215 Cal. App. 3d 1571, 1586 (2d Cir.
1989)
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not involve a guilty plea or finding of facts sufficient to support guilt,
they are not regarded as convictions for immigration purposes.
D. DeferredEntry ofJudgment, Expungements, and OtherRehabilitative
Schemes Following a Plea
Many states have some form of rehabilitative program for underage
or first-time offenders, which the state may or may not characterize as a
conviction.119 The state may provide that after a person pleads guilty, as
long as probation or other requirements are satisfied, the court will withdraw the plea, charges are dropped, and for many state law purposes the
conviction will cease to exist.120 Generally, withdrawal of plea under
these kinds of rehabilitative relief has no effect for immigration purposes.121 The only exception is for a first conviction for certain minor drug
offenses in the Ninth Circuit.122
Unfortunately, convictions that result in alternative placements or
treatments are still convictions for immigration purposes. For example,
many states have enacted laws that require or give discretion to a judge
to sentence an underage or first-time drug offender to treatment rather
than incarceration.123 A person might be placed in a state mental hospital
or treatment facility following a finding of guilt. Minors who are tried
and convicted as adults might be committed to a youth facility. However,
these dispositions do not ameliorate the immigration effect as long as
there has been an admission or finding of guilt that led to a conviction.1 24
V.VACATION OF JUDGMENT FOR CAUSE

With the exception of the Fifth Circuit, when a court acting within
its jurisdiction vacates a judgment of conviction, the conviction no longer constitutes a valid basis for removal. 12 5 Immigration authorities give
119.

For example, in Georgia, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 reads: "upon a verdict or plea of guilty

or nolo contendere, but before an adjudication of guilt, the court may, in the case of a defendant who
has not been previously convicted of a felony, without entering a judgment of guilt and with the
consent of the defendant, defer further proceeding and place the defendant on probation as a first
offender." First Offender does not mean that the incident is wiped away or expunged, but it does
mean that it should not appear as a conviction on the defendant's criminal history. See Breakfield
and Associates, Georgia First Offender Act and Treatment of a Ist Offense, Feb. 12, 2011, available
at http://www.gainesvillegalawyer.com/georgia-first-offender-act-and-treatment-of-a- I st-offense/

120.
See, e.g., In re Luviano-Rodriguez, 21 1 & N Dec. 235, 237-38 (BIA 1996).
121.
See, e.g., Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2001).
122.
See Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 749-50. But cf Salazar-Regino, 23 1. & N. Dec. 223,
224, 227-29 (B.I.A. 2002) (discussing the agency's disagreement with the Ninth Circuit rule).
123.
See Caren Chesler, New Jersey's Drug Court Program: Making the Sentence Fit the
Crime, NJSPOTLIGHt, Oct. 22, 2013, available at http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/10/22/newjersey-s-drug-court-program-making-the-sentence-fit-the-crime/?p=all

124.

See, e.g., United States v. Arellano-Torres, 303 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a

defendant's drug possession, where he was sentenced to probation instead of prison, did not stop him

from being deported); United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2002); L-R-, 8 I.
& N. Dec. 269 (B.I.A. 1959), overruled in part by Ozkok, 19 1. & N. Dec. 546 (B.I.A. 1988). Cf
Chavez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2004).
125.
Marroquin-Garcia, 23 1. & N. Dec. 705 (U.S. Att'y Gen. 2005); see also GarciaMaldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284, 291 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he BIA held that convictions vacat-

2015]

DEFENSE COUNSEL STRATEGIES AFTER PADILLA

855

"full faith and credit" to the state court action, not questioning the validity of vacations of judgment under state law.126 Thus, when there has been
a conviction, it makes sense for criminal defense counsel to consider
whether the judgment can be vacated.
The conviction must have been vacated for cause, not merely for
hardship or rehabilitation. A conviction is not eliminated for immigration
purposes if the court vacates the judgment for reasons "solely related to
rehabilitation or immigration hardships, rather than on the basis of a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings." 27
Except in the Sixth Circuit, the immigrant has the burden to show that
the conviction was vacated for procedural or substantive, rather than
rehabilitative, reasons. 128
VI. PARDON
Seeking a gubernatorial or presidential pardon can eliminate some
convictions for deportation purposes. A "full and unconditional pardon"
by the President of the United States or the governor of the state will
prevent removal for a conviction involving moral turpitude, an aggravated felony, or high-speed flight near a border.1 29 A pardon is ineffective
for other grounds, for example the domestic violence or firearms grounds
of deportation, even if the conviction also is a crime involving moral
turpitude or aggravated felony.' 30
VII.

PLEA BARGAINING TO AVOID DEPORTABLE OFFENSES

Given the basic framework for criminal deportation classifications
of moral turpitude, drug offenses, firearms, and aggravated felonies,
competent criminal defense attorneys can avert the possibility of removal
at the plea bargain stage. If the prosecutor is willing to accept a guilty
plea for a charge that does not result in a deportable offense, the client
has been provided a great service. The informed client may even be willing to accept more incarceration time in order to avoid conviction of a
removable offense.
Seeking a deal at the plea bargaining stage to avoid a deportable offense requires defense counsel to be aware of the viable non-removable

ed on the basis of procedural and substantive defects were not valid for purposes of immigration,
while those vacated because of post-conviction events such as rehabilitation were to be given effect
in immigration proceedings. This may be the stance of our sister circuits, but is not the law in this

circuit.") (citation omitted); Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 2002).
126. See Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1378, 1380 (B.I.A. 2000).
127.
Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 621 (B.I.A. 2003), rev'd, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d
263 (6th Cir. 2006).
128.
See Pickering, 465 F.3d at 269 (holding that the government must show, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the petitioner's conviction was "vacated solely for immigration reasons"
in order for him to still be deportable).

129.
130.

Immigration and Nationality Act § 237, 8 U.S.C.
Suh, 23 1. & N. Dec. 626, 627 (B.I.A. 2003).

§

1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2015).

856

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:4

options to a removable charge. For example, if the client is charged with
a serious property crime that is a crime involving moral turpitude, an
alternate charge of vandalism might be considered. But even then, counsel needs to be aware of how vandalism is regarded in the particular jurisdiction. Katherine Brady, a highly regarded criminal immigration expert offers this admonition on vandalism:
Although the better and most commonly-held view is that [California] PC 594 is not a CIMT, we don't have [a] specific case on that, so
it is possible that the conviction could be held a CIMT. One conservative immigration judge in San Francisco held that it is.
The Ninth Circuit held that vandalism is not a CIMT under a Washington statute that has similar elements to PC 594 except that the
amount of damage had to exceed $250. The court reasoned that since
the minimum damage could be as low as $250, [vandalism] was not a
CIMT because it could essentially be a prank. See Rodriguez-Herrera
v. INS, 52 F.3d 238 (9th Cir. 1995) ("In contrast to the bulk of other
non-fraud crimes necessarily involving moral turpitude, malicious
mischief is a relatively minor offense. Indeed, one can be convicted
of malicious mischief for destroying as little as $250.00 of another's
property with an evil wish to annoy.") The difference between $250
and $400 ought not to bring it into moral turpitude.
The BIA found that felony PC 594 with a gang enhancement pursuant to PC 186.22(d), is a CIMT. This is based on the fact that the
gang enhancement elements, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, are included in the elements of the offense and they require an intent greater than to "annoy." Matter of Hernandez, 26 1&N
Dec. 397 (BIA 2014) ("The California Legislature required that the
underlying crime be committed with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist the criminal conduct of a street gang to make it
"clear that a criminal offense is subject to increased punishment under the STEP Act only if the crime is 'gang related,"' given that not
all crimes committed by gang members are related to a gang. People
v. Albillar, 244 P.3d at 1071 (quoting People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d
713, 724 (Cal. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is only
when a defendant's intentional acts are "combined with his
knowledge that those acts would assist crimes by fellow gang members" that there is sufficient evidence of the requisite specific intent
to support a gang enhancement. People v. Morales, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d
615, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). Thus, to be convicted of felony vandalism with a gang enhancement, the offender must have been found
beyond a reasonable doubt to have had a malicious or evil intent in
committing vandalism for the benefit of a criminal street gang and to
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have done so with the specific intent to promote criminal activity by
gang members.").1

This relatively simple example underscores the pressure on criminal
defense counsel to be up on the immigration effects of certain crimes.
A. Plea Bargainingand Sentencing
Sentencing is an area in which criminal defense counsel can exert
significant control over immigration consequences. Often, the immigration question focuses on the amount of sentence imposed.1 32 For instance,
obtaining a sentence of less than one year imprisonment can prevent

many offenses from being classified as aggravated felonies.133 A sentence of not more than six months imposed for a first misdemeanor conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude will qualify the nonciti34
zen for the petty offense exception to the inadmissibility ground.1
For immigration purposes, a sentence is "deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless
of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or
sentence in whole or in part." 35 For example, when the imposition of

sentence is suspended, and custody-i.e., jail time-is ordered as a condition of probation, the sentence is the amount of custody time ordered,
1 36
regardless of the fact that technically no sentence was "imposed."
When the sentence is imposed and all or part of the execution of the sentence is suspended, the entire sentence imposed is the sentence for immi-

gration purposes, regardless of the fact that the defendant will not serve
all or part of the sentence.' 37 Probation alone is never a sentence to confinement, although if the judge orders the noncitizen to spend time in jail
3
as a condition of probation, the time ordered is a sentence. 1

The sentencing issue should be kept in mind in the post-conviction
context as well. Counsel pursuing post-conviction relief may find it easier to persuade authorities to vacate or reduce a sentence than to vacate
the entire conviction. After that, the judge can impose a new sentence
that can avert the immigration consequence. Implicit in this and other
situations discussed in this section is the requirement that defense coun-

131.

E-mail from Katherine Brady, Senior Staff Attorney, Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., to author

(Feb. 8, 2015) (on file with author).
8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(48)(B).
132.
133. E.g. id. § I 101(a)(43)(G) (defining theft and burglary as an aggravated felony only if "the
term of imprisonment (is] at least one year").
NORTON
OF
OFFICES
LAW
Exception,
Offense
Petty
134.
http://nortontooby.com/topics/petty offense exception (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).

TOOBY,

135.
8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(48)(B).
United States v. Alvarez-Hemandez, 478 F.3d 1060, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2007).
136.
137. See Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
138. See, e.g., De La Cruz, 15 I. & N. Dec. 616 (B.I.A. 1976); Matter of F, I I. & N. Dec. 343
(B.I.A. 1942).
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sel becomes very familiar with the range of related criminal charges and
associated sentencing possibilities.
A sentencing deal can make a difference in a misdemeanor situation
as well. Noncitizens are deportable for one conviction of a moral turpitude offense committed within five years of admission if the offense has
a maximum possible sentence of one year or more.' 39 So a conviction of
a misdemeanor with a potential sentence of a year can cause deportability under this ground because the offense carries a maximum possible
sentence of a year.140 Defense counsel should attempt to plead to a nonturpitudinous offense in any situation, for example, by taking an increased time in jail, waiving credit for time served, or waiving good-time
credits. However, if the client is facing the first possible conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude, then counsel should try to plea to a
crime where the maximum possible sentence is less than one year.
Several offenses are regarded as aggravated felonies only if a sentence of a year or more was imposed for the conviction. 14 1 These include
convictions for such things as crimes of violence, theft, burglary, bribery,
document fraud, counterfeiting, forgery, obstruction of justice, and perjury.142 Avoiding the aggravated felony bar to potential discretionary
relief is important for lawful permanent residents, even if the conviction
is regarded as a moral turpitude crime.143
When a criminal court judge modifies a sentence, the modification
can avert immigration consequences.144 This is true even if the basis for
the sentence motion is not legal error but merely a need to avoid immigration consequences.145 This contrasts with the vacation of judgment
situation.146 Similarly, during probation a court can modify the terms of
probation for any reason, including reducing custody imposed as a condition of probation to less than 365 days due to immigration concerns and
affect the immigration outcome. 147
139.

8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A).

140.
In California, for example, this could arise in a "wobbler" situation when an offense could
be treated as either a felony or misdemeanor and the prosecutor offers to reduce the crime to a misdemeanor. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West 2011) (stating that the same type of offense may be

prosecuted as a felony or a misdemeanor); People v. Staturm, 50 P.3d 355, 356-57 (Cal. 2002) (describing an example of a "wobbler" crime).

141.
142.

See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43).
Id. § 101(a)(43)(F), (G), (P), (R), (S).

143.
A person who has been a lawful permanent resident for at least five years, has resided
continuously in the United States for seven years, and has not been convicted of an aggravated
felony can apply for discretionary cancellation of removal before an immigration judge.

Id.

§ 1229b(a).
144. See Cota-Vargas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 849, 852-53 (B.I.A. 2005).

145.
See id at 850. In this case, a judge granted a motion to reduce a sentence to 364 days in
response to counsel's argument that this would prevent the conviction from being an aggravated
felony, enabling the lawful permanent resident defendant to apply for cancellation of removal. Id
146.
See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.

147.

See Coto-Vargas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 850-51; see also People v. Segura, 188 P.3d 649

(Cal. 2008) (trial court's statutory authority to modify conditions of probation in the exercise of its
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B. FirearmsCases
The firearms offense ground of deportation provides a good example of the importance of considering potential alternate pleas to avoid
removal. The law provides a broad firearms ground of deportation. A
noncitizen is deportable "who at any time after admission is convicted
under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying . . . any . . . firearm or destructive
device . . . in violation of any law." 1 4 8 This removal ground includes
convictions of pure firearms offenses as well as firearms offenses committed in connection with other crimes. 149
Given the breadth of this ground of deportation, defense counsel
might be wise to consider these options on behalf of clients facing firearms charges.
Solicitation. A conviction for solicitation to commit a firearms
crime arguably is not a trigger to deportation under the firearms ground.
Since the deportation ground does not mention solicitation, which is a
distinct offense, solicitation to commit a firearms crime should be fine. 150
Accessory after the fact. An accessory after the fact is one who,
knowing that a felony has been committed, "harbors, conceals, or aids a
principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or
15
escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment."s
The offense can
be punished as a misdemeanor or felony, but the offense does not take on
the character of the principal offense. 152 The accessory after the fact to a
firearms offense will not be held to have committed a deportable firearms offense.1 53 The BIA, however, has found that accessory after the
fact is obstruction of justice and can be regarded as an aggravated felony
if a sentence of a year or more is imposed.1 54
Divisible statutes. If a statute is divisible containing firearms and
non-firearms offenses, then counsel should make every effort to keep the
record of conviction clear of information that a firearm was used. Some
statutes target possession of a weapon with subdivisions indicating
whether the weapon is a gun, knife, machete, or something else.' 5 ' Those
jurisdiction over a probationer did not, however, extend to modifying a material term of a plea
agreement that bestowed the privilege of probation subject to defendant's service of a specified jail
term).

148.
149.
150.

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
See, e.g., Valerio-Ochoa v. INS, 241 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2001).
Cf Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that solicita-

tion of a controlled substance is distinct and not on the list of deportable offenses).

151.
152.
153.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 32 (West 2015).
See People v. Mouton, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 429-431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
See Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), overruled

on other grounds by United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011).

154.
155.
1996).

Batista-Hemandez, 21 1. & N. Dec. 955, 961 (BIA. 1997).
See, e.g., Calif. P.C. §§ 245, 12020(a); Pichardo-Sufren, 21 1. & N. Dec. 330 (B.I.A.
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statutes would be regarded as divisible, and an immigration judge can
use a modified categorical analysis in order to determine whether the
specific offense involved firearms.'1 6 The judge can look beyond the
statute in that situation to certain documents in the record of conviction,
including the indictment, plea, judgment or verdict, sentence, and transcript from court proceedings. 57 However, the police report, pre-trial
reports, and the noncitizen's own statements outside of the criminal court
hearing cannot be reviewed.' 8
Sporting, recreational, or cultural purposes. The federal definition of
a destructive device that is used in the firearms deportation ground and
aggravated felony categories does not include "a rifle which the owner
intends to use solely for sporting, recreational or cultural purposes." 5 9
This definition invites defense counsel to push these limits. The outcome
of such efforts has been mixed. Counsel have not been successful in the
Eighth Circuit in arguing that the cultural exception should apply to general firearms charges, even if the exception precludes the weapon from
being classified as a destructive device.1 60 However, the Seventh Circuit
has held that the definition of destructive device includes firearms, and a
general cultural purpose exception for rifles exists.161
CLOSING

The Supreme Court's message to criminal defense attorneys in Padilla v. Kentucky was clear: When there is a risk of deportation, defense
counsel has a constitutional duty to inform an immigrant defendant of the
potential for deportation or adverse immigration consequences prior to
pleading guilty. In my view, this constitutional duty places tremendous
pressure on defense counsel to do more than advise, because once advised, the client very naturally may want to know what options are available other than going to trial. Rather than simply focusing on how to
minimize the time of incarceration for the client under a particular plea
agreement, counsel has to figure out how to minimize the immigration
ramifications. As I have outlined, the competent efforts range from determining whether the client might actually be a citizen, to seeking a
sentence that would fall outside the realm of an aggravated felony, to
seeking a plea to an alternative charge that does not involve moral turpitude, to making sure that the sentencing plea or colloquy is silent about
certain facts.

156.

157.
U.S. 575,
158.
159.
160.
1092 (9th
161.

See supranotes 95-99 and accompanying text.

Matter of Teixeira, 21 1. & N. Dec. 316 (B.I.A. 1996); see Taylor v. United States, 495
602 (1990).
See, e.g., Madrigal-Calvo, 21 1. & N. Dec. 323 (B.I.A. 1996).
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) (2015).
Awad v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 2007). Cf Valerio-Ochoa v. INS, 241 F.3d
Cir. 2001).
Lemus-Rodriguez v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
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These efforts discussed are demanding. They entail resourceful, intricate knowledge of the relevant criminal codes. They also require resourceful, intricate knowledge of the criminal grounds of removal and
up-to-date research on what classifications of convictions can or cannot
lead to removal. In short, this could very well mean that competent defense counsel needs to partner with a competent immigration specialist.
Since Padilla v. Kentucky was decided in 2010, some public defenders' offices across the country have responded with a clear understanding of the burden that criminal defense counsel now face. In the San
Francisco Bay Area, the public defender offices in San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa counties have brought on full-time immigration
specialists on their staff. Soon after Padilla, the Brooklyn, New York
public defender office did the same. Some public defender offices contract with immigration experts like the Immigrant Legal Resource Center
for consultations. 62 That all makes sense.
However, at the same time, after reading the Padilla case, one of
my students who interned at a different public defender office in California during the summer of 2014 sent me this troubling reflection:
While working in one of the poorest Public Defender's offices in the
state of California I realized how under-served the immigrant population was. The poor public defenders had a caseload of about 300 cases a day which they had to somehow get through. They often did not
have the time to further inquire about a person's immigration status
before pleading them into a deal that will later hurt their immigration
process. Only one attorney actually took his time to inquire about the
immigration status of some of his clients but he often got in trouble
for not finishing his caseload for that day. And when he asked for
better deals because of his clients' immigration status the D.A. would
often not be at all reluctant to give better deals.
But many public defenders pleaded their clients to deals that will later hurt their immigration process because they were crimes of moral
turpitude. The public defender did not know because he/she didn't
inquire about the client's immigration status and the client didn't
know because he/she didn't know the law. And admitting to a law
enforcement official, including a public defender, a person's immigration status is often not the easiest thing to do.
But aside from lowering the caseload in poor counties . .. I think that
it is imperative that the public defenders serving such a big immigrant population be trained in spotting possible immigration issues.
The public defenders in [this county] currently get paid about
For example, Vic Eriksen, Felony Team Supervising Attorney in San Diego, said, "I
162.
consider the consulting agreement with the ILRC as one of the best resources available for attorneys
and their clients. I have no idea how we managed without it! Thanks so much." What Our Clients
Say, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., http://www.ilrc.org/legal-assistance/satisfied-clients (last visited
Apr. 5, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[$]40,000 a year and are worked to the ground. I don't really know
what will be better to hire an immigration attorney or just give all of
them training on immigration issues especially on crimes involving
moral turpitude but something should be done.' 63
Something should be done indeed. Because the Constitution requires it. Because deportation "may result . . . in [the] loss of . .. all that
makes life worth living."164 And thus the fate of countless immigrants
facing criminal charges is at stake.

163.
164.

E-mail from [2L law student], to author (Feb. 5, 2015) (on file with author).
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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INTRODUCTION

Immigration crimes are the most prosecuted federal crimes in
America. In 2014, they accounted for 56.5% of all federal prosecutions.'
t Associate Professor at the University of Oklahoma College of Law; J.D., University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law. © 2015 Kit Johnson. Konomark-Most rights sharable. See
konomark.org.
2015),
REPORTS,
INC.,
(Jan.
23,
2014,
TRAC
I. Prosecutions for
http://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x2054c27815cd.html. For ease of readability, I will refer to all statis-
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Defendants in such cases are nearly always convicted and go on to serve
sentences in federal prisons. This Article asks a simple question: Is it
worth it? 2

Criminal law enforcement is routinely justified in explicitly economic terms. Prosecution and punishment are, according to the prevailing argument, the least costly means of deterring and incapacitating socially undesirable behavior.3 But for this to be true, there must be no other less costly alternative. And immigration crimes have a preexisting,
low-cost alternative: the civil deportation scheme. Therefore, to determine whether the prosecution of immigration crimes is worthwhile, despite the existence of a civil deportation process, we must weigh the system's principal benefits and costs.
This Article is not the first scholarly work to question the economic
sensibility of immigration prosecution.4 My analysis is different, however, in that it gives far more credence to claims that prosecution pays large
dividends in terms of training prosecutors, deterrence, and signaling/expression. Other writers have downplayed these claimed advantages
or dismissed them altogether. I find, by contrast, that the proffered benefits-particularly the signaling/expression benefits-are not so easily
dismissed.
Giving pro-prosecution economic arguments the full benefit of the
doubt leads to what may be a surprising conclusion: Even then, the benefits do not outweigh the costs. Yet the prescription is not necessarily to
abandon the prosecution of immigration crimes altogether. Another alternative is to prosecute these crimes but not to jail those convicted of
them. Deportation immediately following a conviction for an immigration crime appears to capture the key benefit of this system (signaling/expression) while alleviating its greatest expense (incarceration).
It goes without saying that the weighing of benefits and costs is not
the only way or even necessarily the best way to evaluate the desirability
tics in this Article as concerning 2014. In fact, these statistics concern fiscal year 2014, which runs

from October 1, 2013 through September 30, 2014.
2.
In asking this question, I implicitly accept the validity of immigration crimes. Other
scholars do not. See, e.g., Daniel 1. Morales, Crimes of Migration, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1257,
1323 (2014) ("Crimes of migration are an illegitimate use of the criminal power. They fail for not
being consented to, for violating thoughtful theories of the criminal law, and for being imposed on
top of deportation.").
3.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 267 (9th ed. 2014); Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic Analysis of

Criminal Intellectual PropertyLaw, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 284-85 (2014).
4.
See, e.g., Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 481, 487 (2010) (noting the "substantial cost" of prosecuting immigration
crimes); see generally Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gomez-Pomar, Punish Once or Punish Twice: A
Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties, 6 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 410, 410 (2004) (offering an economic theory in support of the combined use of criminal
sanctions and regulatory penalties to deter the same underlying illegal behavior).
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of criminal enforcement. There are purely moral questions to ask ourselves: Is prosecuting unauthorized entry ethical? What kind of society
do we want to live in? And what do we say about our American character
by prioritizing the prosecution of people whose essential crime is trying,
in some sense, to join us? I do not intend to disparage such questions.
But in this Article, I do mean to set them to one side. Given that economic arguments hold so much sway in policymaking arenas, it seems helpful to focus on them and to engage with them on their own terms. That is
what this Article attempts to do.
Here is a preview of what follows: In Part I, I provide some background on federal immigration crimes, looking at the charges, evidentiary requirements, and sentencing guidelines. In Part II, I examine the
benefits of prosecuting federal immigration crimes: training, deterrence,
and signaling/expression. In Part III, I look at the costs of prosecution,
including courthouse time, alternative prosecution, and incarceration,
with incarceration being the single most important cost. Finally, in Part
IV, I weigh the benefits and costs, which leads me to observe, in Part V,
that deportation following conviction obtains all the claimed benefits of
prioritized prosecution while accumulating very large fiscal savings.
. IMMIGRATION CRIMES

At the outset, it's important to understand the nature of the crimes
we are discussing. Immigration crimes include a wide range of conduct,
from misuse of a U.S. passport' to falsely claiming U.S. citizenship. 6 The
two most prosecuted federal crimes, however, are unauthorized entry of
an alien7 and reentry of a deported alien.8 In 2014, 43,652 migrants were
prosecuted for unauthorized entry (a misdemeanor) and 37,929 were
prosecuted for reentry after deportation (a felony).9 The yield on these
prosecutions is tremendous. Prosecutors obtained 43,079 convictions for
unauthorized entry and 36,507 convictions for reentry.' 0
Unauthorized entry and post-deportation reentry have been called
the "low-hanging fruit of the federal legal system."" The description is
apt. Both are crimes with few elements and minimal evidentiary burdens.
Take unauthorized entry, also known as "a 1325" in reference to its
statutory basis in 8 U.S.C. § 1325. Conviction requires proof that the

18 U.S.C. § 1544 (2015).
5.
Id. § 911; see also id. § 1546(a) (counterfeiting visas); id. § 1428 (failing to surrender a
6.
canceled naturalization certificate); 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2015) (harboring aliens).
7.
8 U.S.C. § 1325.
8. Id. § 1326.
9.
Prosecutionsfor 2014, supra note 1.
2015),
(Jan.
24,
REPORTS,
INC.,
2014,
TRAC
Convictions for
10.
http://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x2054c3f5284f.html.
John Schwartz, Immigration Enforcement Fuels Rise in U.S. Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21,
I1.
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/22/us/22crime.html?_r-0.

866

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 92:4

defendant (1) is not a U.S. citizen, (2) was found in or trying to enter the
United States, and (3) did not have permission to be in the country.1 2
Reentry, correspondingly called "a 1326" because of its basis in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326, does not require much more. In addition to the elements above, §
1326 cases require proof that the defendant (4) had previously been removed or deported from the United States.' 3
The evidence required to prove these elements is not hard to come
by.14 To prove citizenship, a prosecutor might have the defendant's own
admission, a birth certificate, or fingerprint data.'s To prove presence, a
prosecutor can simply point to the defendant in the courtroom-though,
16
in practice, prosecutors generally use the arresting officer's testimony.
For lack of permission, the prosecutor might present a Certificate of
Non-Existence from the USCIS indicating a lack of any paperwork regarding formal admission. 17 As for prior removal, the prosecutor need
only introduce certified copies of the prior order of removal and warrant
of removal.' 8 To do all this, a prosecutor would need, at most, two witnesses-a records custodian and the arresting officer.19
It should come as no surprise that prosecution of § 1325 and § 1326
cases are "lightning quick." 2 0 And the process moves even faster with
routine plea agreements.21 Many defendants who might be tried for felony reentry are offered the following deal: Don't fight prosecution, and
receive instead a misdemeanor conviction for unauthorized entry. 22 Such
pleas can take prosecutions from a two-day endeavor 23 to a process last-

12.
8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2015) ("Any alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United
States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers .... ). Alternatively
stated, § 1325 requires that: "I. [t]he defendant was an alien; and 2. [t]he defendant knowingly
[entered][attempted to enter] the United States; and 3. [t]he defendant [entered][attempted to enter]
at a place other than a designated port of entry." THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 123 (2012) [hereinafter PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS], available at
https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/PattemJurylnstr/7thcriminaljuryinstr.pdf.
13.
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a); see also PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12, at

130.
14.
See DENNIS CANDELARIA, IMMIGRATION: DEFENDING AGAINST THE ILLEGAL ENTRY AND
ILLEGAL
REENTRY
CHARGES,
2-3
(2008),
available
at

http://www.fd.org/pdf _ib/MT08/MTO8_DefendlllegalEntryReenty.pdf.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id at 2, 5.
18. See id at 2.
19. See id.
20.
21.

Schwartz, supra note I1.
Lydgate, supra note 4, at 484 ("Defense attorneys estimate that 99 percent of Streamline

defendants plead guilty.").
22.
See, e.g., Joshua Partlow, Under Operation Streamline, Fast-Track Proceedings for
Illegal
Immigrants,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
10,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-americas/under-operation-streamline-fast-track-

proceedings-for-illegal-immigrants/2014/02/10/87529d24-919d- I e3-97d3f7da32 I f6f33_story.html.
23.

Schwartz, supra note I1.
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24
ing just seconds. That's not hyperbole. Section 1325 pleas are handled
en masse in many courts along the southern border 25 where the initial
appearance, arraignment, plea and sentencing all take place in one hearing.26 Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Arizona can routinely process seventy pleas to § 1325
charges in thirty minutes, averaging out to just under twenty-six seconds
27
per defendant.

The quickness of prosecution contrasts strongly with the length of
incarceration. The maximum sentence for a § 1325 conviction is six
months for a first offense, 28 and a second unauthorized entry conviction
can result in a two-year prison term.29 The maximum sentence for a
§ 1326 conviction is two years. 3 0 But there's a hitch: If the defendant was
removed on the basis of a conviction for three or more misdemeanors
involving drugs, crimes against the person, or certain felonies, the maximum sentence jumps to ten years. 3 ' And if the defendant was removed
32
on the basis of a conviction for an aggravated felony, the maximum
sentence is twenty years.
II. THE BENEFITS OF PROSECUTING IMMIGRATION CRIMES

§

The potential benefits of the federal prosecution of § 1325 and
1326 crimes include training, deterrence, and signaling/expression.

A. TrainingBenefits
A seasoned federal prosecutor does not fall from the sky. She is
grown within the ranks. And immigration crimes provide a training
ground for junior U.S. Attorneys to gain the skills and confidence needed
to tackle more complex federal cases. 34 After all, immigration crimes are
numerous, but there's not much to them. They offer a means for untested
U.S. Attorneys to get comfortable in the courtroom in a not-toochallenging context.

24.
Fernanda Santos, Detainees Sentenced in Seconds in 'Streamline'Justiceon Border, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/us/split-second-justice-as-us-cracksdown-on-border-crossers.html?r-0.

25.

See id.

26.
27.

Lydgate, supra note 4, at 486.
See Santos, supranote 24.

28.
29.
30.
31.

8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2015).
Id.
Id. § 1326(a).
Id § 1326(b)(1).

See id. § I 101(a)(43). For a nice summary of the scope of aggravated felonies, see Shoba
32.
Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics ofImmigrant Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS L. REV.

387, 393-98 (2007).
8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).
33.
Cf Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 596 (2013)
34.
(noting misdemeanor cases have been the traditional training ground for inexperienced prosecutors
and defenders).
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One reason to doubt that training is a significant benefit in these
contexts is that there is a limit to the training U.S. Attorneys can gain
from § 1325 and § 1326 prosecutions. Former U.S. Attorney Carol Lam
has explained that young prosecutors in immigration cases "may not
have the opportunity to learn how to do a wiretap case, or learn how to
deal with the grand jury, or how to use money laundering statutes or flip
witnesses or deal with informants and undercover investigations." Yet
these skills are necessary for more complex prosecutions.
Another reason to question the significance of the training benefit is
that many U.S. Attorneys are hired not straight out of law school, as a
state prosecutor might be, but from the ranks of seasoned state prosecutors.36 Experienced attorneys require less training, which tends to diminish the marginal benefit of using immigration crimes for training. Even
so, immigration crimes would continue to function as a training ground
for those with less overall experience.
B. DeterrenceBenefits
Officially, the primary goal of prosecuting § 1325 and § 1326
crimes is to "increase the consequences for illegally crossing the border.""37 In other words, it aims to deter. 3 If individuals know that unauthorized migration is subject to criminal prosecution-the argument
goes-they will be deterred from attempting it.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) believes so strongly
in the deterrence value of prosecution that, since 2005, it has made prosecution of § 1325 and § 1326 cases mandatory under its Operation
Streamline. 39 And DHS has cited mandatory prosecution as one factor
explaining decreased border apprehensions.40
35.
Solomon Moore, Push on Immigration Crimes Is Said to Shif Focus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/us/12prosecute.html?pagewanted=all
(quoting Carol
Lam) (internal quotation mark omitted).
36.
For example, see the recent hiring announcement for an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the
Northern District of California. Assistant United States Attorney Job Announcement,

USAJOBS.GOv, https://usao.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/392037300 (last visited Mar. 19,
2015)._One required qualification is "3 years post-J.D. legal or other relevant experience." Id And
among the preferred qualifications is "good judgment and courtroom skills." Id.
37.
Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Remarks before the Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Securing the Border: Progress at the Federal Level
(May 3, 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/05/03/secretary-janet-napolitano-senatecommittee-homeland-security-and-govemmental ("Operation Streamline ... aims to increase the
consequences for illegally crossing the border by criminally prosecuting illegal border-crossers.").
38.
Lydgate, supra note 4, at 496; see also Doug Keller, Re-Thinking Illegal Entry and Re-

Entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65, 126-27 (2012).
39.
See Lydgate, supra note 4, at 493.
40.
Napolitano, supra note 37 ("[A]pprehensions have decreased 36 percent in the past two
years, and are less than one third of what they were at their peak."); see also Memorandum from Jeh
Charles Johnson, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., on Southern Border and Approaches Campaign to
R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Admiral Paul F. Zukunfit, Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard, Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., W. Craig Fugate, Adm'r, Fed. Emer-
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Critics dispute the deterrence value of immigration prosecutions. 41
One argument is that for deterrence to work, would-be offenders must
have knowledge of the possible criminal consequences of their actions.42
Yet this claim rests on an untested assumption that those outside the
United States have good information about potential criminal consequences inside the United States.43 Evidence indicates they may not.4
Of course, this line of argumentation only goes so far. First-time
participants in the criminal justice process may not be aware of the criminality of their conduct. Repeat offenders, however, certainly are. As
noted earlier, unauthorized reentry is the second most prosecuted federal
crime in America.45 Data shows that the recidivism rate for migrants
convicted of immigration crimes is just over 10%-in contrast to 27%
for migrants who are not prosecuted criminally. 46 Such statistics provide
a strong inference that prosecution deters repeated attempts at crossing
the border without authorization.
Another criticism rests on the claim that immigration crimes are not
capable of being deterred because of their social context. The argument
is this: Family members separated by borders will not be deterred from
undertaking unauthorized migration even when fully informed of the
possibility of lengthy prison sentences.47 This reasoning is plausible, and
it is indirectly supported by some empirical evidence. 4 8 But it seems
equally plausible that many migrants motivated by family ties might
nonetheless be deterred if they figure that a lifetime of Skype messaging
beats decades of once-a-month prison visits. And even taken on its own

gency Mgmt. Agency, Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Sec'y for Policy 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_southernborder

campaignpla

n.pdf ("This Nation's long term investment in border security has produced significant, positive
results over the years . . . . Illegal migration into this country has dropped considerably .... ").
41. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 147 n.70 (2009); Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions,
Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1888-89 (2007).
42.
Lydgate, supra note 4, at 519.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See supra Part I.
46.
LISA
ENFORCEMENT

SEGHETTI,
BETWEEN

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BORDER
PORTS
OF
ENTRY
II
tbl.1

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf.

SECURITY:
(2014),

IMMIGRATION
available
at

Others challenge this statistic. See ALISTAIR

GRAHAM ROBERTSON ET AL., GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, OPERATION STREAMLINE: COSTS AND

CONSEQUENCES
16
(2012),
available
at
http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/GRLSept2012_Report-final.pdf. But note
that the 85% recidivism rate for criminal defendants highlighted in the Grassroots report rests on an
NPR interview of just 35 individuals. See Ted Robbins, Claims of Border Program Success Are
Unproven,
NPR
(Sept.
13,
2010,
3:35
PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld= 129827870.
47.
Lydgate, supra note 4, at 519; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURNING MIGRANTS
INTO CRIMINALS: THE HARMFUL IMPACT OF US BORDER PROSECUTIONS 4, 47, 72 (2013), available

at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us05I3_ForUpload_2.pdf.
48.
Robbins, supra note 46.
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terms, this argument of critics does not refute the claim that deterrence
works for migrants without such family ties.
Perhaps the most effective argument questioning the deterrence
benefit centers on cause and effect. Critics argue that lower apprehensions at the border are unrelated to prosecutions. Rather, they say border
entries fluctuate in response to wholly different factors, such as the U.S.
economy49 and conditions in the migrants' home countries.5o It is undoubtedly true that cause and effect relationships are complex, and a hard
conclusion about deterrence is precarious given great and shifting forces
of economics, politics, and social order. But that fact cuts both ways.
Observing that other driving forces in migration flows are larger does not
indicate that criminal prosecution has no deterrent effect.
C. Signaling/ExpressionBenefits
Perhaps the most significant claimed benefit to the federal prosecution of immigration crimes is signaling or expression. That is to say,
stepped-up prosecution is a way for the federal government to send a
message about how it perceives the seriousness of unauthorized migration. This message is directed both to migrants (which I'll call "signaling" since it sends a signal to potential migrants about the likelihood and
severity of criminal consequences) and voters (which I'll call "expression" since it is an expression of the federal government to the body politic about its mission and priorities).
Consider the language used by President Barack Obama. He routinely talks about the need for "secure borders." 52 He emphasizes the role
law enforcement has played to "stem the flow of illegal crossings,"s3
which he touts have been "cut by more than half' over the past six
years. 54 Congressional debate similarly focuses on "[b]order security."55

49.
Lydgate, supranote 4, at 515-16.
50.
See Johnson, supra note 40, at 2 ("Much of illegal migration is seasonal .... The poverty
and violence that are the 'push factors' in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador still exist. The
economy in this country-a 'pull factor'-is getting better.").
51.
See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 46 (noting one out of 35 interviewees convicted of immigration crimes would not return to the United States out of fears regarding future jail time).
52.
See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration at Del Sol

High

School

(Nov.

21,

2014),

available

at

http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-

office/2014/ll/21/remarks-president-immigration; President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Dinner (July 9, 2014), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/09/remarks-president-dccc-dinner.
53.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration -- Chicago, IL (Nov.
25, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/25/remarks-presidentimmigration-chicago-il; see also President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform (Jan. 29, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/01/29/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform
("[W]e
strengthened
security at the borders so that we could finally stem the tide of illegal immigrants.").
54.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration at Del Sol High
School, supra note 52; see also President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, supra note 53 ("We put more boots on the ground on the southern border
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And prosecution of immigration crimes plays a key role in that narrative.5
In this way, signaling/expression is a different kind of benefit. It's
less tangible than training or deterrence. Taken in its most favorable
light, it's a collective benefit for voters-a way for the federal government to make a public statement on behalf of the polity about migration.5 Its value is in the statement itself.58 And this is a benefit that
scholars have ignored to date.59 Of course, quantifying this benefit for a
cost-benefit analysis is difficult. But for the moment, we can assume that
these signaling/expression benefits have some significance. Even if thin,
such a benefit might affect a conclusion about whether prosecutions are
economically worthwhile.
D. Beyond the Benefits
It is worth taking just a moment to step back and provide some
skeptical context. A good question to ask is: Why does the U.S. government invest so heavily in federal prosecution of immigration crimes if
the benefits are somewhat flimsy? After all, the training benefit seems
minimal and the deterrence value, while not nonexistent, also appears to
be slight. There is the signaling/expression benefit, but its value is hazy.
So, putting aside for a moment the question of "Is it worth it?," let's ask
this question: Why is it worth it from the government's perspective?
One happy side effect of prosecuting immigration crimes (from the
government's perspective) is fabulous criminal justice statistics. Immigration prosecutions bloat the total number of prosecutions undertaken
and convictions obtained. This enables U.S. Attorneys to project a message of not only being tough on crime, but also wildly successful.
The story of Carol Lam, former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California, is illustrative. Appointed in 2002, Lam resigned in
than at any time in our history. And today, illegal crossings are down nearly 80 percent from their

peak in 2000.").
55.
See, e.g., SEGHETTI, supra note 46, at 1-2.
56.
See Napolitano, supra note 37; see also ROBERTSON supra note 46, at 6, 8; cf Edwin
Mora, Eight Out of Ten Illegal Aliens Apprehended in 2010 Never Prosecuted, Says Border Congressman, CNSNEWS.COM (Mar. 17, 2011, 3:26 AM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eight-outten-illegal-aliens-apprehended-2010-never-prosecuted-says-border-congressman
(reporting
on
Congressman Culberson's assertions that unauthorized border crossings were under prosecuted
despite the fact that such prosecutions were "'the key' to securing the nation's border with Mexico").
57.
Cf Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaborationas the Basisfor

Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 435 (2000) (discussing expressive benefits in the

&

context of interest groups).
58.
It is, of course, important to acknowledge that statements made on behalf of voters are not
intrinsically good. As I've discussed in prior work, immigration law itself has often derived from
racist motives. See Kit Johnson, Theories of Immigration Law, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.1 1211, 1217

nn. 16-17 (2014).
59.

But cf Margaret H. Taylor, Symbolic Detention, in 20 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIENS 153,

153-159 (Lydio F. Tomasi ed., 1998) (discussing and rejecting the symbolic component of immigration detention).
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2007 after significant political pressure. 6 0 She directed a "shift in the
nature of border crimes" prosecuted, pursuing "[m]ore serious, more
sophisticated and larger organizational rings" instead of low-level offenders.61 As a result, overall prosecutions fell during her tenure.62 Even
though the number of immigration defendants receiving longer sentences
actually rose while Lam was U.S. Attorney, 6 3 many speculated that the
overall decline in prosecutions played a role in her departure.64
The message is that numbers matter. They help to shape the image
of the efficacy of the federal prosecutorial system-both its image to
others and its self-image.
III. THE COSTS OF PROSECUTING IMMIGRATION CRIMES
Having looked at the benefits, we need now to look at the costs. If
teaching, deterrence, and signaling/expression are key benefits to the
federal prosecution of immigration crimes, the key factors on the cost
side are courthouse costs, alternative prosecution costs, and, most significantly, incarceration costs.
A. Courthouse Costs
Every prosecution takes time. Prosecution of immigration crimes,
like all crimes, requires a prosecutor, a defense attorney (provided at
government expense), 65 a judge, a U.S. Marshall (to transport the defendant), a courtroom deputy, a court reporter, and an interpreter.66 Increasing the prosecution of these crimes necessarily incurs these associated costs.
Yet immigration crimes are different than other crimes, and these
differences in substance entail differences in cost. Courts have responded
to immigration crimes with unique procedural mechanisms, such as the
en masse hearings discussed earlier.6 7 This sort of structural change may
ameliorate at least some of the courthouse costs. At the same time, these

60.

See Greg Moran & Onell R. Soto, Lam's Legacy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Jan. 21,

2007), http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/politics/20070121-9999-In211am.html.
61.

Id. (quoting Carol Lam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

62.

Id.

Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
63.
at
available
Representatives,
of
House
Issa,
U.S.
Darrell
Congressman
http://www.epluribusmedia.org/documents/DOJDocsPtl -2070319_epm.pdf.
Moran & Soto, supra note 60.
64.
Several studies have noted that the defense of immigration crimes has largely fallen on
65.
private Criminal Justice Act panel attorneys due to insufficient resources within the Federal Public
Defender offices impacted by zero-tolerance prosecutions. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 46, at

8.
66.
67.

SEGHETTI, supra note 46, at 14 n.68; see also Lydgate, supra note 4, at 522-24.
See supra Part 1.
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new mechanisms may lead to different costs in the form of reduced constitutional protections for criminal defendants.6 8
It must be pointed out that arguments about courthouse costs are, in
some ways, circular. Federal courts haven't moved to the big-city courthouse system of night court. They are only open so many hours a day
and so many days a week. And a large portion of the time and money
spent on prosecution is going to be spent in any event. The main difference, therefore, is yield and focus. Any given twelve months of courthouse time might yield thousands of immigration convictions or a handful of some other type of criminal conviction.69
B. Alternative ProsecutionCosts
One of the strongest criticisms leveled at the prosecution of immigration crimes is that such prosecutions divert resources from more serious crimes.70 Under Operation Streamline, all immigration crimes are to
be prosecuted." Yet not all districts participate in the program, leaving
overall prosecution rates at around 97%.72 That contrasts with, for example, white collar crimes, where only about half of the cases referred to
federal prosecutors are pursued.
Critics of low-level immigration prosecution, such as Carol Lam,
argue that with "more difficult investigations, the number of prosecutions
might not be as high, but you have a larger impact on crime in the community." 74 This criticism is well-placed. But it does not take account of

the signaling/expression benefits of prosecuting immigration crimes discussed earlier. The federal government, standing in as it does for the voting public, is prioritizing a particular category of crime; it is saying that
immigration crimes deserve more attention than other crimes. Viewed
through this lens, the "impact" mentioned by Lam, is irrelevant.
C. IncarcerationCosts
Incarceration is the single greatest cost to federal prosecution of
immigration crimes, and it is growing. Immigration-related incarceration
is changing the shape of the federal prison population. For instance, the
number of federal prisoners increased 77% from 1998 to 2010,7' and
68.
See generally Lydgate, supra note 4, at 530-39 (discussing problems of due process,
effective assistance of counsel, separation of powers, prosecutorial independence, and delayed initial
appearances).
Schwartz, supra note II (contrasting white collar prosecutions, which might take 460
69.
days, and narcotics cases, which take on average 333 days, with immigration cases that can be dis-

posed of in 2 days).
70.

See Lydgate, supra note 4, at 519-22.

71.

See id. at 483-84.

72.

See Schwartz, supra note 11.

73.

Id.

74.
Moran & Soto, supranote 60 (quoting Carol Lam) (internal quotation mark omitted).
KAMALA MALLIK-KANE, BARBARA PARTHASARATHY & WILLIAM ADAMS, URBAN INST.
75.
JUSTICE POLICY CTR., EXAMINING GROWTH IN THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION, 1998 T0 2010, at
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17% of that increase is due entirely to immigration crimes. 76 Currently,
nearly 25% of current federal inmates are noncitizens.7 And around 10%
78
of federal inmates are incarcerated for immigration crimes.

'

The average time served for these crimes varies. Unfortunately,
good statistics for § 1325 crimes are hard to come by. One study indicates that first-time offenders typically receive a sentence of time served,
having spent between two and fifteen days in detention prior to sentencing. 79 Individuals who plea to a § 1325 in lieu of a § 1326 prosecution,
on the other hand, might serve the full six months allowed under the statute. 80 The study concludes that the average sentence for a § 1325 conviction is thirty days. 8
In contrast to the paucity of § 1325 data, there are solid government
statistics regarding § 1326 convictions. The average sentence for § 1326
offenders in 2013 was 18 months. 82 In 2009, that figure was 21 months.83
The Federal Bureau of Prisons estimates that each inmate costs
$30,619.85 per year. 84 We can, therefore, estimate that the annual cost of
§ 1326 inmates alone is $1,274,597,186. We can also estimate that the
annual cost of § 1325 convicts is $54,208,460. In total, incarceration
for these immigration crimes may cost $1,328,805,646 per year.
Not only is incarceration expensive in dollars and cents, but as Professor Peter Schuck recently argued, incarcerating individuals convicted
of immigration crimes contributes to a nationwide problem of prison

1 (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412720-examining-growth-in-the-federalprison-population.pdf.

76.

Id. at 4.

77.
See
BOP Statistics: Inmate
Citizenship, FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statisticsinmatecitizenship.jsp (last updated May 30, 2015).
78.
BOP
Statistics:
Inmate
Offenses,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics-inmateoffenses.jsp (last updated May 30, 2015).
Lydgate, supranote 4, at 508.
79.

ble

80.
81.

Id. at 509.
Id. at 528.

82.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, QUICK FACTS: ILLEGAL REENTRY OFFENSES (2014), availahttp://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quickat

facts/Quick FactsIllegalReentryFY I 3.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
Id.
83.
84.
Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 80 Fed. Reg. 12,523, 12,523
(Mar. 9, 2015). Professor Shuck notes that this number may be "higher than the actual average cost"
given that the "BOP has a practice of housing non-U.S.-citizen inmates in private facilities, and
private facilities are generally operated at lower cost." Peter H. Schuck, Immigrant Criminals in
Overcrowded Prisons:Rethinking an Anachronistic Policy, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 597 app. 6 at 727

(2013) (footnote omitted).
85.
This $1.27 billion figure can be calculated in the following manner: Multiply the total
number of § 1326 convictions in 2014 (27,751) by 1.5 (to account for the total inmate population in
any given year as not only those convicted in that 12 months but those serving the final six months
of their convictions in the prior year) by the cost of each inmate per year ($30,619.85).
86.
This $54 million figure can be calculated in the following manner: Multiply the total

number of

§

1325 convictions in 2014 (43,079) by 15/365 (representing the average of 15 days in

custody post-sentencing) by the cost of each inmate per year ($30,619.85).

2015] IS IT WORTH PROSECUTING IMMIGRATION CRIMES?

875

overcrowding. 87 Such overcrowding can result in "human rights threats;
violence against prisoners and guards; breakdown of order and discipline; obstacles to prisoner rehabilitation and good health; . . . and violation of constitutional or statutory rights."8 8 While hard to quantify, these
are additional and significant costs of incarceration.
IV. WEIGHING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS

Having set out the benefits and costs of prosecuting federal immigration crimes, we can now weigh them.
On the benefits side, we have two items that appear to be of minimal value: training and deterrence. It's not to say that they have no value,
but their value appears to be small given that U.S. Attorneys do not typically need nor receive training through immigration prosecutions and
that such prosecutions do not appear significantly to deter immigration
crimes.
Then there is the signaling/expression benefit to prosecution. This is
harder to weigh. Perhaps signaling/expression is of great value. After all,
Professor H.L.A. Hart has described criminal punishment as expressing
the "formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of
the community.,,89 And prosecution is the mode by which the federal
government expresses "moral condemnation" for immigration crimes.
But even if we value the signaling/expression benefit highly, does it outweigh the costs of prosecution?
As there are two items on the benefits side that appear minimal,
there are two costs to immigration prosecution that appear to be minimal:
courthouse costs and alternative prosecution costs. Note that, to some
extent, immigration prosecutions are a zero-sum game. They may take
more courthouse resources and divert attention from other crimesalthough that reflects policy choice and budgeting practice and is not a
cost per se.
On the other hand, incarceration costs are concrete and very substantial. Thus, we can focus our question. "Is it worth it?" can be reduced
and simplified to this: Does the signaling/expression benefit outweigh
the $1.3 billion tab for annual incarceration of those convicted of immigration crimes? Once the question is phrased that way, it becomes clear
that the answer is the benefits do not outweigh the costs.

87.
88.
89.
(1958).

See Schuck, supra note 84, at 599.
Id. at 660.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405
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This conclusion, however, does not mandate either reducing the
prosecution of immigration crimes 9 0 or eliminating such crimes altogether.9 1There is an alternative: Deportation after conviction.
V. DEPORTATION AFTER CONVICTION
Deporting defendants immediately after their conviction for immigration crimes is one way the United States could capture whatever signaling/expression benefits there are to prosecuting immigration crimes
while ameliorating the lion's share of the costs. After all, once convicted
of a federal crime, few noncitizens will have a defense to their inevitable
deportation.92 Deportation removes an individual from society as incarceration does, but it's cheaper for the government. So why isn't this
standard practice?
Under current law, "the Attorney General may not remove an alien
who is sentenced to imprisonment until the alien is released from imprisonment." 93 This is known as the imprisonment-before-deportation rule.94
The most straightforward way this hurdle could be addressed would be to
repeal the imprisonment-before-deportation rule-something that has
been unsuccessfully tried before.9 5 Another option would be to take advantage of the rule's exception for "nonviolent offenders," who, upon the
determination of the Attorney General, can be removed prior to serving
their sentence if it is determined that the removal is "in the best interest
of the United States."96 This would be a particularly attractive method for
handling § 1325 convictions, and it could be extended to all § 1326 convictions that are based wholly on prior § 1325 convictions. Imprisonment-before-deportation could also be relaxed by changing the sentencing guidelines for § 1325 and § 1326 cases to make it easier for federal
judges to sentence those convicted to time served. If this change were
made, deportations after convictions could be achieved while maintaining adherence to the imprisonment-before-deportation rule.
Opponents of such a plan might argue that deportation following
conviction would offer insufficient punishment for the underlying
crimes. 97 Or they might argue that it would hinder the deterrence benefit

90.
See, e.g., Lydgate, supra note 4, at 540-42; Schuck, supranote 84, at 605-06 & nn. 3233 (noting the range of scholars opposed to increased criminalization of immigration as well as
efforts to make the enforcement system more effective).
See Morales, supra note 2, at 1323.
91.

92.
93.

Schuck, supra note 84, at 612.
8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(4)(A) (2015).

94.

Schuck, supra note 84, at 631.

95.
96.

Id. at 638-41.
8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(4)(B)(i) (2015).

97.
See, e.g., Schuck, supranote 84, at 638-39 (discussing opposition to a 1993 plan by thenRepresentative Schumer to eliminate the imprisonment-before-deportation rule). This is a distinctly
retributivist view resting, as it does, on the idea that the conduct underlying the immigration crime
both justifies and compels punishment. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth ofRetribu-
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of prosecuting immigration crimes and thereby promote additional unauthorized reentries. 98 My response to these potential challenges is this:
Yes, deportation following conviction may insufficiently punish and
deter, but it does capture the strongest benefit to prosecuting immigration
crimes (signaling/expression) while addressing its largest cost (incarceration). As such, it seems worthy of significant consideration.
CONCLUSION

The United States prosecutes immigration crimes at a rate that far
outstrips other federal crimes, even drug crimes and firearms offenses.
The approach of this Article has been to evaluate the sensibility of this
trend by weighing the benefits and costs of prosecuting immigration
crimes, accepting as valid, for purposes of the analysis, the claims of
proponents of strong criminal enforcement of immigration crimes. I conclude that even stipulating to the benefits of prosecution, those benefits
do not outweigh the associated $1.3 billion of incarceration costs. Thus, I
suggest that the strongest arguments of those in favor of prioritized prosecution of immigration crimes point to deportation of those convicted of
immigration crimes immediately following their conviction and before
they are put in prison. This approach would capture the claimed benefits
of prosecuting immigration crime while alleviating its greatest cost.

lion, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
179, 181-82 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 84, at 639 (discussing opposition to a 1993 plan by then98.
Representative Schumer to eliminate the imprisonment-before-deportation rule). This is a distinctly
consequentialist view resting, as it does, on the idea that punishment ought to have deterrent value.
See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 351-52 (1983) (discussing utilitarian goals of general deterrence and specific deterrence).

CONFRONTING PROXY CRIMINALIZATION
ANNIE LAIt

ABSTRACT

Though state laws that directly criminalize unlawful presence have
been struck down in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States, the criminalization of immigrants continues unabated. This Article examines one form of criminalization, criminalization by
"proxy," by which state and local governments are punishing conduct by
undocumented immigrants linked closely to their social and economic
survival. More ubiquitous than previously understood, such measures
have eluded constitutional scrutiny, confounding the legally constructed
line between "civil" and "criminal" and the legally constructed distinction between "immigration crimes" and "other crimes." But, as this Article observes, they are no less pernicious than direct criminalization as a
vessel for antipathy towards immigrants and their impact on communities no less profound.
Using state driver's license schemes as a paradigmatic example of
subfederal proxy criminalization of migration, the Article argues that
states should not be permitted to use their police powers to punish undocumented status simply because the laws they use are focused as a
formal matter on conduct rather than status and tend to be rules of general applicability. The Article looks to the experience of another group
that has long been subject to proxy criminalization at the local levelpoor people who fall into homelessness-and courts' analysis of local
ordinances to limit their use of public space under the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, to reveal transsubstantive
lessons. It concludes by discussing the implications of a more nuanced
conception of states' role in the management of migration.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2010, undocumented college student Jessica Colotl was stopped
by campus police in Kennesaw, Georgia, and later taken to the Etowah
Detention Center in Alabama to await deportation.' A longtime resident
who had immigrated to the United States from Mexico with her family as
a child, Ms. Colotl did not fit many people's notions of the type of per2
son who should be banished from the country. Her arrest sparked a national discussion about the dangers of entrusting local police with immigration enforcement powers at a time when the nation was still grappling
with the implications of Arizona's then-new stringent immigration law,
S.B. 1070.' Fellow students, advocacy groups, and even her university
president lobbied on her behalf, and eventually U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) granted the young DREAMer one year of
"deferred action." 4
It has been five years since Ms. Colotl's arrest, and a great deal has
changed. Several key programs to deputize state and local law enforcement agents as immigration police have been partially dismantled as a

I.

Robbie Brown, Student's Arrest Tests Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2010, at

A14.
2.
Id.
3. The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act of 2010, S. 1070, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), amended by H.R. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010)
(Among other things, the omnibus measure imposed obligations on local law enforcement to enforce
federal immigration law and attempted to create new immigration-based crimes and powers at the
local level.).
4.
Id. Deferred action is a discretionary, temporary deferral of deportation that authorizes an
individual to remain in the United States and apply for work authorization.
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result of public scrutiny.

The Supreme Court invalidated substantial
portions of S.B. 1070 in Arizona v. United States.6 And thanks to the

political activism of DREAMer and others, young people like Ms. Colotl
can now apply for deferred action prior to arrest through the Deferred
7
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. But in other ways,
things have remained the same. Ms. Colotl was initially taken into custody for driving without a license because her undocumented status pre-

cluded her from obtaining a driver's license under Georgia law.8 Like the
great majority of other states, Georgia treated operating a motor vehicle

without a license as a criminal misdemeanor offense.9 Even today, the
majority of states continue to effectively punish undocumented immigrants for driving.
A full-throated critique of the indirect criminalization of immigrants
through state laws such as Georgia's driver's license scheme is long
overdue. Attaching criminal sanctions to conduct that immigrants must
engage in as a result of their status is no less a perversion of state criminal justice systems than making their status itself a crime, and states

should not be permitted to do indirectly what courts have already said
they cannot do directly. Nevertheless, as Juliet Stumpf has noted, such
indirect schemes to punish immigrants present a "harder case[]" for doc-

trinal analysis because they tend to evoke generally applicable criminal
law.o Indeed, it is a well-established principle of preemption law that
state laws are not preempted merely because they may have an incidental

5.
See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY 2012: ICE
Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer Guidance to Further Focus Resources (Dec. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/fy-2012-ice-announces-year-end-removal-numbers-highlightsfocus-key-priorities-and (announcing that ICE would stop renewing 287(g) task force agreements

with state and local agencies); Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
Megan Mack, Officer, Office of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Philip A. McNamara, Assistant
Sec'y for Intergovernmental Affairs, on Secure Cmtys. (Nov. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_ 1120_memosecure communities.pdf [hereinafter Johnson Memorandum] (announcing certain changes to immigration detainers in response to
widespread resistance to the Secure Communities program).
6.
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501-05 (2012) (upholding injunction of Sections 3 and 5(C) of S.B.
1070, which created a new state misdemeanor for failing to comply with federal registration laws
and for performing or soliciting work as an unauthorized immigrant, respectively).
7. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to David
V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (Jun. 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-cane-to-us-as-children.pdf (establishing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program).
8. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-21.2 (2010); Brown, supra note 1.
9.
See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
10.
Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Inmigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1610-12 (2008) (explaining that courts have been inclined to view
measures that have a parallel to generally applicable criminal statutes as touching not on the prohibited field of immigration but on the traditionally state-regulated field of criminal law).
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effect on immigrants living in the interior of the country." But what
about criminal laws that, while ostensibly neutral, have a profound and
harmful effect on the immigrant community? Preemption law alone does
not provide a satisfying answer, and the existing scholarly literature does
not offer a framework to assess their legal validity.
This Article seeks to add to the literature by locating a form of indirect criminalization of immigrants' undocumented status that I will describe as criminalization by "proxy." Proxy criminalization, as I use the
term, refers to state and local governments' use of their police powers to
punish undocumented communities for activities linked to their social
and economic survival rather than directly based on status.' 2 Though
proxy criminalization is focused as a formal matter on conduct rather
than status, and tends to rely on laws of general applicability, it should be
no less tolerated by policymakers and courts. I draw on the experience of
another group that has long been subject to its own form of proxy criminalization at the local level-the homeless-to illustrate the limits of the
conduct/status distinction as a measure for the legitimacy of criminal
laws, especially where the state has a role in forcing the conduct onto a
discrete group based on status.
The remainder of this Article will proceed in three parts. Part II
traces the development of subfederal proxy criminalization in the immigration context, a phenomenon that is more ubiquitous than previously
understood. It summarizes current doctrine disapproving direct attempts
by states to punish immigrants and presents state driver's license
schemes as a paradigmatic example of an effort to criminalize immigrants by proxy. As part of this analysis, I catalogue state laws that impose criminal punishment for driving without a license and further expound on the harms of proxy criminalization. Part III then turns to other
areas of the law where proxy criminalization occurs to reveal transsubstantive lessons. Specifically, I analogize proxy criminalization of immigrants to municipalities' use of local ordinances to limit the use of public
space by homeless residents and courts' analysis of those ordinances
under the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Part IV previews the implications of a more nuanced conception of prohibited state uses of criminal law in the management of migration.
I. SUBFEDERAL PROXY CRIMINALIZATION OF MIGRATION

Juliet Stumpf has observed that a state acts at the height of its power
when it joins criminal lawmaking authority with the plenary powers as-

11.

See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).

12.
Examples include state driver's license laws that criminalize driving without a license as
well as laws that punish undocumented immigrants for the use of false documents to work. See infra

Parts I.B, IV.
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sociated with immigration law.' 3 Plenary power grants federal officials
the ability to make distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, and
between groups of non-citizens.1 4 When exercised jointly with criminal
law, it exacts substantial deprivations of liberty at a lower procedural
price tag.' 5 Indeed, enforcement of criminal laws is increasingly linked to
deportation-either because contact with the criminal justice system will
lead to detection by federal authorities' 6 or because a criminal conviction
can itself trigger immigration consequences. Perhaps for these reasons,
courts deciding Supremacy Clause claims have shown increasing intolerance for state laws that criminally punish unlawful presence directly.' 8
Nevertheless, states' participation in less visible proxy criminalization that likewise exacts a high human cost continues largely unabated.
In this section, I review the rationales put forth for limiting state involvement in the punishment of immigrants, trace the history and structure of state driver's license schemes to show how they have become a
paradigmatic form of proxy criminalization, and chart some additional
harms associated with proxy criminalization illuminated by the driver's
licenses example.
A. The Casefor Limiting State Involvement in the Criminalizationof
Immigrants
State laws that criminally punish unlawful presence directly have
generally been met with skepticism in the modem era. This is based on a
recognition that subfederal measures that impose burdens on immigrants
are often borne out of antipathy or majoritarian disfavor towards immigrants, particularly immigrants of color.1 9 Though state and local civil
Stumpf, supra note 10, at 1613-16 (concluding that such exercises of power should be
13.
viewed with disfavor). See also Daniel I. Morales, Crimes of Migration, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1257, 1258-59 (2014) (noting, in the context of federal regulation of migration through criminal
law, how crimes of migration combine two of the most coercive and distinctly violent practices the
state can engage in-criminal punishment and banishment).

14.

See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).

15.
See Stumpf, supra note 10, at 1613-16; Morales, supra note 13, at 1260-61 (observing
that a core objection to the "dissolution of the boundaries between separate criminal and immigration
spheres" has been "the way that this move enables the magnification of the coercive force deployed
against migrants").
See infra notes 28, 34 and accompanying text.
16.

17.

See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360-64 (2010) (describing the expansion of immi-

gration consequences based on criminal convictions); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.

469, 482-86 (2007).
18. Stumpf, supra note 10, at 1581-84, 1600-07.
19.

See Jorge M. Chavez & Doris Marie Provine, Race and the Response of State Legislatures

to Unauthorized Immigrants, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 78, 78-92 (2009) (finding
that conservative citizen ideology appears to be the factor that most drives anti-immigrant state
legislation); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A

Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2102-07 (2013) (observing, based on an empirical analysis,
that many state and local immigration laws are the product of politicized processes rather than organic policy responses); Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption:
Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POLY 1,
27-42 (2013) (discussing the long history of local discrimination against immigrants and document-
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ordinances aimed at making life difficult for immigrants can arise from
similar political circumstances, 20 criminal laws punishing immigrants
present a heightened concern. 2 1
Consistent with the general skepticism towards subfederal laws that
punish unlawful presence, the Supreme Court recently struck down Arizona's attempt to create two new state misdemeanors tied directly to
violations of the immigration laws.22 The Arizona decision sounded a
death knell for other state laws that had been challenged in the courts.
Injunctions soon followed for state harboring and smuggling laws. 23 These developments were not altogether surprising, given the laws' reliance
on individuals' (or their companions') immigration status as an element
of the offense.
But the Supreme Court in Arizona appeared to be concerned with
more than just prosecution for state immigration crimes. Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy also expressed a worry that unsupervised state
and local efforts to enforce the federal immigration laws would lead to
undue harassment of immigrants that federal officials had deprioritized
for removal. 24 In fact, the majority did something the Court does not usually do. In striking down the provision that authorized state and local
officers to make a warrantless arrest of any person they believed to be
removable from the United States, the Court proclaimed "it is not a
crime" for an immigrant to remain present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws. 25
ing a forgotten equality norm in immigration preemption); Lindsay Nash, Expression by Ordinance:

Preemption and Proxy in Local Legislation, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 243, 251-58 (2011) (discussing
how localities have invoked nuisance laws that have no explicit reference to status as a way to target
immigrant populations and express community preferences). While the doctrinal basis for striking
down state and local immigration measures has largely been the Supremacy Clause, this literature
demonstrates that courts can be skeptical of state and local immigration lawmaking and even make
preemption rulings for reasons other than a wish to aggrandize federal power.
20.
Examples include laws imposing restrictions on renting to undocumented immigrants and
limiting access to public benefits, professional licenses, and higher education. HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 73-76 (2014).
21.
See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 367-68 (1886) (invalidating San Francisco's discriminatory enforcement of a misdemeanor fire
ordinance against Chinese laundry operators noting that "in the administration of criminal justice, no
different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like
offenses").

22.

See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501-03 (2012) (upholding injunction for

Section 3 on the grounds that Congress had already created a comprehensive, fully-integrated
scheme for alien registration that left no room for state regulation); id. at 2503-05 (upholding injunction of Section 5(C) based on the finding that Congress had specifically declined to impose criminal
penalties on unauthorized workers as part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986).

23.

United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 529-32 (4th Cir. 2013) (striking down

provisions of South Carolina's Act 69 making it a crime for an undocumented person to allow himself or herself to be transported or harbored or fail to carry an alien registration document); We Are

Am. v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 297 F.R.D. 373, 386-95 (D. Ariz. 2013) (ruling unconstitutional Maricopa County's practice of prosecuting migrants under state law for conspiring to
smuggle themselves).

24.
25.

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (discussing the dangers of Section 6 of S.B. 1070).
Id. at 2505.
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Of course, the statement that unlawful presence is not a crime was
not itself novel. The Court had frequently reached for a distinction between the civil and criminal to deny individual rights in the immigration
context. 26 But this time, the Court was appealing to the civil nature of
removability to settle a question about the appropriate role of local criminal justice actors in the enforcement of federal immigration law in a
generally rights-protective way.27 This followed on the heels of a debate
about local officers' authority that had intensified in the lead up to the
decision. 2 8 Left unchecked, state and local immigration enforcement ef-

26.

See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-51 (1984) (collecting cases where

civil nature of deportation proceedings led to denial of criminal trial protections and holding that
suppression of evidence is similarly unavailable as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in the
absence of evidence that such violations were widespread or egregious). See generally Fong Yue

Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (declaring that because deportation is not punishment for a crime, constitutional rights such as the right to trial by jury, and the prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment do not attach); DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 134-35 (2007) (observing how the reasoning of Fong Yue Ting has led to
denial of procedural protections to immigrants in removal proceedings). In recent years, scholars
have begun to take aim at the untenable nature of characterizing immigration as a purely civil matter.
See, e.g., Cesar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia HernAndez, Immigration Detention As Punishment, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1346, 1346 (2014) (challenging the conventional understanding of immigration detention as a
form of civil confinement through historical examination of immigration detention legislation's
punitive goals); Legomsky, supra note 17, at 476-500 (discussing the asymmetric incorporation of
criminal law doctrine and enforcement norms in deportation proceedings); Peter L. Markowitz,

Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1332-50 (2011) (arguing that Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), marked the beginning of a reconceptualization of deportation as
neither truly civil nor truly criminal).

27.

See also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (noting, in discussion of Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070,

that "[dietaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional
concerns").
28.
After the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel issued a memorandum in the
wake of September 11th reversing a longstanding view that local police did not have the authority to
make arrests based on civil removability, see Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen.
on Non-Preemption of the Auth. of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for
Immigration
Violations
to
the
Att'y
Gen.
(Apr.
3,
2002),
available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf, state and local governments began taking a
more active role in immigration enforcement, initially at the invitation of the federal government,
and then, later, on their own. Jennifer M. Chac6n, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism,
21 WM.& MARY BILL RTS. J. 577, 598-606 (2012) (tracing states and localities' increased participation in immigration policy and enforcement over the past two decades); Anil Kalhan, The Fourth
Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1137, 1161-65 (2008) (describing federal-local collaborations in immigration enforcement, and state
and local governments' own statutes, ordinances, and orders seeking to involve officers in immigration enforcement); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6

U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1085-88 (2004) (critiquing early efforts by the federal government to
enlist state and local officials in immigration enforcement).
By the time Arizona submitted its brief, the State was asserting that states had inherent
authority to enforce federal immigration laws, both civil and criminal. Brief for Petitioners at 42-46,

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (Feb. 6, 2012) (No. 11-182). The State noted cases from
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits that apparently authorized detentions by state and
local officials based solely on suspected unlawful presence. Id. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
had concluded that states had no such authority, though it did note an earlier case that permitted
Arizona officials to arrest an individual for a criminal immigration violation. United States v. Arizo-

na, 641 F.3d 339, 362 (9th Cir. 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). Part ofthe
confusion may have been caused by dicta in the Supreme Court's INS v. Lopez-Mendoza decision
suggesting that "remaining unlawfully in [the U.S.]" could be considered "itself a crime." 468 U.S.

at 1038.
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forts had caused widespread racial profiling, illegal detentions, and other
individual rights violations. 2 9
The Arizona decision therefore had a tangible, positive impact on
communities threatened by state and local involvement in immigration
enforcement in a post-2012 world.30 While the Court left a critical gap in
its protection of racial minorities by failing to invalidate Section 2(B) of
S.B. 1070,31 advocates and scholars managed to leverage the decision in
other ways, for example, by arguing that even detention by local officials
on an immigration detainer was unlawful.3 2 Arizona thus represented an
important milestone.
Proxy criminalization, however, undermines both the Supreme
Court's disapproval of the creation of state immigration crimes and its
circumscription of the role of state and local police in making arrests
based on suspected unlawful presence. Regarding the former, proxy
criminalization offers states a way to criminalize migration all the same
through facially neutral laws that nominally target conduct. Regarding
the latter, state and local governments' ability to enact measures that
criminalize immigrants' subsistence allows them to rely on their own
police powers to conduct arrests.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the Supreme Court's
pronouncements in this area can be undermined because they are themselves unstable. Decades of complicated interactions between the immigration law system and the criminal law system have created a momen-

-

29.
See, e.g., Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State and Local Enforcement of
FederalImmigration Laws: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, BorderSec. and Int'l Law & Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Libertiesof
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11-20 (2009) (statements of Julio Cesar Mora and
Antonio Ramirez). See generally ANITA KHASHU, POLICE FOUND., THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE:
STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 28-30 (2009),
available at http://www.policefoundation.org/sites/pftestl.drupalgardens.com/files/Khashu (2009)

The Role of Local Police.pdf.
30.
See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2012) (invalidating Maricopa County Sheriffs Office's (MCSO) practice of detaining suspected unauthorized immigrants
after loss ofthe agency's 287(g) authority in the field based, in part, on Arizona v. UnitedStates).

31.

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (limiting but not invalidating Section 2(B), which requires

local law enforcement officers to investigate suspected unlawful presence during the course of
lawful stops, detentions or arrests); Chac6n, supra note 28, at 609-17 (warning that the Court's
decision to leave Section 2(B) intact cedes substantial enforcement powers to subfederal entities and
would invite discrimination and harassment of Latinos); Feranda Santos, In Arizona, Confusion on
Ruling on Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 26, 2012, at A 12 (noting mixed reaction to Court's decision).
32.
See Christopher N. Lasch, FederalImmigration DetainersAfter Arizona v. United States,

46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 673-95 (2013) (explaining how the Arizona decision undermines the
legality of detention on an immigration detainer); KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42690, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: LEGAL ISSUES 19-24 (2014) (summarizing unlawful seizure
analysis and collecting decisions). On November 20, 2014, federal officials announced that they
were replacing Secure Communities with a new program based largely on notification detainers
rather than detention-based detainers. Johnson Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2. Notably, the Memorandum does not rule out detention altogether. It suggests that ICE may continue to issue requests
for detention in certain cases where a "person is subject to a final order of removal or there is other
sufficient probable cause to find that the person is a removable alien." Id.
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turn that is difficult to reverse. By 2012, immigration enforcement had
become a normalized feature of local criminal justice bureaucracies.3 3
The legacy of federal-local collaboration programs is not so easily
erased, and the persistence of jail-based programs sends a message that it
34
is business as usual when it comes to investigating unlawful presence.
Further, while federal proposals to criminalize unlawful presence have
been unsuccessful,35 federal law allows certain migration-related acts to
be criminally punished, and federal officials have been prosecuting these
offenses at an unprecedented rate. 36 As Hiroshi Motomura has observed,
if police authority to enforce the federal criminal immigration provisions
is accepted, then as a practical matter, state and local officers unable to
distinguish between mere unlawful presence and probable cause of unlawful entry or other "immigration crimes" will continue to target undocumented immigrants for arrest and detention.37
Ultimately, the reach of state and local powers in immigration enforcement rests on legal constructions-the legally constructed line between "civil" and "criminal" and the legally constructed distinction between "immigration crimes" and "other crimes." Proxy criminalization is
both produced by these categories, in the sense that the categories give
proxy criminalization its meaning and significance, 'and confounds these
categories, since it fails to fit neatly into any of them. Given proxy criminalization's potentially far-reaching impact for immigrant communities,
a more focused study of it is long due.
B. State Driver'sLicense Schemes as Proxy Criminalization

Next, I turn to describing a paradigmatic example of subfederal
proxy criminalization in the immigration context-state driver's license
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
33.
34.
See, e.g., Civil Rights Orgs Celebrate the End of S-Comm, Caution Against the Replacement "PEP-Comm" Program, CAL. IMMIGRANT POL'Y CENTER (Nov. 21, 2014),
http://www.caimmigrant.org/groups-celebrate-s-comm-end/ (explaining how the Administration's
new Priority Enforcement Program continues to entangle local law enforcement in immigration
enforcement); see also Anjana Malhotra, The Immigrant and Miranda, 66 SMU L. REv. 277, 327-

35 (2013) (explaining how the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, or SCAAP, creates financial incentives for state and local officials to engage in immigration screening).
35.
See, e.g., Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,

H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 203 (2005) (proposing new legislation which would have made it a misdemeanor offense to be present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws).
36.
Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLuM. L. REV. SIDEBAR

135, 142-43 (2009); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281-83
(2010); Michael T. Light, Mark Hugo Lopez & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, The Rise of Federal Immigration Crimes: Unlawful Reentry Drives Growth, PEW RES. CENTER: HISPANIC TRENDS (Mar. I 8,
2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/03/18/the-rise-of-federal-immigration-crimes/.
37.
Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State

and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1825 (2011). Others have
challenged the notion that police can be assumed to have authority to enforce the criminal provisions
of federal immigration law. See Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position:
Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.

REV. 965, 977-78 (2004); Wishnie, supra note 28, at 1090-93. The Supreme Court specifically did
not reach this issue in Arizona. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509-10 (2012).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

888

[Vol. 92:4

schemes. I have selected state driver's license schemes as a focus for
several reasons. First, the structure of state driver's license schemes provides a useful illustration of how proxy criminalization works. Rather
than criminalizing status itself, state laws criminalize conduct (i.e., driving without a license) that, by virtue of their status, undocumented immigrants as a group must by and large engage in. Second, there is already
growing public consciousness that driver's license laws can act to criminalize undocumented communities, 3 8 though detailed legal study of this
phenomenon has been limited. Finally, unlike subfederal efforts to criminalize immigration that have received the lion's share of scholarly attention in recent years, criminalization of undocumented status through
driver's license schemes is occurring in the vast majority of states rather
than being concentrated in only a few states. 39
State driver's license schemes are already understood by many to be
an important battlefront for immigration issues at the local level.4 0 In the
past few years, nine states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
have passed measures extending eligibility for driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants.4 1 Campaigns to grant immigrants access to
driver's licenses revealed how licenses have come to represent much
more than a permission slip to drive. For example, supporters have spoken about the significance of the license as a symbol of belonging and a
source of personal security.42 And the Los Angeles Times called California's move last year to allow undocumented immigrants to receive li38.
39.
40.

See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
Kevin R. Johnson, Driver's Licenses and UndocumentedImmigrants: The Future of Civil

Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 215-23 (2004) (describing how access to driver's licenses has become
a primary civil rights concern for the Latino community); Maria Pab6n L6pez, More Than A License
to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of Driver's Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91,
126-27 (2005) (calling driver's license restrictions "a civil rights issue among noncitizens").
41.
The states include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Mary-

land, Nevada, and Vermont. Assemb. 60, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); S. 13-251, 69th
Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); H.R. 6495, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn.
2013); S. 69, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015); H.R. 1007, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw.
2015); S. 957, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (111. 2013); S. 715, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2013); S. 303, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013); S. 38, 2013-2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Vt. 2013); see also D.C. 20-275, 2013-2014 Council of the D.C., Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2013); P. de C.
900, 17th Legis. Assemb., Ist Sess. (P.R. 2013). Washington, New Mexico and Utah previously
allowed undocumented immigrants to obtain driver's licenses. Some of the above states issue special
or temporary licenses or driving privilege cards to those not able to show lawful presence. This has
prompted criticism from advocates who fear that any distinguishing feature on licenses can draw
attention to the fact that their holders are undocumented. See, e.g., Ruben Navarrette, Don't Meddle

With

Driver's

Licenses

for

Undocumented,

CNN

(May

13,

2014,

7:51

AM),

http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/13/opinion/navarrette-immigration-licenses/.
42.
See, e.g., Mary E. O'Leary, 2,000 Attend New Haven Hearingon Bill to Give Licenses to
Undocumented,
NEW
HAVEN
REGISTER
(Mar.
4,
2013,
12:01
AM),
http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20130304/2000-attend-new-haven-hearing-on-bill-to-givelicenses-to-undocumented (discussing statements of Carolina Bortolleto, Sen. Martin Looney and
Rev. James Manship); Becca Heller, Legislature Extends Md. Driver's Licenses for Immigrants
Here
Illegally,
MARYLAND
REPORTER
(Apr.
7,
2013),
http://marylandreporter.com/2013/04/07/legislature-extends-md-drivers-licenses-for-immigrantshere-illegally/ (discussing statement of Del. Joseline Pena-Melnyk).
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censes a step forward "in the long campaign to decriminalize [immigrants'] day-to-day lives." 43

But state driver's licenses did not start out having such significance
in the struggle for immigrants' rights. The first state driver's license laws
date back to the early 1900s and were enacted to establish standards for
who was fit to be on the road." Eligibility criteria focused on public
safety considerations and included age, physical capacity to drive, driving competency, and knowledge of traffic laws.45 For safety reasons, the
original idea was to license all drivers who would be on the road.46
Though driving is characterized as a "privilege," the conventional wisdom was that a driver's license should be granted to anyone fit to be on
the road.47
The ubiquity of the license eventually led to its prominence as a
primary form of identification in American society.4 8 It was this feature
of driver's licenses, and not a concern for road safety, that led policymakers to start to see licenses as a "benefit" that should be denied to undocumented immigrants.4 After nearly a century without restrictions on
driver's license eligibility based on immigration status, in the early
1990s, states began to require applicants to demonstrate authorized presence in the United States to receive a license.o
In 1993, as nativist sentiment swept the country,5 ' California became one of the first states to disallow undocumented residents from
obtaining licenses.52 Proponents of the measure expressed alarm that the
license might serve as a "breeder document" to allow immigrants to
qualify for other public services and programs; they noted openly their
hope that the denial of driver's licenses would "act as a deterrent to illegal immigration."5 3 For its part, the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) questioned whether it was their role to enforce federal

43.
Richard Winton, Hector Becerra & Kate Mather, Driver's Licenses for Undocumented
Immigrants Stir Debate, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-Indrivers-license-for-undocumented-immigrants-stir-debate-201 30913-story.html.
44.
L6pez, supra note 40, at 108-09.

45.

Id

46.

Johnson, supra note 40, at 220.

47.
48.
49.

Id. at 221.
Id.
Id.

50.
See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
51.
See Johnson, supra note 40, at 215. This same wave would be responsible for California's
Proposition 187 in 1994. Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens As Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition

187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1450-51 (1995) (discussing the "inflated rhetoric" about "'illegal' aliens" and coded racial appeals that preceded the
referendum); Johnson, supra note 40, at 218-19 (observing that California's bid to deny immigrants
driver's license came shortly before voters approved Proposition I87).

52.
S. 976, 1993-1994 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993).
53.
S. B. Analysis, S. 976, 1993-1994 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 10, 1993), CA B. An., S.B.
976 Sen., 9/10/1993 (Westlaw) (quoting sponsors of S.B. 976).
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immigration laws.54 Notwithstanding objections that it would lead to
many more unlicensed drivers on the road, the legislature passed the bill
and it was signed into law.55
California's rationales for restricting driver's license eligibility had
traction, and other states soon followed suit. Over the next decade, numerous states began requiring their residents to demonstrate lawful presence before receiving a driver's license.56 Others that did not explicitly
require proof of lawful presence nevertheless required applicants to submit a Social Security number to obtain a license. This operated as a de
facto ban on undocumented immigrants receiving driver's licenses since
individuals not authorized to work in the United States are not eligible
for a Social Security number.58 In addition to driver's licenses, state motor vehicles offices were also offering non-driver identification cards for
residents who could not drive. 59 States restricted eligibility for these documents based on immigration status as well.o
Restrictions on driver's license and non-driver identification card
eligibility for immigrants peaked after the September 11th attacks. 6 1 Public debate focused on the fact that the hijackers apparently had United
States driver's licenses.62 It is far from clear whether the hijackers needed driver's licenses to carry out the attacks.63 But for many people, it was
problematic enough that driver's licenses allowed the hijackers to "blend
in[]" with the rest of society.

54. Assemb. Comm. on Transp. B. Analysis, S.B. 976, 1993-1994 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
Aug. 16, 1993), CA B. An. S.B. 976 Assem. 8/16/1993 (Westlaw); S. Transp. Comm. B. Analysis,
1993-1994 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Apr. 14, 1993), CA B. An. S.B. 976 Sen. 4/14/1993 (Westlaw).
55.
S. 976, 1993-1994 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993).
See, e.g., S. 1009, 43rd Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1997); S. 1, 59th Gen. Assemb., 2d
56.
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1994); S. 89, 2002 Leg., Ist Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2002).
57.
L6pez, supra note 40, at 105-06.
58.
20 C.F.R. § 422.104(a) (2015) (listing classes of persons who may be assigned a Social
Security number). Some believe that federal law requires driver's license applicants to present a
Social Security number. To the contrary, states may require applicants to provide the Social Security

numbers, if they have them. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.

§§

405(c)(2)(C)(i), 666(a)(13) (2015) (discussing

procedures requiring the Social Security number of applicants to be recorded for child support enforcement purposes).
59.
See L6pez, supra note 40, at 99.

60.
61.
62.

Id. at 96.
Id.
Deborah Sharp, Immigrants Encounter Red Lights at DMVs, USA TODAY (May 9, 2002,

Jude Joffe8:05 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/05/10/drivers-usat.htm;
Block, How 9/11 Changed our Driver's Licenses, FRONTERAS: THE CHANGING AMERICA DESK
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/how-9 11 -changed-our-drivers-licenses.
Margaret D. Stock, Driver's Licenses and National Security: Myths and Reality, 10
63.
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 422, 424-25 (2005) (noting that the hijackers did not need driver's licenses to board commercial aircraft, since they all had passports).
Sharp, supranote 62.
64.
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The distorting lens of national security65 thus fueled further restrictions on the eligibility of immigrants to obtain driver's licenses. Several states passed laws restricting access to driver's licenses in their own
jurisdictions during this period. 6 In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID
Act, which mandated strict, uniform standards for driver's license and
state identification cards used to board commercial flights and enter federal buildings. 67 One of these standards was the requirement to show
lawful immigration status.
Thirty-eight out of fifty states currently restrict or effectively restrict
undocumented immigrants' ability to obtain a driver's license. 69 A sur-

vey of state laws reveals that most states that restrict eligibility for driver's licenses on this basis also make it a misdemeanor to operate a motor
vehicle without a valid license.o Several states go further, subjecting
65.
Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1832 (2007) (describing how national security rhetoric
has led to distortions in immigration policy).

66.

See, e.g., H.R. 188, 2002 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2002); S. 2182, 2002 Leg., Reg.

Sess. (Miss. 2002); Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, "Aliens" in our Midst Post-9/II:

Legislating Outsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1683, 1711-12 (2005). Louisiana passed the "Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways Act," which made it a misdemeanor for a
person to "operate a motor vehicle in the state without documentation demonstrating that the person
is lawfully present in the United States." S. 89, 2002 Leg., Ist Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2002). The
law was eventually held to be preempted by federal law. State v. Sarrabea, 126 So. 3d 453, 465 (La.

2013).
67.
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 30301-30308 (2015)) [hereinafter REAL ID Act].
68.
REAL ID Act, § 202(c)(2)(B). "Lawful status" is defined at 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2015). The
REAL ID Act makes a preemption challenge to the denial of access to driver's licenses by undocumented immigrations more difficult because the Act invites states to condition license eligibility by
status. However, complying states also have the option to make licenses available to undocumented

immigrations, so long as they are marked. REAL ID Act

§

202(d)( 11); cf Shirley Lin, States of

Resistance: The REAL ID ACT and Constitutional Limits upon Federal Deputization of State Agen-

cies in the Regulation of Non-Citizens, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 329, 337-38 (2009) (noting that the
requirement to specially mark licenses provided to undocumented immigrants nevertheless draws
states, some unwillingly, into the business of screening and classifying noncitizens).
69.
See State Laws & Policies on Driver's License for Immigrants, NAT'L IMMIGR. L.
CENTER, http://www.nilc.org/driverlicensemap.htmi (last updated July 1, 2015).
70.
This was originally to encourage every driver to take the requisite tests and obtain a driver's license. Thirty-six of the forty states make driving without a license a misdemeanor offense.

ALA. CODE § 32-6-18(a) (2014); ALASKA STAT. §§ 28.15.011, 28.15.281, 28.90.010(a) (2014)
(specifying penalty); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-16-602, 27-14-301 (2015) (specifying penalty); FLA.
STAT. §§ 322.03(1), 322.39 (2010) (specifying penalty); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-5-20(a), 40-5-121(a)
(2014); IND. CODE § 9-24-18-1(a) (2015); IOWA CODE §§ 321.174(1), 321.482 (2015) (specifying
penalty); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-235(a), (e) (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 186.410(1), 186.990(3)
(West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:52, 32:57 (2014) (specifying penalty); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
29-A, § 1251(l)(A) (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 10, 23 (2014); MICH. COMp. LAWS §§
257.301(1), 257.901 (2015) (specifying penalty); MINN. STAT. §§ 171.02, 171.241 (2015) (specifying penalty); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-1-5 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 302.020 (2014); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 61-5-102(l) (West 2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-484(1)(a), 60-4,111 (2015) (specifying
penalty); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:1 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-10 (West 2015); N.Y. VEH.
& TRAF. LAW § 509(1), (11) (McKinney 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-7(a), 20-35(al) (2014)
(specifying penalty); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.02(A)(1) (West 2014) (specifying no jail unless
multiple offenses); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-303(A) (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-11-18(a) (2014);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-440 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-12-22 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
55-50-301(a)(1), 55-50-603 (2014) (specifying penalty); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 521.021,
521.461 (2013) (specifying penalty, no jail unless multiple offenses); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-300
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drivers to felony punishment in some cases-drivers are either cited under statutes penalizing driving while their licenses are revoked or suspended,7 1 or state law makes it a felony to drive without a license after
the third or subsequent convictions.72
Proxy criminalization works by punishing conduct that-whether
by operation of law or other circumstance-an identifiable group of individuals must regularly engage in for social or economic survival. The
Ninth Circuit recently recognized, also in a case arising out of Arizona,
that "[a]s a practical matter, the ability to drive may be a virtual necessity" for residents who are working.73 This is true not only of Arizona but
for many other places as well.74 By excluding immigrants from being
able to obtain a driver's license, the government does not deter them
from driving. 75 Instead, states force them to risk arrest or a criminal citation for engaging in an everyday activity needed to survive.
State and local law enforcement agents have taken advantage of this
state of affairs to investigate, arrest, and detain undocumented immigrants.76 These enforcement actions have little relation to road safety.
Instead, driver's license schemes became an immigration enforcement
tool of choice for police agencies and sheriff's offices around the country

(West 2014); W. VA. CODE §§ 17B-2-l(a)(1), 17B-5-1 (2015) (specifying penalty); WIS. STAT. §
343.05(3)(a), (5)(b)(1) (2015) (specifying no jail unless multiple offenses); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 317-106(a), § 31-7-136 (2014) (specifying penalty).
Three states-Arizona, Oregon and Pennsylvania-treat driving without a license as a
civil or summary offense, but undocumented immigrants can still effectively be arrested. ARIZ. REV.

STAT. ANN. §§ 28-3151(A), 28-121(B), 28-1595(B) (2015) (specifying that a driver not licensed
who fails to show qualifying ID is guilty of a misdemeanor); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 807.010(l), (4),
807.570 (2015) (describing how an officer can detain to verify identity of anyone who fails to present license); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1501(a), (d), 6304 (2014) (specifying that officer can arrest).
Only one out of the forty states appeared to treat driving without a license as a civil moving offense

without the possibility of arrest. N.D. CENT. CODE

§§

39-06-01, 39-06.1-09 (2013).

Memorandum from Daniel Morales, Joanne Lin & Chris Rickerd to Alejandro Mayorkas,
71.
Deputy Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., on Driving Without License Felonies and Deferred

Action

Eligibility

I

&

n.3

(Jan.

23,

2015),

available

at

(explaining
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/felony driving convictions_1-23-15.pdf
that in those jurisdictions, drivers without licenses are treated as having their licenses "revoked"
upon the first stop).

72.
73.

Id. at 2-3.
Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that

Arizona's denial of driver's licenses to DACA recipients may violate the Supremacy Clause because
federal law intended them to be able to work, but declining to reach the question due to its holding
that Arizona's policy violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating DACA recipients differently
than other immigrants with deferred action).
Aldana & Lazos Vargas, supra note 66, at 1709-10 (explaining how driving rises to the
74.
level of necessity in many areas where immigrants live); Gregory A. Odegaard, A Yes or No Answer:

A Plea to End the Oversimplification ofthe Debate on Licensing Aliens, 24 J.L. & POL. 435, 448
(2008) (discussing the unavailability of public transportation and noting that it is often difficult, if
not impossible, to function without a car).
Odegaard, supra note 74, at 448.
75.
76.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note I and accompanying text.
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interested in exacting retribution from undocumented immigrants, allowing racially motivated traffic stops to flourish.77

'

After the Obama Administration announced the DACA program in
2012, a move that was met with overwhelming voter support that election season,'7 state legislatures started to enact the first measures in two
decades to roll back restrictions on driver's license eligibility for immigrants. 79 The vast majority of states also confirmed they would extend
eligibility for driver's licenses to recipients of deferred action under the
program.so It is unclear, though, if this trend to integrate immigrant populations into the fabric of local communities will continue, given the current political climate. 8
77.
See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor, Town of East Haven 8-10 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthavenfindletter_12-19-Ill.pdf
(describing
police department's practice of patrolling locations where Latinos congregated and following vehicles with a Latino driver in an attempt to enforce immigration laws); Letter from Thomas E. Perez,
Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Clyde B. Albright, Alamance Cnty. Att'y, et al. 4-

5

(Sept.

18,

2012),

available

at

http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/1 71201291812462488198.pdf
(describing
Alamance
County Sheriffs Office's discriminatory traffic enforcement and checkpoint practices and referring
to one deputy who said "he stopped a Latino man because 'most of them drive without licenses"'
(quoting Alamance County Sheriffs Office deputy)); see also Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen,
More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Data Shows, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2014, at Al (finding
that two-thirds of the nearly two million deportations during the Obama administration involved
individuals who had only a minor traffic violation, or no criminal record at all).
78.
See Loren Collingwood, Matt A. Barreto & Sergio I. Garcia-Rios, Revisiting Latino

Voting: Cross-Racial Mobilization in the 2012 Election, 67 POL. RES. Q. 632 (2014); Lynn Vavreck,
It's Not Too Late for Republicans to Win Latino Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/upshot/its-not-too-late-for-republicans-to-win-latinovotes. html?abt=0002&abg= 1.
79.
See supranote 41 and accompanying text.
80.
Nat'l Immigration Law Ctr., Are IndividualsGrantedDeferredAction Under the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Policy Eligible for Driver's Licenses?, NILC.ORG,
http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses.html (last updated June 19, 2013). Because state restrictions
on driver's license eligibility are typically linked to unlawful presence and the lack of a Social Security number, and DACA recipients have lawful presence (though not lawful status) and work authorization, they are in a different position than undocumented immigrants who do not have deferred
action. Arizona and Nebraska were notable exceptions, though DACA recipients in those states can
now receive licenses. See Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 81 F. Supp. 3d 795, 799 (D. Ariz.
2015) (granting permanent injunction against Arizona's denial of driver's licenses to DACA grantees); Griselda Nevarez, NebraskaEnds Ban on Driver 's Licensesfor Young Immigrants, NBC NEWS
(May 28, 2015, 2:53 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/nebraska-ends-ban-driverslicenses-young-immigrants-n366136. Georgia recently made news with introduction of a bill that
would take driver's licenses away from DACA recipients, though the bill was eventually defeated.
Aaron Morrison, Immigration Reform 2015: Georgia Lawmakers Defeat Driver's License Ban For
Undocumented Immigrants Under Obama Relief INT'L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015, 4:38 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/immigration-reform-2015-georgia-lawmakers-defeat-drivers-license-banundocumented-I1865552.
81.
For example, the President's expansion of administrative relief to undocumented parents
in the Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) program was met with strong opposition.
Muzaffar Chishti, Faye Hipsman & Bethany Eberle, Policy Beat: As Implementation Nears, U.S.
Deferred Action Programs Encounter Legal, Political Tests, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Feb. I 1,
2015),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/implementation-nears-us-deferred-action-programsencounter-legal-political-tests. That states would have to provide driver's licenses to recipients of
deferred action is one of bases on which U.S. District Court Judge Andrew Hanen recently found
they have standing in the legal challenge to DAPA and Administration's expansion of DACA. Texas
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C. Diagnosingthe Harms ofProxy Criminalization
In Part II.A above, I explained that proxy criminalization is undermining some of the gains of recent decisions limiting the role of state and
local participation in the immigration arena. Reconceptualizing state
driver's license schemes as a form of proxy criminalization also makes it
easier to see some of the other harms associated with proxy criminalization. In this section, I discuss the multiple and complex harms of subfederal proxy criminalization of migration. In addition to the human costs,
proxy criminalization contributes to the notion that immigrants should be
viewed with suspicion in general and outcast from local communities at
the expense of real policy solutions.
Of course, the enforcement of laws that criminalize the subsistence
activities of undocumented immigrants has direct impacts on immigrants' lives. An individual who is cited or arrested for a violation of
driving without a license can incur substantial criminal fines. Enforcement also carries a possibility of jail time in many states 82 and the prospect of temporary separation from one's family and community. Arrest
83
can then serve as a pipeline to deportation and permanent separation.
Proxy criminalization is also harmful because it brands immigrants
as deviant for conduct that is not deviant, 84 whether or not they spend
any time incarcerated for the offense. The mark of criminality becomes
a form of local community self-definition, cementing immigrants' outsider status. 86 In the process of defining who is "in" and who is "out," the
law also constructs the undocumented immigrant identity.87 Individuals
v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 616-25 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2015) (No. B-14-254). The United
States has taken an appeal of Judge Hanen's injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (dismissing the United States'
motion to stay the preliminary injunction).
82.
See supra note 70.
83.
See supra notes 28, 34; see also Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809,
826-33 (2015) (explaining, inter alia, how arrests have increasingly become a tool for immigration
screening and enforcement).
84.
See Chac6n, supra note 65, at 1886 (noting that criminalization of immigrants makes it
"even harder to distinguish between those who pose a genuine threat to personal security and those
who are merely trying to survive").
85.
Though most states treat driving without a license as a misdemeanor rather than a felony,
carrying little or no jail time, misdemeanors can still have significant branding effects. Cf Issa
Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY
351, 351-93 (2013) (detailing how misdemeanor justice can exert social control); Jenny Roberts,
Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 277, 285-89 (2012) (describing the impact of misdemeanor convictions on defendants and their families).
86.
In her influential piece, The Crimmigration Crisis, Juliet Stumpf discusses how criminal
law and immigration law can both serve membership gatekeeping functions. Juliet Stumpf, The
CrimmigrationCrisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 396-402
(2006); see also Rick Su, Local Fragmentationas Immigration Regulation, 47 Hous. L. REV. 367,
372-73 (2010) (observing that local immigration regulations can be a way by which communities
define themselves).
Cf MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
87.

MODERN AMERICA 58-64 (2004) (describing the process by which the "illegal immigrant" subject
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falling within this definition are reduced to the sum of their immigration
transgressions and "crimes," and their existence is problematized across
settings.88

The stigmatizing impact of proxy criminalization, combined with
the tangible consequences for immigrants, has led to reduced civic participation of some immigrants in their communities. Though many immigrants will drive without a license to go to work, for example, they
may otherwise try to refrain from being on the roads out of fear of arrest.89 They are literally kept inside by criminalization, hidden from public view. Driver's license schemes can thus constitute a powerful way by
which states assert dominance over noncitizens, altering their movements
and very existence. 90
In a new book, Charles Epp, Steven Maynard Moody, and Donald
Haider-Markel explain how driving can be understood as a marker of
democratic citizenship. 91 Driving has become a prerequisite to freedom,
essential to participation in the social and economic life of one's community; and it has special meaning for racial minorities who were historically deprived of mobility in various ways.92 The criminalization of
driving for undocumented immigrants substantially limits their access to
these aspects of democratic citizenship.
Finally, the perversion of the criminal justice system for immigration control ends fuels misperceptions about migrant criminality. Public
discourse around immigration has already become "dominated by the
trope of criminality." 93 When immigrants are reimagined as criminals for
engaging in everyday activities, this-together with enforcement of the
laws through arrests, citation, and incarceration-generates a feedback
loop and validates the public's fears.94 The notion that immigrants com-

was constructed in early 20th century America, noting that the "illegal alien" became "something of
a specter, a body stripped of individual personage.... both fulfilling and fueling nativist discourse").
88.
Cf Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers, 9 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 79, 81 (1998) ("The process of criminalizing the immigrant and her dreams is multistepped. First the immigrant is labeled a problem through demonization, then she is dehumanized,
until at last her actions or conditions are criminalized.").
See SARAH E. HENDRICKS, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., LIVING IN CAR CULTURE
89.
at
available
(2014),
3-6
LICENSE
A
WITHOUT
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/livingincarculture-without-a-license_

3.pdf.
90.
L6pez, supra note 40, at 111-12 (discussing Michel Foucault's theory of power and
applying it to state restrictions on driver's license eligibility).
CHARLES R EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: How POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND
91.
CITIZENSHIP, 17-19 (2015) (discussing traffic stops of African Americans and, to a lesser extent,
other people of color).

92.

Id.

93.

Jennifer M. Chac6n, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

613, 629 (2012).
Chacon, supra note 36, at 146 (describing how enforcement efforts can generate a feed94.
back loop of popular pressure that drives even greater enforcement).
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mit more crime has been empirically disproven. 9 5 Nevertheless, proxy
criminalization helps ensure that the myth persists-because the definition of crime itself has been altered. John Hagan, Ron Levi, and Ronit
Dinovitzer explain how this type of linking of crime and immigration can
affect a type of symbolic violence by which immigrants come to be
viewed as inherently delinquent. 96
Indeed, proxy criminalization may be more concerning than direct
criminalization because the role of the state in conflating immigrants and
crime is obscured. A state can claim that it is merely trying to address the
criminal externalities of migration. When criminalization operates on a
subconscious level, we are less likely to resist it.97 The state avoids legal
scrutiny and the public is left with unchallenged internalized associations
of immigrants with disorder.
Ultimately, proxy criminalization of migration affects more than
just immigrants and their families. In the case of driver's license laws,
internalized associations have taken on a racialized image-the prototypical traffic misdemeanant becomes a Latino/a immigrant who is driving
without a license. 98 Proxy criminalization thus becomes a way by which
the law reaffirms racial salience and racial hierarchy. 99
Certainly, there are moments of dissonance. Campaigns by immigrants' rights groups, typically around individual cases, have prompted
reflection about the "criminal" label and how it is being deployed. But on
the whole, proxy criminalization has helped to legitimate a host of state
practices towards immigrants and minorities, from police harassment to
the erosion of procedural rights and deprivation of liberty, that the public
might otherwise find intolerable. In the next section, I explore what lessons we can learn from the experience of another group that has been

95.
See Rub6n G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (June 1, 2006),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/debunking-myth-immigrant-criminality-imprisonmentamong-first-and-second-generation-young.
96.
John Hagan, Ron Levi & Ronit Dinovitzer, The Symbolic Violence of the CrimeImmigrationNexus: Migrant Mythologies in the Americas, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 95, 97-

99 (2008); see also Jeff Ferrell, Cultural Criminology, 25 ANN. REV. OF Soc. 395, 405 (1999) (describing how cultural criminalization may be an "end in itself, successfully dehumanizing or delegitimating those targeted, though no formal legal charges are brought against them").
97.
See Nash, supra note 19, at 265-66 (explaining how the targeting of immigrants through
nuisance regulation facilitates implicit bias by labeling their ways of living as quality-of-life diminishing, leveraging and validating pre-existing negative associations with immigrant communities).
98.
See supra note 77.
99.
See also Jamie Longazel, Moral Panic as Racial DegradationCeremony: Racial Stratification and the Local-Level Backlash against Latino/a Immigrants, 15 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 96, 96
(2013) (describing passage of Hazelton ordinance as perpetuating racial stratification). This process
is not entirely different from the process by which states, through Black Codes, criminalized African-Americans for engaging in ordinary actions that were legal for white people. See, e.g., David F.
Forte, Spiritual Equality, the Black Codes and the Americanization of the Freedmen, 43 LOY. L.

REV. 569, 600-)1 (1998).
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subject to persistent proxy criminalization at the local level-the homeless-and how courts have analyzed their claims.
II. PROXY CRIMINALIZATION AS UNDERSTOOD THROUGH COURTS'
EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF LOCAL LAWS TARGETING THE
HOMELESS

It is perhaps not surprising that proxy criminalization is often carried out against groups at the center of local political debates who themselves have limited political power (at least in a conventional sense).
Because the group being targeted is often perceived as being undesirable
or imposing a burden, communities may disguise criminalization as a
neutral response to local concerns or public safety, making it harder to
recognize. It is useful, then, to examine how other groups and their advocates have framed their objections to proxy criminalization and, specifically, how they have described proxy criminalization's relationship to
overt or direct criminalization based on status.
Over the past few decades, advocates for the homeless have been
able to gain some ground arguing that local ordinances that criminalize
sitting, lying, sleeping, or camping in public spaces are tantamount to
criminalizing homelessness itself. The cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from criminally punishing individuals based on a status or condition. 00 Therefore,
these advocates contend, the enforcement of laws that render these necessary, life-sustaining activities of homeless persons criminal are unconstitutional.101
In both the immigration and the homelessness context, direct criminalization based on status is generally impermissible. In both contexts,
states and localities have responded by passing measures that have the
veneer of punishing conduct rather than status. Some courts evaluating
the claims of homeless persons, however, have been willing to look past
the conduct/status distinction, particularly where a locality has played a
role in leaving the homeless with no option but to sleep outdoors. In the
remainder of this section, I provide some background on the homelessness example and review the Eighth Amendment decisions to see what
light they can shed on the phenomenon of subfederal proxy criminalization in immigration.
A. Local Responses to Homelessness
Beginning in the 1980s, cities grappled anew with the question of
how to address homeless populations within their jurisdictions.1 02 As
See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
100.
See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
101.
102.
Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers,
Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169 (1996) (describing what he calls
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with immigration, differing local contexts have led to a patchwork of
approaches,'0 3 with some jurisdictions being more hostile to the homeless
and others treating them with greater humanity.'1 Local policies have
also fluctuated over time. 05
One response to the presence of homeless populations has been the
passage of anti-camping ordinances and other measures that limit resting
or sleeping in a public space. o0The practical effect of such ordinances is
that poor people are forced to violate the law since they do not have private spaces to which they can go. When they violate the law, local police
may then subject them to questioning, searches, arrest, and fines. Enforcement of these low-level ordinances has become a major way by
which local communities manage, control, and sometimes expel poor
people out of a jurisdiction.1 07 Proponents of the measures garner support
for them by framing their motivations in the language of public safety. 0 8
In the late 1980s, the Miami Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and others brought a class action suit against the city for its
practice of harassing and arresting homeless persons in an attempt to
drive them out of public spaces.109 Four years into litigation, in 1992,
U.S. District Court Judge Clyde Atkins held in Pottinger v. City of Mi-

"[c]hronic street nuisances" as presenting "practically knotty and normatively perplexing questions
about the management of public spaces"); Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutionaland
HistoricalAnalysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L.
REV. 631, 646-47 (1992) (discussing the dramatic rise of homelessness in American cities in the

1980s).
103.

See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text; see also Rick Su, A Localist Reading of

Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2008) (arguing that local immigration
ordinances are "products of, and complicated by, how localism organizes and defines the powers and
interests of local governments").
104.
See Donald E. Baker, "Anti-Homeless" Legislation: UnconstitutionalEfforts to Punish
the Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 424 (1991) ("Local and state governmental responses to the
problems of homeless persons vary."); NAT'L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, No SAFE
PLACE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 35-41 (2014), available at
http://www.nlchp.org/documents/NoSafePlace (describing examples of constructive approaches).
105.
Gary Blasi, And We Are Not Seen: Ideological and Political Barriersto Understanding
Homelessness, 37 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 563, 569-75 (1994) (comparing attitudes toward the

homeless in New York City in the early 1980s versus the early 1990s).
106.

Jamie Michael Charles, "America's Lost Cause": The Unconstitutionalityof Criminaliz-

ing Our Country's Homeless Population, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 315, 317-20 (2009); Donald
Saelinger, Nowhere To Go: The Impacts of City OrdinancesCriminalizingHomelessness, 13 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 545, 551-53 (2006) (describing restrictions on sleeping, sitting, or storing
property in public spaces).
107.
See Saelinger, supra note 106, at 553; see also Simon, supranote 102, at 645-47. As Rick
Su has explained with reference to immigration regulations, such measures can be understood as a
technique by which cities use the law to "demarcate, define, and enforce the role of space and community in American society." Su, supra note 86, at 372-73.
108.
See Saelinger, supra note 106, at 553-54 (describing rationales advanced for "quality of
life" ordinances and origin of public safety rationale in George Kelling and James Wilson's broken
windows theory of crime and order maintenance).
109.
Baker, supra note 104, at 457-59; Benjamin S. Waxman, Fighting the Criminalizationof
Homelessness: Anatomy of an InstitutionalAnti-Homeless Lawsuit, 23 STETSON L. REV. 467, 467-

68 (1994).
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amilt lo that the city had violated the Eighth Amendment by punishing
homeless residents for lying, sleeping, standing, or sitting in public.'" He
relied on a line of cases starting with the Supreme Court's decision in
Robinson v. California,ll2which had held that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from
criminally punishing individuals based on a status or condition." 3
Though Robinson's admonition applied only to the punishment of status,
Judge Atkins found that the Eighth Amendment could also work to limit
the government's punishment of conduct that is closely associated to that
status-in this case, resting or sleeping in a public place.114
The court in Pottinger supported the connection between status and
conduct incidental to status by pointing to a concurring opinion by Justice White in a Supreme Court case that closely followed Robinson.'15 In
Powell v. Texas,1' a majority of justices voted not to overturn the conviction of a Texas resident under a statute that punished "be[ing] found
in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his own."'"7 A plurality of four justices concluded in that case that
unlike Lawrence Robinson, Leroy Powell had not been punished for the
status of being an alcoholic." 8 Justice White also ruled to uphold Mr.
Powell's conviction but noted that he might have overturned the conviction under the Eighth Amendment if Mr. Powell had come forward with
evidence that his condition essentially rendered his public intoxication
involuntary. 1 9 In other words, if Mr. Powell could have persuaded Justice White that his conduct was an unavoidable consequence of his alcoholic condition, the outcome may have been different.
In the Pottingercase, Judge Atkins found that the conduct for which
homeless individuals were being punished was an unavoidable conse110.

810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).

111.
Id. at 1562-65. The Court also ruled the practice unconstitutional on other grounds, including overbreadth and infringement on plaintiffs' right to travel. Id. at 1575-83. Prior to Pottinger,
courts had occasionally overturned vagrancy statutes on the ground that they punished a status or
condition. See id. at 1562 (collecting cases). Pottinger was the first to do so for laws that criminalize

sleeping in public. See id. at 1563.
112. 370 U.S. 660, 662, 667 (1962) (overturning the conviction of a California man who had
been found guilty of violating a statute that made it a crime "[tlo be addicted to the use of narcotics").
113.
Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1562. In Robinson, the Supreme Court found offensive the
notion that a condition or illness could be made into a criminal offense, rendering a person "continuously guilty" and subject to prosecution at any time without committing a transgression. Id. at 666
(internal quotation omitted). Though the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause is
more popularly understood as limiting how a state may punish, Robinson and its progeny address
limits of what a state may punish. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (noting that the
Eighth Amendment circumscribes the criminal process in several ways, one of which is that it "imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal").

114.
115.
116.

Pottinger,810 F. Supp. at 1564.
Id at 1563 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551 (1968) (White, J., concurring)).
392 U.S. 514 (1968).

117.

Id at 517, 536-37 (discussing Mr. Powell's conviction under Texas Penal Code Art. 477).

118.
119.

Id. at 533-34.
Id at 551, 553-54 (White, J., concurring).
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quence of their condition. Sleeping, eating, standing, and congregating in
public, the court found, were essential, life-sustaining activities that class
members had no reasonable choice but to perform in public.1 2 0 To arrive
at this conclusion, the court relied on expert testimony describing the
shortage of shelter beds in the city and the social, economic, and psychological barriers homeless people faced.1 2 1 So long as the city did not have
sufficient shelter to house Miami's homeless, the court ruled, the city
could not criminalize otherwise innocent acts if doing so would be tantamount to punishing the homeless for their status. 122
Over a decade later, in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 123 the Ninth
Circuit adopted similar reasoning to uphold an injunction prohibiting the
City of Los Angeles from enforcing an ordinance that criminalized sitting, lying, or sleeping on public streets and sidewalks in the Skid Row
area.124 The court held that "so long as there is a greater number of
homeless individuals in Los Angeles than the number of available beds,"
the city could not unconditionally enforce the ordinance against them.125
Most recently, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed
a Statement of Interest in a federal case in Idaho arguing-based on
Jones-that criminalizing the homeless for sleeping in public spaces
when there is insufficient shelter space violates the Eighth Amendment. 126

One innovation in these cases is the introduction of a notion that local governments could not deny homeless populations shelter on the one
hand and criminalize the only alternative they had-sleeping in the street
and in public places-on the other. In other words, the relationship between these two acts by a local government turned the criminalization of
a homeless person's conduct into the de facto criminalization of a homeless person's status. While courts opining on the lawfulness of anticamping laws in other jurisdictions have sometimes declined to invalidate them, several have done so on grounds that the plaintiffs had not
shown an insufficiency in shelter for the homeless.12 7
120.
121.
122.
123.

Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1574.
Id. at 1564.
Id. at 1564-65.
444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).

124.
Id. Judicial pronouncements in these cases helped to highlight the complex causes of
homelessness and the social and economic reality confronting homeless persons, leading cities to
adopt more constructive solutions through settlement. Unfortunately, criminalization continues to

this day. Paul Boden & Jeffrey Selbin, Op-Ed., Californiais Rife with Laws Used to Harass Homeless People, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0216-bodencalifomia-vagrancy-laws-target-homeless-20150216-story.html.

125.

Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138.

126.
News Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Files Brief to Address the Criminalization of Homelessness (Aug. 6, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/justicedepartment-files-brief-address-criminalization-homelessness.

127.

See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that

Orlando's law prohibiting, inter alia, sleeping or being in a temporary shelter on public property did
not violate the Eighth Amendment because the city presented evidence of an abundance of shelter
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B. Going Beyond the Homelessness Cases
Some scholars and advocates have argued for an application of the
Robinson prohibition on the criminalization of status to additional contexts. For example, before the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas,1 28 Claude Millman argued that sodomy statutes should be held unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because they punished conduct
closely related to status.1 29 Millman suggested that the reasoning of Justice White's concurring opinion in Powell should apply to acts that are
"elemental" or "lie at the core of the individual's status," even if they are
not, in the strict sense, involuntary.' 30 As for types of statuses that should
be protected by the Eighth Amendment, Millman again turned to Justice
White, noting that a status in this context applied to "a condition brought
about by acts remote in time from the application of the criminal sanctions contemplated, . . . relatively permanent in duration . . . [and] of
great magnitude and significance in terms of human behavior and val'

ues."' 3

Taking the homelessness cases and Millman's argument to heart,
one can see how a similar analysis might apply to local proxy criminalization of migration through state driver's license schemes. In the homelessness context, courts recognized that a local government may be
tempted to use its power to define crime to express local community
preferences by punishing the disfavored group as a "lawbreaking other."l32 When a state forces discrete groups to violate the law, in that case

space); Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 846-47 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (declining to
enjoin enforcement of camping prohibition in public parks as part of San Francisco's "Matrix Program" in part because plaintiffs failed to make a substantial evidentiary showing that there was

insufficient shelter available). Cf Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1167 (Cal. 1995) (reversing ruling of Court of Appeals that Santa Ana, CA ordinance prohibiting unlawful camping
violated the Eighth Amendment rights of homeless residents, noting, among other things, that "it is
far from clear . . . [they] had [no] alternatives to either the condition of being homeless or the conduct that led to homelessness and to the citations").

128.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

129.

Claude Millman, Sodomy Statutes and the Eighth Amendment, 21 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.

PROBs. 267, 269 (1988). He pointed to four justices' dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
202 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), where they noted that it could be cruel and unusual to
criminally punish a homosexual for an act of sodomy. Id at 267-68; see also Sheldon Bernard Lyke,
Lawrence as an Eighth Amendment Case: Sodomy and the Evolving Standards of Decency, 15 WM.

& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 633, 634-35 (2009).
130.
Millman, supra note 129, at 269 & n. 15.
131.
Id at 285 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 550 n.2 (White, J., concurring)); see
also Powell, 392 U.S. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (noting that even though the defendant in Robinson had voluntarily elected to take drugs at some point in the past, punishing him for the addiction
he eventually developed would have been inappropriate). Millman also noted it was important to
look at the state's interest in punishing such conduct. Millman, supra note 129, at 278, 291-94. He
argued that there were no compelling state interests furthered by sodomy statutes. Id. at 302-06.
132.
In a volume that explores the ways that LGBT people have been problematized criminalized in law and social discourse, Joey Mogul, Andrea Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock write, "[t]he very
definition of crime is socially constructed, the result of inherently political processes that reflect
consensus only among those who control or wield significant influence. It often has more to do with
preservation of existing social orders than with the safety of the larger populace." JOEY L. MOGUL,

902

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:4

by failing to provide sufficient shelter space, it engages in the punishment of status through the punishment of conduct. Similarly, states force
undocumented immigrants to risk arrest and criminal sanctions by denying them drivers' licenses as a categorical matter, on the one hand, and
making it a crime to drive without a license on the other. As the Supreme
Court has stated, "possession [of a driver's license] may be[] essential in
the pursuit of a livelihood."l 33 Immigrant workers may have no realistic
choice but to get behind a wheel so they can put food on the table. Even
if driving without a license is not in a strict sense involuntary, under
Millman's framework, it is sufficiently integral to immigrants' livelihoods and existence to be "elemental," 34 just as sleeping outdoors may
be to a homeless person.
The underlying "status" at issue in state driver's license schemesundocumented immigration status-is one that should fit Justice White's
definition in Powell.'35 Though coming to the United States in violation
of immigration laws may be a voluntary act for some,'3 those voluntary
actions are usually remote in time from application of the criminal laws
relating to driving without a license. Once a person enters the United
States without status, that status can become virtually fixed and permanent.' 37 Undocumented status also carries great personal significance for
individuals who live with it and its attendant disabilities. 38
That local efforts to control homelessness and state responses to the
presence of immigrant communities might follow a similar trajectory is
probably to be expected. Both groups have, at various times, served as
easy scapegoats for jurisdictions confronted with the complex effects of
joblessness, poverty, and demographic change. Indeed, the regulation of
migrants and the poor were once formally intertwined. Early in our country's history, for example, states, having inherited the tradition of the
English poor laws, enacted various restrictions on the ability of poor

ANDREA J. RITCHIE & KAY WHITLOCK, QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT
PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, at xvi (2011).

133.
134.

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
Millman, supra note 129, at 269.

135.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
136.
For others, it is not voluntary, but a response to persecution or severe conditions in their
countries of origin.

137.

See Immigration and Nationalitiy Act

§

245(a), 8 U.S.C.

§

1255(a) (2012) (generally

limiting those who may adjust status to that of a legal permanent resident to individuals who were
"inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States"); Why Don't They Just Get In Line?: The
Real Story of Getting a "Green Card" and Coming to the United States Legally, IMMIGR. POL'Y
CENTER
(Mar.
13,
2013),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/why dont theyget inline.pdf.
138.
See supra note 131 and accompanying text; see also Roxana Kopetman, Group Fightsfor

Immigrants Living in the U.S. Illegally, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (May 5, 2014, 4:03 PM),
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/raiz-612533-immigration-members.html. (profiling the stories of
DREAMers who have grown up without status in the United States); Jose Antonio Vargas, Inside the

World of the "Illegal" Immigrant, TIME (June 14, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/06/14/insidethe-world-of-the-illegal-immigrant/.
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people to settle in or move between jurisdictions.1 39 The Articles of Confederation denied "paupers" and "vagabonds" the equal enjoyment of the

privileges and immunities of citizens. 140 The use of low-level ordinances
to police these populations would thus seem a natural extension of their
common history.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF PROXY
CRIMINALIZATION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF MIGRATION

The analysis of the homelessness cases under the Eighth Amendment suggests a way of understanding proxy criminalization that cuts
across subject matters and even areas of constitutional law. Where a govemmental jurisdiction's power to punish a group based on that group's
status or condition-whether created by operation of law or circumstance-is limited, the jurisdiction should not be permitted to elude that
limitation by criminally punishing conduct incidental to that status, particularly where the jurisdiction has a role in forcing the group to engage
in such conduct. In the immigration area, this means that states and local-

ities should not be able to use their police powers to punish undocumented immigrants for activities they must engage in for their social and economic survival simply because those laws are focused as a formal matter

on conduct and tend to be rules of general applicability. This is all the
more the case when, as with the driver's license schemes, the state has
elected to deny immigrants access to the means to engage in essential
subsistence activities lawfully.

The foregoing analysis may be applied to other forms of subfederal
proxy criminalization of immigrants as well. For example, some states
arrest and prosecute undocumented immigrants for using false documents to work under fraud, identity theft, and related statutes.141 Like
139.
Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1846-59 (1993); see also Simon, supra note 102, at 635-42. Those laws
made relief for the poor the responsibility of the community where they settled, incentivizing states
to try to close their doors to migrant laborers who moved from place to place in search of work. See
Simon, supra note 102, at 637-38.
140.

Neuman, supra note 139, at 1846-47 (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1871,

art. IV § 1) (internal quotation mark omitted). "[F]ugitives from justice" were also exempted. Id.
(quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1871, art. IV

§

1) (internal quotation mark omitted).

Today, "public charge" provisions in federal immigration and welfare law continue to impact poor
immigrants. See, e.g., Lisa Sun-Hee Park, Perpetuation of Poverty Through "Public Charge", 78
DENv. U. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141.
See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION: IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT, CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS AND ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF FROM REMOVAL 1-3 (2014), availa-

ble
at
https://www.actu.org/sites/default/files/assets/14 9_30_memoonstatecriminalconvictionsand
eligibilityfor administrative relief from removal.pdf; see generally John Leland, Some ID Theft is
Not for Profit, But to Get a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at A5. The Immigrant Rights Clinic at
the University of California, Irvine School of Law, which I co-direct, has also joined with others to
file a lawsuit challenging workplace raids conducted by Maricopa County law enforcement officials
based on such laws. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, No.
2:14-cv-01356-DGC, 2014 WL 2872310 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2014) (describing impact concerted
enforcement efforts on workers). The court granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction in January.
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driving without a license laws, the fraud and related statues generally do
not have immigration status as an element. 142 But immigrant workers
often have little choice but to use a different name or Social Security
number in order to subsist.143 In the absence of federal immigration reform, systematic enforcement of these laws against immigrants has the
effect of criminalizing workers based on their status. Unlike state driver's licenses schemes, only certain states have had a direct role in regulating businesses' verification of employees' eligibility to work through
state employer sanctions laws. But even if federal law alone creates the
conditions for proxy criminalization, enterprising state and local officials
should not be able to capitalize on those conditions to enact a punishment
scheme.
Doctrinally, this more nuanced framework for evaluating subfederal
criminal law measures that punish migration by proxy is most likely to
come into play in the evaluation of preemption claims. But current
preemption doctrine alone is insufficiently robust.1" Instead, I posit that
it is necessary to borrow developments from the Eighth Amendment cases and equal protection norms as an analytical lens to discern the right
result. While others have discussed the overlap between preemption and
-*
equal protection norms in the immigration context, 145 critical
here is the
addition of an Eighth Amendment analysis in response to states' invocation of criminal law.1 46 Crossover in the analysis of constitutional law
claims has some precedent1 47 and would be well-placed here.

Arizona v. Arpaio, No. CV-14-01356-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL 1432674, at *1
2015).

(D. Ariz. Mar. 27,

142.
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 141, at 2-3.
143.
Federal law prohibits employers from hiring those who do not have authorization to work
and requires that they verify prospective employees' eligibility by checking their information and

documents. Immigration and Nationality Act § 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B) (2012).
144.
See supranote 10 and accompanying text. In some areas relevant to immigration, such as
with regard to driver's license regulations, the federal government has allowed for states to have a
role. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Thus, courts have generally not found state
restrictions on driver's license eligibility to be preempted unless the law applies explicitly to noncitizens. See supra note 66 (discussing Louisiana Supreme Court's invalidation of law making it a
misdemeanor for certain noncitizens to operate a motor vehicle without carrying documentation of

lawful presence); see also John Doe No. I v. Georgia Dep't of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369,
1375-76 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (opining that Texas's driver's license eligibility restrictions are consistent
with national policy and thus not preempted by federal law).

145.

See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 19; cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (noting

that courts "faced with an equal protection challenge respecting the treatment of aliens . . . must be
attentive to congressional policy"); Hiroshi Montomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and

Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1730-46 (2010) (describing how equal protection
arguments of undocumented immigrants tend to be obliquely asserted through institutional competence claims like preemption).
146.
Like preemption doctrine, equal protection doctrine provides an unsatisfying answer to
proxy criminalization because laws of general applicability will be upheld absent a showing of
discriminatory intent. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977). But the main obstacle to equal protection challenges in the immigration context has been
courts' resistance to applying heightened scrutiny to laws that affect undocumented immigrants. See,
e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (noting that for equal protection analysis, undocumented status is "not
irrelevant to any proper legislative goal" but applying heightened scrutiny in that case because the
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I have discussed in detail the contribution that the Eighth Amendment cases can make. As for equal protection norms, the lack of an articulable state interest can be circumstantial evidence of invidious intent
and invalidate a law. 148 With regard to driver's licenses, there can be no
serious public safety rationale for not allowing immigrants to learn the
driving rules and be tested on their driving ability.1 4 9 The same goes for
arbitrarily subjecting them to criminal punishment for not having a license, particularly since many will drive anyway.
Notably, the framework I propose for understanding proxy criminalization here does not necessarily depend on bad motives of states in enacting criminal laws or of state and local officers in enforcing them. Indeed, some states that have driver's license schemes that punish immigrants are integrationist in other ways. There can be heterogeneity in
approaches to enforcement at the municipal level. And while many state
laws precluding undocumented immigrants from obtaining driver's licenses acted with restrictionist intent, the statutes making driving without
a license a criminal offense generally predated eligibility rules conditioned on lawful presence and were not about immigration at all. The
framework for proxy criminalization accounts for this complexity by
focusing more so than other legal analytical tools on the effect of criminalization measures on immigrants' experience. Not every punitive state
Texas law at issue was directed a children who "have little control" over their presence in the United

States); see also Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 817 (Iowa 2005) (declining to apply heightened
scrutiny review to Iowa's driver's license eligibility restrictions, claiming that undocumented immigrants are not a suspect class). There have been some recent successes with equal protection challenges to policies targeting undocumented immigrants based on improper animus. See, e.g., Arizona

Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that animus theory could
support an equal protection challenge to Arizona's decision to deny driver's licenses to DACA

recipients); Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, 76 F. Supp. 3d 833, 864-67 (D. Ariz. 2015) (denying motion
to dismiss equal protection claim against state identity theft measures enacted to penalize undocumented workers). But progress is slow.
Eighth Amendment law would also likely be insufficient on its own. A challenger would
need to overcome courts' reluctance to expand the prohibition on the criminalization of status to new
contexts. See Benno Weisberg, Comment, When Punishing Innocent Conduct Violates the Eighth
Amendment: Applying the Robinson Doctrine to Homelessness and Other Contextual "Crimes",96 J.

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 329-31 (2005) (suggesting Robinson v. California, 379 U.S. 660
(1962) may be somewhat of a dead letter but arguing for its revival in the homelessness context); see
generally Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to
ConstitutionalDiscourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. I11, 140-56 (2007) (expressing skepticism that the
Eighth Amendment, as presently interpreted, can be a locus of reform).
147.
See, e.g., Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83 FORDHAM L.

REV. 155, 176-78 (2014) (describing Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) as an example of interest-limiting noncongruence based on federalism in the equal protection context).
148.
See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267; see also Stumpf, supra note 10, at
1615 (noting that lack of empirical support for prioritizing immigrants in criminal legislation suggests that motives other than crime control underlie at least some of the subnational criminal laws
focusing on noncitizens).
In fact, studies show that licensing immigrants make the roads safer. AAA FOUND. FOR
149.
(2011),
available
at
TO
KILL
13
TRAFFIC
SAFETY,
UNLICENSED
https://www.aaafoundation.org/sites/default/files/201 I Unlicensed2Kill.pdf (reporting that unlicensed
drivers are more likely to be involved in fatal car crashes); HENDRICKS, supra note 89, at 6-8 (describing public safety benefits of licensing immigrants). No other group has been so uniformly
denied a driver's license based on reasons other than road safety.
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law is invalid simply because immigrants are also affected. But nor can
schemes that feel like criminalization because they punish conduct intimately connected to status be immune from attack.
Beyond doctrinal application, and perhaps more importantly, a better understanding of how proxy criminalization works might improve
policy decisions. To give just one example, the immigration legalization
proposal that passed out of the Senate in 2013, as well as guidance for
the DAPA program, contain clauses intending to preserve eligibility for
immigrants whose only criminal convictions are based on laws that penalize undocumented status.150 However, these clauses only apply to
state and local criminal statutes where immigration status is an essential
element, reflecting an incomplete view of the way that immigration status is criminalized at the subfederal level. 5 i Although the Administration
has released updated details on its enforcement priorities stating that officers should be sensitive to the overall circumstances of the arrest and
conviction in cases that punish immigrants for using false documents to
work, it still regards immigrants with identity theft related convictions as
presumptively falling into priority categories.152 The federal government
could go much farther in ameliorating the effects and legacy of proxy
criminalization.
CONCLUSION

As the criminal and immigration law systems evolve and interact,
our legal analytical tools must also evolve. Immigration scholars and
advocates must be willing to transcend conventional frameworks in their
own areas and look to the experience of other groups. Historically, both
immigrants and the homeless have been the target of local prejudice, and
their political marginalization means policymakers will frequently bend
to the will of the majority when making decisions about their welfare. It
makes sense that the struggle of homeless persons should yield lessons
for immigrants burdened by criminalization.

150.

Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,

113th Cong.

§

2101(b)(3)(A)(i)(1) (2013); Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S.

Dep't Homeland Sec. to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement et al. on Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immi-

grants

3-4

(Nov.

20,

2014),

available

at

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/141120_memojprosecutorialdiscretion.pdf
(describing the circumstances that make an individual an enforcement priority and therefore not

eligible for DAPA).
151.
For a discussion of how these clauses fail to capture a significant number of cases where
immigrants are being penalized for their status, see AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 141.

Our Immigrant Rights Clinic also sent a letter to Administration officials explaining the inadequacy
of this exception in connection with the Puente Arizona v. Arpaio case. Letter from Annie Lai et al.,
to Esther Olavarria, Senior Counselor to the Sec'y, U.S. Dep't Homeland Sec. et al. (Jan. 20, 2015)
(on file with author).
Frequently Asked Questions Relating to Executive Action on Immigration, U.S. IMMIGR.
152.
& CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/immigrationAction/faqs (last visited June 28,

2015).
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The same forces that have caused proxy criminalization to persist
produce excesses in other areas of the modem criminal justice system,
and confronting proxy criminalization should be part of a larger project
to tackle mass incarceration. By studying the proxy criminalization of
migration, we are reminded that it is important to pay close attention to
the lived experience of those subject to the law. When legal phenomena
are experienced as criminatization and articulated as so by impacted
communities, we can no longer ignore those voices because existing legal frameworks fail to clearly locate their illegitimacy. Only by listening
more closely can we truly begin to transform the relationship between
subordinated groups and governmental institutions in the communities
where they live.

DEFENSE LAWYERS AS MEMBERSHIP BROKERS
STEPHEN LEE'

Twelve years ago, I enrolled in an immigration course as a 2L. I had
the good fortune to learn the material from someone who possessed as
much compassion for the nation's immigrant communities as he did expertise over the subject matter.' Years later, once I entered law teaching,
I began gathering my materials for an immigration course of my own. I
quickly learned that my old notes were useless. The subject of this symposium explains why. The emergence of "crimmigration" as a body of
law-comprised mostly of cases, regulations, and administrative memoranda-has transformed the field of immigration law. Criminal law and
procedure is changing as well. This much became clear in 2010 when the
Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky,2 which held that a criminal
defense lawyer's failure to apprise her noncitizen defendant client of the
potential immigration consequences of a proposed plea deal could
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
For the uninitiated, Jose Padilla was a Honduran citizen who had
4
been living in the United States for more than forty years. He was
caught transporting a large amount of marijuana. Prosecutors offered
Padilla a plea deal for misdemeanor and paraphernalia possession counts
and felony marijuana trafficking.5 This deal included a ten-year sentence
in which only five years would be served.6 Padilla's lawyer assured him
he faced no adverse immigration consequences given the length of his
residence. 7 This was bad advice. These convictions unambiguously triggered the immigration code's deportation provisions.! Padilla pursued a
post conviction challenge arguing that his lawyer's conduct amounted to
a violation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel.9 After losing and winning and losing in the state courts,' 0 Padilla got the chance to present his case to the Supreme Court, where he
t Stephen Lee, Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
1. Lucas Guttentag, the founding director of the ACLU's national immigrants' rights project,
taught the course at UC Berkeley while I was a student. He is currently serving as senior counsel to
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.
2. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
3.
Id. at 366.
4. Brief of Petitioner at 8, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651).
5.
See id. at 9.
6.
Id.
7.
Padilla,559 U.S. at 359 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky.
2008).
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(B) (2013); 8 U.S.C. §
8.
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i).
9. Padilla,559 U.S. at 359.
10. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483, 485 (Ky. 2008).
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persuaded seven justices that he had a legitimate Sixth Amendment
claim." Every defense lawyer must now identify and communicate to her
noncitizen client potential immigration consequences, at least where such
consequences are clear.12
Padilla undeniably represents an important intervention,' 3 but now
what? What does Padillamean for immigration law's core goal of selecting new members? This brief essay highlights two conversations that
have unfolded in separate universes but that, if brought together, could
help start answering this question. The first involves legal scholars who
have developed a "consumer protection" account of Padillaand the provision of criminal defense services. These scholars frame the central regulatory challenge in terms of correcting information asymmetries and
vindicating informational rights. Noncitizen defendants, these scholars
argue, are entitled to immigration-related information as they advance
through the criminal justice system.14 These informational rights are
analogous to the kinds of rights consumers face in markets characterized
by information asymmetries.
The notion of criminal defense services as a form of consumer protection stems from the transactional nature of the criminal convictiongenerating process. The vast majority of convictions are not the result of
a trial with judicial and jury oversight, but rather, the result of a plea bargain, which largely takes place between the prosecutor and the defense
attorney.' 5 Plea bargains are like contracts, and of course, contracts are
the legal mechanism that attracts a significant amount of scrutiny under
consumer protection laws. Forum selection clauses, arbitration clauses,
false advertising, labeling requirements, negotiation defaults-these are
all laws that try to constrain the universe of contracts. And that's what
Padilladid. It effectively imposed a different set of plea bargaining rules
when noncitizen defendants were involved.
This view of criminal defense practice crystallizes the degree to
which noncitizen defendants simply cannot make informed decisions
about plea offers because of the information asymmetry pervading the
plea bargaining process. Jenny Roberts has characterized Padillaas es-

11.
12.

See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
Id. at 369.

13.
Today, criminal courts, and especially state criminal courts, have emerged as key adjudicative bodies for making membership decisions, a power that has traditionally belonged to immigration judges and other federal agency officials and the Executive more generally. While state courts
lack the formal authority to enter removal orders to make other immigration-related decisions, they
functionally possess the power to do so. See Stephen Lee, De FactoImmigration Courts, 101 CALIF.

L. REv. 553, 555 (2013).
14.
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-BargainingMarket: From Caveat Emptor
to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1120 (2011); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95
IOWA L. REV. 119, 126-31 (2009).

15.

See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.
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tablishing an "informational" right.1 6 This information must be material
to the defendant's decision-making process. And indeed, this resonates
with the Strickland inquiry itself.1 7 After all, establishing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel requires demonstrating prejudice, which is
simply another way of characterizing information as material to the decision-making process.
A core tenet of transparency and mandatory disclosure laws is that
firms, private entities, and other regulatory targets possess information
that affects consumers and is difficult or impossible for the public to access.' 8 In each of these cases, the regulatory disclosure policy operates by
forcing the party in the best position to provide (and oftentimes in sole
possession of) information to a consumer. 19 This characterization applies
to Padilla,but it explains other areas of criminal procedure as well. Consider, for example, Brady v. Maryland,20 which established a rule requiring prosecutors to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence to defendants, 21 or Miranda v. Arizona,22 which established the widely familiar set
of warnings to arrestees about their constitutional rights pertaining to
arrest and interrogation.23 Prosecutors hold a monopoly over the power to
charge defendants with crimes, thus they are in the best position to identify whether exculpatory evidence exists. 24 Informational rights as they
operate in the context of police serve a slightly different function, though
they ultimately improve the decision-making process for would-be criminal defendants as well. Miranda established a right to know about your
rights, and in that sense, members of the public could in theory learn
about their rights in the arrest and interrogation process. 25 But encounter-

ing the police on the street or in one's car or in an interrogation room can
be intimidating. Miranda rights seek to reduce the coercive nature of
these situations thus reducing the likelihood that individuals will make
decisions based on fear.26 Taken together, Brady, Miranda, and now Padilla, all established rights entitling the targets of law enforcement to
know about their rights at critical junctures throughout the criminal justice process.
16.
See Roberts, supra note 14, at 123.
17.
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step inquiry for establishing an ineffective assistance of counsel: first that the defendant's lawyer failed to provide "counsel" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, and second, that this failure prejudiced the outcome. See 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Cesar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia HernAndez, Strickland-Lite:
Padilla s Two-Tiered Duty for Noncitizens, 72 MARYLAND L. REV. 844 (2013).
18.
See David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 156 (2006).
19.
See id.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 87.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 444-45.
See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-87.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
Id. at 443.

912

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 92:4

As a concept, then, criminal defense as consumer protection offers
descriptive clarity. It helps organize and make sense of a variety of criminal procedural rights. And in many ways, viewing criminal defendants
as consumers has an empowering element. Providing noncitizen defendants with the information they need-that is, information on the immigration consequences of a proposed plea deal-allows those noncitizens
to choose their destinies for themselves. Of course, consumer realities are
much more complicated. The information a consumer receives can be
confusing and overwhelming. It is in this respect that the consumer protection framework resonates with an ongoing discussion among social
scientists on immigrant incorporation. Adequately protecting the interests
of consumers involves not only establishing a right to obtain certain information but also designing a legal system that pays attention to how
and by whom that information should be provided.27 In this vein, markets
characterized by information asymmetries often are characterized by
intermediaries or brokers providing the information consumers seek. And
indeed, much of what defense lawyers must do on behalf of noncitizen
defendants involves identifying, communicating, and manipulating sensitive, immigration-related information.
Social scientists have long been interested in immigrant incorporation and the process by which immigrants integrate into their communities. In recent years, scholarly interest has intensified given the high
number of unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States and the
limited opportunities available to them for regularizing their status. This
group of scholars has been particularly interested in how immigrants'
tenuous and "liminal" status informs their strategies for securing an array
of protections, benefits, and services to which they are otherwise entitled.2 8 An increasingly influential strand of this conversation has highlighted the degree to which immigrants must rely on brokers and inter-

27.
The body of scholarship addressing consumer protection through information disclosure is
significant. For a cross-section of this scholarship, see Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty,
Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19

J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 45-46 (2003). See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Casefor Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 353-55 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, Disclosure, Agents,
and Consumer Protection, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 56, 58 (2011); Weil, supra

note 18, at 155-56.
See, e.g., Leisy J. Abrego & Sarah M. Lakhani, Incomplete Inclusion: Legal Violence and
28.
Immigrants in Liminal Legal Statuses, 37 L. & POL'Y 265, 273-76 (2015); Shannon Gleeson, Brokering Immigrant Worker Rights: An Examination of Local Immigration Control, Administrative
Capacity and Civil Society, 41 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 470, 471 (2015); Paul G. Lewis & S.
Karthick Ramakrishnan, Police Practices in Immigrant-Destination Cities: Political Control or
BureaucraticProfessionalism?,42 URB. AFF. REV. 874, 874-75 (2007); Helen B. Marrow, Immigrant BureaucraticIncorporation: The Dual Roles of Professional Missions and Government Poli-

cies, 74 Am. Soc. Rev. 756, 756-57 (2009); Cecilia Menjivar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and
Guatemalan Immigrants'Lives in the United States, Ill AM. J. SOC. 999, 1000 (2006). For a more
comprehensive overview, see Stephen Lee, Book Review, Growing Up Outside the Law, 128 HARV.

L. REV. 1405, 1407 (2015).
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mediaries to overcome significant linguistic, information, and economic
barriers.2 9

As used in this literature, brokers are understood to be institutions
and actors "possessing ties to businesses, nonprofits, and government
agencies rich in resources, which then provide.. .institutions' patrons
with access to these resources.', 30 Brokers bring value to immigrants'
lives by shrinking the universe of services and putting those services in
reach. They bridge networks and provide access to services typically
available only to the mainstream. While brokers themselves may have
the capacity to assist noncitizens with their various needs, often a broker's value resides in its ability to connect noncitizens with other organizations that can meet those needs more effectively and efficiently. 3 1 Social scientists have examined this phenomenon across a variety of contexts ranging from childcare centers that serve the poor,3 2 foreign consular offices that respond to their citizens in the United States,33 and childhood immigrant arrivals who mediate the needs of their parental counterparts. 34
This scholarship has generated important insights about how immigrants can engage in member-like activities despite their tenuous legal
status, but often times, it has proceeded from the assumption that membership status is something to be attained or earned. It has left largely
unexamined those instances when a noncitizen already possesses insider
status and must fight to maintain or preserve it. That is, it has sidelined
those instances when a noncitizen with some form of permanent status
encounters the criminal justice system and faces the distinct possibility
that a trapdoor may open dropping her into the removal pipeline.
Consumers rely on a variety of intermediaries to gather information.
In some instances, legislatures and agencies play the role of intermediary
by compelling information disclosure. In other instances, these public
entities apply a softer hand by inviting and encouraging regulated bodies
to make voluntary disclosures or to submit to third-party entities for cer29.
See Marrow, supra note 28, at 756-57.
30.
Mario Luis Small, Neighborhood Institutions as Resource Brokers: Childcare Centers,
InterorganizationalTies, and Resource Access Among the Poor, 53 SOC. PROBS. 274, 274 (2006).
This definition applies to institutional brokers. Another subject of this conversation has focused on
individual brokers such as children. See, e.g., Lucy Tse, Language Brokering Among Latino Adolescents: Prevalence, Attitudes, and School Performance, 17 HISP. J. BEHAv. SC. 180 (1995).
31.
See X6chitl Bada & Shannon Gleeson, A New Approach to Migrant Labor Rights Enforcement: The Crisis of Undocumented Worker Abuse and Mexican Consular Advocacy in the

United States, 40 LAB. STUD. J. 32, 45 (2015).
32.
See, e.g., Mario Luis Small, Erin M. Jacobs, & Rebekah Peeples Massengill, Why Organizational Ties Matterfor Neighborhood Effects: Resource Access through Childcare Centers, 87

Soc.

FORCES 387 (2008).

33.
34.

See, e.g., Bada & Gleeson, supra note 31, at 32.
See, e.g., Abel Valenzuela, Jr., Gender Roles and Settlement Activities Among Children

and Their Immigrant Families, 42 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 720, 723-25 (1999).
35.
See Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 109 (1997).
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tification. And in still other instances, private actors step into the gap to
gather and sort information.37 In a sense, these brokers help workers navigate labor markets filled with precarious work and "bad jobs." 38 In Padilla, the Court harnessed the Sixth Amendment to force defense lawyers
to serve a similar function for noncitizens traveling through the criminal
justice system-that is, to protect them against "bad deals."
The intermediaries and brokering frameworks help explain postPadillacases. Padillareoriented defense lawyers to look for and identify
immigration-related information. A pair of subsequent plea bargaining
cases helped fill out the infrastructure in which defense lawyers could fill
the interstitial space connecting the criminal and immigration systems. In
Missouri v. Frye,39 the Court held that defense lawyers were required to
communicate proposed plea deals to their clients. 4 0 This type of rule puts
pressure on defense lawyers to err on the side of communicating too
much rather than too little information. And in Lafler v. Cooper,4 1 the
Court held that one possible remedy for a defense lawyer's ineffective
assistance of counsel was for prosecutors to reoffer the initial plea deal.42
This kind of rule creates a remedy for noncitizen defendants who suffer
from ineffective assistance of counsel. Without this kind of remedy,
noncitizen defendants who prevail on a Padilla ineffective assistance of
counsel claim would presumably have to proceed to trial. And the inherent uncertainty of trial would mean that a victory on a Padilla claim
would amount to no victory at all. Lafler provides a fix for this by allowing noncitizens who are unhappy with their counsel's performance to
have a clear sense of the road not taken.
Having said all this, it's important to emphasize that the market for
immigration-savvy criminal defense services was not inevitable. Rather,
it is entirely the by-product of the expansion of the grounds for deportation and the near elimination of opportunity for equitable relief and mercy in immigration proceedings. Prohibiting a service or product can have
the effect of opening up new, black markets. 4 3 Immigration law has witnessed this phenomenon through several changes of law. In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which

36.

The organic food-labeling regime is a good example of this. See Julie Guthman, Back to

the Land: The Paradox of Organic Food Standards, 36 ENV'T & PLAN. 511, 511 (2004) ("The
cornerstone of organic regulatory convention is third-party certification, a way to verify that producers grow according to organic standards.").
37.
The National Association of Law Placement is a good example. See Estlund, supra note
27, at 384-85. So is YELP. See Daniel E. Ho, DesigningInformation Disclosure, 38 ADMIN. & REG.

L.NEWS 13, 14 (2012).
38.
39.

40.
41.
42.
43.
(2012).

See Bada & Gleeson, supra note 31, at 33.
132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).

Id. at 1409.
132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
Id. at 1391.
David Michael Jaros, Perfecting Criminal Markets, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1947, 1948-49
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conditioned access to work on immigration status-in broad brush
strokes, it effectively prohibited visa overstayers, undocumented immigrants, and many other temporary visa holders from obtaining work.""
IRCA simultaneously required employers to verify the work authorization status of their employees.4 5 Of course, this did not actually exclude
these immigrants from the labor market. Today, eight million of the estimated twelve million unauthorized immigrants are in the workforce.4 6
What happened? IRCA created a black market for work authorization
documents-birth certificates, social security cards, and the like. Restricting access to work created new, criminal opportunities for entrepreneurs. 47 The market for criminal defense services might be thought of as
markets in this tradition.
Immigration law's member-selection process has been transformed
from the affirmative pursuit of citizenship to the defensive posture of
avoiding contact with the police. Naturalization ceremonies no longer
represent the iconic cultural moment of becoming an insider.48 In 2015, a
moment that better reflects member-selection realities would be plea
colloquies conducted by sentencing judge in state courts all around the
country.

44.
45.

See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3,359.
Id. § 101, 100 Stat. at 3,361-63.

46.
See Securing the Border: Defining the Current Population Living in the Shadows and
Addressing Future Flows: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (written testimony of Jeffrey S. Passel), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/03/26/testimony-of-jeffrey-s-passel-unauthorized-immigrantpopulation/.
47.
Jaros, supra note 43, at 1958-59.
48.
See Susan Bibler Coutin, Cultural Logics of Belonging and Movement: Transnationalism,
Naturalization, and U.S. Immigration Politics, 30 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 508, 514-19 (2003).

THE PRODIGAL ILLEGAL: CHRISTIAN LOVE AND
IMMIGRATION REFORM
VICTOR C. ROMEROt
INTRODUCTION

Despite the impasse around immigration reform, most everyone believes the United States' immigration system is broken. And most agree
that the key issue is what to do with the eleven million or so undocumented persons currently residing in the United States. As a Christian
immigration law teacher,2 I have been interested in the debate among the
churches as to what such reform should look like. In this Article, I use
Professor Jeffrie Murphy's conception of agapic love as a lens through
which to examine reform proposals. 3 I then evaluate the two positions
Christian churches have seemed to embrace-permanent legal status on
the one hand, full citizenship on the other-from both a gospel and legal
perspective. To aid my analysis from the Christian perspective, I turn to
Dr. Timothy Keller's interpretation of the Parable of the Prodigal Son;4
t Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, Maureen B. Cavanaugh Distinguished Faculty
Scholar & Professor, Penn State Law. The idea for this paper came from the "Love and Law" Conference, sponsored by the Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics at
Pepperdine School of Law in February 2014 (http://Iaw.pepperdine.edu/nootbaar/annualconferencelloveandlaw/schedule.htm). Although winter weather prevented me from attending that
symposium, I am grateful for the inspiration. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
Denver Law Review's CrImmigration symposium and at the Interdisciplinary Roundtable on Immigration (IRI) at Penn State Law. Thanks to participants at those events for their helpful comments
and perspectives. Particular thanks to C6sar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia HernAndez and Jennifer Lee Koh
for their thoughtful insights on an earlier draft and to Dean Jim Houck for his support of my work.
Most important, thanks to Corie, Ryan, Julia, and Matthew for their constant love and for reminding
me of what's most important in life. All biblical references are to the New International Version
(NIV) except as noted. All errors that remain are mine alone.
I. Jeffrey S. Passel, D'Vera Cohn & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Population Decline of Unauthorized Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed, PEW RES. CENTER: HiS. TRENDS (Sept. 23, 2013),

http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stalls-mayhave-reversed/ (estimating undocumented population at 11.7 million in 2012); Michael Hoefer,
Nancy Rytina & Bryan Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the
United States: January 2011, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS
3
(Mar.
2012),

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois illpe.2011.pdf (estimating undocumented population at 11.5 million in January 2011).
2. This is my third essay exploring legal issues from my faith perspective. My primary
audience are other Christians well aware that I see but "through a glass, darkly" (1 Corinthians
13:12 (King James)). I am grateful for the perspective of others and offer mine as but one view on
these complex issues. For the other essays, see Victor C. Romero, Christian Realism and Immigration Reform, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 310 (2010) [hereinafter Romero, Christian Realism]; Victor C.
Romero, An "Other" Christian Perspective on Lawrence v. Texas, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 115
(2006) [hereinafter Romero, An "Other" Christian Perspective].
3. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Law Like Love, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 18-23 (2004).
4.

See generally TIMOTHY KELLER, THE PRODIGAL GOD XI-XV (2008) (arguing that the

parable was really about the "lostness" of both sons, not just the prodigal).
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from the legal perspective, I examine the lived experiences of those subject to our current deportation laws. I argue that a thick conception of
agapic, neighborly love requires embracing a pathway to citizenship as
the only available reform option.
This Article explores what agapic love might look like in the context of formulating immigration policy regarding the undocumented.
Despite what appear to be the strict borders of law that create categories
of immigrant status and belonging, the Christian tradition of sacrificial
love suggests a willingness to promote equality and reject subordination-in a sense, to set captives free. 5
I. AGAPIC LOVE AND THE PRODIGAL GOD

In his seminal article, Jeffrie Murphy asks, "What would law be like
if we organized it around the value of love and thought about and criticized law in terms of that value?" 6 Murphy answers by focusing on
agape, which he equates with a "love of neighbor." 7 Elaborating further,
Murphy asserts that "[s]uch love is concerned not simply with satisfying
preferences, alleviating distress, providing for people's material wellbeing, and thereby making their lives more pleasant (i.e., liberal compassion) but is also centrally concerned with promoting their moral and spiritual good-helping each one to grow in virtue." 8
In Christian circles, the Parable of the Good Samaritan9 is usually
invoked as the paradigmatic illustration of neighborly love. When the
young lawyer asks Jesus to define who his neighbor is, the teacher replies by telling a story of what a neighbor does.' 0 Jesus challenged his
listeners by choosing a despised minority as his hero, as it was the Samaritan traveler-and not the priest or the Levite-who showed agapic
love to the Jewish crime victim on the side of the road, caring for him
despite the social boundaries that divided their cultures. Indeed, immigration scholar Michael Scaperlanda cited this parable as an important
touchstone for his Catholic Christian vision of a just immigration policy.

11

Cf Luke 4:18 ("The Spirit of the Lord is on me, because he has anointed me to proclaim
5.
good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim freedom for the prisoners and recovery of sight
for the blind, to set the oppressed free . . . ." (quoting Isaiah 61:1) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
6.
Murphy, supra note 3, at 18.

7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id. at 22.
Luke 10:25-37.

Luke 10:36-37 ("'Which of these three do you think was a neighbor to the man who fell
10.
into the hands of robbers?' The expert in the law replied, 'The one who had mercy on him.' Jesus

told him, 'Go and do likewise."').
I1.

See Michael Scaperlanda, Who Is My Neighbor?: An Essay on Immigrants, Welfare Re-

form, and the Constitution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1587, 1612-13 (1997) ("The Parable of the Good
Samaritan provides an excellent backdrop to illustrate my Catholic Christian vision of America's
constitutional duty toward permanent resident aliens."). There has been some excellent recent schol-

arship regarding immigration policy and biblical principles, though primarily from a Catholic per-
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While Professor Scaperlanda's work focused primarily on legal
immigrants and lawful permanent residents, I am interested in exploring
the other end of the immigrant population: the undocumented-those
here without proper papers. In this analysis, I turn to a different Bible
story that has helped me better understand the debate regarding the legalization of this population: the Parable of the Prodigal (or "Lost") Son:
Jesus continued: "There was a man who had two sons. The younger one said to his father, 'Father, give me my share of the estate.' So
he divided his property between them.
"Not long after that, the younger son got together all he had, set off
for a distant country and there squandered his wealth in wild living.
After he had spent everything, there was a severe famine in that
whole country, and he began to be in need. So he went and hired
himself out to a citizen of that country, who sent him to his fields to
feed pigs. He longed to fill his stomach with the pods that the pigs
were eating, but no one gave him anything.
"When he came to his senses, he said, 'How many of my father's
hired servants have food to spare, and here I am starving to death! I
will set out and go back to my father and say to him: Father, I have
sinned against heaven and against you. I am no longer worthy to be
called your son; make me like one of your hired servants.' So he got
up and went to his father.
"But while he was still a long way off, his father saw him and was
filled with compassion for him; he ran to his son, threw his arms
around him and kissed him.
"The son said to him, 'Father, I have sinned against heaven and
against you. I am no longer worthy to be called your son.'
"But the father said to his servants, 'Quick! Bring the best robe
and put it on him. Put a ring on his finger and sandals on his feet.
Bring the fattened calf and kill it. Let's have a feast and celebrate.
For this son of mine was dead and is alive again; he was lost and is
found.' So they began to celebrate.

spective. See, e.g., Michael A. Scaperlanda, Immigration Law: A Catholic Christian Perspective on
Immigration Justice, in RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON
AMERICAN LAW 292, 292-3 10 (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa S. Collett eds., 2007); MICHELE
R. PISTONE & JOHN J. HOEFFNER, STEPPING OUT OF THE BRAIN DRAIN: APPLYING CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING IN A NEW ERA OF MIGRATION xv-xix (2007); Mary Ann Glendon, Principled
Immigration,
FIRST
THINGS
(June
2006),
http://www.firstthings.com/article.php?year-2007&month= I 2&title_1ink=principled-immigration---31.
One recent non-Catholic analysis of immigration policy comes from an evangelical Christian congressional staffer. See James R. Edwards, Jr., A Biblical Perspective on Immigration Policy, in
DEBATING IMMIGRATION 46, 46 (Carol Swain ed., 2008). For other Old and New Testament texts
relevant to immigration see Romero, Christian Realism, supra note 2, at 323-29. Rather than focusing on specific biblical texts, Professor Jennifer Koh's forthcoming article deftly analyzes the immigration debate through the lens of grace. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Christianity, Grace, and the Immigration Laws (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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"Meanwhile, the older son was in the field. When he came near the
house, he heard music and dancing. So he called one of the servants
and asked him what was going on. 'Your brother has come,' he replied, 'and your father has killed the fattened calf because he has him
back safe and sound.'
"The older brother became angry and refused to go in. So his father went out and pleaded with him. But he answered his father,
'Look! All these years I've been slaving for you and never disobeyed
your orders. Yet you never gave me even a young goat so I could
celebrate with my friends. But when this son of yours who has
squandered your property with prostitutes comes home, you kill the
fattened calf for him!'
"'My son,' the father said, 'you are always with me, and everything I have is yours. But we had to celebrate and be glad, because
this brother of yours was dead and is alive again; he was lost and is
found."'

2

In his book, The Prodigal God, Dr. Timothy Keller 3 retitles the
narrative "The Two Lost Sons," not only because it comports with Jesus's own telling of the story, but also because Jesus's listeners would
likely not have focused solely on the younger, prodigal son, but rather on
the elder, upstanding one, as well.1 4 The story of the Two Lost Sons follows two other shorter ones in Luke's gospel, all in response to a snide
remark uttered by Pharisees who observed that Jesus "welcomes sinners
and eats with them," for he had attracted a crowd of tax collectors and
other outsiders eager to listen to his teaching. 5
Dr. Keller uses this parable to explain how the conventional title
and reading of this story fails to fully capture the context and importance
of its message about both sons' "lostness" and the redeeming (and
agapic) nature of the father's love for them. The conventional reading of
the parable focuses on the younger son's profligacy-his utter disrespect
for his father by insisting on receiving his inheritance (prior to his father's death!) and then squandering it all on reckless living. Once spent
and downtrodden, this son contritely returns to plead for his father's
mercy, not that he be restored to the status of son but that of hired hand.
12.
Luke 15:11-31.
13.
Through his writings and his ministry, Dr. Keller has quietly built a reputation for
thoughtful, accessible Christian apologetics for modem readers. See, e.g., Michael Luo, Preaching
Feb.
26,
2006,
the
Voice,
N.Y.
TIMES,
the
Word
and
Quoting
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/nyregion/26evangelist.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search
&mabReward=relbias%3Aw; Anthony Sacramone, 21st-Century Apologetics: Pastor Timothy
Keller Makes the Case for Faith, BOOKS & CULTURE: A CHRISTIAN REV. (2008),
http://www.booksandculture.com/articles/webexclusives/2008/march/08033 I.html?paging=off.
14.
KELLER, supra note 4, at XIV ("I will not use the parable's most common name: the
Parable of the Prodigal Son. It is not right to single out only one of the sons as the sole focus of the
story. Even Jesus doesn't call it the Parable of the Prodigal Son, but begins the story saying, 'a man
had two sons.'. . . The parable might be better called the Two Lost Sons.").
15.
Luke 15:1-2 (internal quotation mark omitted).
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But the son never gets a chance to repent, for the patriarch, in an utterly
unbecoming act, runs to him, embraces and kisses him, and calls for an
extravagant feast (complete with fattened calf) in celebration of his son's
return! Read this way, the "Parable of the Prodigal Son" teaches Christians of God's limitless grace to the abjectly penitent. This is an attractive interpretation, for it gives hope to those who, like the younger son,
have wallowed in obviously sinful behavior. Yet, this reading of the story is nonetheless incomplete, for it does not reckon with the status of the
older son.
Dr. Keller reminds us that the conventional reading fails to explain
how the older son-the elder brother-fits into the narrative. The elder
brother's equally sinful nature is revealed when he learns of his younger
sibling's return. While he was dutifully working in the fields, the elder
brother heard celebratory music; he discovered that a feast was being
held to honor his licentious brother's return. At this revelation, the older
brother became angry, refused to join the festivities, and disrespectfully
rebuked his father. From the elder brother's perspective, it was blatantly
unfair for the father to celebrate his sibling's return when the elder son
had never been rewarded for his years of faithful service: "Look! All
these years I've been slaving for you and never disobeyed your orders.
Yet you never gave me even a young goat so I could celebrate with my
friends. But when this son of yours who has squandered your property
with prostitutes comes home, you kill the fattened calf for him!"' 6 In
pleading with him to join the celebration, the father spoke firmly yet
kindly, reminding the elder brother of his privileged status and entreating
him also to extend grace to his younger sibling for returning to the fold:
"'My son,' the father said, 'you are always with me, and everything I
have is yours. But we had to celebrate and be glad, because this brother
of yours was dead and is alive again; he was lost and is found."" 7
Keller notes two lessons in the elder brother's strong reaction and
the father's gentle response. First, the elder brother is just as sinful and as
lost as the younger one. And second, the father's response is the corrective to both sons' "lostness"; the father's grace, then, is the perfect example of agapic love.
Most people, whether Christian or not, understand where the
younger brother went astray but may have a harder time finding fault in
the elder brother's actions. Even in today's age, demanding one's inheritance from a still-living parent and then wasting it on far-flung, hedonistic pursuits would be, to many, foolish if not immoral. And so, the idea
that the younger son was a "prodigal"-an impudent, extravagant spendthrift-translates well in most moderns' minds. The elder brother's la-

16.
17.

Luke 15:29-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Luke 15:31-32.
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ment and refusal to join in the father's feast, in contrast, seems eminently
reasonable. Wasn't the elder brother justified in his envious anger because he had been nothing if not the perfect son? Didn't the father owe
him for the years of his slavish obedience? Why did the father choose to
celebrate the prodigal over the moral? Keller argues that by extolling his
moral uprightness, the elder brother revealed a heart that was just as sinful as his younger brother's:
What did the older son most want? If we think about it we realize
that he wanted the same thing as his brother. He was just as resentful
of the father as was the younger son. He, too, wanted the father's
goods rather than the father himself. However, while the younger
brother went far away, the elder brother stayed close and "never disobeyed." That was his way to get control. His unspoken demand is,
"I have never disobeyed you! Now you have to do things in my life
the way I want them to be done."
The hearts of the two brothers were the same. Both sons resented
their father's authority and sought ways of getting out from under it.
They each wanted to get into a position in which they could tell the
father what to do. Each one, in other words, rebelled-but one did so
by being very bad and the other by being extremely good. Both were
alienated from the father's heart; both were lost sons.
The elder brother thought he could earn his way into the father's
good graces. Hence, it was utterly appalling to him that his father would
then treat a disobedient younger son better than an obedient older one.
The elder brother was estranged from the father because he felt superior
to the younger one and believed his father's grace to his sibling unmerited.
The similar estrangement of both sons to the father leads to Keller's
second argument: that the father is equally gracious to the immoral and
moral, which should then prompt "moral" elder brothers to extend the
same mercy to their "immoral" younger brethren. Keller contends:
If the elder brother had known his own heart, he would have said,
"I am just as self-centered and a grief to my father in my own way as
my brother is in his. I have no right to feel superior." Then he would
have the freedom to give his brother the same forgiveness that his father did. But elder brothers do not see themselves this way.
Because they view themselves as morally superior, elder brothers
refuse to partake in the father's feast. It is the metaphor of the father's
feast-the extension of God's grace and mercy-that sheds light on the
meaning of agapic, or neighborly, love. By accepting the father's invita-

18.

KELLER, supranote 4, at 35-36.

19.

Id. at 57.
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tion to celebrate the younger son's return, the elder brother would embrace and thus convey to his sibling the grace, forgiveness, mercy, and
reconciliation evident in the feast. For the "elder brother" Pharisees who
disdained Jesus's ministry to the "younger brother" tax collectors and
prostitutes, this parable would have been an invitation to reflect not only
on their own hard-hearted sinfulness, but also on the peace and reconciliation that comes with extending mercy to outcasts, just as God extends
mercy to them. Just as the Good Samaritan modeled neighborly behavior,
Jesus's Parable of the Two Sons reminds even so-called moralists that
agapic love calls all of us to share grace with others just as we each receive grace from above. In the end, both sons are lost, and it is therefore
the father's forgiveness to both that is the model of true agapic love.
Agapic love, then, requires a humility and awareness of one's own
fallibility as a way of selflessly seeking the good of one's neighbors.
Understanding one's lostness may well be a prerequisite to accepting
solutions to situations that advance neighborly well-being in the furtherance of agapic love.
II. CHRISTIAN CHURCHES AND LEGAL STATUS FOR THE UNDOCUMENTED

But how might agapic love manifest in the context of immigration
policy? How does the love of neighbor extend to those whose citizenship
lies beyond our borders but who are currently living among us without
papers?
Like many politicians, various Christian churches have weighed in
on how to deal with the possible legalization of the millions of undocumented persons currently in the United States. The good news is that
there is much common ground.20 Citing various texts and traditions,
churches seem to uniformly favor some form of legalization of those
already here. Typically, this would involve those who either entered surreptitiously or whose visas have expired to pay a fine and adjust their
status to a legal one. The main difference stems from what form that legalization might take. While some advocate a pathway to citizenship,
others are reluctant to embrace such a solution. Advocates of a citizenship pathway include the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,
which supports what they term "Earned Legalization":
20.
This common ground contrasts with the 2012 national platforms of the Democrats (pathway to citizenship) and Republicans (opposing any legalization program as amnesty). Compare
Moving America Forward: 2012 Democratic National Platform, 2012 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL

CoMMITTEE [hereinafter Democratic Platform], available at http://assets.dstatic.org/dncplatform/2012-National-Platform.pdf and We Believe in America: 2012 Republican Platform, 2012
REPUBLICAN

NATIONAL

COMMITTEE

[hereinafter

Republican

Platform],

available

at

http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf. This divide is also currently reflected in the differing stances of the current Senate and House, where the Senate has endorsed a pathway to citizenship while certain House members favor legal status at best. See, e.g.,
Immigration
Impasse,
Hous.
CHRON.,
May
2,
2014,
http://www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/Immigration-impasse-5449547.php.
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An earned legalization program would allow foreign nationals of
good moral character who are living in the United States to apply to
adjust their status to obtain lawful permanent residence. Such a program would create an eventual path to citizenship, requiring applicants to complete and pass background checks, pay a fine, and establish eligibility for resident status to participate in the program. Such a
program would help stabilize the workforce, promote family unity,
and bring a large population "out of the shadows," as members of
21
their communities.
Similarly, the United Methodist Church "supports a pathway to status
that will allow those who now hide in the shadows to pursue their dreams
openly, whether those dreams lead to citizenship, a work permit, permanent residence, or cyclical migration." 22
In contrast, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints endorses
legalization without requiring citizenship as an option: "The Church supports an approach where undocumented immigrants are allowed to
square themselves with the law and continue to work without this necessarily leading to citizenship." 2 3 Similarly, Texas Congressman Joe Barton (R-Ennis) announced that he would propose legal status-but not
citizenship-for adults who came here without proper documents; opponents decry the proposal as amnesty in disguise.24
Which of these two positions-legal status only, on the one hand,
and a pathway to citizenship, on the other-best promotes agapic love?
Keller's interpretation of The Two Lost Sons helps me choose between
the two. I see this policy debate mapping quite nicely onto the biblical
story: Just as the father's mercy enriches our understanding of agapic
love, his approach provides an answer that helps us choose between these
two policy options.
In my view, the undocumented migrants are represented in the parable by the younger brother. Regardless of how one views the serious25
ness of their transgression, many in society believe that those who
21.

Migration and Refugee Serv./Office of Migration Policy and Public Affairs of the U.S.

Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic Church's Position on Immigration Reform, U.S. CONF. OF
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and2013),
(Aug.
BISHOPS
CATHOLIC
dignity/immigration/churchteachingonimmigrationreform.cfm.
22.
Terminology 2: Amnesty vs. Pathway; United Methodist Statements on Immigration,
UNITED FOR OUR NEIGHBORS, http://www.tnjfon.org/resources/united-methodist-statements-on-

immigration/ (last visited July 6, 2015).
23.
Immigration: Church Issues New Statement, MORMON NEWSROOM (June 10, 2011),
http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/immigration-church-issues-new-statement.
Maria Recio, Barton To File Immigration Bill, STAR-TELEGRAM (Apr. 28, 2014, 5:50
24.
PM), http://www.star-telegram.com/2014/04/28/5774065/barton-to-file-immigration-bill.html?rh=l.
25.
1 do not consider surreptitious entry a criminal offense and have argued for its decriminalization. See generally Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
273, 273 (2010). That notwithstanding, nearly half of all unauthorized migrants initially entered the
U.S. with legal documents, according to the Pew Hispanic Center. See Modes of Entryfor the Unauthorized Migrant Population, PEW RES. CENTER: HIsP. TRENDS (May 22, 2006),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2006/05/22/modes-of-entry-for-the-unauthorized-migrant-population/.
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break the law should pay their public debt. In this analogy, undocumented migrants are willing to pay a fine and step out of the shadows so that
they may join their American brethren as productive community members. Like the younger son returning home, they are ready to rejoin society.
The elder brother plays the role of immigration reformers willing to
allow for some legal status for the undocumented, but not citizenship.
Just as one might question the earlier analogy between the younger
brother and the undocumented, one may bristle at the comparison here,
especially given the open disdain the elder brother had for the younger in
the parable, something not present in any of the churches' statements on
immigration. Indeed, one might argue that a better analogue for the elder
brother would be the xenophobe who believes nothing short of criminal
sanction and permanent expulsion would serve the ends of justice. Here
is where Keller helps. The analogy works because persons and institutions that hold the "legal status only" view are blind to the privileges that
come with U.S. citizenship, just as the elder brother failed to see that
everything the father had was his. Citizenship is the only failsafe against
deportation; by definition, U.S. citizens may not be deported from the
United States. Lawful permanent residents and temporary guest workers,
however, may be removed, if they run afoul of the law. Hence, just as the
elder brother was blind to the privileged status he enjoyed living under
his father's roof, legal status only advocates likely underestimate the
difference citizenship makes.
And the difference that citizenship makes is a serious one, especially when it comes to one's deportability for committing even minor criminal offenses. For instance, the government may deport any noncitizenwhether a longtime lawful permanent resident or temporary visitor-who
commits an "aggravated felony." 26 Although initially defined to target
only serious offenders, the aggravated felony ground for deportation has
grown exponentially since 1996, subsuming within it a whole host of
low-level, nonviolent crimes including drug possession, drug addiction,
petty theft, shoplifting, and undocumented entry following deportation. 27
Some of these crimes would not be felonies under relevant state law, and
Nor does current law treat overstaying one's visa a criminal offense. See, e.g., ALISON SISKIN ET AL.,
CONG. RESEARC SERV., RL33351, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 8
(2006), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6493 I.pdf ("The INA [Immigration
and Nationality Act] includes both criminal and civil components, providing both for criminal
charges (e.g., alien smuggling, which is prosecuted in the federal courts) and for civil violations
(e.g., lack of legal status, which may lead to removal through a separate administrative system in the
Department of Justice). Being illegally present in the U.S. has always been a civil, not criminal,
violation of the INA, and subsequent deportation and associated administrative processes are civil
proceedings." (footnote omitted)).

26.

8 U.S.C.

§ 1227 (2012); Id. §

Il01(a)(43) (defining "aggravated felony").

27.
OVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME: A READER 1, 15 (Julie A. Dowling & Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 2013); see also Aggravated Felonies: An Overview, IMMIGR. POL'Y CENTER
(March 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/aggravated-felonies-overview.
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the Supreme Court has occasionally intervened to curb immigration authorities' overreaching. Recently, the United States Supreme Court held
that Adrian Moncrieffe's Georgia conviction for possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute was not an aggravated felony.28
At other times, however, the Supreme Court has allowed Congress
to draw distinctions within naturalization law that have highlighted the
divide between U.S. citizens and even longtime lawful permanent residents.29 Tuan Anh Nguyen was born in Vietnam to an American father
and Vietnamese mother who were not married. When he was six years
old, Tuan moved to the U.S. with his father, Joseph Boulais, and became
a lawful permanent resident. Boulais did not, however, seek to have Tuan
naturalized as a U.S. citizen. Some sixteen years after living in the United States, Tuan pleaded guilty to sexual assault and was adjudged deportable. On appeal, Boulais presented an order of parentage from a state
court based on DNA evidence, but the Board of Immigration Appeals
dismissed the claim for Boulais's failure to comply with the statutory
requirements to convey citizenship to Tuan, which specified different
rules for birth mothers and birth fathers. 30 The Supreme Court upheld
this gender distinction, deferring to Congress's judgment that, because
birth mothers and fathers are differently situated at the child's birth, it
was constitutionally permissible to require that fathers take extra steps to
establish paternity notwithstanding uncontroverted evidence of a biological relationship between father and son. Whether one agrees with the
Court's analysis or not, Nguyen v. INS illustrates the difference that citizenship makes. Had the Court acknowledged Boulais's parenthoodwhich it would have, had Boulais been Tuan's mother-Tuan would
28.

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013). Based on the recent oral argument, it

appears the Court is headed toward a similar result favoring the noncitizen deportee in the recent
crimmigration case, Mellouli v. Holder, in which the government sought removal based on
Mellouli's conviction for possessing "drug paraphemalia"-in this case, a sock used to hide drugs.
See Kevin Johnson, Argument Recap: Mellouli v. Holder and Removal for a Misdemeanor Drug

Paraphernalia

(Sock)

Conviction,

SCOTUSBLOG

(Jan.

15,

2015,

2:59

PM),

http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/argument-recap-mellouli-v-holder-and-removal-for-amisdemeanor-drug-paraphemalia-sock-conviction/; see also Online Symposium on Crimmigration
Law: Supreme Court Hears Mellouli v. Holder, CRIMMIGRATION (Jan. 13, 2015, 4:05 AM),
http://crimmigration.com/2015/01/13/online-symposium-on-crimmigration-law-supreme-courthears-mellouli-v-holder/ (contributing commentary by Alina Das, Jennifer Lee Koh, Nancy
Morawetz, Maureen Sweeney, and Craig Shagin).

29.

See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57 (2001).

30.
Id. at 57-58. For a recent, thought-provoking examination of removal practice and the
murky contours of U.S. citizenship, see Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV.
1803, 1829-30 ("[C]itizenship is clear for many individuals. But where the claims are not clearand where the human stakes are arguably highest-the level of factual and legal complexity runs
deep and has meaningful consequences that go to the heart of the government's immigration enforcement power. Citizenship claims thus illustrate how removability matters, how it is complicated,
and how outcomes in citizenship claims may depend just as much on the government's actions-in
responding to individual claims, in imposing difficulties to obtaining proof, or in construing the
law-as on the merits of the individual's claim.").

31.

Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73 ("To fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological differ-

ences-such as the fact that a mother must be present at birth but the father need not be-risks
making the guarantee ofequal protection superficial, and so disserving it.").
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have been deemed a U.S. citizen and would not have been subject to
deportation. U.S. citizens who commit crimes more heinous than Tuan's
could not be banished by the immigration authorities because they are
U.S. citizens. 32
Given this significant difference that citizenship plays, returning to
the parable, it is the "citizenship option" proponents that are represented
by the father and his example of true agapic love. These advocates' willingness to confer full citizenship upon those immigrants who opt for it
parallels the father's welcoming embrace of his prodigal son home. And
indeed, the father invites the elder brothers-those upstanding Christians
who may not see the full value of their U.S. citizenship-to also celebrate their younger brothers' formal integration into our community.
Even assuming some accept my analogy, others may claim that
there are at least three reasons why legal status only should be preferred
to a citizenship option from both a legal and agapic love perspective.
Limiting relief to legal status only (1) advances respect for the rule of
law, (2) deters future undocumented migration, and (3) maximizes the
migrant's options by permitting the opportunity to return home. While
each holds some initial appeal, these reasons ultimately fall short from
both a legal and gospel perspective.
First, proponents of the legal status only idea may believe that this
option best advances respect for the rule of law. If submitting to legitimate government is both a biblical 33 and legal imperative, then there
should be consequences for transgressing the law. As such, undocumented migrants should not be rewarded with citizenship for having failed to
follow the law. Even under Professor Murphy's view of agapic love,
criminal punishments are justifiable so long as they are not cruel; 34 in
contrast, the proposal here is one that allows for integration through

32.
Similarly, I discuss this difference in a recent article, comparing the effects of a minor
marijuana charge against a U.S. citizen versus a noncitizen, See Victor C. Romero, A Meditation on
Moncrieffe: On Marijuana, Misdemeanants, and Migration, 49 GONz. L. REV. 23, 28-32 (2013).
Admittedly, the U.S. government may seek to exile a U.S. citizen, but only after she relinquishes her
citizenship; indeed, this is what happened to suspected terrorist Yaser Hamdi. Following the federal
government's failure to convince the U.S. Supreme Court of its ability to indefinitely detain Hamdi,
the government offered to return him to return him to Saudi Arabia if he renounced his U.S. citizen-

ship. See, e.g., Hamdi Voices Innocence, Joy About Reunion, CNN.coM (Oct. 14, 2004, 5:39 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/i0/14/hamdi/ ("Under the terms of his release, he was to
renounce his U.S. citizenship and never travel to Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, Syria, the West
Bank or Gaza. He is also required to report any intent to travel outside Saudi Arabia for the next 15
years. If accused of any wrongdoing, Hamdi is to be subject to Saudi law.").
33.
Paul's Letter to the Romans is often cited as a command to obey the government as God's
representative on earth. See Romans 13:1-2 ("Let everyone be subject to the goveming authorities,
for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been
established by God. Consequently, whoever rebels against the authority is rebelling against what
God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves.").
34.
Murphy, supra note 3, at 29 (noting that hatred, cruelty, and callous indifference are
inconsistent with agape).
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eventual adjustment to permanent resident status while dispensing discipline by withholding citizenship.
It seems to me that those who oppose the citizenship option on "rule
of law" grounds should oppose any form of legalization or amnesty.35
Once some path to legalization is proposed, then the rule of law objection weakens. As to the notion that discipline-and therefore agapic
love-is furthered by withholding citizenship, adjusting status already
requires a penalty under both proposals because immigrants will need to
pay a fine. If part of agapic love involves selflessly promoting the flourishing of the other, then the citizenship option does that, not just by safeguarding against deportation, but also by conferring the right to vote, 36a
privilege critical to the country's commitment to democratic governance.
Relatedly, it may also be that legal status only advocates view undocumented migrants as criminals or criminals-to-be, that their willingness to transgress immigration law is equivalent to theft or worse." Such
advocates may fear the slippery slope. If undocumented migrants receive
citizenship, what about those immigrants who have been convicted of
minor crimes-may they receive citizenship, too? Legal status only becomes a hedge then: an opportunity to hold the Damocles sword of deportation over someone who, given their alleged criminal proclivity,
would still be subject to removal.
While agapic love does not require tolerating ongoing sin, neither
should it operate out of fear. Given the ever-broadening removal power
of immigration authorities over even minor offenses, agapic love should
err on the side of the powerless immigrant, not the powerful government.
Apart from true threats to the polity,3 immigrants should be embraced
and welcomed as full citizens, not relegated to second-class status be-

Indeed, such opposition forms the basis of the Republican National Party's platform in
35.
2012. See Republican Platform, supra note 20, at 25 ("That is why we oppose any form of amnesty
for those who, by intentionally violating the law, disadvantage those who have obeyed it. Granting
amnesty only rewards and encourages more law breaking.").
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
36.
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.").
1 have heard these views expressed from time to time. One email I received intimated that
37.
border crossing may be similar to "breaking into a bank and stealing other people's money."
Romero, supra note 25, at 281 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 agree with Dean Kevin Johnson that those who are true threats to the republic-like
38.
terrorists and serious criminals-may be subject to deportation. KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE

FLOODGATES 196-99 (2007). While some might argue that this simply shifts the locus of debate, I
believe this shift is an important one, for it focuses the discussion on the right issues rather than on
unspecified fears based on fear and prejudice. For instance, Professor Bill Ong Hing's editorial
regarding the influx of children and families from Central America correctly asks us to rethink
whether deporting so-called "gang bangers" is the right approach, or whether investing in rehabilitation and societal integration of these minors would be a better policy. Bill Ong Hing, Border Crisis
Lesson: Reform DeportationPolicies Toward Gang Bangers, HUFFPOST POL. BLOG (July 22, 2014,

3:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-ong-hing/border-crisis-lesson-refo-b_5609667.html.
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cause of some amorphous fear that their foreignness forever implies their
criminal propensity.
The second claim appears to be an empirical one: that withholding
rather than providing a citizenship option might be a better deterrent to
future undocumented migration. If the best an undocumented person
might aspire to is adjustment to legal residence, that still leaves open the
possibility of future deportation, as illustrated above. Such a safeguard
may deter further surreptitious border crossings.
While this claim has some appeal, studies of the inflow of undocumented migrants from Mexico do not list amnesty policies as a possible
incentive to immigrate. A 2009 working paper estimating the cyclical
inflow of undocumented migrants surmises that larger inflows into the
United States correlate with poorer economic conditions in Mexico.39
Similarly, a 2012 Pew Research report noted that net migration from
Mexico has fallen to zero based on a number of factors related to economic opportunities and border enforcement initiatives. 40 While it is true
that since the last immigration amnesty in 1986 there has been a large
influx of migration from south of the border, a 2011 study by Joshua
Linder concluded that the 1986 amnesty did not encourage such migra-

tion.41
Third, and finally, proponents of legal status only might assert this
alternative maximizes the migrant's options by permitting the opportunity to return home. By limiting legalization to permanent resident status,
the proposal permits the adjusting migrant to retain her original foreign
citizenship, which would arguably facilitate her return home, if she so
chooses.
In actuality, however, it is the citizenship option alternative that
provides the most number of choices to the adjusting migrant. With the
citizenship option, the lawfully resident migrant need not naturalize, but
may choose to do so. Such a choice is not open to her under the legal
status only proposal. Eliminating one option-full citizenship-actually
diminishes choice. Consistent with agapic love, the United Methodist
Church recognizes that leaving the full panoply of options on the table

39.
Scott Borger, Estimates of the Cyclical Inflow of Undocumented Migrants to the United
States 2 (Ctr. for Comparative Immigration Studies, Working Paper No. 181, 2009), available at
http://ccis.ucsd.edu/wp-content/uploads/WP 181 .pdf.
40.
Jeffrey S. Passel, D'Vera Cohn & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico
Falls to Zero-and Perhaps Less, PEW RES. CENTER: HISP. TRENDS (Apr. 23, 2012)
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less/.
41.
Joshua Linder, The Amnesty Effect: Evidence From the 1986 Immigration Reform and
Control
Act,
PUB.
PURPOSE
13,
14
(Spring
2011),
available
at
https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/201 I -Public-Purpose-Amnesty-Effect.pdf
("[T]he findings refute unsubstantiated claims that the amnesty program encouraged further illegal
immigration.").
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maximizes human flourishing and individual choice, allowing adjusting
migrants to "pursue their dreams openly." 42
While none of these three defenses appears to withstand closer scrutiny, there may be a practical reason for preferring the legal status only
option-political viability. Recent surveys of Latina/o and Asian Americans suggest support for legalization, with or without citizenship:
"[W]hen dealing with the issue of unauthorized immigration, being able
to live and work in the U.S. legally without the threat of deportation is
more important than a new government plan to obtain citizenship. This
may reflect a possible opening for legislative compromise on immigration reform."4 3 Perhaps a politically viable compromise would be better
than a preferable, though unviable, alternative. But the problem with the
compromise is that it contains an erroneous assumption, which is embedded in the above quote: Legalization does not mean freedom from
deportation. As Nguyen implicitly illustrates, citizenship provides the one
sure defense against involuntary exile."
CONCLUSION

In The Four Loves, noted Christian apologist C.S. Lewis reminds us
that our natural loves-Affection, Eros, Friendship-are nothing without
Charity, for Charity reflects God's love within us, helping us to love others above self.45 Commentators read Lewis's "Charity" as the equivalent
of "agape"-"that deep, unconditional Gift-love that God has for us and
that completes all other loves." 46 Because God is love, we, as fallible
humans, even at our best, can express love only imperfectly. Our natural
loves die when we do, but God's love endures. Like the father in the parable, God calls us "elder brothers," we U.S. citizens who also claim to be
Christ followers, to accept our younger brothers, those undocumented
persons who now want to rejoin the fold. On our own, we cannot do this.
But as Lewis and Keller remind us, with God's help, we can reflect true
agapic love in the policies we adopt. Perhaps as U.S. citizens it is difficult to fully comprehend our immunity from deportation, but once we
grasp its import, we might realize that a pathway to citizenship appears
best to promote the agapic love of our undocumented neighbors. Politically daunting it may be, but to seek anything less risks adopting the
42.
See United Methodist Statements, supra note 22.
Mark Hugo Lopez & Anna Brown, Hispanics Prioritize Legalizationfor Unauthorized
43.
Immigrants Over Citizenship, PEW RES. CENTER (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/01/23/hispanics-prioritize-legalization-for-unauthorized-immigrants-over-citizenship/.
See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
44.

45.

C.S. LEWIS, THE FOUR LOVES 116-40 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 1991) (1960) (chapter

on Charity).
46.
Brenton Dickieson, And the Greatest of These . . .: A Review of C.S. Lewis'FourLoves,
A PILGRIM IN NARNIA (Sept. 1, 2011), http://apilgriminnamia.com/2011/09/0 I/and-the-greatest-ofthese-a-review-of-c-s-lewis%E2%80%99-four-loves/; accordArt Lindsley, C.S. Lewis on Love, C.S.
LEWIS INSTITUTE, http://www.cslewisinstitute.org/CS Lewis onLove (last visited March 7, 2015)
(noting that "charity" is C.S. Lewis's word for "agape").
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stance of the elder brother, refusing to partake of the father's feast of
love and reconciliation.

In Rembrandt's evocative depiction of The Return of the Prodigal
Son below, one might contrast the kind, gentle hands of the father's embrace 47 with the concerned look of the elder brother, unaware of his spiritual distance from his father as he simultaneously keeps his physical
distance. Echoing Keller's interpretation, theologian Henri Nouwen recorded the following reflection on Rembrandt's own duality:
Rembrandt is as much the elder son of the parable as he is the younger. When, during the last years of his life, he painted both sons in Return of the Prodigal Son, he had lived a life in which neither the
lostness of the younger son nor the lostness of the elder son was alien
to him. Both needed healing and forgiveness. Both needed to come
home. Both needed the embrace of a forgiving father. But from the
story itself, as well as from Rembrandt's painting, it is clear that the
hardest conversion to go through is the conversion of the one who
stayed home. 48

47.
Unlike Keller's interpretation of the parable and Nouwen's reflections on the painting,
this description of Rembrandt's work focuses exclusively on the relationship between the father and
younger son, following the more conventional reading of the story:
Unforgettable is the image of the repentant sinner leaning against his father's breast and
the old father bending over his son. The father's features tell of a goodness sublime and
august; so do his outstretched hands, not free from the stiffness of old age. The whole
represents a symbol of all homecoming, of the darkness of human existence illuminated
by tenderness, of weary and sinful mankind taking refuge in the shelter of God's mercy.
Rembrandt 's
Prodigal
Son,
REMBRANDTPAINTING.NET,
http://www.rembrandtpainting.net/rembrandt%27s_prodigal son.html (last visited March 7, 2015).
48.
HENRI J.M. NOUWEN, THE RETURN OF THE PRODIGAL SON 65-66 (1992).
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CLEAR AND SIMPLE DEPORTATION RULES FOR CRIMES:

WHY WE NEED THEM AND WHY IT'S HARD TO GET THEM
REBECCA SHARPLESSt
ABSTRACT

In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court held that defense attorneys have a Sixth Amendment duty to advise noncitizen clients of the
"clear" immigration consequences of a proposed plea agreement. This
Article argues that the Court's reference to clarity denotes predictability,
not simplicity, and that defense attorneys must advise their clients of
predictable immigration consequences, even if they are difficult to ascertain. The scope of this duty has broadened as the U.S. Supreme Court has
made the crime-related deportation rules more determinate, although
many rules remain complex. A legislative move to a regime of simple
deportation rules would greatly facilitate the implementation of Padilla,
enhance the legitimacy of immigration law, and conserve judicial and
administrative resources. However, pro-immigrant reformers hesitate to
push for simple deportation rules because legislative reform in the area
of immigration and crimes would likely widen the deportation net.
Assuming the existence of the political will for more moderate treatment
of noncitizens with criminal convictions, this Article argues for a brightline trigger for the commencement of removal proceedings of five years
imprisonment actually served and calls for the restoration of judicial discretion to halt deportations on a case-by-case basis.

t Clinical Professor, Director of the Immigration Clinic, & Roger Schindler Fellow, University of Miami School of Law. I wish to thank the editors of the Denver University Law Review for
inviting me to participate in their 2015 symposium. I am grateful for the insights and feedback of Pat
Gudridge, Dan Kesselbrenner, Andrew Stanton, Maureen Sweeney, and Katie Tinto.
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INTRODUCTION

In the years since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky,' courts and commentators have struggled to define the contours of
defense attorneys' duty to advise their noncitizen clients of the "clear"
immigration consequences of plea agreements. 2 Some take the position
that "defense attorneys must advise noncitizen clients as specifically as
research allows." 3 Others argue that it is too burdensome for defense
attorneys to determine whether some crimes fall within certain categories, like the case law-defined category of "crimes involving moral turpitude." 4 This Article builds on the scholarly work and jurisprudence contending that the Padilla duty requires defense attorneys to research the
immigration statute and relevant case law, counsel their clients about
predictable immigration consequences, and attempt to negotiate an immigration-safe plea. As others have noted, a plethora of immigration law
resources for defense attorneys has existed for decades and continues to
grow and improve. 5 The debate should not be whether defense counsel
I. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
2.
Id. at 369; see, e.g., Lindsay C. Nash, Considering the Scope of Advisal Duties under
Padilla, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 549, 551-54, 561-71 (2011); C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernhndez,
Criminal Defense after Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 506 (2012)
3. Nash, supra note 2, at 554.
4. Garcia HernAndez, supra note 2, at 506.
5. For a list of the considerable resources available to defense counsel about the immigration
consequences of crimes, see Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner-Appellant at 9-16, United States v. Rodriguez-Vega, 797
F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Maureen Sweeney, CategoricalAnalysis of Immigration Consequences, YOUTUBE (July 28, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-eDAwVIedTO, and Maureen Sweeney, Divisibility of Criminal Statutes and the Modified Categorical
Analysis of Immigration Consequences, YOUTUBE (May 5, 2015), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eAr6FcOzhK8 for helpful introductory explanations of the
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should reasonably be expected to advise about immigration consequences in light of the fact that immigration law can be difficult to master.
Rather, the scope of the Padilla duty is a function of immigration law's
predictability-a distinct concept from complexity. While some sets of
technical or difficult rules do not generate predictable results, others do. I
argue not only that the relevant concern is determinacy but also that the
legal rules relating to immigration consequences of crimes are increasingly determinate.
Although the technical nature of immigration law should play no
role in defining the scope of the Padilladuty, Congress should strive to
make immigration law more accessible as it relates to criminal convictions. While it is eminently reasonable to require that all defense attorneys learn the tools needed to render competent advice about immigration consequences, there are good reasons to simplify the rules, if we can
do so in a way that is both predictable and fair. The sheer number of removal grounds, as well as the learning curve needed to understand and
apply the rules for measuring a criminal conviction against the grounds
of removal, has contributed to unevenness in the quality of immigration
advice by defense counsel across offices and jurisdictions. A simple and
determinate deportation rule would not only promote accurate advice by
defense counsel but would enhance the transparency and legitimacy of
our immigration system, help to ensure proper notice of immigration
consequences, and conserve judicial and administrative resources. Whatever the scope of the Padilla duty, simpler rules would facilitate the discharge of it.
Simple rules may never establish a foothold in this area of immigration law, however. Immigration advocates and pro-immigrant reformers
hesitate to push for such rules for fear that Congress would create an
even more punitive regime for immigrants convicted of a crime. History
teaches that when Congress legislates in the area of immigration and
6
crime, the result is expanded grounds of removal. The fear is that a
move to simple rules might result in a net loss for immigrants with a
criminal record seeking to defend against deportation. A further concern
is. that the most workable simple rule-one that tethers deportation to a
certain length of jail or prison sentence-would grant additional authority to sentencing judges to decide who will be subject to removal. Sentencing practices vary notoriously by jurisdiction. Even worse, discrimination based on race and other factors distorts sentencing practices, rais-

categorical approach to analyzing the deportation consequences of crimes-discussed below as a
source of much confusion.
6.
See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
7.
See, e.g., Caitlyn Lee Hall, Note, Good Intentions:A NationalSurvey of Life Sentences for

Nonviolent Offenses, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 1101, 1106 (2013); Ronald Helms & David
Jacobs, The Political Context of Sentencing: An Analysis of Community and Individual Determi-

nants, 81 Soc. FORCEs 577, 577-78 (2002).
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ing concerns about bundling deportation so closely with sentencing.
Any reform proposal involving a sentence trigger must ameliorate these
significant drawbacks.
I argue that, on balance, both immigrants and our justice system
would be significantly better served if Congress were to repeal the current crime-based grounds of removal and create a new ground based on a
trigger of over five years actual incarceration for a crime, and grant immigration judges broad discretion to override deportability based on sentence length in appropriate cases.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explains how Padilla's
holding that defense counsel has a "clear" duty "when the deportation
consequence is truly clear, . . . to give correct advice" refers to a duty to

convey an accurate prediction, when possible, even if it requires an analysis of complex rules.9 Part II maps "crimmigration" law and demonstrates how even the complex rules in this specialized area of the law are
now generating more predictable results. Part III discusses the benefits
that would flow from a simple rule for determining which crimes trigger
immigration consequences. Part IV describes the barriers to the adoption
of such a rule, and Part V presents a proposal for reform.
I. SCOPE OF THE PADILLA DUTY

In Padillav. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether
Jose Padilla's defense attorney had rendered ineffective assistance of
8.
Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors
and Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 35 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 733, 737 (2001) (finding that
disparate sentencing between African Americans and whites is approximately twenty percent);
Ojmarrh Mitchell & Doris L. MacKenzie, The Relationship Between Race, Ethnicity, and Sentencing Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis of Sentencing Research 8, 12 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished report),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/208129.pdf (concluding, in an analysis of
eighty-five studies of sentencing practices "that even after taking legal factors into account, Latinos
and African-Americans were sentenced more harshly than whites on average"); see also TUSHAR
KANSAL, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING: A REVIEW OF THE

ed.,
Mauer
(Marc
I
LITERATURE
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rdsentencing

at
available
2005),
review.pdf; CASSIA SPOHN, How

Do JUDGES DECIDE? THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT ix-xi (2002); Mar-

&

&

gareth Etienne, Sentencing Women: Reassessing the Claims of Disparity, 14 J. GENDER RACE
JUST. 73, 73 (2010); Brian D. Johnson, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Sentencing Departures
Across Modes of Conviction, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 467-69 (2003); David B. Mustard, Racial,
Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. FederalCourts, 44 J.L.
ECON. 285, 285 (2001); Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing
Reforms Reduce Discrimination in Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781, 781 (1993); Darrell
Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges' Sentencing Decisions: Hispanic-BlackWhite Comparisons, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 145, 164-66 (2001); Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer,
Court Communities Under Sentencing Guidelines: Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing
Disparity, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 383, 397-402 (1996); Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Disparitiesin
Federal CriminalCases I (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econs. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-018,
2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2144002; Jill K. Doemer, Explaining the Gender Gap in
Sentencing Outcomes: An Investigation of Differential Treatment in U.S. Federal Courts (May
2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bowling Green State University), available at
https://etd.ohiolink.edul!etd.send file?accession=bgsul237482038&disposition=inline.
9.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010).
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counsel under the Sixth Amendment.o The attorney failed to counsel Mr.
Padilla that his plea to a drug trafficking charge would result in his virtually automatic deportation." Padilla's crime straightforwardly fit within
the statutory grounds of deportation.12 Noting that "[t]he consequences of
Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute," the Court concluded that "[t]his is not a hard case in which to find
deficiency."' 3
The Court articulated its general holding as "when the deportation
consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally
clear."' 4 The Court's focus on clarity as the touchstone for when and how
attorneys should counsel clients about immigration consequences is best
understood as referring to predictability or determinacy-the degree to
which an immigration consequence like deportation is likely to occur. If
a plea can be predicted to lead to immigration consequences, the attorney
is obligated to counsel the client of these consequences.
In Mr. Padilla's case, the Court could ascertain with ease the result
of the drug plea because a quick glance at the statute reveals that virtually all drug crimes are grounds for removal.' 5 The Court's reference to the
lack of effort needed to determine the deportation consequence in Padilla's case should not be read to limit an attorney's duty to only simple
immigration assessments, however. At no point did the Court state that
attorneys are excused from advising their clients about predictable immigration consequences simply because the assessment involves understanding and applying technical or multiple immigration rules. Nor did
the Court indicate that defense attorneys must only research the immigration statute, as opposed to relevant agency and court decisions.
At the same time, the Court's discussion of the scope of defense
counsel's duty is not a model of lucidity. In the paragraph announcing its
holding, the Court muddles discussion of counsel's duty to communicate
predictable results with commentary on the complexities of immigration
law.16 In one breath, the Court acknowledges that "[i]mmigration law can
be complex" and that some defense attorneys "may not be well versed
in" immigration law.' 7 In the next, the Court states, "There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain." 18 The juxtaposition of these two sentences might suggest that ignorance of immigration
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 359-60.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 368-69.
Id.
Id. at 369.

Id. at 368 ("In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct,
15.
clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's conviction.").

16.
17.
18.

Id. at 369.
Id.
Id.
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law can excuse a failure to advise. The Court's use of the phrase "succinct and straightforward" could also be read as requiring that the law be
both predictable and simple.1 9 But such a reading would be a mistake.
The closing sentences of the Court's discussion make clear that the Court
requires defense attorneys to advise noncitizen defendants of immigration consequences that can be accurately predicted, even if they are not
immediately ascertainable. 20 The Court drives home its concern with
predictability by contrasting a case in which "the deportation consequence is truly clear" with a scenario in which an attorney need only
advise that the plea "may carry a risk of adverse immigration conse,,2 I
quences.
To read the majority opinion to express a concern with complexity,
as opposed to clarity, would not only ignore the plain meaning of a
"clear" consequence but would make an unwillingness to research the
law an excuse for deficient lawyering. Such an approach to the Sixth
22
Amendment would be unprecedented. The Court has never suggested
that the need for legal research puts certain advice outside the scope of a
lawyer's duty to provide competent counsel. To the contrary, the Court
has consistently upheld a lawyer's duty to investigate both the facts and
the law.23 In Strickland v. Washington,24 the Court stated that counsel is
expected to either conduct a "thorough investigation" of both the "law
and facts" or make a "reasonable professional judgment[]" that "makes

19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 369.

22.

See Cdsar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hern~ndez, Strickland-Lite: Padilla's Two-Tiered Duty for

Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REv. 844, 850 (2013) (arguing that Padilla has broken from Strickland to
create an unprecedented Strickland-lite standard by "allow[ing] attorneys to provide legal advice to
noncitizen defendants without first unraveling the complexities of crime-based removal").

23.

See, e.g., Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014) ("[I]gnorance of a point of law

that [was] fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform basic research on that point
is a quintessential example of unreasonable performance under Strickland"); Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 511 (2003) (finding that "investigation supporting [counsel's] decision not to introduce

mitigating evidence" was not reasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 363-64, 373 (2000)
(finding deficient attorney performance where attorney incorrectly believed state law blocked access
to mitigation records in death penalty case); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 368-70, 385-

87 (1986) (finding deficient performance where attorney failed to engage in pretrial discovery based
on an incorrect understanding that the State was affirmatively required to turn over all inculpatory

evidence to the defense); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 62 (1985) (finding the first prong of
Strickland's test is "a restatement of the standard of attorney competence" which "[t]he failure of an
attorney to inform his client of the relevant law clearly satisfies"); see also Jenny Roberts, Too Little,
Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and PretrialDiscovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1106 (2004) (discussing defense counsel's Sixth Amendment duty to investigate the case). The duty to investigate the law applies to cases involving plea

agreements. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (acknowledging deficient performance where attorney advised defendant to reject a favorable plea based on a misunderstanding of
the law).

24.

466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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particular investigations unnecessary." 25 The fact that a lawyer is practic26
ing outside his or her usual area, or is a new lawyer, is no excuse.
The distinct lenses of clarity and simplicity bring Justice Alito's
concurrence in Padilla into sharp focus. Justice Alito agreed that Mr.
Padilla's attorney had rendered ineffective advice but disagreed that de27
fense counsel must advise about clear immigration consequences. Defense attorneys, in Justice Alito's view, discharge their Sixth Amendment duty when they refrain from giving incorrect advice, tell their
noncitizen clients that they may be deported, and advise them to speak
with an immigration lawyer.28
Unlike the majority opinion, Justice Alito's concurrence rests on the
premise that the complexity of an area of the law limits an attorney's
duty, at least when it is outside of the attorney's normal area of expertise. 29 In Justice Alito's view, "Because many criminal defense attorneys
have little understanding of immigration law, it should follow that a
criminal defense attorney who refrains from providing immigration advice does not violate prevailing professional norms." 30 In other words, a
lack of skill or effort excuses a lawyer's failure to advise of predictable
consequences. Justice Alito discusses at length the complexity of the
immigration consequences of crimes, characterizing it as "quite complex," "not 'easily ascertain[able],' and "dizzying." 3' He, however, never considers whether complex rules can be clear because they generate
predictable results. Instead, he appears to assume the opposite.32
It is incorrect to equate clarity with simplicity. Clarity and simplicity, while sometimes related, are distinct attributes of legal rules.3 3 The
clarity of a rule or set of rules is the degree to which its application generates foreseeable or determinate results. In contrast, the relative simplicity or difficulty of a rule or set of rules is how easily it can be understood. The difficulty of a rule or area of the law could have several causes, including the need to take multiple variables into account; a large
quantity of relevant statutes, regulations, and case law, or actors with
25.
26.

Id. at 690-91.
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 (1984) (acknowledging possible deficient

performance even though the "lawyer was young, . . . his principal practice was in real estate, [and
it] was his first jury trial"). The American Bar Association rules permit lawyers to take on representation in a new area of the law. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. (2011).

27.
28.
29.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 375 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
Id
Id at 376-77.

30.

Id. at 377 (citation omitted).

31.

Id. at 377-81.

See id. at 377-88. If Justice Alito were correct that the scope of the Sixth Amendment
32.
depends on the simplicity of a legal regime, the enactment of simple rules would presumably make
the Sixth Amendment apply.
33.
Scott Page explains the difference between simplicity and determinacy as follows: "Difficulty corresponds to problems with lots of local optima. Uncertainty corresponds to situations in
which the value of an outcome depends on a state." Scott E. Page, Uncertainty, Difficulty, and Complexity, 20 J. THEORETICAL POL. 115, 127 (2008).
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decision-making authority; the use of confusing or technical language,
including exceptions to general rules and exceptions to those exceptions;
and the degree to which relevant statutory provisions cross-reference
other provisions. 34 As discussed below, the rules governing immigration
consequences for a crime possess many of these features.
An example of a rule that is both simple and determinate is the rule
that drivers must stop in front of a stop sign and wait for a clear path
before proceeding. 35 Another example is the rule that young adults become authorized to buy alcohol at age twenty-one. Predictability and
simplicity, however, need not run together. Some simple rules do not
generate predictable results. The "reasonable person" standard, for example, is readily accessible to experts and nonexperts alike, but as Peter
Schuck has noted, the standard is "an example of an indeterminate rule"
because of the judgment needed to determine what counts as reasonable.37 A long line of scholarly work has expounded upon the difference
between rules and standards, the latter being less determinate than the
former. More to the point for our purposes, rules that are relatively difficult to understand and apply can also generate predictable results. Indeed, technical rules are often adopted with the goal of making an area of
the law more determinate. The complexity of the U.S. tax code, for example, is driven by a desire to address all likely scenarios, close tax liability loopholes, and ensure fairness. 39

34.

See Lance W. Rook, Laying Down the Law: Canonsfor Drafting Complex Legislation, 72

OR. L. REV. 663, 669-70 (1993).
35.
Of course, the stop sign rule is somewhat more complicated, as there are rules about
which vehicle yields when more than one vehicle comes to a halt at the same time. Notwithstanding
this complexity, most would agree that the rules governing stop signs are relatively simple.
36.
Duncan Kennedy, relying upon Rudolph von Ihering's Spirit of Roman Law, uses "the
determination of legal capacity by sole reference to age as a prime example of a formally realizable"
rule. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,

1687-88 (1976).
37.
Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1, 4 (1992) (describing the reasonableness standard as an example of an indeterminate rule,

which is characterized as "usually open-textured, flexible, multi-factored, and fluid"). All rules may
be at least somewhat indeterminate due to the "open texture" nature of language. H. L. A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 120 (1963); see also BRIAN Bix, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 735 (1993) (discussing Hart's "open texture" concept).
38.
See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in LAW AND
INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 279 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995), reprinted in 82

IOWA L. REV. 739, 740-43 (1997) (explaining that standards or principles are different from rules
and are less desirable than rules); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14,
25, 27 (1967) (contrasting rules, which apply in an "all-or-nothing fashion" if certain conditions are
met, with standards or principles, which "do not set out legal consequences that follow automatically
when the conditions provided are met" and possess the "dimension of weight or importance"); Louis

Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 586-96 (1992) (discussing the relative economic cost of rules versus standards); Kennedy, supra note 36, at 1687-1701
(discussing the difference between "a formally realizable rule" and "a standard or principle or poli-

cy").
39.
See John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness:Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 78 (1993).
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I argue below that many of the rules for determining the immigration consequences of crimes are examples of complex rules that generate
predictable results. In many cases, the immigration consequences are
virtually certain but the analysis needed to arrive at this conclusion requires either multiple steps or a more nuanced understanding of immigration law, or both. If Padilla were to limit the Sixth Amendment duty to
only readily ascertainable immigration consequences, defense attorneys
would not be required to advise their clients of entire classes of virtually
certain outcomes.
II.COMPLEX BUT INCREASINGLY CLEAR RULES

Rules at the intersection of immigration and criminal law (sometimes referred to as "crimmigration" law) illustrate how a body of complex law can generate predictable results.40 In this Part, I explain the
complexity of this area of the law as well as its increasing determinacy.
A. Complexity
The rules governing the immigration consequences of crimes have
many of the attributes associated with complexity. The criminal grounds
of removal in the Immigration and Nationality Act are numerous, and
case law plays a significant role in defining the scope of these grounds.
People with lawful immigration status-including longtime lawful permanent residents-face deportation based on a wide range of criminal
convictions, from murder to nonviolent misdemeanor offenses. 41 Some
grounds of removal contain multiple subsections or cross-reference other
statutory provisions that contain multiple subsections.4 2 The aggravated
40.

Juliet Stumpf coined this term. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants,

Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006). A sampling of the crimmigration
scholarship includes: Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009); Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law
Enforcement Tools in the "War" on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059 (2002); Daniel Kanstroom,
Criminalizingthe Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September IIth "Pale of Law," 29

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639 (2004); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration
Law: Asymmetric Incorporationof CriminalJustice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007);
Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 619-20 (2003); Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 61 (2010); Yolanda Vizquez,
Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the Incorporation of

Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 How. L.J. 639 (2011); and Ingrid Eagly,
ProsecutingImmigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010).
41.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2015) (criminal grounds of deportation); id § 182(a)(2)
(criminal grounds of inadmissibility).
42.
See, e.g., id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(1) (crimes against moral turpitude); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv)
(high speed flight); id. § I227(a)(2)(A)(v) (failure to register as a sex offender); id
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (controlled substances); id. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (certain firearm offenses); id

§ 1227(a)(2)(D) (miscellaneous crimes). Noncitizens can be removed for having an aggravated
felony conviction, which contains numerous subsections. See, e.g., id. § I 101(a)(43)(B) (illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance); id. §1 101(a)(43)(C) (illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices); id. § I 101(a)(43)(D) (money laundering); id § 1101 (a)(43)(E) (explosive materials
and firearms offenses); id. § I 101(a)(43)(F) (crime of violence); id. § I l01(a)(43)(H) (ransom offenses); id. § I l01(a)(43)(1) (child pornography); id. § I l01(a)(43)(J) (corrupt organizations and
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felony ground of removal, for example, incorporates the definition of
aggravated felony, which contains twenty-seven subsections describing
different types of qualifying offenses, many of which are defined by
cross-reference to other federal statutes.43
Removal grounds are broken down into two types: the grounds of
inadmissibility and the grounds of deportation." The grounds of inadmissibility apply when a noncitizen seeks admission at the border or to
"adjust status" to that of a lawful permanent resident while in the United
States.45 Inadmissibility grounds also apply to people who entered the
country without inspection or who overstayed a temporary grant of "parole" to the United States.46 In contrast, the grounds of deportation apply
when U.S. immigration authorities seek to remove a person inside the
United States who has lawful status or who was admitted to the country
*47
on a nonimmigrant visa.
A removal ground is usually based on a type of crime, sometimes in
combination with the length of a sentence. Application of the statutory
reference to sentences is usually straightforward. The term "sentence" is
statutorily defined and includes suspended sentences. 4 8 The removal
grounds refer variously to the possible sentence, the sentence actually
imposed, or the sentence actually served.49 Determinations based on a
sentence can fairly be regarded as simple while "type of crime" determinations can be much more difficult. Because our nation is composed of
fifty states, each with its own criminal code, it would be impractical for
immigration law to reference state criminal statutes. Instead, the grounds
employ a federal standard against which state convictions are judged. As
mentioned above, some grounds of removal cross-reference a federal
definition. For example, the "crime of violence" aggravated felony
ground cross-references the term "crime of violence" at 18 U.S.C. § 16.5o
Other grounds, in contrast, use phrases like "theft," "fraud," "burglary,"

gambling offenses); id. § ll01(a)(43)(K)(ii) (prostitute transportation); id § 1101(a)(43)(K)(iii)
(trafficking in persons); id. § I 101(a)(43)(L) (security related crimes); id. § I 101(a)(43)(M)(ii) (tax
evasion); id. § I l01(a)(43)(N) (alien smuggling); id. § I l01(a)(43)(0) (improper entry by an alien
previously deported); id. § 1101 (a)(43)(P)(i) (document fraud).
43. See id. § I 101(a)(43). For example, the drug trafficking aggravated felony ground references two federal criminal statutes. Id. § I101 (a)(43)(B).
44. For the grounds of inadmissibility, see id § I 182(a). For grounds of deportation, see id.
§ 1227(a).
45.
Id. § 1255(a)(2) (stating that to qualify for adjustment of status an applicant must be
"admissible to the United States").

46.

Id.

§

II 82(a)(6)(A)(i) ("An alien present in the United States without being admitted or

paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the

Attorney General, is inadmissible.");

§

1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (rendering inadmissible any noncitizen

"not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification
card, or other valid entry document required by this chapter").

47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. § 1227(a).
Id. § I 101(a)(48)(B).
See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(ll); id.
See id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

§ 11 82(a)(2)(A)(ii)(Hl).
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or "involving moral turpitude," which refer to generic offenses whose
elements are defined by federal case law.
The complexity of this area of law stems not only from the multiplicity of statutory references but also from the methodology used to
determine whether a particular conviction falls within a removal ground.
With limited exceptions, what is now commonly referred to as the "categorical approach" governs the determination of whether a particular offense, state or federal, triggers removal.52 The approach is rooted in over
a century of federal and agency case law and practice.53 Since the early
twentieth century, courts have emphasized the importance of a single
methodology for judging the nature of a conviction and have based deportation not on underlying conduct but the elements necessary to consti54
tute the crime. After the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was established in 1940, it repeatedly endorsed the approach begun by federal
courts. 5

The categorical analysis rests on the bedrock principles that fairness
requires that immigrants convicted of the same offenses be treated uniformly, immigration adjudicators are not triers of underlying facts of
convictions, and adjudication of immigration cases should be efficient
and not involve minitrials on the stale facts underlying a criminal case.
The categorical approach takes as its focus the elements of the offense.
Elements are essential facts, defined by statute and case law, which the
jury must find "unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt" in order to
convict.57 Facts about which jurors can disagree but still convict are
means by which the crime could have been committed rather than elements. Under the categorical approach, to say that someone can be removed under our immigration law because of a conviction is to say that
the person is being removed based on the elements of the offense.
The manner in which a defendant was alleged to have committed
the elements of the crime is irrelevant. The only relevant conduct is the
"the least of th[e] acts criminalized." 59 In applying this "minimum con-

51.

Id.

§

1227(a)(2)(A)(i); id.

§ I 101(a)(43)(A);

id.

§

I 101(a)(43)(G), (M).

52.
Legal scholars have discussed the origins of the categorical approach. See Alina Das, The
Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting CategoricalAnalysis in Immigration

Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1677 (2011); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A
Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 260 (2012); Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and
the CategoricalAnalysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 994-96 (2008).

53.

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1685 (2013) ("This categorical approach has a

long pedigree in our Nation's immigration law." (citing Das, supranote 52, at 1688-702, 1749-52)).
54.
See Sharpless, supra note 52, at 1008.

55.

See id. at 995-97.

56.

See Koh, supra note 52, at 267.

57.
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2288 (2013).
Id.
58.
59.
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
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duct" test, the adjudicator reviews the universe of conduct made culpable
under the statute and determines whether that universe is broader than
the universe of culpable conduct defined by the pertinent federal standard.60 For example, in cases involving fraud, the adjudicator asks whether
the state definition of fraud, as it appears in the relevant criminal statute
and case law, is broader than the federal definition. If the state definition
of fraud criminalizes conduct that does not qualify as federal fraud, the
state offense would not be a categorical match with the federal standard
under the minimum conduct test and would not trigger deportation. The
minimum conduct test ensures that when the immigration statute hinges
consequences on a conviction rather than conduct, immigration adjudicators are not the triers of fact in the first instance. Rather, they rule only
on the legal question of whether the conviction-as determined by the
criminal justice system-falls within a removal ground.61
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States62 adopted the categorical approach as the methodology for evaluating whether
prior crimes qualify as predicate offenses for federal sentencing enhancements. 63 Defense attorneys who practice in federal court thus routinely apply the categorical approach in their practice. States also employ
analogs to the categorical approach in a variety of different criminal law
contexts, including habitualization sentencing. 4
Despite having pervaded immigration law jurisprudence since the
earliest of immigration decisions, the categorical approach has historically frustrated immigration and federal courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit lamented in 2011 that "[i]n the twenty years since
[the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in] Taylor," it has "struggled to understand the contours of the Supreme Court's" categorical approach,
pronouncing that "over the past decade ... no other area of the law has
demanded more of [the court's] resources."6 5 Commentators have characterized the categorical approach as complex, controversial, and confusing. "One scholar [has] compared the categorical approach to property
law's rule against perpetuities in terms of its complexity, . . . not[ing]
that '[e]ven lawyers who regularly practice [in the area] can struggle to
60.
The minimum conduct test surfaces whenever an adjudicator is asked to assess whether a
conviction falls within a definition, be it the definition of an element of a crime (e.g., fraud) or a
definition of a category of offenses that trigger deportation (e.g., crime involving moral turpitude).
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez that adjudicators cannot engage in
"legal imagination" when determining the universe of conduct made culpable under the statute but
must point to cases to show that the language of a statute has been interpreted to apply to the scenar-

io at issue. 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007).
61.

See Sharpless, supra note 52, at 979-80.

62.
63.
64.

495 U.S. 575 (1990).
Id. at 602.
See, e.g., State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 2007) (holding that when determining

whether a prior conviction constituted a forcible felony, the only relevant consideration is the elements of the offense).

65.

United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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understand the doctrine and its occasionally perplexing results."" 6 The
Supreme Court has noted that "the categorical method is not always easy
to apply. . . . because sometimes a separately numbered subsection of a
criminal statute will refer to several different crimes, each described separately." 67 Perhaps in part because of this complexity, the BIA, and some
federal courts of appeals, had retreated from the strict categorical approach before the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its saliency.68
A primary thesis of this Article is that these admittedly complicated
rules governing the immigration consequences of crimes have become
better defined and determinate in recent years.
B. Predictability
In the years since Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in at
least fourteen times to clarify ambiguity in the rules that immigration
adjudicators and federal sentencing judges must follow when applying
the categorical approach. 6 9 The Court's decisions have significantly increased the ability of lawyers to predict the immigration consequences of
a plea, making the immigration analysis of crimes more akin to a logic
puzzle that is difficult but has a clear answer. To borrow from Duncan
Kennedy's typology of rules, the rules governing removal for a crime
have become more "formally realizable."7 0
Historically, the BIA, the U.S. Attorney General, and some lower
federal courts had introduced dissonance in the law regarding the categorical approach, even going so far as to permit review of extrinsic evidence to determine whether a person could be removed under certain
grounds. 7 ' The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has now definitively ruled
66.

Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REv. 1803, 1834 (2013) (third and

fourth alterations in original) (quoting Doug Keller, Causing Mischief for Taylor 's Categorical
Approach: Applying "Legal Imagination" to Duenas-Alvarez, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 625, 625

(2011)).
67.
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 35 (2009) (discussing James v United States, 550 U.S.
192 (2007), overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)).
68.

See infra note 71.

69.
Johnson v. U.S. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 19861991 (2015); United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1408 (2014); Descamps v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684-85 (2013); Kawashima
v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010); Johnson v.
United States, 559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010); Nihawan, 557 U.S. at 32; Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez,
549 U.S. 183, 185-86 (2007); James, 550 U.S. at 208; Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50-51
(2006); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 3-4
(2004).
70.
Duncan Kennedy describes formal realizability as "describ[ing] the degree to which a
legal directive has the quality of 'ruleness,"' namely the degree to which an official following the
rule acts based on "the presence together of each of a list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of
a situation by intervening in a determinate way." Kennedy, supra note 36, at 1687-88. He credits
Rudolph von lhering in Spirit ofRoman Law for the term. Id. at 1687.
71.
U.S. Attorney General Mukasey ruled in 2008 that the government may, in some cases, go
beyond the categorical approach to look at evidence outside the record of conviction in order to
determine removability under the crime involving moral turpitude grounds of removal. See Silva-

Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. 687, 708 (U.S. Atty. Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 1. & N. Dec. 550 (2015). See
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that the categorical approach applies with only limited exceptions and
has clarified the rules for applying the methodology. 72 In Moncrieffe v.
Holder,7 3 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that the strict categorical approach governs the determination of whether a conviction falls within a
removal ground.74 The Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit to hold that a state statute criminalizing possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is not a "drug trafficking" aggravated felony under immigration law when the statute includes conduct-namely
social sharing of marijuana-that falls outside the federal definition of
drug trafficking. In response to the Court's ruling, the BIA and lower
courts reversed their courses straying from the categorical approach.76
The Supreme Court has further engendered determinacy by reconciling divergent views about when statutes can be deemed to contain
multiple crimes such that the adjudicator can look beyond the statute of
conviction and review the record of conviction, a methodology called the
modified categorical approach. In the past, lower courts and the BIA
were divided about when an adjudicator could look beyond the statute to
review the record of conviction when determining whether a conviction
was a categorical match with the relevant federal removal ground. 7 8 In
the majority of cases, recourse to the record of conviction was appropriate only if the statute defined multiple crimes, and the record could establish which set of elements were the elements of conviction. 79 In other
cases, however, courts sanctioned reliance on nonelement facts that ap-

peared in the record of conviction.80 The BIA and several circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, had permitted review of the record of convic-

generally MANNY VARGAS ET AL., MONCRiEFFE V. HOLDER: IMPLICATIONS FOR DRUG CHARGES
AND OTHER ISSUES INVOLVING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH, LEGAL ACTION CENTER 10-13 (May

2, 2013), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/moncrieffe-v-holderimplicationsfordrugchargesand other categorical approach issues_5-1-13_fin.pdf.
72.
Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684-85. The Court has thus overruled U.S. courts of appeals
precedent. See, e.g., Garcia v. Holder, 638 F.3d 511, 514 (6th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2019
(2013); Juice v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct.
1678.
133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
73.
74. Id. at 1684-85.
Id at 1682, 1684.
75.
76.
See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Cordero, 723 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), was abrogated by Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013)). On April 10, 2015, the U.S. Attorney
General Eric H. Holder vacated Silva-Trevino in light of Moncrieffe and other Supreme Court cases.
See Silva-Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. 687, 708 (U.S. Atty. Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 1. & N. Dec. 550
(2015); see generally, VARGAS ET AL., supra note 71, at 10-13.
77. In Descamps, the Court reconciled divergent approaches to the modified categorical
approach. 133 S. Ct. at 2282-83 & n.l (comparing Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 940, and
United States v. Armstead, 467 F.3d 943, 947-50 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated by Descamps, 133 S.
Ct. at 2292, with United States v. Beardsley, 691 F.3d 252, 268-74 (2d Cir. 2012), and United States
v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 27, 40 (1st Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
78.
Descamps, 133 S. Ct at 2282-83.
79. Sharpless, supra note 52, at 996-99.
80.
See id at 1030.
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tion in a broad range of circumstances. 8 ' The Court in Moncrieffe set
these courts straight, stating that the modified categorical approach is
appropriate only if a "state statute[] . . . contain[s] several different
crimes, each described separately." 82 Because the statute under which
Moncrieffe had been convicted was not divisible in this way, the Court
refrained from reviewing the record of conviction to see how much marijuana was alleged to have been in Moncrieffe's possession and whether
the distribution was for remuneration.8 3
Shortly after deciding Moncrieffe, the Court squarely addressed the
issue of when a criminal statute is divisible such that immigration judges
and other adjudicators can consult the record of conviction under the
modified categorical approach. Descamps v. United States84 -a federal
sentencing enhancement case-involved the issue of whether the federal
government could seek to enhance a sentence under the Armed Career
Criminal Act based on Descamps's prior state convictions, including a
California conviction for burglary that the government contended was
equivalent to federally defined generic burglary.85 The issue was whether
the California burglary conviction could serve as a predicate for enhancement because it did not require "unlawful entry," an element of
generic burglary as defined by the Court in Taylor v. United States.86 The
sentencing judge had found that the conviction could be the basis for
enhancement after reviewing the underlying record of conviction and
finding that Descamps had admitted to an unlawful entry as a factual
basis for the plea.87 The Supreme Court, however, held that the sentencing judge should not have reviewed the record of conviction because the
California burglary statute contained only a single set of elements." The
modified categorical approach, the Court found, is simply a "tool" to
"identify, from among several alternatives, the crime of conviction so
that the court can compare it to the generic offense." 89 The Court's deci-

81.

See, e.g., United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (en

banc) (permitting the modified categorical approach if the theory of the prosecution "necessarily
rested" on a facts that "satisfy the elements of the generic offense") (internal quotation marks omitted); Lanferman, 25 1. & N. Dec. at 722 ("[A]ll statutes of conviction [are divisible] . . . regardless of
their structure, so long as they contain an element or elements that could be satisfied either by removable or non-removable conduct." (second alteration in original) (quoting Lanferman v. B.I.A.,

576 F.3d
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

84, 90 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
133 S. Ct. at 1684.
See id. at 1685-86.
133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
Id. at 2281.
Id. at 2282; 495 U.S. 575, 577-78 (1990).
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2282.

88.
Id. at 2283 (holding that "the modified categorical approach" does not apply to statutes
"that contain a single, 'indivisible' set of elements sweeping more broadly than the corresponding
generic offense.").

89.

Id. at 2285.
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sions directly overruled contrary decisions from several circuit courts. 90
The BIA subsequently issued a precedent decision retreating from its
former position and aligning with Moncrieffe and Descamps.
The Court has also settled any lingering doubt about whether the
categorical approaches used in the federal recidivist sentencing and immigration contexts are one and the same. The BIA had previously found
that "the categorical approach itself need not be applied with the same
rigor in the immigration context as in the criminal arena." 92 Some court
of appeals decisions had adopted similar positions. 9 3 In Moncrieffe, however, the Court made clear that the methodologies are identical in both
immigration and criminal resentencing law.94 By citing indiscriminately
to both immigration and criminal precedent when elucidating the categorical approach, the Court demonstrated that the methodology is the
same in both contexts. 9 5 The BIA subsequently acknowledged this unity
of approaches. 96
The Court has also provided guidance on the limited circumstances
in which the categorical approach does not apply. In Nijhawan v. Holder,97 the Court considered the aggravated felony ground of removal encompassing "an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the
loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000."98 The question before the
Court was whether the "loss to the victim" language referred to "an element of the fraud or deceit" crime or the "particular circumstances in
which an offender committed a (more broadly defined) fraud or deceit
crime on a particular occasion."99 In finding the latter, the Court reinforced that the categorical approach applies to the threshold question of
whether an offense involved an element of fraud or deceit. The Court
listed the many aggravated felony provisions requiring the categorical
90.
See, e.g., United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc), abrogated by Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276; United States v. Armstead, 467 F.3d 943, 948 (6th
Cir. 2006), abrogated by Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276.
91.
Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. 349, 349, 352-54 (B.l.A. 2014), partially vacated by
Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. 478 (B.I.A. 2015) (overruling Lanferman, 25 1. & N. Dec. 721).
The U.S. Attorney General has stayed this decision pending her resolution of whether Descamps
requires juror unanimity for a fact to be treated as an element rather than a means of committing a

crime. Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. 686 (Att'y Gen. 2015). See infra note 102.
92.
Lanferman, 25 1. & N. Dec. at 728.
93.
See, e.g., Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1056-58 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2012); Ali v.
Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 741-42 (7th Cir. 2008); Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 55-56 (1st Cir.
2006).
94. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1685 (2013).
95.
Id. at 1684 (citing immigration cases: Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), Gonzales
v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), along
with criminal sentencing case Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010)). The Court has recognized that the term "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. § 16 must be interpreted uniformly in both

criminal and noncriminal contexts. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004).
96.
Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 353-54 ("Descamps itself makes no distinction
between the criminal and immigration contexts.").

97.
98.
99.

557 U.S. 29 (2009).
Id. at 32 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
Id.

§

I 101(a)(43)(M)(i)).
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'

approach, reaffirming its commitment to it. 1 Later, in Moncrieffe, the
Court further emphasized the limited role for the circumstance-specific
approach by excoriating "post hoc investigation[s] into the facts
of predi0
cate offenses" and "minitrials conducted long after the fact."'
While the Court has not definitively resolved every open question
relating to the categorical approach, it has settled many of the debates
among the BIA and lower courts.' 02 The rules for determining whether a
criminal conviction falls within a ground of removal are now sufficiently
clear to generate predictable results in most cases.

100.
Id. at 37. For a chart mapping the aggravated felony provisions and whether Nijhawan
designated them as requiring the categorical or circumstance-specific approach, see DAN
KESSELBRENNER ET AL., NAT'L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, THE IMPACT OF NIJHAWAN V. HOLDER ON
APPLICATION OF THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO AGGRAVATED FELONY DETERMINATIONS app. at

8-15

(2009),

http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/cd

available

at

paNijhawan%20and%20the%20Cate

gorical%20Approach%20-%20NIPNLG%20and%201DP%20-%202009.pdf.
101.
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2013).
102.
Several areas of confusion persist. The Court has stated that, when applying the minimum
conduct test, noncitizens must demonstrate a "realistic probability" that a state would actually prosecute behavior that renders a state statute broader than the relevant federal standard. Moncrieffe, 133

S. Ct. at 1684-85 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). See also Ferreira, 26 1. & N. Dec. 415 (B.I.A. 2014) (a noncitizen must provide evidence of actual prosecutions
to satisfy the "realistic probability" test). The standard for what counts as a "realistic probability" is
unclear. See ANDREW WACHTENHEIM ET AL., NAT'L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, THE REALISTIC
PROBABILITY STANDARD: FIGHTING GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO USE IT TO UNDERMINE THE
CATEGORICAL APPROACH (2014). A second dispute involves the question of who wins when there is
ambiguity about whether a conviction falls within a removal ground. The government has the burden
of establishing deportability for a crime, whereas the noncitizen has the burden of proof to establish
eligibility for relief from removal. See Nifhawan, 557 U.S. at 42. Some forms of relief are unavailable to noncitizens who have been convicted of a certain type of crime, like an aggravated felony. See
id at 41-42. The BIA and some federal courts have held that even if the government could not meet
its burden of establishing deportability for a particular crime, the crime could render the noncitizen

ineligible for relief. See, e.g., Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2012), abrogated by
Almanza-Arenas v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2014), rehearingen banc granted, 785 F.3d 366
(2015); Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d Ill, 120 (4th Cir. 2011); Garcia v. Holder, 584 F.3d 1288, 1290
(10th Cir. 2009); Almanza-Arenas, 24 1. & N. Dec. 771, 775-76 (B.I.A. 2009). The Supreme Court's
discussion in Moncrieffe characterizing the categorical analysis of crimes as a legal, rather than a
factual, inquiry may settle this dispute by clarifying that the burden of proof for factual and evidentiary matters does not apply. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684-86. Lastly, a circuit split exists regarding what qualifies as an element of a crime, as opposed to the means by which a crime was committed. Ifjurors need not agree about certain alleged facts, then the facts are means, not elements. Some
circuits, however, have held that a statute's use of a list or "or" language definitively establishes
multiple sets of elements such that the modified categorical approach applies, even if jurors need not
agree on how the crime was committed. Compare United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485 (4th Cir.

2015); Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014), rehearing en banc denied, 782 F.3d 466
(9th Cir. 2015), United States v. Estrella, 758 F.3d 1239, 1246 (1 ith Cir. 2014) (following juror
agreement test), with United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Ozier,

796 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2015) (declining to follow juror agreement test). The U.S. Attorney General
has vacated and certified to herself the BIA's decision in Chairez-Castrejon,a decision adopting the
juror agreement test for any circuit that had not held otherwise. Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec.

349, 349, 352-54 (B.I.A. 2014), partially vacated by Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. 478 (B.I.A.
2015), stayedandcertifiedbyChairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. 686 (Att'y Gen. 2015).
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THE CASE FOR SIMPLER RULES

I have argued that the relative simplicity or complexity of a legal
inquiry should not define the scope of defense counsel's Padilla duty,
that defense attorneys must counsel their clients about predictable immigration consequences, and that the admittedly complex area of law governing immigration consequences of crimes is now producing determinate results. Although simplicity cannot be the standard for measuring
compliance with Padilla, simplifying the law would have positive, transformative effects.
Society stands to gain when the government minimizes the amount
of human capital needed to run an effective legal system.' 0 3 Congress
rightly strives to make rules understandable by nonexperts, as it did in
the Plain Writing Act of 2 0 10 .H At the same time, some degree of complexity is inevitable because precision sometimes requires it.' 05 Moreover, "institutions" tend to "slowly creep toward complexity" because,
over time, the aggregation of small additions to a legal regime becomes
"unwieldy."' 06 The critical task is thus to determine the optimal degree of
complexity.1 07 In the context of immigration law and crimes, simpler
rules would have numerous salutary effects, including enabling the implementation of Padilla;enhancing the legitimacy of immigration law by
ensuring understandability, notice, and fairness; and increasing administrative and judicial efficiency. Moreover, as illustrated below, the complexity of the current scheme could be eliminated without sacrificing
predictable results.

&

103. Daniel Katz and M. J. Bommarito define complexity as the amount of "human capital
expended by a society when an end user is required to review and assimilate a body of legal rules."
Daniel Martin Katz & M. J. Bommarito II, Measuringthe Complexity of the Law: The UnitedStates
Code, 22 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 337, 340 (2014).
104. Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-274, § 2, 124 Stat. 2861, 2861 (2010) ("The
purpose of this Act is to improve the effectiveness and accountability of Federal agencies to the
public by promoting clear Government communication that the public can understand and use."); see
also 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2015); Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The
Implications of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403, 413-14
(1997) (arguing that Congress has an obligation to draft the rule in a way that persons of reasonable
intelligence can understand); Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, When Laws Become Too Complex, GOV.UK (Apr. 16, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/govemment/publications/when-laws-becometoo-complex/when-laws-become-too-complex.
See Kades, supra note 104, at 412 ("[T]he usual cure for indeterminacy ... may itself
105.
introduce further complexity."); Miller, supra note 39, at 7 (noting that the "use of elaborative complexity to achieve fairness in tax law has been debated"). See generally Byron Holz, Chaos Worth
Having: Irreducible Complexity and PragmaticJurisprudence, 8 MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH. 303, 333
(2007); Schuck, supra note 37; R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanationof Why
the Law Can't Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715, 717 (2000).
106. Katz & Bommarito, supra note 103, at 339.
107.
See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON.
ORG. 150, 150-51 (1995); Gordon Tullock, On the Desirable Degree of Detail in the Law, 2 EUR.
J.L. & ECON. 199, 202 (1995).
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A. Implementation ofPadilla
The enactment of simple rules would greatly facilitate implementation of Padilla.0 8 Simple rules would increase both the quantity and
quality of defense lawyer counseling about immigration consequences.
Counseling based on simple rules is undeniably easier for lawyers to
communicate and easier for clients to understand.
The post-Padilla practices of public defender offices illustrate this
point. Public defender offices have taken a variety of approaches to implementing the Padilla decision, some more successfully than others.' 09
In a limited number of venues, the office of the public defender has immigration specialists on staff and has routinized the screening of cases in
which the defendant is a noncitizen.110 In others, individual lawyers are
expected to learn the relevant immigration law themselves, sometimes
assisted by office trainings or outside consultants."'
A common strategy for dealing with difficult problems is to use a
heuristic device as a shortcut. In the context of immigration consequences of crimes, such tools are typically lists of common crimes and their
usual immigration consequences.11 2 As with other heuristic devices, lists
work well in some scenarios but also lead to errors.11 3 Moreover, lists of
crimes that trigger immigration consequences do nothing to help a defense attorney identify what category of consequences are relevant to a
particular client's case.1 4 For example, a list will never tell a defense
108.
For a discussion of the challenges in implementing Padilla, see Maureen A. Sweeney,
Where Do We Go from Padilla v. Kentucky? Thoughts on Implementation and FutureDirections, 45
NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 357-65 (2011).
109.
For a blueprint of how offices could choose to implement Padilla, see PETER L.
MARKOWITZ, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT & N.Y. STATE DEFENDERS ASS'N, PROTOCOL FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLic DEFENDER IMMIGRATION SERVICE PLAN 22-23 (2009), available at
http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Protocol.pdf.
See id.
110.

Ill.

See id.

112.
For examples of charts on immigration consequences of criminal convictions, see Legal
Resources,
NAT'L
IMMIGRATION
PROJECT,
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
113.
The disclaimers on charts by reputable immigration attorneys reflect their limitations. See,
e.g., Dan Kesselbrenner & Sandy Lin, Selected Immigration Consequences of Certain Federal
Offenses,
NAT'L
IMMIGRATION
PROJECT
1
(2010),
Maureen
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/fedchart_2010%20update.pdf;
Sweeney, Immigration Consequences of Maryland Offenses, U. MD. FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. L.
1-2, http://www.law.umaryland.edulfaculty/Msweeney/ImmigrationConsequencesChart.pdf
(last
updated Aug. 3, 2015).
114.
See Andres Benach, Sejal Zota & Maria Navarro, How Much to Advise: What are the
Requirements of Padilla v. Kentucky, 2013 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. I (discussing the Padilla duty as
including investigating "the immigration status and criminal history of the defendant" and "the
specific immigration consequences that the proposed plea would have on the particular individual"
as well as "encompass[ing] both avoiding [the defendant] becoming removable and preserving
eligibility to apply for relief from removal"). Under reputable post-Padillaprotocols, defense attorneys are instructed to determine their client's (1) immigration status, if any, and when it was ob-

tained; (2) prior criminal history; and (3) eligibility for immigration relief. Id. Only with this information can attorneys convey an accurate immigration consequences evaluation and effectively plea
bargain. See, e.g., MANUEL D. VARGAS, IMMIGRANT DEE. PROJECT, DUTY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE
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attorney whether a particular client should be concerned about pleading
guilty to an aggravated felony, a crime involving moral turpitude, or
both.
The degree to which offices have taken Padilla on board varies
widely. Some offices have model programs with immigration specialists
on staff, while others have only begun to grapple with Padillaimplementation.115 The crushing caseload of some public defender offices makes
Padilla implementation a particular challenge." 6 Even in offices with
immigration specialists, however, attorneys struggle to ensure that each
and every noncitizen defendant receives advice and that the advice is
accurate and complete.'1 7 Regardless of an attorney's level of success in
implementing Padilla, he or she would stand to gain from simpler deportation rules.
B. Transparency,Legitimacy, andNotice
The complicated deportation rules of today render inaccessible the
reasoning behind our government's choices about whom to deport. When
the rules for how the system seeks to treat like cases alike are hard to
explain, the public's confidence in the deportation system declines." 8
Decisions appear arbitrary rather than rule bound. Simple rules are more
readily recognized as transparent than complex rules and therefore regarded as more legitimate. 119
Simple rules about what convictions trigger removal or ineligibility
for immigration status would greatly enhance the general public's understanding of the law and their confidence in the immigration system. Such
rules would also more effectively put noncitizens on notice of what
counts as a basis for being deported or denied immigration status. ImmiCOUNSEL REPRESENTING AN IMMIGRANT DEFENDANT AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY (2010), availahttp://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wpat
ble

content/uploads/2012/01/PadillaPractice Advisory_O1 1712FINAL.pdf.
115.
116.

MARKOWITZ, supra note 109.
See Malia Brink, A Gauntlet Thrown: The Transformative Potential of Padilla v. Ken-

tucky, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 39, 53-61 (2011) (discussing effect of high public defender caseloads
on implementation of Padilla); Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical:Defense Counsel and

CollateralConsequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 678-81 (2011) (discussing the impact of
high caseloads and lack of funding on the ability of public defender offices to deliver Padilla advice); L. Jay Jackson, Miami-Dade's OverburdenedPD's Office May Decline New Clients, Florida
Court Says, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 1, 2013, 8:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/miamidadesoverburdenedpds office maydecline new-clients floridacourt s; Erik Eckholm, Citing
Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/us/09defender.html?pagewanted=all.
117.
For a discussion of the need to make information about immigration consequences accessible to the defense bar, see Chin, supra note 116, at 684-88.

118.

See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of-JurisdictionalClarity, 97 VA. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (2011).

119.
Id. at 8 (arguing that in the context of jurisdictional rules "[t]he transparent judicial enforcement of a clear statutory rule of jurisdiction negates the democratically problematic perception
of unauthorized judicial lawmaking."); Miller, supra note 39, at 21 (arguing that "the elaborative
complexity of tax law is justified by its certain and uniform fairness when applied by one who has
mastered it" but that "mastery of the rules is rendered extremely difficult" making it only possible
for the "elite" to understand, a result that "would strike many as unfair").
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gration adjudicators would also be properly incentivized to apply the
law. As discussed above, immigration adjudicators, the BIA, and federal
appellate courts had broken with the categorical approach and rendered a
significant number of result-driven decisions prior to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Moncrieffe and Descamps.120 The complexity of the
categorical approach may have made it easier for adjudicators to justify
decisions designed to rule against the convicted noncitizen, as complexity can be mistaken for ambiguity. A simple replacement rule for the categorical approach would be more likely to constrain adjudicators and
lead to more rule-bound decisions.121

C. Efficiency
Plain deportation rules would be easier to administer, resulting in
cost savings for the administrative and court systems as well as the
noncitizens embroiled in it. Litigation about the immigration consequences of crimes consumes a significant portion of administrative and
federal court dockets.122 As mentioned above, the Ninth Circuit stated in
2011 that cases involving the categorical approach have taken up more of
the court's time than any other type of case.123
If the rules for determining deportation for a crime were more easily
understood and applied, attorneys would save time when advising their
clients and might pass these cost savings onto their clients. Judges would
adjudicate cases more accurately and quickly, and judges' caseloads
would be smaller because fewer people would be erroneously placed into
removal proceedings.1 24 Efficiencies would extend to savings on detention costs, as many immigration court cases involving the analysis of
crimes take place while the noncitizen is detained.

120.
See supra notes 90-91.
121.
Legal realists argue that judges do not follow rules when deciding cases. In this view, any
determinacy that exists in the law stems not from the clarity of a rule but from the ability to predict
what judges will do. Even if legal realism holds true as a general matter, it is difficult to see how
immigration judges could fail to follow a sentence-trigger deportation rule, at least without enormous effort.
122.
Between 2008 and 2012, the percent of deportation orders sought in immigration court
based on alleged criminal activity ranged from 17.5 percent to 14.3 percent. Deportation Orders
Sought in Immigration Court Based on Alleged Criminal Activity by Type, TRAC IMMIGRATION
(2012), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/281/include/depordertype.html.

123.

United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011 ) (en banc).

124.
An immigration judge, faced with making a determination about whether a hit and run
crime constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, remarked, "I have gone back and forth on this
issue," and continued "[a]re these crimes of moral turpitude? This is tough." Eli Saslow, In a
Crowded Immigration Court, Seven Minutes to Decide a Family's Future, WASH. POST (Feb. 2,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-a-crowded-immigration-court-seven-minutes-to-

decide-a-familys-future/2014/02/02/518c3e3e-8798-lIe3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.htmi

(internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Judge Lawrence Burman of the Arlington Immigration Court).
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IV. WHY SIMPLE RULES ARE HARD TO GET

Despite the benefits of simple criminal deportation rules, numerous
barriers prevent their adoption, including a concern that any new legislation would be even more punitive than the current rules. Noncitizens
with criminal convictions might be collectively better off under the current rules. As I argue below, the only way to significantly simplify the
rules would be to tag deportation to sentence length. Because of widespread concerns about the fairness of sentencing practices, many rightly
view the use of time served in prison a problematic trigger for removal.
History teaches that noncitizens with criminal convictions lose
when Congress amends immigration law. Over the last three decades,
legislative reforms at the intersection of crimes and deportation have
increasingly expanded the reach of deportation for crimes and rolled
back defenses from deportation for those found removable.1 25 Congress
added the term "aggravated felony" to immigration law in 1988 and,
since then, has expanded it several times.126 As the Supreme Court noted
in Padilla, deportation is now "practically inevitable" for a wide range of
criminal offenses. 12 7
Given the history of progressively restrictive legislative amendments, pro-immigrant reformers are legitimately concerned that any simplification of the rules for deportation for a crime would be a net loss for
immigrants with a criminal conviction. If deportation were tied to sentence length, the length of sentence that would be politically palatable as
a trigger would likely be unacceptably short. As a group, immigrants
with criminal convictions might be better off with the status quo.
One need look no further than the framing of the current debate on
immigration reform to understand the fears of pro-immigrant reformers.
The approach of the Obama Administration and mainstream immigration
reformers is to seek political gains for some immigrants by contrasting
them with immigrants who have been convicted of a crime. "Criminal
aliens" serve as foils for "good" immigrants, who are packaged as model
minorities.128 In announcing administrative immigration reform, for ex-

125.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 361-64 (2010) ("These changes to our immigration
law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction.").
126. When the term "aggravated felony" was added to the INA in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70 (1988), it included murder, drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices. In 1990, Congress expanded the
term in the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990). In
1996, Congress added additional crimes to the definition in the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 321(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
127. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363-64. During oral argument in the 2001 case INS v. St. Cyr, one of
the justices expressed concern that stealing a pair of tennis shoes could be an aggravated felony.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-16, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (No. 00-767), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argumenttranscripts/00-767.pdf.
128.
See Rebecca Sharpless, "Immigrants Are Not Criminals": Respectability, Immigration
Reform, and Hyperincarceration,53 HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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ample, President Obama has framed the central tenet of his immigration
policy as deporting "[flelons, not families," thereby writing off convicted
noncitizens with U.S. citizen children or other family members in the
United States.129 Creating the political space for simple, yet not harsh,
deportation rules appears linked to the success of the broader movement
to dial back overly punitive laws and enforcement practices. 3 0
A second, formidable barrier to the adoption of a simple, sentencetrigger deportation rule is a concern about disparities in sentencing practices across jurisdictions and along racial, ethnic, and gender lines. The
federal government keeps comprehensive statistics on federal sentencing
broken down by type of crime and district. The data show that average
sentences vary significantly by federal court district. For example, the
average prison sentence in 2012 in Colorado federal court was forty-six
months while it was twenty-nine months in the Southern District of California. 131 The average sentence for drug trafficking in Colorado federal
court was seventy months, compared to forty-four months in the Southern District of California.' 32 Statistics on state court sentencing practices
also show that average time served varies significantly by jurisdiction. 3 3
Even more troubling is research showing that disparate sentencing
occurs on invidious grounds.' 34 The Sentencing and Corrections Working
Group of the Department of Justice has been charged with reviewing
"unwarranted racial and ethnic disparities in sentencing."'3 ' A 2004

129.
Barack Obama, President, United States, Remarks by the President in Address to the
Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration.
130.
See Sharpless, supra note 128.
131.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'Ns, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
app. B (2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/annual-reportssourcebooks/2012/sourcebook-2012 (last visited Sept. 7, 2015).
132.
Id The wide disparity of sentences by courts for the same or similar conduct was the
impetus behind creating the sentencing guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL § IAl.3 (2004) ("Congress sought uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct by similar offenders."). Notwithstanding the guidelines, sentencing disparities persist. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
133.
Using data from the National Corrections Reporting Program, the Pew Charitable Trusts
has calculated the average time served of released offenders in every state. THE PEW CTR. ON THE
STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, Low RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 11 (2012). The
statistics show that, for example, 2009 released offenders in Michigan who had committed violent
crimes had served an average of 7.6 years, whereas similarly situated released offenders in Colorado
had spent an average of 4.6 years imprisoned. Id. at 16.
134.
See sources cited supranote 8.
135.
Lanny A. Breuer, The Attorney General's Sentencing and Corrections Working Group: A
Progress Report, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 110, 110-11 (2010) (finding that the movement towards "a
sentencing system that affords greater discretion to prosecutors and judges" requires an "increase ...
[in the] monitoring of sentencing practice and outcomes to ensure that unwarranted disparities are
minimized"); see also Eric Holder, Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Holder's Remarks for the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice and Congressional
Black Caucus Symposium "Rethinking Federal Sentencing Policy 25th Anniversary of the Sentencing Reform Act" (June 24, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attomey-generalholder-s-remarks-charles-hamilton-houston-institute-race-and-justice.
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study funded by the U.S. Department of Justice reviewed the data, methodology, and conclusions of eighty-five studies on sentencing practices
and concluded that, after controlling for other factors, "Latinos and African-Americans were sentenced more harshly than whites on average."1 36
Researchers have summarized studies of state and federal sentencing
practices as "show[ing] legally prescribed factors are the strongest predictors of sentencing outcomes, but defendant social statuses often influence the likelihood and type of incarceration, sentence length, and guideline departures."1 3 7 Given the questionable nature of sentencing practices,
any sentence-based deportation regime would have to take unwarranted
sentencing disparities into account.
V. A

PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

Assuming that the political will could be generated for simple and
fair deportation rules, I argue for reforms that would create an over-fiveyear actual sentence trigger for deportation and restore judicial discretion
to stop deportations. The proposal sketched below reflects the reality that
there are three basic choices for conditioning deportation on conviction
for a crime. Deportation could be made a function of type of crime,
length of sentence, or some combination of the two. As described above,
the current scheme is largely based on the type of crime but sometimes
also requires a sentence of a particular type and length.
The only way to significantly simplify the rules would be to take the
type of crime out of the deportation equation. As discussed above, federalism complicates hinging removal on types of crime.' 38 The lack of a
single criminal code under which all defendants are prosecuted requires a
federal standard against which state convictions are judged using the
complex categorical approach described above. The only viable alternative is for Congress to tag deportation to sentence length, as a number of
countries in the United States' peer group already do. 139
A sentence-based deportation regime would represent a paradigm
shift in immigration law with immense efficiencies and benefits. The
practical barriers to the full implementation of Padillawould cease to
exist and noncitizen defendants would be much more likely to enjoy the
full extent of their Sixth Amendment right. No longer would defense
counsel, immigration attorneys, pro se noncitizens, federal appellate
136.

Mitchell & MacKenzie, supra note 8, at 1, 12.

137.

Jeffrey Ulmer, Michael T. Light & John Kramer, The "Liberation" of FederalJudges'

Discretion in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision:Is There IncreasedDisparityand Divergence

Between Courts?, 28 JUST. Q. 799, 801 (2011).
138.
See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
139.
Australia and the United Kingdom, for example, have deportation rules that operate largely by reference to length of sentence. Migration Act of 1958, section 201 (Australia); UK Borders
Act 2007, c. 30, § 32 (U.K). Although these countries have sentence triggers that are less than five
years, they also impose significantly shorter sentences for crimes than the United States. See infra
notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
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judges, immigration judges, and other agency adjudicators struggle with
the determination of whether a crime would lead to deportation. A plain
deportation scheme would also be more transparent and therefore more
legitimate. The general public would understand the deportation rule and
noncitizens would more likely be on notice of what crimes result in removal.
At the same time, hinging deportation on sentence length is no silver bullet. As discussed above, chronic sentencing disparities, including
ones based on invidious grounds like race, render sentence length a blunt
instrument for treating like cases alike. A sentence-based deportation
regime could minimize the impact of sentencing disparities in two ways.
First, deportation could be made a consequence of only relatively long
criminal sentences, specifically an actually served sentence of over five
years. Second, Congress could legislate a return to the prior state of affairs in which immigrants had robust opportunities to apply for relief
from removal in immigration court. I address each of these proposals in
turn.
A. A Long Sentence DeportationTrigger
Deportation of a noncitizen with lawful status should occur only if
the immigrant has been convicted of a crime for which he or she has actually served more than five years in prison. A five-year sentence standard has precedent in immigration law. It appeared in pre-1996 law as the
cutoff for eligibility for a discretionary waiver of deportation under former INA section 212(c). 14 0 Under that provision, lawful permanent residents who had been domiciled for seven years and who had not served
five years incarceration for an aggravated felony could apply to an immigration judge to retain their lawful permanent residency, despite having been convicted of a crime.141 Although a sentence over five years has
never been required to trigger removal proceedings, I argue that it should
for several reasons.
Requiring a sentence of more than five years would offset the effect
of sentencing disparities. While reasonable minds can disagree about
what length of sentence constitutes the tipping point for deportation,
most would agree that a sentence of more than five years (even if it reflects some amount of invidious discrimination) is long enough to warrant at least the commencement of removal proceedings. Some of those
sentenced fairly to five years or under might also be people who most
would say should be subject to removal. But just as the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof in criminal cases is designed to acquit
some number of guilty people in order to ensure that few innocent people
are convicted, an over-five-year sentence deportation trigger would help
140.
141.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1992) (repealed 1996).
Id
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to ensure that people who were sentenced unfairly are not deported, even
if it means that some people who should have been subject to removal
proceedings are permitted to remain. Any sentence-based deportation
scheme must err on the side of permitting people to stay who could have
been given longer sentences in high sentencing jurisdictions as a means
of ensuring that people who were sentenced unfairly are not erroneously
subjected to removal proceedings.
Further support for a rule based on an over-five-year sentence derives from studies showing that length of time served correlates with
recidivism. 142 A relatively small group of offenders are convicted of the
majority of crimes. 143 If deportation for a crime is justified on public
safety grounds, it is most justified when targeted at individuals who have
proven to be chronic and serious lawbreakers. 1" Individuals who have
not served more than five years for a crime generally fall outside of this
category.1 4 5
Efficiency and cost considerations also weigh in favor of a long sentence trigger for deportation. If fewer people are ensnared in deportation
proceedings, judges could hold fewer hearings and the number of people
in immigration detention would decrease. At a price tag of $159 per detainee per day, the direct financial costs of immigration detention are
high.1 46 Moreover, our nation suffers multiple adverse ripple effects
142.
LIN SONG & ROXANNE LIEB, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, RECIDIVISM: THE
EFFECT OF INCARCERATION AND LENGTH OF TIME SERVED 5 (1993) ("[W]hile on parole, offenders
with the longest time served generally had higher recidivism rates than offenders with the shortest
time served." (quoting Don M. Gottfredson, Michael R. Gottfredson & James Garofalo, Time Served
in Prison and Parole Outcomes Among Parolee Risk Categories, 5 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 8 (1977)); Long
sentences may cause recidivism. Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV.

1049, 1093 (2008) ("As of roughly a decade ago, prison increased crime by at least 7 percent.

...

[but] the true impact today is likely higher."); Paul Gendreau, Claire Goggin & Francis T. Cullen,
The Effects of Prison Sentences on Recidivism, PUB.
SAFETY CAN.
15 (1999),
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ffcts-prsn-sntncs-rcdvsm/ffcts-prsn-sntncs-rcdvsmeng.pdf ("Spending more vs. less time in prison or being incarcerated vs. remaining in the community was associated with slight increases in recidivism for 3 of 4 outcomes."); M. Keith Chen & Jesse
M. Shapiro, Do HarsherPrison Conditions Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-basedApproach, 9
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 22-23 (2007) (explaining that the harshness of prison conditions increases
recidivism).
See PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
143.
OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 5 tbl.4 (2002), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf; Pritikin, supra note 142, at 1087 ("It is well known that a
small percentage of offenders commit a disproportionately high percentage of crimes." (citing PETER
W. GREENWOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION 44-46 (1982)), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R2815.pdf; Christy A. Visher, Incapacitation and Crime Control: Does A "Lock 'Em Up" Strategy Reduce Crime?, 4 JUST. Q. 513, 523

(1987).
144.
I and others have discussed the downsides of linking immigration enforcement to crime
control. See Allegra M. McLeod, The US. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible

Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012); Sharpless, supra note 128.
145.
Indeed, some might argue that my proposal is not generous enough to convicted noncitizens, as some people serve more than five years for offenses such as nonviolent drug crimes. See
Hall, supra note 7, at 1105 (illustrating how life sentences for nonviolent crimes are possible).
146.
NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY
COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 2 n.5 (2013) (report-
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when noncitizens with family and other ties to the United States are de147
tained and removed.

A further justification for linking deportation only to relatively long
sentences is the reality that the United States punishes people for crimes
far more harshly than others in its peer group. Per capita, the United
States criminally incarcerates more people for longer periods of time
than any other country in the world.148 We hold 2,228,400 people in our
criminal jails and prisons. 149 Our rate of imprisonment compares to that
of Russia.15 0 We lock up over five times more people per capita than the
United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Germany.15 1 The United States
punishes drug offenders much more severely than similarly situated
countries.152 Given how out of step the United States is with comparable
countries, a relatively long sentence trigger for deportation would help to
offset the effect of the United States' harsh sentencing practices.
B. Restoration oflmmigration Judge Discretion
In addition to a lengthy sentence trigger, the restoration of discretion to immigration judges to halt deportations in appropriate cases
ing that ICE claims the daily cost per detention bed is $119 but that this figure rises to $159 when
ICE's operational expenses are included).
147.
See KALINA BRABECK ET AL., THE PSYCHOSOCIAL IMPACT OF DETENTION AND
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would also compensate for the impossibility of crafting a simple and
truly evenhanded system of deportation based only on the outcome of the
criminal system. As discussed above, Congress has repealed much of the
authority of immigration judges to use their discretion to stop deportations. A noncitizen's deportation fate is therefore largely sealed in the
criminal justice system. If discretion were restored to immigration judges, they could act as fail-safes against unfair outcomes resulting from
harsh sentencing practices, among other things. Moreover, the significant
time saved by immigration judges not having to adjudicate complex challenges to removability could be used to adjudicate discretionary relief
cases on the merits.
Restoring discretion to stop deportation based on a criminal record
would also bring the United States back into compliance with its international law obligations.1 54 In 2010, the Inter-American Commission held
in Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al.' 55 that the 1996 amendments to
U.S. immigration law repealing discretionary relief for lawful permanent
residents convicted of an aggravated felony violated the human rights to
family life and due process. 156 The Commission found that the petitioners
"had no opportunity to present a humanitarian defense to deportation or
to have their rights to family duly considered before deportation. Nor
were the best interests of their . . . U.S. citizen children taken into account by any decision maker." 157 According to the Commission, "a balancing test" was required to "reach a fair decision between the competing individual human rights and the needs asserted by the State."'15 Other
international bodies, including the European Court of Human Rights,
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have also ruled that human rights law places limitations on a nation's
sovereign right to deport.159
The United States' punitive approach to criminal and immigration
law enforcement puts it out of step with its peer group and international
standards. Reform efforts to simplify the law and fully realize immigrants' Sixth Amendment rights must go hand in hand with the scaling
back of harsh immigration consequences for crimes and the restoration of
immigration judge discretion.
CONCLUSION

The legal regime governing deportation for a crime is simultaneously complex and coherent. I have argued that we should interpret Padilla
as enunciating a rule about predictability, not simplicity. Defense counsel
discharge their Padilla duty only when they advise their clients of predictable immigration consequences, even if they must engage in legal
research.' 60 At the same time, all stakeholders-defendants, defense attorneys, criminal and immigration judges, and prosecutors-stand to gain
from the simplification of the rules governing the intersection of criminal
and immigration law. The current rules largely hinge on a type-of-crime
analysis that can be complex because state convictions must be compared
to a federal standard. While this categorical approach has become much
better defined in recent years, a sentence trigger would be exponentially
easier to understand and implement.
A fair sentence-based regime would be difficult to achieve, however. Congress has passed increasingly harsh legislation against noncitizens
convicted of a crime over the last three decades, and any wholesale revamping based on sentence length could leave more, rather than fewer,
people subject to removal. The wide disparities in sentencing practices,
including on invidious grounds, also call into question the efficacy of
length of sentence as a basis for removal. Notwithstanding these formidable reservations, I have argued that, on balance, both noncitizens and
our justice system are better served by a sentence-based removal regime
that conditions removal of lawfully present noncitizens on having actually been incarcerated for more than five years for a crime and restores
discretion to immigration judges to halt removal in appropriate cases. An
over-five-years sentence basis for deportation is sufficiently lengthy to
ameliorate the effects of unfair sentencing. The ability of judges to grant
159.
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CCPR/C/81/D/101 1/2001 (Aug. 26, 2004) (finding a violation of the right to family life if immigrant
was deported because of hardship to his family who had lived in Australia for many years); Am-
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would violate the right to family life if it deported a man with a serious drug offense because his

family would face "serious difficulties"); Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, Eur. Ct. H.R.,

147 (2001) (ruling

that an immigrant convicted of a violent crime could not be deported because the
sovereign right to deport for a criminal record must be put in "fair balance" with right to family life).
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relief from deportation on a case-by-case basis would further help to
ensure just results. Moreover, such a scheme would also restore United
States' compliance with international law.
As our nation contemplates immigration reform, it must carefully
consider how the law should regard noncitizens with criminal records.
Amendments to immigration law have historically constituted a one-way
street of progressively harsh penalties for criminal activity. The current
debate about immigration continues to perpetrate the over-simplified
assumption that any noncitizen with a nontrivial criminal record has no
place in our society. While the need for clear and simple immigration
laws governing deportation for a crime is beyond controversy, reform
efforts in the name of simplicity must simultaneously seek to reverse our
nation's draconian historical approach.

